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Research does not always proceed according to a predetermined plan. 
In some cases, the opposite is true: only when a work is completed can we 
observe its fundamental inspiration, which was implicit from the start. The 
essays presented in this book demonstrate the latter: the coherence of the col-
lected pieces—the common elements that connect them—was visible only 
post factum. Only in collecting some of the articles I wrote between 1998 and 
2012 was I able to see clearly the common elements in theoretical approach 
and conclusions which, when viewed as a whole, reveal a rather uniform 
result.
The motivations that drive the scholar to choose a certain field of re-
search, a specific subject within that field, and the way that subject will be 
approached are difficult to pin down, perhaps even mysterious. But within 
that choice itself lies a large measure of the results: in the sciences, or at least 
in the human sciences, the answers one finds are guided largely by the ques-
tions one asks.
My field of research is the intellectual history of Italian Judaism. Though 
this choice obviously stems from my own experiences and cultural training, 
my choice of eras is the result of an attraction that is difficult to explain, 
whose motivations are probably found in that murky area between emotion 
and intellect, or in the inputs from emotion to the intellect, guiding its choices. 
The period covered in this book is called “Modern” in the French and 
Italian historiographical traditions and “Early Modern” in Anglophone coun-
tries. It ranges from the the Renaissance at its height in the first decades of the 
sixteenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century, on the threshold 
of the Enlightenment. According to the classical scansion of Jewish history, 
this period is called the “Age of the Ghetto”—long considered by historians, 
from the nineteenth century until the revision of a few decades ago, as an era 
when the repressive policies of the Catholic Church caused Italian Jewish 
communities to fold in on themselves, an era of intellectual obscurantism 
and demographic decline. 
However, scholars like Baruch Sermoneta and Robert Bonfil1 (and many 
others in their wake) have shown that exchange with non-Jewish society be-
came more intense in the Age of the Ghetto, and that some of the intellectual 
9
Introduction
forms that developed in the Jewish world were completely analogous to 
those in the Christian world. The era of emancipation, situated in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, was actually preceded by a series of appar-
ently contradictory processes. Though, on the one hand, philosophical and 
scientific rationalism spread among Catholic and Jewish intellectuals, this 
period also saw the diffusion of an opposite attitude: a religious devotion 
that in the Catholic world inspired the values of the Counter-Reformation 
and that in the Jewish world took the form of Kabbalah. The history of these 
two hundred years is, at its base, the history of tension and dialectic between 
these two positions. 
It was an age marked by contrasts, paradoxes, and extremely significant 
personal crises. Authors who denounced the inadequacy of medieval sci-
ence, which was founded on fossilized and superseded knowledge, became 
devoted penitents and adherents to religious tradition; the most intransigent 
kabbalists recognized the obscurity of their doctrine in the form in which it 
had been handed down, and tried to adapt it to the rationalism of contempo-
rary science. Hebrew prose and poetry were transformed, while at the same 
time literary translations into Italian multiplied, and the use of Italian (the 
“national” and “modern” language) became increasingly frequent under the 
pen of many Jewish authors. 
In sum, it was a time when many of the elements of the era of emancipa-
tion were being prepared, yet the richness of Jewish culture, its intellectual 
forms and its linguistic expression, was maintained; in other words, a time 
before the rapid abandonment of culture that resulted from the integration 
of a small minority into a much more populous society, leading to so-called 
“assimilation.” 
However, the common traits of this period became clear to me only in 
collecting and combining these essays—and perhaps even in the drafting of 
these present lines, which must serve as a general and unifying introduction.
A similar observation can be made regarding the topics and authors that 
I chose to study. It is not always easy for researchers to remember their 
first encounters with an author or a work, and the considerations (in that 
early stage, we usually rely on simple intuition) that led to the dedication of 
months or years of study. 
Post factum, I can say that all of the authors discussed in this book si-
multaneously demonstrate a strong anchoring in traditional Jewish culture 
(biblical-rabbinic) and a clear tendency toward engagement with non-Jewish 
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culture, whether philosophical, scientific, literary (Italian and, less com-
monly, Latin), or theological (Christian). The first three areas have, a priori, a 
neutral valence insofar as they do not touch on the foundations of the Jewish 
religion and can represent a zone of exchange and encounter with non-Jews: 
Italian rabbi-philosophers cited Muslim authors like Averroes and Christian 
authors like Thomas Aquinas, doctors corresponded with their Catholic col-
leagues, and poets were explicitly inspired by prestigious Italian authors, 
above all Dante. For a large portion of the era we are studying here, during 
which fundamentalism prevailed, these “neutral” areas were considered “im-
pure” and extraneous with respect to the “authentic” tradition handed down 
to the Jews (and only to the Jews). But connections with “the other” never 
stopped: they simply took other forms. 
Some of these authors tried to establish contact with Christians on the 
(obviously very sensitive) level of theology. There were those who tried 
to show the common threads of Judaism and Christianity and those who, 
through polemicizing on some essential points of Christian belief, showed 
respect and openness to a religion that represented otherness par excellence. 
The figures reviewed in this book do not necessarily seek harmony be-
tween Jewish and non-Jewish elements: in some cases, each of these sets 
of elements belonged to separate and seemingly mutually exclusive phases 
in their biographies; in other cases, the non-Jewish elements are implicit, 
buried beneath a thick layer of apparently self-sufficient Jewish elements, 
leaving it to the researcher to find and feature them—a good example of the 
answers being guided by the questions.
One of the recurring terms in this book is modernity. The concept is sug-
gested by the anti-traditionalist positions of some authors (like Avraham 
Portaleone in his younger period) and explicitly used by another fundamen-
tal figure of this period, Leone Modena. Indeed, this term appears in the 
original titles of some of my articles, as well as in publications or research 
seminars I have coordinated over the last several years. 
There are no doubt some good reasons to attribute a kind of “primogeni-
ture” in terms of modernity to Italian Jewish society and the culture it ex-
pressed. If no one doubts the Ashkenazi (German and Eastern European) 
origins of many fundamental realities of contemporary Judaism (Zionism, 
Jewish Socialism, Hasidism, the rebirth of the Hebrew language, and the 
scientific study of traditional heritage), if we can, with extremely good rea-
son, see the Jews of seventeenth-century Amsterdam as the “prototype” for 
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modern Jews who incline toward secularization (of whom Baruch Spinoza is 
only the most visible representative),2 it is equally true that, as far as the size 
and duration of the phenomenon is concerned, the Italian community is most 
anciently and most broadly “modern.”
But what do we mean by “modern”? 
Is modernism identified with secularization? Does it suggest an anti-tra-
ditionalist, progressive, and optimistic ideology? Or does it simply designate 
a chronological period between the Medieval, perhaps Renaissance era and 
the contemporary age, which is defined by many as “post-modern”?
Although founded on solid grounds, the term “modernity” presents (along 
with a certain dose of the arbitrariness inherent in all denominations of tem-
poral scansion) the inconvenience of finality. When we talk about modernity, 
there is the implication that the preceding age was the preparation and the 
modern age was the fulfillment. Despite the fact that nineteenth-century his-
torical philosophies, with their visions of the present as the completed and 
somehow final result of a long process, seem to have been eclipsed, the idea 
of the present as the perfection of the past dies hard.
Of course, there is no reason to consider the contemporary Jewish condi-
tion any more perfected than that of, say, the 1600s. This is why one should 
be careful when using a debatable term like modernity, and instead empha-
size the constant dialectic, among Italian Jews in those years, between the 
tendency to exploit traditional Jewish cultural heritage and the explicit, un-
confessed, or unconscious appeal to different forms of Italian culture. At 
base, theirs was, as Moritz Steinschneider defined it (referring to linguistic 
levels), an “amphibious” life, in which Jewish and Italian elements com-
bined with considerable ductility.3
I would like to express an intellectual debt to Robert Bonfil. In addition 
to the general formulation of the book, which was certainly influenced by 
his approach, some of the essays contained here were developments of the 
Greek-Italian-Israeli scholar’s concisely expressed intuitions. 
My hope is that these elaborations and other original contributions will 
help others to see things a little differently, showing them new aspects of the 






From Philosophy to Kabbalah:  
Yeḥiyel Nissim of Pisa  
and the Critique of Aristotelianism
We know a good deal about the Da Pisa family, as well as about the finan-
cial and intellectual activities of its members, thanks to the research of David 
Kaufmann, Umberto Cassuto, and Michele Luzzati.1 By now we know that 
the Da Pisa family included money-lenders of great importance even on a 
national scale, as well as rabbinical authorities who were extremely produc-
tive in the fields of juridical decisions, thought (both kabbalistic and philo-
sophic), and even poetry. For at least three generations, from the late fifteenth 
century to the mid-sixteenth century, the Da Pisas were one of the main refer-
ence points of the entire Italian Jewish community.
Much attention has been given recently to the figure of Yeḥiyel (Vitale) 
Nissim of Pisa (1493?—before 1572), author of the important philosophi-
cal text Minḥath Kenaoth (The Gift of Zeal), dated 1539,2 and two other 
shorter works, the Discourse on the Ten Sefyroth (Hebrew), previous to the 
Minḥat, and the Discourse on the Righteous Man and the Purpose of the 
World (Hebrew), dated 1559,3 as well as a juridical text on loans with inter-
est, the (Maamar Ḥayyey ‘Olam (Discource on Eternal Life).4 In Rabbis and 
Jewish Communities in Renaissance Italy, Robert Bonfil dedicated several 
dense pages to this scholar, reading his work in the context of the crisis of 
medieval rationalism, a crisis that interested Christians as well as Jews.5 The 
present study intends to develop a few parts of Bonfil’s interpretation, fol-
lowing his general orientation. We will then try to sketch an intellectual por-
trait of Yeḥiyel, in reference to both Jewish tradition and the Italian culture 
of his time.
All of Yeḥiyel’s works circulated as manuscripts, even though some of 
them (such as the Discourse on Eternal Life) were probably meant to be pub-
lished.6 In its scope and ambition, the Minḥath Kenaoth distinguishes itself 
from the others. It is a punctual confutation of the Iggereth Hithnatzeluth 
(Letter of Justification) written by the Provençal philosopher and moral-
ist Yeda‘yiah Bedersi (known as “ha-Penyny,” 1270-1340) in reaction to 
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Shelomo ben Adret’s decision to prohibit the study of the natural sciences 
and philosophy before the age of twenty-five.7
Bedersi’s Letter is a brief, clear list of the advantages that religion draws 
from the study of philosophy; Yeḥiyel examines it in detail and replies to all 
of Bedersi’s arguments, furthering the discourse remarkably. The result is an 
actual treatise, in which the main problems of the philosophical tradition are 
analyzed according to the classical structure of the scholastic quaestio: first 
the adversary’s opinion is presented, along with a detailed analysis of the ar-
gument according to the main philosophers, and then the author describes his 
own position based on what he considers to be the authentic Jewish tradition.
It goes without saying that by philosophy, or free rational research, 
Yeḥiyel means Aristotelianism as it developed from Aristotle through his 
Greek, Arab, and Jewish commentators up until the more recent discussions 
of the Italian “university philosophy.” The work’s objective is clearly pre-
sented from the very introduction, which is written in a careful, sophisticated 
prose: it opposes the position of “those who want to show the great advan-
tages to be gained from the study and knowledge of that science called phi-
losophy, as if without it the sacred Torah did not have the right to be placed 
in the highest ranks and as if its beliefs [...] did not make any sense without 
her: in short, [as though it is] the maid who passes as a lady [...] But we have 
the obligation to destroy and shatter these confused opinions and bad beliefs: 
this is what ruins our people and corrupts our patrimony. [...] The Torah de-
serves the primogeniture, it is the light of all other sciences.”8
Further on, Yeḥiyel nuances and clarifies his idea:
My objections do not regard the intensive study of philosophy as such, 
because science qua science makes possible the knowledge of the causes 
or the natural hierarchy of things, and thus can be pursued with profit; as 
long as it helps to know the reality of the entities, as these were created, 
and as to their use, but not when it claims to be the main moment and the 
evaluating criterion of the Torah.9
The book’s long introduction continues, developing the following funda-
mental points:
1) the centrality of the Torah as a source of knowledge;
2) the refutation of allegory as a means by which to explain the Bible. 
According to the allegorists: “In the Torah there would not be teachings 
14
Chapter 1
relative to what is permitted and what is prohibited, to the guilty and 
the innocent, to the sacrifices and the offerings; instead, it would over-
flow with notions of incommensurable value, like the primary mate-
rial called hyle that is ready to assume any form, towards which it is 
attracted like a man to a young woman, or the rotation of the spheres, 
and so forth.”10
3) the self-sufficiency of the Torah, if accompanied by its esoteric expla-
nations: “Everything is included in brief mentions in its letters, in its 
vocalization and cantillation signs, in the closed passages and in the 
open ones, in the marks to be added over some of the letters, just as it 
was delivered to the greatest of the shepherds from the mouth of the 
Lord. [...] Such is the Kabbalah, orally transmitted unto us.”11
All this is accompanied by an affirmation of proud particularism (“Why 
turn to others? [...] Why return to Egypt in search of help? Why embrace 
a foreign breast?”),12 in which argumentation is replaced by a peremptory 
affirmation, and the concatenation of rational discourse by the rhetoric of 
suggestion.
The Components of Yeḥiel’s Thought
According to Yeḥiyel, the alternative way to philosophy develops through 
these successive phases:
1) the anti-intellectualism of Yehudah ha-Levy (1075-1141), author of 
the book Kuzary (The King of the Khazars), considered the champion 
of the traditional attitude vis-à-vis the rational;13
2) the interpretative attitude—also profoundly anti-intellectualistic—of 
Mosheh ben Nahman (Nahmanides, 1194-1270);
3) the vision of the sefyroth, according to the Italian kabbalistic tradition.
1) The Spanish scholar and poet is cited at length by Yeḥiyel, who quotes 
in extenso his strong declarations against the philosophical notion of proph-
ecy as the highest level in the scale of intellection: one does not prophesy, 
according to Yehudah ha-Levy, after the union of the potential intellect with 
the agent intellect, but thanks to the constant application of the Torah’s com-
mandments. We will consider this argument in detail later on. Yeḥiyel also 
appropriates ha-Levy’s declarations of the uniqueness of the Jewish peo-
ple as the object of a special divine love and in whom alone the authentic 
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prophecy could be realized. Yeḥiyel is not the only Jewish intellectual in Italy 
to turn to Yehudah ha-Levy as an alternative to Aristotelian-Maimonidean 
rationalism. During this period, the Kuzary reached the great level of dignity 
of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed.14 At the end of the previous cen-
tury, with the typical Italian Jewish respect for Maimonides, the kabbalist 
Eliyah di Genazzano had already said that he would not insist on his critique 
of the Andalusian philosopher, because there already existed a book which 
could function as a perfect counterweight to the Guide: the Kuzary, “which 
does not have equals in its accordance with truth and its harmony with the 
Kabbalah,” a book worthy of being the object of constant attention “of the 
eyes and of the heart.”15
2) Yeḥiyel claims to have founded his ideas entirely on Nahmanides,16 
whom he cites in support of the fundamental idea that the Torah is the origin 
of all the other sciences, as well as in support of several theological issues—
for example, the question of individual providence—and esoteric notions, 
such as the transmigration of souls.17 One needs to remember that Mosheh 
ben Naḥman is an uncompromising upholder of the tradition, which he natu-
rally sees as going back to Moses, and therefore to the divine revelation, 
which he seemingly paradoxically considers to be in antithesis to autono-
mous reflection. He concludes his dense introduction to the commentary on 
the Pentateuch, “What I write on the secrets of the Torah certainly does not 
result from individual reasoning and understanding, but was transmitted to 
me by a master; in like manner the student is taught to become a person who 
understands.”
Close to Nahmanides’ sensibility is also the idea of God’s absolute free-
dom with regard to the world; his action is not limited by the separate intel-
lects, and even less so by the laws of nature.18 Omniscience corresponds to 
absolute freedom. Therefore Yeḥiyel’s total opposition to the Provençal phi-
losopher Gersonides (1288-1344) is entirely logical, for the latter denied to 
God knowledge of man’s individual and freely performed acts. The freedom 
of man—which, as we will see, is vast, although not absolute—does not for 
Yeḥiyel contradict the idea of divine knowledge, to which providence and 
justice are linked.19
3) Thanks to the studies of Moshe Idel, we can distinguish a kabbalis-
tic tradition specific to Italian Jews. This tradition, which refers back to 
Menaḥem Recanati (thirteenth—fourteenth centuries) and was developed by 
Yoḥanan Alemanno, is characterized by a strong philosophical bent, as well 
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as by its relative degree of freedom from the influence of the Zohar’s mythical 
thought, typical instead of the Spanish Kabbalah.20 One of the most remark-
able points of divergence concerned the nature of the sefyroth. The problem, 
whose delicacy and importance become clear when considering the question 
of the attributes in Spinoza’s Ethics, is whether the sefyroth belong to the 
divine substance (‘atzmuth). Recanati, the author of an important esoteric 
commentary on the Torah, defines the sefyroth as instruments or receptacles 
(kelym) of the divine activity (“as instruments in the hands of an artisan [...] 
yet tightly united among themselves and with a single spirit for all”),21 and 
as such knowable, thereby distinguishing them from the substance of God 
(the eyn sof), which remains unknowable. In his commentary on the Song of 
Songs, Alemanno returns to this distinction and illustrates it through the si-
militude of soul and body—a comparison which can give an idea of both the 
relationship between invisible cause and visible effects, and the relationship 
between the unity of God and the multiplicity of forces ruling the world.22 
Yeḥiyel’s uncle, Yitzḥaq of Pisa, who certainly knew Alemanno, who was 
his contemporary and a frequent guest of the Da Pisas, is the protagonist of 
an epistolary exchange with a rabbi of Spanish origin, Yitzḥaq Mar Ḥayyim. 
This correspondence reveals a position different from Alemanno’s, in that 
the sefyroth are not considered solely as an instrument of God, but also—at 
least in the case of the first two or three—as participating in God’s essence.23 
We will not delve into a discussion of these difficult, though fundamental, 
classifications. Naturally, one must wonder about the degree of philosophi-
cal awareness with which these minute distinctions were made. We take it 
for granted that the scholars in question did not limit themselves to a ser-
vile repetition of themes whose depth they ignored. Obviously, pedagogical 
traditions played an important—albeit not exclusive—role in determining 
their various stances; nevertheless, even beyond what may appear to be mere 
formulas (the status of the sefyroth; the relationship between the eyn sof and 
the sefyrah keter; the classification of the sefyroth in subcategories), the main 
question is whether these authors were aware of the fact that they were dis-
cussing issues of enormous importance, such as the relationship between 
God and the world, between the mystery and the knowable, between the 
ineffable and the sayable.
After recalling that Yeḥiyel seems to uphold his uncle Yitzḥaq’s theory,24 
it is important to note that this debate combines philosophy’s conceptual ter-
minology with the Kabbalah’s: he describes the sefyroth as “attributes,” and 
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the eyn sof is the “primary cause.” For Yeḥiyel, critic of philosophy, the re-
lationship between God and the world—a relationship of entirely kabbalistic 
inspiration—is made to overlap with Aristotelian physics and metaphysics:
God transmits his spiritual energy (shefa‘) and strength to his attributes, 
without undergoing any changes; from there, this transmission of energy 
descends to the world of the intellects, and thereafter to the spheres, and 
finally to the sublunar world.25
This is a real overlay, which according to the kabbalistic, esoteric doctrine 
may complete, rather than refute, the philosophical: the first begins where 
the second leaves off. Alemanno had been clear on the subject: “The wise of 
Israel speak of a world which is not that of the philosophers: the world of the 
sefyroth is superior to that of the corruptible entities, as well as to the world 
of circular movements and that of the angels.”26
Kabbalah and Philosophy
Yitzḥaq Mar Ḥayyim had already warned his correspondent about the 
relationship between tradition and autonomous reflection, inviting him to 
choose the first as his reference point, that is, to adapt philosophy to the 
Kabbalah, and not the contrary. “Rational research in this field is prohibited 
to us,” Yitzḥaq Mar Ḥayyim contends elsewhere; “instead, it is to the pro-
phetic Kabbalah that we must turn, because it is superior to reason.”27
This testimony of a Spanish teacher confirms a contrario the Italian 
Kabbalah’s philosophical tendency, of which Yeḥiyel is a typical representa-
tive. The rest of Yeḥiyel’s philosophical forma mentis is confirmed by the 
scholastic course of his juridical argument. In the Discourse on Eternal Life, 
his brief text on loans with interest, written as a juridical synthesis and ref-
erence book for the numerous Jews who supported themselves on financial 
activities, Yeḥiyel (a) pronounces the most general principles on which the 
arguments are constructed; (b) elaborates a syllogism from which to deduce 
the general conclusion; (c) announces the necessity of studying each particu-
lar case; and (d) proceeds to the definitions, which delimit the problems to be 
discussed and facilitates their solution.28
Presented only to be confuted, the abundance and precision of the 
philosophical arguments in the Minḥath Kenaoth illustrate Yeḥiyel’s deep 
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understanding of the discipline. His culture was naturally based on the Arab-
Jewish Aristotelian tradition, in addition to the Zohar. Yeḥiyel had person-
ally copied Averroes’ commentary on books 3 and 4 of Aristotle’s Physics;29 
thanks to his knowledge of Latin, he was also acquainted with the most re-
cently published works in Italy. A precious source for him were the exten-
sive philosophical syntheses of his contemporary Agostino Nifo, to whom 
Yeḥiyel refers many times in his thorough analyses of particular questions.30
Several philosophical expositions—on the intellect, for example—are 
wide-reaching and exemplary in terms of their order and clarity. They could 
have been more convincing if the author had presented a more unified and 
coherent thought. Roberto Bonfil has therefore argued that Yeḥiyel finds 
himself between two cultural eras, and that he masters the discourse of the 
older era, which he rejects, but not that of the new, which is not yet well 
defined. This statement, important from the point of view of historical per-
spective, should perhaps be nuanced with regard to Yeḥiyel’s specific com-
petence not only in rabbinical tradition but also in Kabbalah itself. The Pisan 
scholar masters basic texts like the Zohar, just as he also establishes a precise 
position for himself within kabbalistic thought, one that reveals technical 
knowledge and deliberate intellectual choices.31
Kabbalah is not simply a philosophy, or at least not simply a philoso-
phy in the Aristotelian sense.32 Apart from its origins (traditional or rational), 
Kabbalah represents an intuitive attitude that would function as an alterna-
tive (or complement, as we have seen) to Aristotelian discursive reason. The 
relationship between unity and plurality as the kabbalists intend it (as do, ul-
timately, the Neoplatonists) cannot be analyzed with Aristotelian conceptual 
instruments. When Yeḥiyel refrains from analyzing these subjects in depth,33 
it is not because of any superficiality or incompetence on his part; rather, 
he is aware of the fact that they can only be treated in allusive and intuitive 
terms, with a metaphoric or even mythical lexicon:
The question of the attributes is one of the most profound of all theology 
(ḥokhmah elohyth, divine science). [...] All actions that manifest them-
selves in reality are potentially qualities (middoth) through which God 
acts, as instruments in the hands of an artisan; however, they are not sepa-
rated from God; rather they are united in Him in a total unity that words 
are not capable of describing.34
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Yeḥiyel’s adherence to the philosophical dimension and, at the same time, 
the distance that he keeps from it, are visible in his definition of the stars’ and 
celestial spheres’ constitution. They are of “sefirotic material”: the ontologi-
cal character of the substance serves to define an element, be it celestial or 
Aristotle’s “fifth element.” Beyond this coincidence in terminology, how-
ever, the difference between the Aristotelians’ position and Yeḥiyel’s is evi-
dent from the very beginning. Maimonides, who in this regard referred back 
to Aristotle, had defined the fifth element negatively (it is neither light nor 
heavy, and so forth), for the obvious reason that we do not have any direct 
experience of it.35 Where the philosopher had prudently stopped for lack of 
proof, Yeḥiyel advances without any scruples. The combination of his anti-
intellectual and intuitive attitudes culminates in a need for positive contents, 
which the schools’ philosophy could not provide. This is perhaps the most 
historically significant aspect of Yeḥiyel’s work, which we will discuss in 
further detail.
Yeḥiyel, Renaissance man
Once again, it is to Idel’s research that we owe the particular attention 
given to the magic—and Neoplatonic—character of a certain Kabbalah. 
This aspect had been well known for a while, thanks in part to the Christian 
Kabbalah and its magic-alchemic elements. However, its importance had 
been forgotten in the shadow of the great figure of Gershom Scholem, who, 
in his reconstruction of the historical development of Jewish esotericism, 
had not highlighted this aspect.
The magical aspect is emphasized by Idel, in the same studies men-
tioned above in regards to Yoḥanan Alemanno and Yitzḥaq of Pisa. This step 
marked considerable progress in linking Jewish historiography—for a long 
time the prisoner of a reductive rationalism—and European historiography, 
which instead had learned to see magic as an important step in the develop-
ment of a “modern” consciousness. To a certain extent, Yeḥiyel shares this 
trust in magic: clearly a Renaissance man in his behavior, he was also one in 
his mental attitudes.
After having reached the highest level of spirituality, man can attach his 
soul to the superior worlds and cause divine energies to descend onto the 
world by means of his moral virtues and performance of the commandments. 
Thanks to this union, in a way he, too, becomes divine and is thus able to 
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intervene in the normal course of nature, which, as we have seen, is totally 
dependent on divine will:
When man ascends from one level to another thanks to those steps which 
are represented by the virtues that the Torah indicates and that our teach-
ers call pietas [ḥasiduth], and after the accomplishment of the Torah in 
its general rules as well as in its details, his soul strongly adheres to and 
unites itself with the superior worlds, attracting and propagating the di-
vine presence [shekhynah]; he will therefore provide the people with true 
knowledge, and will conduct them along the right way. That man will 
then be able to accomplish prodigies and miracles, and change the course 
of nature.36
At this level he will become entirely spiritual and divine, and while 
remaining in this world he will belong to the superior worlds, and these 
will obey him as it happened with the prophets. Thus even the teachers 
of Israel, when the prophecy was interrupted, by virtue of their absolute 
adhesion [devequth] to God caused the dead to resurrect and the living 
suddenly to die. They overturned the order and nature of the world, be-
cause they adhered to blessed God, and he “fulfills the desires of those 
who fear him” (Ps 145:19).37
All the different components of these propositions are already in 
Alemanno, and many of them can be found in Florentine Neoplatonism. 
Alemanno speaks explicitly of the descent of spiritual energies onto the 
world thanks to the intervention of the man who is capable of receiving and 
directing divine emanations and their powers.38 And if Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola describes man as “et caelestium et terrestrium vinculum et nodus 
si in se ipso pacem et foedera sancit,”39 Yeḥiyel recalls the Zohar’s image of 
the tabernacle and the terrestrial Temple (both the historical and the future 
ones) as places in which the superior and inferior worlds have been, and will 
be, strongly linked, thereby fulfilling the will of God.40 One should note, 
however, that despite these important references, in Yeḥiyel’s writing magic 
does not have the weight that it seems to possess in Alemanno’s. Yeḥiyel 
does not insist on the subject, and more importantly, he ignores all descrip-
tions of magical practices, on which Alemanno dwells at length (for exam-
ple, how to prepare to receive the divine energy through the reading of the 
Torah, which is the equivalent of reading the names of God);41 in the Minḥath 
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Kenaoth, there is a single and cursory reference to the mystical properties of 
the letters and the vocalization and cantillation signs.42
Yeḥiyel is interested, on the one hand, in establishing the privileged role 
of man within the universe, and of the Jewish people in their relationship to 
God in particular; on the other hand, he wishes to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of conceptual instruments to fulfill their destinies. He therefore limits the im-
portance of magic, inserting it within the traditional and anti-intellectualis-
tic framework that we have already described. As he exalts man’s calling, 
Yeḥiyel appears to emphasize the descent of divine energies onto the world 
by virtue of the just man’s work, while he neglects the Zoharic concept of 
harmony between the sefyroth themselves as a consequence of human action. 
The affirmation of the absolute freedom of God is combined with the anthro-
pocentric vision of the world as created for the good and perfection of man.43
Moreover, to this problem Yeḥiyel dedicated his whole Discourse on the 
Righteous Man and the Purpose of the World, a short treatise written in an-
swer to the letter of a certain Ya‘akov from Modena, which contained the 
following questions: Is man more important than the angels? Was the world 
created for man? Yeḥiyel correctly links the two questions and, as he already 
had in the Minḥath Kenaoth, reviews the philosophical doctrines on the sub-
ject, to which he then opposes others drawn from the rabbinical-kabbalistic 
tradition.
To understand Yeḥiyel’s answers, it is necessary to remember that, ac-
cording to Maimonides, who is in this regard a faithful follower of Aristotle, 
man cannot be seen as the object of creation because every entity was created 
for the good of that same entity, and not for any other. Furthermore, there is 
a hierarchy of the purity of beings, within which man occupies an inferior 
position in relation to the separate and celestial intellects (identified with the 
angels).44
Yeḥiyel’s answer is the opposite of Maimonides’: man is a microcosm, 
a model of all worlds. When he is just, he is superior to the angels; his soul 
originates on the throne of God’s glory, to which it returns when it sepa-
rates from the body, even before death. It is the Torah, which preceded the 
existence of the world, that allows corruptible man to ascend to the supe-
rior worlds and unite himself with God, leaving the angels beneath him.45 
It seems almost superfluous to point out how close this idea is to Renaissance 
Neoplatonism, of which it represents the Jewish version.46
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The Uniqueness of Israel
Speaking of Yeḥiyel Nissim of Pisa, Bonfil underlines how his opposi-
tion to scholastic thought also implies the re-evaluation of the idea of the 
uniqueness of the Jew—as an individual and as a people—which this same 
thought had somewhat disregarded.47 We have not only seen how the Torah 
is an instrument of elevation, but have also noted the privileged position of 
the Jewish people among men: it is like the heart among the members of the 
body.48
Yeḥiyel emphasizes the uniqueness of Israel time and again. This idea 
is highlighted especially in the “classical” argument, bent on proving the 
insufficiency of philosophy in comparison with authentic prophecy. Indeed, 
if prophecy really was a union, favored by the imaginative faculty, of the 
potential intellect with the agent intellect, as Avicenna and Maimonides 
contended, it is not clear why the philosophers were not prophets, and why 
among the latter only the Jews prophesied in truth and at length. In reality, it 
is the performance of the mitzwoth and the knowledge of the Torah ’s secrets, 
both reserved to Israel, that allow a person to acquire prophetic abilities.49
Regarding divine providence, Yeḥiyel establishes a hierarchy of entities 
that views animals as the object of divine providence qua species, humans 
as the object of that providence qua individuals, and the Jews as individuals 
who receive a particular attention, in that
their form is particular and separated from the rest of mankind, and it is 
therefore right that providence be more individualized in their regard. 
Indeed, the more a man is close to God, thanks to his accomplishment of 
the precepts, the more He who provides is close to the one who enjoys this 
providence, and never does He abandon him with His gaze.50
Yeḥiyel alters Maimonides’ argument, whose influence he explicitly ac-
knowledges, at the end. According to the Andalusian philosopher, divine 
providence applies to animals as species and to men as individuals. The lat-
ter receive a particular attention from God in proportion to their degree of 
perfection, which is mainly of an intellectual order and which, in the Guide, 
does not require them to be Jews.51 Yeḥiyel replaces this hierarchy of intel-
ligence with an essentialist hierarchy of form and with performance of the 
commandments, an essentialist act in that, by virtue of their nature, the com-
mandments are close to God.
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Furthermore, the Pisan rabbi’s argument differs from the beliefs of many 
of his Jewish contemporaries. As humanists, they argued for the superior-
ity of Israel on the basis of the antiquity of its laws, a claim which was 
also informed by a cultural pride which could represent itself in the idea of 
an “Israel redeemer of humanity,” as well as in the practice of proselytism, 
however limited.52
The real purpose of the world is the actualization of Israel, the just peo-
ple. Yeḥiyel therefore rejects the Aristotelian and Maimonidean idea of the 
internal actualization of every created thing, and develops this through a 
parable: A man owns a field perfect for planting. He performs all the neces-
sary preparations and plants a tree. This tree grows, and starts bearing fruit, 
but many of the fruits rot on the branches, and others fall before they have 
ripened. There remains one single fruit which grows and ripens as it should, 
and it reaches its final state. If it is true that the field was the cause of the 
tree, as also the tree was the cause of the fruit, the farmer’s intention and 
objective in this work would be to obtain that one perfect fruit; indeed, he 
knew very well that most of his crop would be lost. In the same way, God 
has prepared the world for the planting of the tree—mankind—with the 
intention of obtaining in the end one single fruit, the people of Israel with 
their just men.53 
This particularism is probably not characteristic of the Jews only, as it 
manifests itself as well in the Christian milieu associated with traditional-
ism and the almost exclusive reference to the Scriptures. In his Examen 
Vanitatis (1520), for example, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, nephew 
of Giovanni, affirmed that he “preferred the old theologians of our faith, who 
contended that one should undertake some action against the pagan philoso-
phers (gentium philosophos) and destroy their teachings, rather than philoso-
phize according to their doctrines (like those who cultivated such studies in 
the past centuries).”54 These affirmations clearly recast the ethnic character of 
Jewish particularism. The equivalence made here—of a cultural, not an ethnic, 
character—is therefore between an “us” and the heirs of the dogmatic tradi-
tion (to whatever camp they may belong), on the one hand, and, on the other, 
a “them” and the rationalists who place themselves outside this tradition.
Yeḥiyel’s contemporary, ‘Ovadiyah Sforno (1470-1550), in his important 
philosophical work Or ‘amym (Light of the Peoples, 1537),55 returns to the 
subject of man as the purpose of the universe, adapting this Renaissance idea 
to Aristotelian, and in particular Averroist, coordinates, to which he remains 
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faithful. Sforno contends that, even admitting that superior entities cannot 
exist to ensure the perfection of inferior ones, one cannot deny that man’s 
rational soul is superior to the heavens insofar as it is separate from matter. 
Indeed, the heavens, with their circular and perfect movement, are the cause 
of the combinations among the elements of the corruptible world. It is pre-
cisely in this world that man happens to act in order to accomplish his two 
goals of getting closer to God by means of his intellect and of resembling 
him in accordance with the divine precept.
Within this conceptual framework, the Jews occupy a privileged position, 
not as the executors of the Torah that God himself has reserved for them, but 
because they accepted his covenant and are better disposed than any other 
people to recognize his sovereignty and to serve Him. Further on, we will 
see how Sforno believes that the superiority of the Jews is justified for rea-
sons opposite those of Yeḥiyel: in his mind, the people of Israel are the true 
repositories of a rational tradition.56
Though Yeḥiyel exalts the centrality of man in the universe (and, among 
men, the Jews), nevertheless he is not ready to grant him absolute freedom. 
Several years before he wrote the Minḥath Kenaoth, a heated debate had 
developed about free will, stimulated by the Protestant reform. Yeḥiyel de-
liberately and explicitly places himself within this debate, denying any va-
lidity to the reformist doctrine of the “servant will.” Even without sufficient 
philosophical proofs, he argues, the mere fact that the Torah presents man 
with commandments implies that there is a freedom of choice: free will is 
therefore an indispensable element in the construction of beliefs.57 However, 
Yeḥiyel expresses one important reservation:
free will is not absolute, and the help of God is necessary to perfect the 
inclination that permits man to develop fear and follow the good. This is 
one of the principles of the Torah: if and when, on his part, man disposes 
his heart to good actions and to the mitzwoth, he will receive from God 
help and energy which will give him sufficient strength to accomplish 
them. Most worthy actions that regard the Torah and the mitzwoth, and 
the beginning of fear, depend on man: the help he receives from God is to 
be considered a reward.58 
In its basic structure (man’s actions are completed by divine intervention), 
this idea is similar to the Catholic doctrine of justification, as sanctioned 
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a few years later by the Council of Trent. According to this doctrine, faith in 
a “propitiatory” Christ can compensate for the weakening of freedom after 
the original sin. Only in this way can man be born again to grace.59
Modernity and Tradition
One can take Yeḥiyel’s work to be utterly attached to a traditionalis-
tic vision, as the expression of a spirit hostile to philosophy, which within 
Judaism manifested itself in a critique of Maimonides and a return to internal 
sources.60 However, we know that renewal—without loading this term with 
the value judgments of any philosophy of history—can easily appear to be a 
finalistic return to tradition, at least initially. In this case the historian must 
discover, within traditional arguments, the accent or the few significant de-
tails which nuance them in new ways.
We have seen Yeḥiyel’s reservations about philosophy. Naturally, his 
position was far from new. Yehudah ha-Levy takes it as one of the princi-
ples informing the Kuzary: philosophy is conceived as the ancilla prophe-
tiae, where prophecy mainly means that of Moses, preserved and passed on 
through the oral and written tradition.61 What characterizes Yeḥiyel’s posi-
tion, within this anti-rationalist vein, is his insistence on the insufficiency of 
the philosophical method, which rests all explanations on empirical observa-
tion and on the subsequent search for the causes of the phenomenon. This 
search from the posterior to the anterior is deemed inappropriate by Yeḥiyel 
if one wants to reach truth. The inductive procedure leads one to determine 
the cause through its effect, attested by the senses; but both the starting point 
and this procedure are marred by imprecision.
Prophetic knowledge, on the contrary, captures the effect through its 
cause, that is the posterior along with the anterior, and this is free from 
errors or confusion.62
His opposition to Peripatetic epistemology is clear, even if there is a tendency 
to emphasize its empirical aspect. One should consider, for a comparison, the 
Aristotelian statement made by Agostino Nifo, to whose works Yeḥiyel re-
ferred readers: true, Nifo writes, “Scire proprissimum est scire propter quid” 
(i.e. according to the essence of the object, a priori), but valid knowledge 
can be of two kinds: “Quae sunt per se notae vel per sensum, vel seipsis.”63
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The same opposition is expressed toward logic, for according to Aristotle 
logic is the instrument of the sciences and, as such, is external to them. 
According to Yeḥiyel, to understand the Torah there is no need to refer to 
external means; the necessary interpretative rules were revealed and trans-
mitted along with the text. The Hebraic system of knowledge is configured 
as unitary and is in itself complete and self-sufficent.64
Yeḥiyel’s tradition-based certainties are clearly very different from the 
torments of a philosopher like Pietro Pomponazzi, for example, just as 
their two works also differ in intellectual scope.65 The Pisan rabbi certainly 
would not have reached the skeptical conclusions of the Paduan philosopher. 
However, one should not conclude that Yeḥiyel’s thought was not somewhat 
in consonance with the questions addressed in Christian society. The is-
sues he considers (included that of the transmigration of the soul, which 
will be developed at length after the end of the sixteenth century with the 
Lurianic Kabbalah) were of current interest even within the philosophical 
debate,66 and he faces, just as his Christian contemporaries do, a philosophi-
cal tradition and possibly a whole way of thinking that by then had become 
insufficient. Yeḥiyel’s anti-intellectualistic vis and Pomponazzi’s rigorously 
rational knowledge ultimately reach the same conclusions: on fundamental 
questions, such as the soul’s immortality, thought conducted according to 
the old rules cannot give convincing answers. The Pisan’s answer is to turn 
to tradition; the Paduan’s more prudent and perhaps more skeptical solution 
also tends toward a religious horizon—in which, however, it is not tradition 
but faith that is highlighted.67
In a certain sense, the extremely traditionalist Yeḥiyel was more “mod-
ern” than figures like Sforno, the teacher of reason, and another prominent 
Italian Jewish intellectual, Mosheh Provenzali (1503-1575).
Sforno critiqued blind tradition harshly, exalting reason as the only means 
by which one can distinguish truth from falsehood:
The fear and zeal for the Torah (of the pure traditionalist) are founded on 
a story passed on from father to child. [...] God never ordered that one be-
lieve in His existence, in His power and in His providence, because faith 
does not depend on will, as experience has shown and as the Philosopher 
has demonstrated in De anima II, 153 [...] but He presented true and just 
ideas along with their rational argumentation.68
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Finding in Aristotle many conclusions that contradicted their beliefs, the tra-
ditionalists, Sforno contends, simply denied them, without any proof. The 
Jews, by contrast, are the heirs of a rational tradition, founded by ‘Ever and 
continued by Abraham, and concerned with the existence of God, his attrib-
utes, and many other similar questions. Rational Jewish science survived on 
the ruins of Chaldean science.69
As for Mosheh Provenzali, rabbi in Mantua and a jurist, grammarian, 
and philosopher of interest, his fame is essentially linked to the extremely 
liberal attitude of his ritual decisions, which provoked heated debates and 
caused him numerous difficulties in the exercise of his functions within the 
Jewish community. From a philosophical point of view, however, he is a con-
servative, or a rationalist-conservative. In his commentary on Maimonides’ 
Axioms, he tries in fact to reestablish, within the Maimonidean alveolus, that 
division between substantial and accidental causality which had radically 
called into question an important moment of Aristotelian metaphysics. The 
issue at stake here is infinity in the causal chain, as well as in time and space, 
which, according to Aristotelian presuppositions, was impossible. Ḥasday 
Crescas had attacked these conclusions in depth and with productive results, 
formulating the idea of an infinite space and an infinity of worlds, an idea that 
is rightly considered to be one of the main foundations of modern thought.
Provenzali overturns Crescas’ argument. As he follows Crescas in demol-
ishing the distinctions between accidental causality (whose possible infinity 
had already been acknowledged) and essential causality (whose infinity had 
been denied), Provenzali considers accidental causality (potentially infinite) 
as the reference for essential causality (never infinite), instead of consider-
ing the latter as the reference for the former, as the Spanish philosopher had 
done. This inverted perspective allows him to establish the non-eternity of 
the world and its having been created, thereby accomplishing the traditional 
objective of religious scholars. Thus, Provenzali tries to integrate Crescas’ 
explosive criticism within Aristotelian-Maimonidean thought, using the new 
to reinforce the old—a defensive action which will not be crowned with 
success.70
The great edifice of Aristotelianism is therefore about to become the leg-
acy of a superseded past, even for the Jews. The new is constructed through 
the very negation of a rational structure whose conceptual precision and 
internal coherence were very advanced. The interiorized experience of the 
28
Chapter 1
Florentine Neoplatonists71—like Yeḥiyel’s turning to the Kabbalah, as many 
others did after him—might respond to similar needs that will later emerge 
in the new philosophy of nature and in modern science. But before Galileo 
and the establishment of a new rationality, the rebellion against the old seems 
to present itself as a reaction against rationalism qua rationalism: modernity 
emerges, in a way, from within an anti-rational position.
With his constant reliance on suggestion, rather than argumentation, 
and with his difficult elaboration of an alternative worldview to that of 
Maimonides—which tried to reconcile revealed religion and rationalism—
Yeḥiel moves in unison with the Italian culture of his time. An important 
author such as Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola formulates a critique 
of Aristotelianism in exactly the same terms as the Pisan rabbi (“Aristoteli 
demonstrandi ars incerta, quia fundatur in indicio iudicioque sensum”),72 and 
he shares his idea of an authentic prophecy as something which one reaches 
through a free gift of God and distinct from the inauthentic one, which origi-
nates in evil spirits.73
While Gianfrancesco bemoaned the uncertainty and unreliability of phi-
losophy’s results, the object of continuous debates, Yeḥiyel emphasizes their 
insufficiency. The practical criterion of the quantity and amplitude of the 
answers replaces the theoretical one of demonstrability. Philosophy’s caution 
represents for him not only a symptom, but also a reason for its inferiority 
vis-à-vis traditional doctrines. He voices his opinion on the matter on many 
occasions with a surprising candor. The conclusions that philosophers can 
reach on the issue of the angels (corresponding to the intellects), for exam-
ple, is nothing but “a drop of water in the large sea of truths revealed to the 
prophets by the sacred doctors.”74 
Furthermore, philosophy cannot conceive of the attributes of God merely 
through a negative definition, saying God is not corporeal, and so forth. 
But Yeḥiyel declares that he cannot be content with this: “I would like to 
know what one finally knows this way, given that negation does not produce 
knowledge.”75
Yeḥiyel takes up Crescas’ famous critique of Maimonides. However, 
while the Spanish philosopher’s observations had an epistemological start-
ing point (the negation of an attribute is equal to the affirmation of its op-
posite; therefore God’s attributes can be predicated as analogous to men’s, 
but infinite and original), Yeḥiyel emphasizes the entirely practical need of 
positive contents.76
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The move from rational argumentation to traditional-kabbalistic narrative 
is particularly clear in regards to prophecy, as already mentioned. Let us fol-
low it in its development.
As a first step, Yeḥiyel critiques Maimonides’ semi-naturalistic frame-
work, which granted much importance to man’s imaginative faculty, as well 
as to his ability to capture the images created by God and sent to him by 
means of the active intellect.77 The next step consists of replacing the fac-
ulty of imagination with the intellect: God, in his great goodnes, causes a 
knowledge, similar to that of the primary cause, to pass from potentiality 
to actuality in the prophet’s intellect. In this way, every naturalistic aspect 
of the prophecy is eliminated, and the accent is definitely shifted onto the 
will of God and away from human disposition.78 The third step consists of 
an allusion to esoteric doctrines, which concern the vision of the merkavah 
(Ezechiel’s divine chariot) and include the tradition relative to the “Throne of 
Glory” and the “Celestial Man.” The rabbis had explicitly prohibited speech 
on these doctrines, the “extraordinary secrets,” but this does not prevent one 
from speaking of the divine origin of the prophecy in positive terms. This 
is the last step of Yeḥiyel’s work, after the traditional distinction between 
Moses and the other Jewish prophets.79 On the basis of Recanati’s commen-
tary on the Torah, Yeḥiyel distinguishes the various sefyroth appointed to the 
prophecy of Israel and of the other peoples. In his examination of the mal-
edictions of Bilam, which transform themselves to benedictions (Numbers 
22-24, Deuteronomy 22:6), he arrives at the conclusion that
the nations receive the prophecy from the energy of the attribute of judg-
ment (dyn), as it had happened until then to Bilam. Thanks to the great 
mercy that he nourishes for his people, God caused the energy of the at-
tribute of mercy (raḥamym) to descend upon them.80
In this oscillation between philosophical tradition, esotericism, and a need 





Can Fundamentalism be Modern? 
The Case of Avraham Portaleone,  
the Repentant Scientist
Recent studies on the involvement of Jews in European scientific research 
during the pre-modern era (sixteenth-seventeenth century) have emphasized 
the delicate balancing act of belonging to two worlds: that of modern culture 
and science, which developed new concepts and methodologies, and that of 
the Jewish tradition. The difficulties were similar to those encountered by 
traditionalist Christians, with an additional element of identity. The tradi-
tional religious beliefs and practices were, in effect, the building blocks of 
the life of the Jewish community and justified its separateness: a crisis in 
these could lead to a crisis of “national” Jewish identity itself.
It is true that, with a few exceptions, the science of the time rarely led to 
an extreme rationalism that could jeopardize Jewish traditional beliefs. On 
the contrary, it was generally associated with traditionalist stances that fol-
lowed different paths.1 
As far as the literary manifestation is concerned, it must be said that 
Jewish authors’ attempts at balancing between the two worlds are often im-
plicitly expressed through changes in references or slight but meaningful 
changes in language in a text that otherwise followed the usual rabbinical 
pattern. This makes the study of their works a delicate and sometimes dif-
ficult operation, but also a fascinating one.
In the context of this issue, the intellectual profile of Avraham ben David 
Portaleone, a physician who lived in the second half of the sixteenth century, 
presents us with a number of interesting aspects. Portaleone is not unknown 
to historians. Born in Mantua in 1541, he was descended from a long line of 
great Jewish Italian doctors2 and trained in traditional Jewish studies with his 
father and then with other masters in Bologna. After the 1553 Papal Bull con-
demning the Talmud and commanding that all copies be burned, he returned 
to Mantua to study with the Rosh Yeshivah, kabbalist, and physician Avraham 
ben David Provenzali (or Provenzalo), who still owned a copy of the con-
demned text. (Portaleone uses a circumlocution in order to avoid censorship, 
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describing it as “all parts of the oral Torah.”3) In addition to the Talmud, 
Portaleone studied Latin and logic with his master. He then devoted himself 
to medicine and philosophy at the University of Pavia, where he received his 
doctorate in 1563. He became a renowned doctor, was very involved with 
the nobility of Mantua and other cities, and wrote some Consilia medica, 
compilations of answers to questions asked by doctors from Lombardy and 
adjacent regions, in Latin and Italian;4 he also established a descriptive list of 
the drugs and surgical operations he claimed to have invented. In addition, he 
offered his services for circumcisions and as a “doctor for the poor people” 
in the Jewish community of Mantua. 
Upon Duke Guillaume of Gonzaga’s request5, he wrote a Latin dialogue, 
the De auro dialogi tres (1584),6 about the possibilities of a medical use of 
gold, a topic halfway between alchemy and medical studies that still created 
heated scientific debate.7 In reality, these dialogues go well beyond discus-
sions about the properties of gold and present the author’s general theory on 
the abilities elements have to affect each other: gold, in this general theory, 
is an element amongst others, with no exceptional status conferred upon it 
by a mystical aura. The technical argument comes with a reflection on the 
appropriate scientific method and on the abilities and limitations of knowl-
edge—meaningful cultural aspects that we shall explore further. 
One Author, Two Languages, Two Rhetorics
These Latin Dialogi seek to address a question which was debated by 
scientists at that time (and which would continue to be for over a hundred 
years after the book’s publication): can gold cure certain illnesses? The pres-
tige gold had enjoyed since Antiquity had given it a special status among 
metals, to the extent that ancient and modern scientists shared the conviction 
that gold, if used in the right way, could be a panacea capable of treating all 
illnesses. Medical literature prescribed grinding it into a very fine powder 
and ingesting it mixed with water, or slicing it into thin strips to be heated in 
the fire and then cooled with wine to produce vinum aureum, golden wine, 
believed to have great powers.
Contemporary medical authorities were divided into two camps on this: 
those who denied gold’s powers and those convinced of them. Portaleone’s 
position lay midway between the two. In his view, the hypothesis that gold 
had powerful medicinal properties was true; nevertheless, it remained a mere 
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hypothesis, since such properties do not reside within gold as we know it 
(aurum vulgare) but in its quintessence (succum aurum), a substance per-
fectly pure and balanced in composition.8 In truth, nobody had yet succeeded 
in extracting this essence, on which the Ars chimica had focused its efforts; 
consequently, the long list of healings that ancient and modern doctors had 
attributed to the ingestion of “common gold” mixed with water or wine was 
the fruit of ignorance and charlatanism.9 As for gold’s capacity to cauter-
ize wounds, it has this in common with many other metals with the same 
characteristics.
As was often the case with scientific works of the period, the subject 
provided the author an opportunity to discuss other, sometimes unrelated 
subjects. In De auro, alongside the strictly medical argument, there are in-
cursions into Greek, Latin, and Italian literature, mythology, and a host of 
other disciplines.10 Two themes, however, stand out for their importance and 
de facto constitute a sort of epistemological framework which organizes the 
book’s empirical observations and gives them coherence: 1) the relationship 
between the ancients and moderns; and 2) the closely related theme of the 
place of experience in scientific argumentation or, in a more general sense, 
the roles of reason and experience in human knowledge. This Latin book be-
longs by full right to the history of science, and must be apprehended as such. 
Near the end of his life, Portaleone published an important book in 
Hebrew inspired by his desire to repent for having devoted himself too much 
to “profane sciences.” In Shiltey ha-Gibborym (The Shields of the Braves, 
published in Mantua in 1612), his tremendous secular erudition was used for 
religious knowledge and practice. The main theme of Shiltey ha-Gibborym 
was the description of the architecture of the Temple of Jerusalem, as well 
as its furniture and rites. This description precedes a collection of passages 
from the Bible and rabbinical literature and is meant, according to the author, 
to supply a better sense of the physical place where the sacrifices were of-
fered, thus adding to the reading of those passages a deeper intention—mak-
ing it possible to feel “as if” sacrifices were presented, Portaleone writes. 
In fact, the model of the Temple is used as a scheme for a sort of encyclo-
pedia wherein Jewish legal arguments inspired by the Talmud and the great 
decision-makers are mixed into long chapters about a variety of contempo-
rary sciences. This Hebrew work belongs to the history of religious mentali-
ties, specifically to the relationships between religion and modern European 
culture. 
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It is worth quoting here, in its entirety, the dramatic incipit to Shiltey 
ha-Gibborym. 
When God wanted to chasten me, I fell ill. Two years ago the whole left 
side of my body became as if dead and I could no longer touch my hand 
to my breast nor walk in the street, even leaning on a cane, because of the 
loss of feeling and the ability to move my limbs.
I searched my behavior and saw (after Him who sees all) that in addi-
tion to my sins, which were more numerous than the hairs on my head, the 
clamor of my neglecting the Torah had risen before the face of God. For 
I had dealings with the children of Greek wisdom, I sought to reach the 
heights through philosophy and medicine, which lured me with their hon-
eyed words to seek salvation in the ways of darkness, and thus prevented 
me from devoting myself to the heritage of the community of Jacob, as I 
should have done. 
This is why God was angered against me, dire maladies have darkened 
my days and defeated me; my nerves are ruined, my sighs do not cease, so 
that with the bitterness of my soul, sleep has left me and I cannot recover 
my strength. Happiness has fled and pain increased. So I raised my eyes 
upward and made repentance in my heart. I told myself that sin might be 
forgiven if, after repairing what he had damaged, the father were to teach 
his children that they would be victorious with God if they would put His 
Law in their hearts, meditate on it day and night and observe prudence 
and good counsel; by so doing they would be blessed….11
The study—never tackled12—of the relationship between the two phases 
of his creation shall provide us with interesting insights about the scientific 
and religious mind-frames of Italian Jews in the pre-Modern time. Beyond 
the psychological motivation that drew this prestigious Jewish doctor of 
Mantua to “conversion,” we shall try to analyze what is left of the scientist in 
the work of the “repentant.” In other words, we shall see whether the pietas 
of the old man careful to make up for the harm done in his youth completely 
erased the former experience. Or, more generally: what was the strategy, 
even an unconscious one, of this sudden and complete change? To what ex-
tent is the “return” (in Hebrew teshuvah, or repentance) just a conversion and 
not a complex variation in which the “old” is another form of the “new”? The 
comparison between the two books practically imposes itself, the first one 
being written in Latin, with a brilliant tone, and marked by an unapologetic 
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rationalism, whereas the second one, in Hebrew, showing a deep religious 
attitude and including prayers and pious reflections. 
“Experience, guide of all natural knowledge”13
An important aspect of the Latin dialogues on gold is the necessity for the 
doctor (considering the role of doctors at the time, we should instead say for 
scientists in general) to consider experience to be the only legitimate source 
of knowledge. This is why, according to the author, alchemists should be 
praised for their endless and repeated experiments with metals, but simulta-
neously, a clear distinction should be made between their practice and their 
ridiculous and “barbaric” theoretical premises.14 
At the beginning of the first dialogue, Dynachrysus, the author’s alter ego 
(a name referring to the “power” of gold), is visited by Achryvasmus (mean-
ing, approximately, “without gold”). The latter is surprised by the peculiar 
attire of his friend: a tunic tied up with a few belts. Dynachrysus explains that 
this is the outfit of the alchemists, and it allows faster access to the “burning 
volcano,” the oven where metals were melted. 
Achryvasmus: Are you looking for the density of Mercury, the philoso-
pher’s stone, the adultery sun, would you like to face financial bankruptcy 
by exposing yourself to tremendous expenses to send to the moon—fol-
lowing the example of the alchemists—terrible howling and barking of 
all kinds, like a rabid dog?15 
Dynachrysus firmly denies being affected by such irrationality. If he be-
haves like an alchemist, it is only in order to experiment: while pursuing 
different objectives, alchemists reach interesting results, important for the 
advancement of scientific knowledge.16 The venerable medical tradition of 
Hippocrates and Galen is certainly not to be rejected, but one should be open 
to innovation. 
Dynachrysus: The same way a man would prepare himself for a duel 
without knowing the weapons he will be using, practicing with the usual 
tools as well as the less common ones, in order to protect life and repress 
his opponent’s aggressiveness; the same way, I would like to be trained in 
the two kinds of therapeutics to make available, according to the different 
inclinations of men, dogmatic as well as empirical elements.17 
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This stance, clearly in favor of experience, and cautiously critical of the 
Greek-Arabic medical tradition, which had become “dogmatic,” was not an 
innovation, since it was a growing trend in Italian universities at the time.18 
Nevertheless, one must appreciate the clarity of Portaleone’s position, which 
is sometimes expressed with an iconoclast tone: Dynachrysus almost plays 
around with his topic, and shocks his interlocutor by talking about such an 
authority as Pliny the Elder. One should dare contradict the great Pliny, he 
says, because 
He assumed a lot of things that were still to be demonstrated.19 
Dynachrysus also explains, in a peremptory manner, that the true dividing 
line between man and an animal deprived of reason is the ability to perform 
experiments. The extent of this statement is remarkable: man is defined by 
his ability to experiment, not to formulate abstract concepts—following the 
Aristotelian-Platonic philosophical tradition—nor by his ability to have a 
religion. His task consists of experiencing in order to know and knowing 
in order to transform (since the knowledge of doctors is supposed to be ap-
plied); thus, the author’s ideal is not contemplative but pragmatic—a feature 
adapted to the social and economic context of Italy in the late sixteenth cen-
tury, where pre-industrial activities of extraction and transformation were in 
full expansion. 
Portaleone constantly repeats that experience is the only legitimate source 
of knowledge, and formulates this in a manner reminiscent, on another level, 
of Martin Luther’s sola scriptura: even where reason is incapable of infer-
ring the cause of a natural phenomenon, we can have a certain knowledge 
of it through experience, without other aids, experientia sola.20 The two in-
terlocutors agree on this: “Experience [says Achryvasmus] is celebrated as 
a source of knowledge for all natural things. If you were to deny this, you 
would deserve not only to be reproached but also to be punished.”21
Can one find a similar experimental vision in the Hebrew work? 
Shiltey ha-Gibborym was inspired precisely by the regret occasioned by 
spending too much time studying the “seductive words” of philosophy and 
medicine, the “children of the Greek scholars,” neglecting Jacob’s legacy. 
A careful analysis of the Hebrew book shows that this vision does not disap-
pear: it is incorporated in a different conceptual pattern. Shiltey ha-Gibborym 
is paved with descriptions of contemporary reality, included under random 
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pretexts over the course of the argument. One can find, for example, the de-
piction of a hypothetical Jewish society amid a discourse on the classes of 
people in charge of the cult of the Temple, which is, in fact, a sociological 
analysis of the urban reality of the Italy of his time.22 Portaleone sometimes 
describes in detail a technical process, such as the preparation of powder for 
military use,23 or of invisible ink meant to send messages to people trapped 
in cities under siege.24 At the same time, he develops here biblical notions, in 
this case that of Kohen meshuaḥ milḥamah, the priest mandated to military 
issues in the Bible.25 
But the neutrality of the experimenter can also be found in the deep logic 
that justifies the writing of the book. The author, afflicted with disease, thinks 
that he was cursed for, among other matters, his intellectual efforts in “for-
eign” fields. He thinks that he may be forgiven if he teaches children, and 
this is why he prepares ma’amadoth, that is to say, anthologies of texts from 
the Bible and rabbinical literature that his children—and all the Jews who do 
not have time to devote themselves entirely to the study of the Bible—will 
be able to read from every day, thus accomplishing their duty to study. This 
reading shall be efficient in the sense that it shall allow them to accumulate 
merits for the after-life, even if it is performed without the proper intention.26 
In support of his theory, Portaleone quotes a passage of the Zohar that, if 
read in a physical context, can be seen as the description of a mechanical 
experience in which a cause is linked to an effect: a scientific outlook is thus 
transposed to the religious realm. Not only study, Portaleone adds, but even 
the simple reading of certain psalms acquires a particular dimension, as the 
kabbalist Yosef Gikatilla (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) points out in 
Sha‘arey Orah (Doors of Light): the psalms, called in Hebrew mizmorym, 
function as mazmeroth, billhooks that open the way to prayer and allow it to 
reach the “Residence of its Holiness.”’27 
This attitude is expressed with strength in the midrash quoted over the 
course of the argument: 
God made you aware that the Torah and the soul are compared to a lamp. 
Indeed, he writes about the soul: “The soul of man is a lamp of God”; and 
about the Torah: “Because the commandment is a lamp, and the Torah is 
a light. The holy man, may he be blessed, said to the man: “My lamp is in 
your hands, and your lamp is in my hands. If you keep mine, I keep yours; 
but if you turn my lamp off, I turn yours off […].”28
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The man acts on Godhead and provokes a reaction from Godhead. The 
midrash chooses to illustrate the conception of the rapport between man and 
God with the example of material order, showing well how the mechanical 
system is formally close to the experimental scientific system of cause and 
effect. Theurgy (the effects of human behavior on Godhead) reproduces the 
attitude of science: the first by intervening with God, the second by interven-
ing with things.
The Limits of Knowledge 
Portaleone’s reflection, leaning towards a pragmatic rationalism, is free 
of scientific hubris. As he writes in the Latin dialogue, the knowledge man 
reaches by means of experience is far from exhaustive. The power of the ele-
ments, for instance, can be identified only by way of generalization, because 
the world is made of an almost unlimited number of things, whose qualities 
are infinite. That being said, the insurmountable boundaries of human knowl-
edge cannot justify negligence, nor lack of intellectual rigor, nor sophism. 
D. - […] Reason […] tries to match a cause with certain effects in order to 
predict why a certain element has an emollient power and another one has 
a stiffening one, why one is drying while the other one is astringent […], 
but to solve a question, Reason only proceeds by way of generalization, 
as if it were holding on to a sacred anchor; it soon brings back the power 
of medication and its remarkable abilities to its specific form, or general 
substance. 
A. - … and takes the ship in quite a frail haven,29 in a light shelter, because 
the exact substance of the element which produces these remarkable ef-
fects is perfectly known by God the very mighty: by Him only, the creator 
of the entire universe. 
D. - And it is certain that since the things of the world are almost infi-
nite, and also that their characteristics are infinite, man, who is mortal, 
deserves indulgence. One should, however, vigorously blame whoever 
among us ignores, out of negligence, what human intellect would be able 
to reach, or the one who ignores the truth for a misleading reason or a 
false distinction.30
A consequence of this declaration of scientific ethics underwritten with 
epistemological caution as well as intellectual voluntarism31 is the separation 
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between the scientific and the religious spheres. The knowledge of the effects 
belongs to man (as does the hypothesis of the causes); the knowledge of the 
real causes belongs to God. The human realm is that of experience, the di-
vine one that of mystery; the unproven notion of quintessence represents the 
hypothetical solution to which the human intellect resorts when it is incapa-
ble finding something out by merely observing phenomena. It is, therefore, a 
notion destined to remain void.
One shall also notice that the mention of God appears in Achryvasmus’s 
lines, here and there,32 whereas Dynachrysus, the author’s alter ego, restricts 
himself to an argument of the logical type: man, a finite and mortal being, can-
not lay claim to a total and definite understanding of the elements and of their 
powers because this task would require infinite time. As for Dynachrysus’s 
allusion to the “specific form,” the author explains well, quoting Galen, that 
this form with “unknown characteristics” is nothing other than harmony, or 
proportion, between hot and cold, humid and dry; the entirety, that is, of 
a substance which cannot be easily divided into its constitutive elements. 
Thus, it is a perfectly natural situation, where the occult character of its qual-
ity depends only on our ignorance. Portaleone appears in these dialogues to 
be a rationalist who completely skips the religious dimension, placing it in 
the realm of the unknown and unknowable.
The dialogue De auro appears to be a scientific essay where the inad-
equacy of analytic techniques is considered a serious handicap in the devel-
opment of knowledge. This explains the indulgence for alchemy that can 
help one—in spite of its declared aims—to better understand the nature of 
elements and their transformations. 
The division between the scientific and the religious spheres disappears 
in the Shiltey ha-Gibborym, the book written after his religious turn: the pro-
ject underlying this book is one that subordinates science to religion. Here 
the scientist, with a deep and modern encyclopedic knowledge, envisions 
secular science merely as ancilla of sacred science: the botanic and musical 
sciences are put to the service of better understanding the rites of the Temple 
of Jerusalem; a short alphabet lesson is useful to a proper reading of Greek 
words that appear in rabbinical literature; and the study of the punctuation of 
Latin texts can help one better grasp the te‘amym, the cantillation signs of the 
Torah, which makes for a better understanding of the sacred text. 
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Portaleone’s approach was indeed so unusual that one of the first contem-
porary researchers who dealt with his work put forth the hypothesis that the 
real aim of Shiltey ha-Gibborym was to transmit modern knowledge under 
the cover of pious intentions.33 The Counter-Reformation era was not the 
right time to extol the autonomy of science and religion. These were the 
years of the unhappy attempt of Galileo to seek a new kind of harmony 
between scientific discoveries and revealed religion, from here came the 
precautions taken by Portaleone who, to express his rational and “modern” 
knowledge, has to advance them in a disguised form, much as Descartes did 
later on. Portaleone’s project, therefore, probably attempted to modernize 
Jewish culture by bringing in new content in a form that would be more pal-
atable to the traditionalists. It is impossible, of course, to decide whether this 
interpretation is correct, or to settle this question with any certainty.
However, an example taken from the very first pages of the volume can 
give an idea of the author’s complex procedure. One finds a description of 
punctuation inserted into the broadest description of the alphabets known 
at that time, a prelude that the author deemed necessary before plunging 
into the real work of scholarship. Speaking of the Latin alphabet, Portaleone 
states that there is no need to reproduce it typographically in order to de-
scribe it, as—he notes—“All the children of our people know it perfectly, in 
both its printed and its cursive versions.”
But punctuation did need to be explained.
Portaleone teaches his readers the names, shapes, and functions of the 
main punctuation marks, that is, the comma, the colon, and the full stop, or 
period. He gives their names in Greek and Latin (carefully spelling them in 
Hebrew), and then in Italian. Then, to insure better understanding, he de-
scribes their function, taking as reference the te‘amym, the cantillation signs 
of traditional Bible reading. In the same spirit as we find in the Kuzary of 
Yehudah Ha-Levy, he seizes the opportunity to proclaim that the te‘amym 
were in existence prior to the Latin signs.
To make sure he will be correctly understood, he cites a long biblical 
verse (Deuteronomy 12:11) into which he inserts Latin punctuation marks. 
He supposes that the reader, familiar with the Masoretic text, will learn the 
Latin signs by associating them with the te‘amym.
This procedure is both complex and strange. It is unlikely that the readers 
for whom the Shiltey ha-Gibborym is intended were unaware of the exist-
ence and usage of these signs, as they had been in use in printing for several 
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decades, particularly in Italy, and as the educated Italian Jews were perfectly 
familiar with the culture of the country. Portaleone writes here on two levels, 
one intentional and the other perhaps unintentional. He begins by reducing 
the basic elements of secular culture to Jewish culture. The te‘amym of the 
Torah, according to Jewish tradition, are revealed, just as its letters are.34 But 
Portaleone slips over this subject; what interests him is not only the fact that 
the Hebrew signs preceded Latin punctuation but that they were the model 
for it, both logically and didactically. This first movement is typical of the 
fundamentalist attitude, in that it reduces external knowledge to traditional 
knowledge, thus neutralizing it. And Portaleone the penitent was—if we take 
him at his word—motivated by a fundamentalist piety.
However, at the same time—and this is the second line of thought—by 
applying these signs to a biblical verse he opens the possibility of a reading 
of the biblical text governed not by the rabia‘ and atnaḥ but by commas and 
periods. By bringing the secular into the sacred sphere, in an attempt to reduce 
the one to the other, he is in fact accomplishing a work of modernization. If 
we compare a verse in Portaleone’s punctuated version with the same verse in 
volumes published in Protestant or Evangelical circles, for instance the one by 
Antonio Brucioli (published in Italian in 1532) and another by Pierre Robert 
Olivétan (published in French in 1535), we can judge the effective modernity 
of Portaleone’s version, which is closer to our modern, usual standards.35
The Silence of Ancient Books
In the Latin dialogues, the constant call for experience and the refusal to 
blindly submit to authorities of the past corresponds to a vision of history in 
which the past does not hold a beautiful, mythical status. On the contrary, the 
time called the “golden age”36 was in reality, according to the author, a time 
of misery, cruelty, and rebellion against God. It was called “golden” only 
because men lived for a long time, and gold, like them, is indestructible.37 
Between Ovid and Horace, who celebrated the ideal virtues of this mythical 
time (or even Torquato Tasso, whose pastoral poem Aminta was performed 
the same years Portaleone wrote De auro), on the one hand and the epicu-
rean Lucretius, who fought this image and opposed to it that of a savage 
humanity, physically strong but unfit to social life and ignorant of technical 
knowledge (De rerum natura, V, 925-1010), on the other, Portaleone clearly 
chooses the latter. 
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The scientist distances himself from the available scientific legacy; 
the knowledge accumulated in the past cannot be used—it’s a dead end. 
Portaleone expresses these difficulties in a suggestive staging, at the begin-
ning of the third dialogue.38
A. - What are you doing locked up in the library, O Dynachrysus, in such 
a way that you do not hear my loud knocking?
D. - I am calling the dead ones, I am begging them with special care. 
A. - O dear friend, so you wish to lose your soul! 
D. - God forbid! 
A. - Let me in already, do not keep me any longer out in the open! 
D. - Push the door, they shall open right away. 
A. - Hello, my Dynachrysus. What a strange thing: it is the daytime, and 
on a chandelier, close to you, burns a candle. 
D. - This is what the magicians, the sorcerers, the charmers and others do 
to ask the dead ones for the truth. 
A. - Are you kidding, Dynachrysus, or are you talking seriously? And 
what kind of relationship do you have with the dead people? 
D. - I was trying to know if those dead people could help me, a living 
one; but I am so unhappy and miserable, the living ones are the cause of 
so much trouble to me, and the dead ones do not seem to defend me in 
any way! 
A. - But where are these dead people? 
D. - What? Are you still held in sleep? Can’t you see that this house is 
full of them? 
A. - Oh, now I understand my foolishness! You were thinking about the 
books, and I thought that you were talking with the dead ones! 
D. - Let the dead ones leave: there is not any relation between us. 
The erudite knowledge of the past is useless for the progress of science; 
the library is a cemetery and the books cannot help with the problems (mo-
lestia) of the present.
The library-cum-cemetery, dimly lit by a candle, corresponds in every 
way to the image formulated by other scientists of Portaleone’s generation 
and the next. The Jesuit astronomer Giovan Battista Riccioli (1598-1671) 
criticized those who exercised their minds purely theoretically, “intra sua 
cubicula meditando” (in meditating in their little rooms).39 To represent this 
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science of the past, Galileo, Francis Bacon, and Descartes proposed the 
same metaphor of an enclosed space where light never reaches, full of books 
which seem to offer protection from new things outside rather than constitute 
a source of knowledge.40
This is an attitude which returns twenty-five years later in Portaleone’s 
second book, in an entirely different existential context and with its own very 
different rhetoric. A quotation from this second book immediately conveys 
the intervening change of tone. The author is still reserved concerning the 
authorities of the past, but gives his attitude a strong religious and national 
(i.e. Jewish) tone:
Understand and see that, just as one has to accept that precious stones 
and some animals possess—by God’s decree—many virtues for avoiding 
man’s illnesses and for preserving their health, for us it would be a fault, 
an impediment, an obstacle, a great sin to believe in everything these 
philosophers [i.e., non Jewish scientists] have to say on the subject; theirs 
are vain, false, and untrue words in which one must not have faith. One 
must attribute these effects to God alone, to Him alone belong the riches, 
the glory, the kingdom … in heaven and on earth, only He has the power 
to make all grow and give it strength. We praise His Name always since 
he is God above all blessings…. He created the sky … and all its armies, 
the Earth and everything on it, the oceans and all they contain. He gave 
life to us all … and we are His people and the flock He leads … and we 
prostrate ourselves before Him in fear.41
What is left, in the Shiltey ha-Gibborym, of “Latin” Portaleone’s reserva-
tions toward past? The same general and harsh dismissal of past authorities 
could not be expressed in a work whose religious inspiration commanded 
respect for the masters of the past, namely for the rabbis of the Talmud, who 
were considered to be indisputable authorities. The scholars of the Talmud 
cannot be mistaken: such is the implicit rule of the work.
For example, Portaleone writes that some Greek words supposedly mis-
spelled by the rabbis were actually distorted by typographers, implying a 
correct knowledge on the part of the rabbis.42 The description he gives of the 
forty alphabets known during his time is justified because it highlights the 
great knowledge of the members of the Sanhedrin, who had mastered the 
seventy languages of the world.
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His knowledge—about the composition of incense, for example—makes 
him sometimes refute not the undisputable rabbis of the Talmud, but the me-
dieval rabbinical authorities: Portaleone is on these occasions quite embar-
rassed, and precedes his opinion with apologies for contradicting these great 
men of the past as well as with statements of humility taking up to a dozen 
lines.43 
Another example of the difficulty of reconciling science and religion, this 
time not on the level of knowledge but on the level of practice, is in regard to 
the manufacture of oil for the anointment of the Priest. The long and detailed 
description of the manufacture of this oil can certainly not lead to a concrete 
execution, because:
we are exiled due to our sins, soiled with impurity from the contact of 
the dead people; and the impure person should not take care of this holy 
manufacture of herbs but rather should wait for the divine commandment 
to be in a condition of purity. And God, thanks to His great goodness and 
mercy, will make us come back to Him and what is written shall come 
true: “I will throw pure water on you, and you shall become pure.”44
But though it is forbidden to manufacture oil for the unction, the theo-
retical knowledge of its preparation cannot be censored, as “Our masters 
allowed us the simple study of all subjects,” on the condition that forbidden 
practices are not performed.45 If this applies to permanent interdictions as 
well, the study of the holy rituals, which are only temporarily forbidden, 
should all the more be allowed.
A plant mentioned in the Bible is not identifiable through the description 
given by the rabbis of the Talmud, but as the assertions of these ḥakhamym 
cannot be denied, an answer that sounds like an escape clause, whose reli-
gious tone borders on unintentional irony, is provided. This answer is the 
result of the subscription to two belief systems that are a priori incompatible, 
and that Portaleone, twenty-eight years before and in a different context, had 
reconciled by pushing away the value of the auctoritates:
Neither I, ever since I have been studying medicine, nor my famous pro-
fessors have seen the “squinante flower,” or fragrant rush, with all the 
characteristics required [by the Talmud] […]. Maybe God, for some rea-
son, took the aforementioned squinante flower, the right one, which shall 
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be missing until the coming of the Messiah; because then the angel put 
in charge of this flower by God shall plant it back (yakke oto) and say: 
“Grow healthy, with an excellent fragrance and an exquisite taste, like in 
the time of creation.”46 
Unconditional acceptation of Talmudic authorities; awkwardness when 
it comes to contradicting medieval authorities; unlimited open-mindedness 
to theoretical knowledge, even in the case of forbidden practices; great at-
tention paid to data provided by experiences, which are a primary source of 
truth: such are the epistemological premises of the scientist Portaleone after 
his religious repentance. Their combination forms a peculiar work where 
empirical passion comes into contact with messianic impulses.47
As we said, Avraham Portaleone’s description of the architecture of the 
Temple in Jerusalem and its ceremonies in ninety chapters is a preparation 
for the reading of the sacred texts which, conducted with the right kavvanah, 
will have an effect on God and consequently on the children of Israel. 
Despite a certain mysticism in the introduction—the author declares 
his admiration for the kabbalists by acknowledging that he has not had 
the privilege of penetrating their secret garden48—this description is ab-
solutely realist in style, with one highly significant exception which I will 
discuss further on. Portaleone the scientist never wavers in his pious work, 
despite the affirmations in the introduction mentioned above. He is ex-
tremely clear and precise and concerned with verifying the coherence of 
his sources. When these seem in conflict with one another he embarks on 
lengthy discussions, which do not always achieve a satisfactory outcome, 
as he acknowledges. One should add that, despite expressing regret for his 
profane studies at the beginning of Shiltey ha-Gibborym, Portaleone does 
not seem to be denying the value of the experiments he carried out in his 
youth. He even refers the reader of the Hebrew book to De Auro for fuller 
information on his scientific opinions. One can therefore conclude that they 
have not changed; what has changed is the overall conception within which 
they are set.49 
Naturally Portaleone’s scathing criticism of the authorities of the past is 
obsolete in this context. On the contrary, we saw that he, as a repentant, sees 
the sages of the Mishnah and the Talmud as absolute, infallible authorities, 
and when perceptible experience contradicts their affirmations (we are in the 
thick of Galileo’s problematic here), he resorts to strange balancing acts to 
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justify two truths—one addressing the man of religion, the other the scientist. 
Nevertheless, instead of looking forward with the optimism of the explorer, 
here Portaleone looks back, following the typical schema of the traditionalist 
Jew for whom all has already been said and generations to come have only 
to organize the knowledge that is progressively forgotten. 
“My quill is clouded by terrible darkness”
In the Latin Dialogues, Portaleone puts a humility statement in 
Dynachrysus’ mouth:
A. - […] Why did you leave out in your writings several praiseworthy 
things?
D. - Lack of time and an arduous topic mutilated the text. I left to other 
scholars and erudite men the opportunity to reach, with elegance and sub-
tlety, a deeper understanding of the nature of things. O, what kinds of 
wonderful elegance are they adorned with, what sort of ability to phi-
losophize are they enlightened with! Their doctrine has a superior degree 
of perfection and shines everywhere: its nature is visible, equally in the 
absence and presence of the sun; whereas my quill is clouded by a terrible 
darkness that brings out the brightness of this very science.50 
This statement of humility in the De auro about the author’s poor writ-
ing is nothing other than a figure of speech with a reverse function. It is, 
actually, asking the reader to give him credit for his excellent stylistic work. 
Dynachrysus claims to be inferior to the knowledgeable and elegant writers, 
who are able to reach the depth of things, but his statement can be read as an 
underlying criticism of subtle and sophist rhetoricians, who are the opposite 
of scientists who wants to make things (and not mere ideas) talk. 
The phrase “lack of time and an arduous topic” is obviously an excerpt 
from Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed (I:34).51 The dialogues De auro 
have a very high degree of intertextuality, since they are sprinkled with nu-
merous references to Latin and also, unusually, Jewish literature which can 
only be brought to light by a detailed analysis.
The intertextuality was a rhetorical game aiming at showing the readers 
the extent of the author’s knowledge; it is a sort of implicit, reciprocal ac-
knowledgement between scholars who shared the same intellectual training. 
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Sometimes, especially for comments on a moral aspect, references are made 
explicit by a character who sends the reader back to the source, usually Plato 
or Aristotle. Such sources should not be ignored by the reader, as the author 
sometimes uses them in order to “expand” his text implicitly. The rest of 
the quoted passage demonstrates this usage. The author develops, through a 
simile, the motif of his poor style that would, by contrast, bring out the excel-
lence of the other authors:
D. : […] My quill is clouded by a terrible darkness that brings out im-
mensely the brightness of this science: the same way in a group of white 
doves, the blackness of the bird of satire [a black swan]52 brings out their 
beauty and their elegance; something the fairness of a swan could not do.
Achryvasmus praises the comparison, and adds that it is from Boccaccio’s 
Decameron. The diligent reader who follows the hint finds a short story 
(day IX, story X) too obscene to be narrated in its entirety in a sixteenth-
century scientific study, and even more inappropriate in a twenty-first-cen-
tury essay.53 What is the reason for this quotation, and why did the author 
put the reader on its track by indirectly inviting them to read the source? 
This short story deals with an attempt at a special kind of transformation in-
volving sexual desire; its actors are a monk, a poor merchant, and his young 
wife. Maybe Portaleone wanted to mock the transformations attempted by 
the alchemists, their pipe dreams supported by desire; and he did so in an in-
direct and playful manner. Furthermore, when one considers that the quick 
and apparently innocent reference to Juvenal’s satire (Portaleone writes of 
the “bird of satire” rather than the “black crow” mentioned by Boccaccio’s 
text) refers indeed to this “rare bird” of a woman who is beautiful, with 
a good figure, rich, “fertile,” and even “chaste”—in short, an exceptional 
being—one shall see the full extent of “Latin” Portaleone’s textual implica-
tions. The black swan who replaces, in Dynachrysus’s simile, Boccaccio’s 
crow reminds the informed reader that the author’s humility is a mere rhe-
torical statement.
Irony and allusion are indeed amongst the most prominent features of 
the dialogues on gold. Portaleone leaves it to the reader to process his syn-
thetic statements, which are sometimes on more serious matters. An example 
is at the end of the second dialogue: Dynachrysus, who already denied the 
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medicinal virtues of gold, is being ironic about its true powers, connected 
with wealth: gold is indeed “able to reinforce a weak heart, to treat melan-
cholia and give life back, it favors pleasures and good deeds,” and the like. In 
another example, Dynachrisus is quick to criticize the morally and socially 
harmful effects of gold, which changes life into death, and, on the other hand, 
he glorifies the “almost divine” moral virtue. Achryvasmus, who, in contrast, 
has a weak spot for material gold, accuses him of talking like Dionysodorus, 
the sophist, and treats him like Ctesippus, the victim of deceitful reasoning. 
However, Dynachrysus, who very soberly identified himself a few lines ear-
lier as a Jew, invites him to reread Plato’s dialogue Euthydemus, where these 
two characters interact: he will find there the clearest condemnation of the 
deception of material gold.
In this short passage, Portaleone indirectly developed an apologetics for 
Jews on the moral and cultural level. He does so, remarkably, using elements 
of Greek philosophical literature. The fact that the Jewish character glorifies 
morality and severely condemns the effects of gold, at the time Shylock was 
being written, seems to be a defense and a counter-attack. Dynachrysus in 
this sequence had actually just pointed out the absence of gold in the clothes 
of the High Priest when he enters into the main area of the Jewish ritual, the 
Holy of Holies.
The author also uses the reference to Euthydemus in order to reverse the 
accusation of “sophism.” Dynachrysus strongly reacts to the accusation of 
being a sophist, and in turn accuses Achryvasmus of falling precisely for 
the bad judgment stigmatized by Plato. One can sense in this exchange the 
implicit defense of the Talmud, the book that is in the eyes of Christians char-
acterized by its content and seemingly deceitful (thus, “sophist”) reasoning.
It is difficult to overemphasize the liveliness of these dialogues: they are, 
taken as a whole, not just a scientific dispute but a true literary work, full of 
digressions and amusing statements, with the two characters (one of them 
acting as the alter ego of Portaleone himself) exchanging learned and some-
times witty remarks, in many cases winking at the reader and implicitly in-
viting him to finish their sentences. 
Sometimes (as in the third dialogue, p. 105), the literary play goes as far 
as mixing classical Greek sources for amusing purposes; this is the case of 
the tale of Aesculapius’s death, where Pindarus’s and Plato’s texts are used 
to compose a new story so as to inject a little humor into a long and tiring 
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scientific discussion. In this instance, the play culminates in a biblical quota-
tion (from 2 Kings 7:15), whose meaning is also distorted. 
Dynachrisus: You must know, dear Achryvasmus, that this joke does not 
make me less good than the harmony of music made the prophet Elisha, 
when he says in the book of Kings “‘Nunc autem adducite mihi Psaltem,’ 
cumque caneret Psaltes, facta est super eum manus Domini,” (Portaleone 
quotes from the Vulgate version; the line reads, according to the King 
James version, “‘But now bring me a minstrel.’ And it came to pass, when 
the minstrel played, that the hand of the Lord came upon him.”)
“The hand of the Lord”—meaning a state of mind which enables proph-
ecy—resting on Elisha when he hears music playing is compared to the 
pleasure of a joke after an intellectual effort. We are not far from a smiling 
blasphemy (which would not have been scandalous at all in the Jewish cul-
ture of that time, if occurring in a comic context, either poetic or narrative); 
an admissible explanation is that behind this remark there is Maimonides’s 
theory of prophecy, which is that it is possible only if the recipient of revela-
tion is good-humored.54
The brightness, irony, and subtlety of the allusions present in the three di-
alogues on gold are completely absent from the Shiltey ha-Gibborym. Here, 
the main figures of speech are apostrophe—to his children and to the reader, 
so they fulfill the precepts included in the reading and avoid forbidden ac-
tivities—, invocation—to God, so that he restores Israel in its glory—, and 
statements of humility—willfully sincere as opposed to rhetorical. 
Just like his Latin book, wherein the classical body of work was used as 
a pool of words and phrases, the Shiltey ha-Gibborym is interwoven with 
biblical and rabbinical quotations. Still, the language in this work is nimble, 
Portaleone manages to explain scientific discourses in Hebrew with great 
ease. This obviously is the expression of a “fundamentalist” project, accord-
ing to which all kinds of information and secular disciplines were essential 
to religious knowledge and acts: let us remember that Shiltey ha-Gibborym 
is not an explicit general encyclopedia but a description of the Temple of 
Jerusalem, for which scientific knowledge is necessary. At the same time, it 
serves as an amazing defense for Jews’ access to modernity. This defense is 
of course formulated in an indirect way and not ostentatiously, being justified 
by the quasi-mystical necessity for modern Jews to identify with the Jews 
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of the Temple, and it contains a strong sense of a national and distinctive 
identity.
Avraham Portaleone was not a rabbi; the role of spiritual and intellectual 
teacher he would take on was a late personal choice, without any institutional 
investiture. In that respect, one would say he was an outsider, but as such he 
could probably allow himself certain liberties that would have been unthink-
able for a rabbi. On the other hand, he was a physician, and being a physi-
cian at this time meant having an extensive knowledge not only of medical 
science, but also of the literary and philosophical corpus that nourished the 
intelligentsia of the time—a knowledge that basically defined the European 
intellectual. As a doctor, and consequently a lettered man, Portaleone was in 
the ideal place to serve as a mediator between the Jewish and Christian cul-
tures, performing a mediation that was not accomplished through theology 
(there is no theological reference in Portaleone’s work), but through litera-
ture, philosophy, and science. 
As a pedagogical project meant for Jews, Portaleone’s mediation was not 
followed upon; still, it gets credit for ignoring the traditional demarcations 
and dealing with rabbinical literature and with science, both ancient and 
modern.55 Portaleone also reached two results he probably did not aim for. 
The first of these is that he created a Hebraic, scientific prose, clear and 
synthetic, distinct from the Hebrew used by contemporary rabbis, which was 
full of technical, talmudic, and juridical expressions. 
Portaleone’s work in a number of disciplines thus anticipated what Yosef 
Shelomo Delmedigo would achieve later by using a scientific style which 
was at once clear and precise, far from what Delmedigo called the “awkward 
phraseology” of Arabic philosophical traditions, the “language of rabbinical 
texts, which makes one’s ears tingle and often resorts to Aramaic,” and the 
“flowery and untranslatable rhetoric of the Bible.”56 
Over the longer term, Portaleone was in the lineage of authors such as 
Yehudah ben Yeḥiyel, “Messer Leon.” Already in 1475 this prestigious 
scholar invited Jewish intellectuals to “return” the “lost sciences,” especially 
rhetoric, which led him to give a stylistic reading of the Bible, to the Nations; 
in other words, he suggested a literary approach to the sacred text, bracket-
ing off its religious value.57 A comparison between Portaleone’s style and the 
style of his older fellow citizen Azariyah de’ Rossi (in his Meor ‘eynayim) 
would stress how Portaleone succeeded in freeing himself from the difficult 
prose of Italian rabbinic literature in the Renaissance. In this sense, he was 
50
Chapter 2
modern. It is also important to consider the number of neologisms he in-
vented to translate into Hebrew words taken from the world of realia or from 
the scientific lexicon. 
The second result is that the “classical” rabbinical culture gains—through 
his work—dynamism, relevance, and legitimacy, thanks to its insertion 
in the context of European culture. Indeed, quite ironically, the “repent-
ant” Portaleone will become famous mainly as the author of volumes of 
Antiquitates hebraicae, and with Christian scholars much more than with 
Jewish ones.
“To see with the eyes of imagination”:  
The Jesuitic Model of Portaleone
Portaleone’s method in Shiltey ha-Gibborym calls for a comparative 
analysis, which ends in interesting, even surprising results, especially if we 
take into account the fact that this work is centred on Jewish culture, which 
is considered as a whole preserved from external influences. One remark-
able example is the use of the notion of kawwanah, “intention” or “direc-
tion,” which enjoyed an important diffusion in the lurianic kabbalah, and 
that Portaleone applies to the complex psychological operations linked to the 
representation of the Temple.
Portaleone reminds his reader that for the Jews, after the destruction of the 
Temple of Jerusalem prayer was substituted for sacrifice. Reading the bibli-
cal passages concerning the sacrifices, as well as their rabbinical interpreta-
tions, reinforces this substitution: it is as if one had really offered the sacrifice. 
Therefore, continues Portaleone, in order to have clearly in mind the situation 
of the worshiper offering the sacrifice, to have the necessary kawwanah, you 
must be able to imagine the concrete scene in which the rite took place.
Portaleone puts great emphasis on this aspect, writing, for example (f. 3b):
And now, in order that you may be able to direct (lekhawwen) your entire 
being to heaven while you are in your House of Prayer, as if (keillu) you 
were in that other great and holy House [the Temple] [...] I will copy for 
you [....] 
There are many passages of this sort in the Shiltey ha-Gibborym. The 
author insists on the need to reproduce a situation of the past mentally, 
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through the imagination, so that the religious acts of the present should 
have the same effect as those of the past. The expressions that recur are: 
“You must imagine being there [in the Temple]” and “It will be in our 
eyes just as if you were there, presenting your offerings.” This mental rec-
reation of a disappeared situation is more than symbolic: it can be called 
mystical, because in order to address God in an effective way, according to 
Portaleone, one has to transport one’s self to a determined time and space. 
Once the worshipper is there, his words will be able to transform reality 
(including Godhead).
How ought one to encourage this psychological transfer; how to flesh 
out, as it were, one’s memory? By describing the situation, in this case the 
Temple, in all its concrete reality. And indeed it is the description of the 
Temple which makes up the first part of the book that will render the second 
part more effective. Only through visualizing the scene will one be able to 
read with the right kawwanah and to identify more completely with the wor-
shiper in the Jerusalem of the past.
This multiple chain (prayers replace religious actions and sacrifices, study 
or reading replaces prayer, and study necessitates a description of the place 
of sacrifice) makes it possible for Portaleone to look at the past in a realistic 
manner. He undertakes the task of describing the Temple as it really was, 
setting aside all allegorical significance: one might say the mystical need to 
identify with the worshipper of the past leads one to see that past in a histori-
cal light. If in order to “be there” one needs to render the past present, then 
one must first reconstruct it faithfully. 
To this end, Portaleone mobilizes his remarkable knowledge of science, 
history, and philology to reconstitute the Temple and its site as they actually 
were. In doing so, as we saw, he composes a series of treatises typical of 
the scholarship of his time, speaking of music when he describes the songs 
of the Levites, of botany when he comes to the offerings of incense, and 
so on. In his treatment of these subjects, Portaleone juxtaposes traditional 
Jewish science—from the Talmud through Maimonides to his contemporary 
commentators—and modern science, including a great many references to 
ancient science, Greek, Latin, and Arabic. We will return later on to this idea 
of inserting modern content with a religious aim.
It is interesting to note, before proceeding with this analysis, that 
Portaleone’s approach, that is, the approach of recreating the scene of a reli-
gious event of the past so that the religious practice of the present should be 
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well-oriented (have the right kawwanah), closely resembles that of the spir-
itual exercises of Ignatius Loyola (1491—1556), the founder of the Jesuit 
Order, which were first published in Rome in 1548. I will cite as an example 
the preamble to Loyola’s first exercise:
The First Prelude is a composition, seeing the place. Here it is to be noted 
that, in a visible contemplation or meditation—such as, for instance, when 
one contemplates Christ our Lord, Who is visible—the composition will 
be intended to show with the sight of the imagination the corporeal place 
where the thing which I want to contemplate is found. I say the corporeal 
place, as for instance, a Temple or Mountain where Jesus Christ or Our 
Lady is found, according to what I want to contemplate.
Speaking of these exercises, Roland Barthes uses the term “transferential 
relation.” The expression “to see with the eyes of imagination,” which occurs 
repeatedly in the preambles of the spiritual exercises, is identical in meaning 
to the expressions used by Portaleone. We can note that the second part of the 
Spiritual Exercises consists of a collection of quotations from the Gospels, 
following the life of Christ from the Annunciation to the Ascension: these 
are known as the Mysteries of the Life of Christ our Lord. It is very tempting 
to see a parallel between this second part of the Spiritual Exercises and the 
Shiltey ha-Gibborym.
Experimental Science and Rabbinic Tradition:  
The Distortion of Historical Time
We saw that Shiltey ha-Gibborym is a work based on experience, like the 
Latin Dialogi, and its declared aim is to describe the Temple of Jerusalem as 
it was, avoiding any recourse to symbols or allegories.
But there is one remarkable exception to the author’s realism; it concerns 
his perception of historical time. One should add that Shiltey ha-Gibborym is 
not a straightforward description of the Temple in the manner of traditional 
Jewish texts (essentially the Mishnah with Bertinoro’s commentary and the 
relevant chapters of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah): rather, whenever the op-
portunity arises the author adds little essays in various disciplines. Together 
the essays comprise a kind of encyclopedia, for which the description of the 
Temple, like a Theatrum memoriae, acts as a supporting structure.58
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Let us give an example. Discussing the music and songs of the Levites, 
Portaleone resolutely denies that that theirs was simple, primitive music and 
describes in minute detail the shir maḥshavty (which could be translated as 
“artistic song”) of his time with evident admiration. Remember that he lived 
in Mantua, then one of Europe’s musical capitals. Contemporary music, 
which was highly elaborate, was for him the music of the Temple, and he 
makes this explicit by using the expression “like today” in statements like, 
“They played and sang the psalms of David son of Yshay with many kinds of 
instrumental and vocal music, basing this on books, like today.’59
This foreshortening of present and past, which naturally meets the well-
known exigency of the Jews to appropriate contemporary knowledge which 
was elaborated by others and which they consider remarkable by claiming 
its paternity, must be put in parallel to the spiritual displacement into the past 
recommended for the pious Jew. These anachronisms—there are many in the 
work—indicate an acute perception of historic time rather than great naïvete. 
It is as if the man who twenty-five years earlier had taken a clear stance in a 
scientific quarrel between ancient people and modern ones now found him-
self in the uncomfortable position of wanting to glorify the Jewish past while 
recognizing the greatness of contemporary culture, which was non-Jewish in 
origin. He beholds two privileged eras, that of the Judaism of the First and 
Second Temple and the contemporary age, out of which he fashions an im-
perfect synthesis bespeaking a tension that is difficult to resolve.
We have evoked Portaleone’s methodological probity in this work full 
of religious piety. One would have expected at least a selective choice of 
sources excluding everything non-Jewish, in conformity with his admission 
of having sinned by allowing himself to be fascinated by “foreign” sciences, 
but this was not in fact the case. True, he proposes the above-mentioned 
model of “Israel mother of all sciences” (including the art of war, which 
suggests a frustration vis-à-vis the affairs of the real world and alludes to the 
still-embryonic notion of Israel as a “normal” nation among others), and he 
attributes infallibility to the rabbis of the Talmud, which can lead a reader 
to define him as a “fundamentalist.” But elsewhere, he cites a great many 
non-Jewish sources, past and present, and openly declares this; better, at the 
end of his introduction, when he gives a list of 196 Jewish and non-Jewish 
authors and books, he assigns to the ensemble, as a mnemonic verse: “As for 
me, I will behold thy face in righteousness (“be-tzedeq,“ 196): I shall be 
satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness (Psalms XVII, 15).”60 In other 
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words, by subtle allusion, Portaleone links the contemplation of the face of 
God or, from his perspective, the obtaining of truth, to the use of all sources, 
Jewish and non-Jewish, which together form righteousness, a human and re-
ligious value. He makes a point of indicating that none of these authors of the 
Nations took up a position against the Torah; and one should add that they 
were scientists, not theologians, which suggests the idea of the establishment 
of a neutral ground, that of science, on which the pious Jew can move freely 
and without danger.
Not only does Portaleone not renounce non-Jewish scientific contribu-
tions, he does not abstain from using numerous languages, indispensable for 
the mastery of his rich bibliography. Above all, he manifests his apprecia-
tion, even love, for the Greek language. He justifies its constant use in his 
book by the use the sages of the Talmud made of it, which requires that one 
establishes its correct spelling, given the mistakes made by typographers—
for the rabbis, remember, never made mistakes. This justification smacks of 
dissimulation, and the following passage bears this out. 
In chapter thirty-five, Portaleone describes the three chests in the Temple 
in which worshippers left money for sacrifices. In the mishnah to which he 
refers (Shekalym, chapter 3), it is written that the letters aleph, beth, and 
gimel or, according to another authority, the Greek letters alpha, beta, and 
gamma were inscribed on the chests. Portaleone unhesitatingly accepts the 
second hypothesis and cites Bertinoro: “It is written that (Genesis IX:27): 
God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, [implying 
that] the beauty of Japheth may dwell in the tents of Shem. But, for Japeth, 
nothing is more beautiful than the Greek language.” (In Bertinoro’s text, 
this reads, “For Japheth, there is no more beautiful language than Greek.”)61 
By citing the Jewish authorities, Portaleone is surreptitiously expressing an 
opinion on the Greek language—evidently the famous and controversial 
Azariyah de’ Rossi, although never mentioned, had not written in vain. It is, 
moreover, almost certainly to de’ Rossi’s Meor ‘Einayym (Part 3, chapter 4) 
that Portaleone is referring in the rest of the passage, in which, by develop-
ing Bertinoro’s commentary, he explains that the Jews during the Second 
Temple period were better versed in Greek than in Hebrew. The develop-
ment consists of taking Philo, the Jewish philosopher from Alexandria, as an 
example of poor knowledge of Hebrew. He calls him Yedidiyah, the Hebrew 
version of Philo according to de’ Rossi, and some of the lines he writes about 
him are identical to those in the Meor ‘Einayim. This work, considered one 
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of the first examples of modern Jewish erudition, which Italian rabbis were 
far from unanimously agreeing with, has, in certain respects, an unexpected 
continuation in the Shiltey ha-Gibborym.62
Let us now examine another striking example of Avraham Portaleone’s 
oscillation between modernity and tradition, his discourses on the properties 
of precious stones in De Auro and Shiltey ha-Gibborym. In both works, the 
author discusses the subject at length. In De Auro, he does so by inserting 
it into a broader examination of the classification of beings as animal or 
mineral. His conclusions are categorical: metals and stones are inanimate 
beings, since their growth process does not depend on any kind of nutrition 
or process one could call “organic” (and which he calls “intrinsic”) but on a 
juxtaposition of parts: 
Dynachrisus: Note, Achryvasmus, that when one says that stones feed 
and grow one uses an inappropriate expression (aequivoce nutriuntur, & 
aequivoce augmentatur). Indeed, they do not increase in volume for an 
internal but for an external reason, and grow through the juxtaposition 
of parts, which should not be considered as true nutrition or autonomous 
growth (propria auctio) but rather as an addition. This is why we affirm 
that these mixed bodies are totally lacking in soul.63 
In Shiltey ha-Gibborym, the discussion of precious stones is introduced 
via the description of the breastplate of the High Priest, which was adorned 
with twelve precious stones. As usual in this work, the description of a ritual 
garment is transformed into a veritable little treatise in which Portaleone 
displays his scientific knowledge. The phenomenon of the growth of stones 
is discussed here by bringing to the fore its quasi-miraculous aspect, without 
bothering to give general definitions. When he writes about the diamond, 
Portaleone cites the mineralogist Francesco Roheo’s account of the phenom-
enon of diamonds occasionally, over time, giving birth to other, identical 
diamonds,64 an observation which he does not doubt but explains by natu-
ral laws: “If one wanted to understand this using natural laws, one could 
say that the celestial energy that God gave them and which enables them to 
produce similar diamonds is first transformed by the pure air around it into 
water, which solidifies and becomes ice. Then, thanks to the energy inherent 
in precious stones, the water changes into diamonds.” He continues in this 
vein, citing Theophrastus and Pliny, who respectively talk of precious stones 
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“giving birth” using the divine energy animating them, and of the “preg-
nancy” of another stone lasting three months.65 
This un-critical acceptance of quasi-miraculous phenomena related by 
others clashes with the empirical attitude to which Portaleone has accus-
tomed us, especially as it contrasts completely with the very clear position 
set out in De Auro. But in the cases already examined, the difference between 
the two works lies in their general frames of reference, scientific in one, re-
ligious in the other, not in the recourse to experience and observation as the 
true sources of truth.
To understand this discrepancy, one has to return to the general exami-
nation of the virtues of precious stones in De Auro. Having discussed the 
curative properties of certain fossils and several animals—about which his 
interlocutor is skeptical—Dynachrisus enumerates the qualities of precious 
stones. The almandine garnet protects one from or heals one from all poisons, 
renders its wearer invincible in battle, and enables one to interpret dreams; 
beryl wards off arguments and danger from enemies and makes one calm 
and sincere; jasper stops the menstrual cycle, wards off lust, and heals fever 
and dropsy, and so on. True, Dynachrisus does take pains to attribute these 
opinions to other authors (dixit … fertur … asseverant … affirmant), but at 
the same time he readily sings the praises of the stones, whose transparency 
and luminosity enable them to receive their particular properties, which he 
likens to various parts of the heavens.66 
In the Hebrew work, the lengthy description of the qualities of precious 
stones follows a philological and scientific analysis of the identification 
of the stones on the breastplate of the High Priest, attempting to put some 
order into the multiplicity of often erroneous identifications suggested by 
traditional Jewish exegetes. Here the Hebrew book is more “scientific” than 
the Latin one. But immediately after Portaleone inserts a rather strange 
passage:
Some of my masters, having read these pages, were dissatisfied when 
they noticed I had not discussed the essences of precious stones on the 
mantelet and breastplate [of the High Priest]. Numerous authorities vigor-
ously requested, ordered me to do everything in my power to seek these 
essences so as to consign them to my book, in which case they would 
have been satisfied. But, for me, this is very difficult, particularly because 
the great [non-Jewish] scientists of the past never agree. 
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But I did my utmost, I hastened to find pertinent answers through the 
light of my reason … by trying to attain good results through well-con-
ducted reasoning, and I wrote them in conformity with the orders of many 
great sages.
If I have said true things, I thank God for his bounty in opening my 
eyes to the way: from his mouth comes knowledge and intelligence. I may 
not have attained complete knowledge of their essences and qualities, in 
which case those who have confidence in me should not blame me, as I 
must write only what my eyes have seen, in a just, correct, and true way 
(be-tzedeq).67
It seems clear from these lines that Portaleone had come under pres-
sure from rabbis to include edifying notions regarding a religious subject 
such as the High Priest’s clothing, and not to limit himself to the work of 
the scientist or philologist. This the Mantuan doctor duly did, imbuing the 
precious stones adorning the sacerdotal vestments with manifold proper-
ties, finding correspondences between the twelve stones and the twelve 
tribes of Israel,68 and identifying fanciful etymological links between 
Hebrew and Italian words. In one instance, he even creates an interpreta-
tion from a gematria, i.e. a correspondence between the equal numerical 
value of two different Hebrew words—a method which has nothing to do 
with science.
In short, in the many pages he devotes to precious stones, the scientist is 
eclipsed by the preacher. But he does from time to time recall the “sin” of 
those who deny perceptible experience,69 and concludes his peculiar miner-
alogical treatise by insisting on the primacy of “plain experience” (nisayon 
pashut) over theoretical study, adding, “Without experience, the doctor 
would have no superiority over other men,”70 which seems to be a warning 
to the reader about the profound convictions which rabbinic pressure has 
forced him to depart from. 
Complex, strange, and fascinating, the Shiltey ha-Gibborym can be read 
as an attempt to give Jews a concise handbook of general culture, written 
in Hebrew and keeping Talmudic knowledge as its basis of reference.71 But 
one should not forget that this text is above all a description of the Temple, 
even if modern researchers are understandably attracted by its divergences, 
discrepancies, disparities, deviations, and originality, above all in its ref-
erence to non-Jewish knowledge. In order to evaluate its characteristics, 
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a systematic examination of this description in comparison to the sources 
must be undertaken. An initial analysis yields the following results:
1. Shiltey ha-Gibborym is more synthetic than its sources, to which the 
reader is sometimes referred. It is also more systematic (or follows 
another system), since it brings together subjects which in the sources 
are scattered in different parts.
2. It is interested in the halakha only when it gives details of the Temple’s 
realia. The book aims to be a historic reconstruction, not a book of 
laws.
3. In places, we are dealing with a veritable exegesis in the traditional 
sense. In particular, one finds explanations of the Mishnah, in which 
Portaleone develops hypotheses rendered necessary by the impossi-
bility of consulting the Talmud, which was forbidden at the time, or 
he adopts a position among ancient and modern commentators whose 
opinions differ.
4. The author sometimes enlarges on his sources when he thinks that 
his scientific experience and readings can help one develop a better 
understanding of the subject. In so doing he produces a kind of “sci-
entific midrash.” This amplificatio can develop into a full-blown fic-
tional account in which the author imagines scenes which could have 
taken place in the Temple, complete with dialogues and oratories. This 
is the case in chapters 18–21, in which he stages a conflict between 
priests, Levites, and Israelites, or in chapters 41–2, with the speech of 
the priest in charge of war.
In the works of Avraham Portaleone, one recognizes the intellectual ten-
sions of his time: the great broadening of the horizons of knowledge, the 
manifestation of both a scientific vision of reality and great religious devo-
tion, a change in the perception of space and, for the Italian Jews in particu-
lar, an oscillation between openness and closure to the non-Jewish world, 
together with a shift toward an increased use of Latin and then Italian as a 
written language (Shiltey ha-Gibborym contains many Italian terms, which 
are used to better explain the subject to the reader). This work, with its rever-
sals and difficulties, is part of what one could call the movement of Italian 
Jewish culture towards modernity, or the Jewish declension of a movement 
throughout European culture.
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The Latin Destiny of a Fundamentalist Jewish Work
It was not surprising that a book of this kind was not successful at all 
among Jewish readers. In spite of its religious, even mystical, inspiration, 
and its repeated statements that the true science was authentically Jewish, 
Shiltey ha-Gibborym was still too open to the external intellectual world to 
be accepted in a period of growing hardening on both the Jewish and the 
Christian sides. As far as I can tell, only Yosef Shelomo Delmedigo, one 
of the rare outstanding Jewish scientists of the seventeenth century, recom-
mended reading it (in his ambiguous book Matzref la-ḥokhmah, Purification 
of Science, printed in Basel in 1629). Ḥanukath ha-bayith (The Inauguration 
of the House), a later description of the Temple by Mosheh ben Gershom 
Ḥefetz, published in Venice in 1696, almost ignores Portaleone’s book, and 
makes reference to Jewish sources alone.
A hundred and fifty years after its first appearance, however, Shiltey 
ha-Gibborym found a new life. This time, it was in a Latin version, totally 
stripped of its religious frame, as a learned and authoritative—maybe the 
most authoritative—textbook of “Jewish antiquities” on the subject of the 
Temple of Jerusalem.
Large sections of Portaleone’s book were translated in Latin by the 
Venetian scholar Biagio Ugolini (1702-1775), who included them in his 
monumental Thesaurus antiquitatum sacrarum, a series of 34 volumes 
in folio devoted to the research on Antiquitates judaicae.72 Ugolini wrote 
some chapters of the Thesaurus himself, but for the most part he included 
both classical Jewish texts he had translated for the first time (thus pioneer-
ing in the field) and Latin works by Christian authors. Portaleone is the 
only relatively modern Jewish author within the compilation, and wher-
ever his contributions are inserted, they occupy a privileged place. The 
first thirty-six chapters of Shiltey ha-Gibborym—now referred to as Clypei 
fortium—by “Abraham e Porta Leonis Mutinensis” open the ninth volume 
of the series (Venice: 1748): “Commentarius de Templo Hierosolomytano 
ex R. Abrahami ben David Scilte Haggiborim excerptus maximam huius 
Voluminis partem amplectetur, in quo tanta sese ubique offert rerum 
praestantia et eruditio, ut merito ceteris, qui hoc argumentum illustarunt, 
preferendus esse videatur.” 
The homage paid to the Jewish author is evident; never, except once, 
does Ugolini interfere with his text, thus recognizing Portaleone’s broad and 
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unbiased culture. Bear in mind that recognizing a Jewish source as an author-
ity was not common, even in the eighteenth century. That is made clear by 
the introduction for one of the volumes (volume XI, published in Venice in 
1750), in which Ugolini feels the need to add:
I think I should not neglect to mention here the criticism of those who 
remark that most of my explanations of the sacred philology are taken 
from very ancient Jewish sources; [by this criticism] they seem to accuse 
and denounce those who deduce the Greek things from Greek sources, 
and the Roman matters from Roman texts. I invite these people to show 
me the way to get to Judaea—which until now has been inaccessible to 
people not accompanied by those [ancient Jewish] escorts—and to ex-
plore it more easily.
Avraham Portaleone’s book had been already noticed by another impor-
tant historian of Jewish antiquities, Johannes Opitius, who mentions him as 
an “egregium opus” in his Disquisitio Historico-Philologica de Candelabri 
Mosaici Admirabili Structura, published in Jena in 1708.73 However, with the 
translation by Ugolini, the book finds a place in the library of every learned 
Christian interested in Philologia sacra, even if its new destiny probably 
does not correspond to the true original intentions of the Jewish author. In 
any case, a quick reading of some passages of this translation shows a per-
fect adherence to the Hebrew text and, at the same time, a fluent and elegant 
Latin. This is certainly due to the talent of Biagio Ugolini, whose knowledge 
of Hebrew was so good that some modern researchers wrongly believed him 
to be a converted Jew. Or, perhaps, some of the reason for such a good Latin 
translation lies in the original Hebrew text itself.
Portaleone, as we have said, was a brilliant Latin author before being 
a Hebrew one. In his Hebrew book he almost creates a scientific Hebrew 
style, which is clear, precise, and simple, without being simplistic; it is ex-
tremely different in style from the Hebrew of Azariyah de’ Rossi, as we no-
ticed before. De’ Rossi, who wrote thirty years before Portaleone on similar 
matters, was striving for a Hebrew style that would allow him to deal with 
subjects new to the Jewish tradition: his sentences are long, complicated, 
full of biblical and rabbinic quotations, and definitely hard for a modern 
reader. 
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We suggest that Portaleone’s Hebrew was innovative because it had im-
plicit Latin structures underneath; these structures were indeed modern—as 
they are in the Dialogues on Gold, and thus suitable for a scientific language; 
they were most probably influenced by contemporary Italian, even though 
both Latin and Hebrew peculiarities are entirely respected. This explains the 
liveliness of his Latin dialogues and the clarity of his Hebrew treaty. 
In a sort of circle, the literary work of the Jew Portaleone started in Latin, 
and ended in Latin. The language of modern science found its way into 





Allegorical Space and Geometrical Space: 
Representations of the Temple 
of Jerusalem in the Works of Italian 
Jewish Authors
The reservations expressed in the Bible and reinforced in Jewish norma-
tive literature concerning divine representation have significantly limited 
the production of images in the Jewish world.1 In practice, this position 
was backed up by Jewish religious behavior and intellectual productions 
until the so-called “modern” era: whether at a popular or scholarly level, 
images were not an instrument of knowledge for the Jews, and visual al-
legories in particular had no place whatsoever in Judaism, despite being a 
privileged means of expression in other cultures. Although Jewish culture 
definitely had allegories, these took the form of written texts, rather than 
images. Moreover, a second restriction was added to this important limita-
tion: even on an exclusively literary level, allegories were seldom based on 
human representation. 
It was the Temple of Jerusalem which was to become a catalyst for al-
legorical representation, having always played a central role in both Jewish 
thought and the Jewish imaginary. For this reason, the changes its representa-
tion underwent over the course of time make it possible to track the evolution 
of Jewish perceptions and representations of space.
To the Temple of Jerusalem—or “Temples” of Jerusalem, rather—one 
should add the Tabernacle, which was erected in the desert under divine 
guidance and prefigured the Temple. The first Temple was erected by King 
Solomon and destroyed by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar in 587 BCE; 
the second was built by Zerubbavel on his return from exile and largely re-
modeled by Herod, before being torn down by the Romans in 70 B.C. From 
this date onward, until the modern period, Jews have never ceased to consider 
the destruction of the Temple to be the most salient and distressing sign of 
their lost national autonomy and disaffection from God; indeed, many Jewish 
thinkers have argued that the physical subjection of the people of Israel and 
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their imperfect relationship with God has led them into intellectual decline 
and confusion. There was also the idea of a third Temple, which the prophet 
Ezekiel had seen in a detailed vision and which was expected to reinstate 
Judaism in Jerusalem, return the people of Israel to prosperity, and rekindle 
their privileged relationship with God.
Profound disillusionment and the hope of a future reinstatement both 
crystallized around the Temple, as the Jewish intellectual need for represen-
tation focused on the volumes, spaces, buildings, courtyards, fortifications, 
furniture, and rites of that—real or imaginary—architectural structure.
A survey of the evolution of the representations of the Temple throughout 
Jewish culture as a whole would be an ambitious project, beyond the scope 
of the present chapter. More modestly, we wish to focus on a specific geo-
graphical area defined by a certain internal coherence and historical continu-
ity: Italy. However, before tackling significant authors from the medieval and 
modern periods, we must say a few words on the founder of the allegorical 
method in Jewish medieval culture, Maimonides.
Maimonides and Allegories
Allegories play a central part in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, 
which was composed around 1190 and is the most celebrated and influential 
work in the history of Jewish thought. In his introduction, the author clearly 
states that his text is exclusively intended for Jews who both believe in the 
truth of the Torah and are conversant with philosophical thought. In particu-
lar, it addresses Jews perplexed by the gap between the conceptual registers 
of narratives wherein God assumes human characteristics (he speaks, is vis-
ible, has feelings, etc.) as he intervenes into the world, on the one hand, and 
of abstract speculations on a transcendent and incorporeal God, on the other. 
Very cautiously, Maimonides proposes a radical solution, arguing that there 
is a perfect correspondence between the Torah and philosophical thought, 
despite their different languages. He compares the Torah to a golden apple 
wrapped in a silver mesh: whereas the overwhelming majority of readers 
will only perceive the mesh—the Torah’s immediate or literal meaning—
knowledgeable readers (i.e., philosophers) will be able to discern the gold—
the figurative meaning—lying beneath that surface. For Maimonides, the 
Torah as a whole (and in particular the stories of Creation and the description 
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of the Chariot, i.e., the celestial vision of the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah) is 
a mashal—an allegory—which must be deciphered to grasp the text’s philo-
sophical nimshal—its hidden meaning. Thus, all the anthropomorphisms in 
the biblical narrative lose their immediate meaning, instead pointing to a 
philosophical discourse on God.
In reality, Maimonides’ thought is more complex. Not only is the Torah 
as a whole an allegory, but allegories also constitute a method of interpreta-
tion. For Maimonides, devising allegories in order to evoke metaphysical 
contents is akin to making a rope by tying pieces of string to each other until 
it is long enough to draw from the depths of the Torah. In other words, for 
Maimonides good interpreters are allegorists, as exemplified by the proph-
ets and the masters of the Talmud, who used allegories when they wished 
to evoke metaphysical realities beyond the reach of common intellects and 
everyday language.2
The Guide of the Perplexed is a philosophical-religious treatise which 
presents its readers with a path to authentic divine worship, where intellec-
tual knowledge leads to passionate desire: it ends on a magnificent allegory 
of the different human attitudes towards the truth and God. Maimonides’s 
chosen mashal is a city with a royal palace at its center: people wander out-
side the city walls, or enter them but take a wrong turn, while still others stop 
in the entrance hall of the palace; only a few reach the king`s room and stand 
before him.
I say then: The ruler is in his palace, and all his subjects are partly within 
the city and partly outside the city. Of those within the city, some have 
turned their backs on the ruler’s habitation, their faces being turned an-
other way. Others seek to reach the ruler’s habitation, turn towards it and 
desire to enter it and stand before him, but up to now they have not yet 
seen the wall of the habitation.3
The images Maimonides had in mind were probably of Jerusalem and the 
Temple, with their different degrees of holiness, from the Temple Mount, to 
the vestibule, the inner courtyards, and the Sanctuary (called heykhal, ‘pal-
ace’), to the “dwelling place of the monarch,” the Qodesh ha-qodashym or 
Sancta sanctorum, where the Tablets of the Covenant were kept and where 
the divine presence was most intense.
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The Allegorical Sanctuaries of Mosheh of Rieti 
Encouraged by this prestigious precedent, Jewish authors placed the 
Temple of Jerusalem at the center of their allegory-making—in Hebrew, the 
making of allegories is called memashel meshalym, and is a quality ascribed 
to prophets. Like their Christian counterparts during the same period (such as 
Bonaventura of Bagnoregio, in his Itinerarium mentis ad Deum), they turned 
the city of Jerusalem into an allegory of perfection and bliss, marking the 
point of arrival for the faithful at the end of their voyage of initiation. One 
of them, Mosheh ben Yitzḥaq of Rieti (1388-ca. 1465), an unconditional ad-
mirer of Maimonides, linked all of his intellectual productions to the image 
of the Temple.4 
A physician, philosopher, and poet, Mosheh of Rieti is mostly known for 
his Miqdash me‘at (“The little Sanctuary”), a 4,800 verse poem in Hebrew 
meant to constitute the “Jewish response” to Dante Alighieri`s Divine 
Comedy.5 Modeled on the Temple of Jerusalem, Rieti’s poem is constituted 
of three parts: a vestibule, a palace, and the Sancta sanctorum. A level of 
sacred knowledge corresponds to each one of these three spaces, increasing 
the closer one gets to the center of the Sanctuary. But the Temple does not 
merely provide an external framework for an encyclopedia of knowledge, 
it also represents Paradise, the final destination of the poet’s voyage of ini-
tiation, both a heavenly Sanctuary and the Yeshivah shel ma‘lah (celestial 
school), where the souls of the saints practice intellectual disputations, as 
they would in a Talmudic school, under the guidance of the divine Presence. 
Rieti confers additional meanings to the Sanctuary: not only does it allegori-
cally represent Paradise, it also illustrates a divine emanation. He suggests a 
long prayer in which the poet entreats the Temple to forgive his sins, includ-
ing the passage: 
Temple of supplicants, O supreme aspiration,
To which we turn for mercy and forgiveness,
Life springs from thy blessed source.6
It is not surprising that the worshipper should address a prayer to the 
Temple, if we consider that we are not dealing with the historical Temple 
here but with a divine emanation (probably Ḥokhmah, “Wisdom”) that al-
lows him to access the divinity, the essence of which lies beyond his grasp. 
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Mosheh of Rieti’s Miqdash Me‘at is entirely allegorical. Its allegories 
can either be explicit, as in the chapter on “The City of God,” in which each 
house represents a biblical book (hence the subsequent identification of the 
Temple or Sacred City and the scriptures7), or left to the reader to interpret, 
as is the case for example with the mashal in which some young girls draw 
water from the sea outside the City of God (“pure water, purity from above”) 
in order to pour it into “the House of the Father.”8
In this poem, spatial representation does not seek to depict a tangible 
reality; instead, it provides a springboard for reflections that are conceptual 
in nature, a visual representation allowing the author to evoke abstract con-
siderations which might otherwise be impossible to grasp.
In another, shorter and more difficult text in Hebrew, Ya‘ar ha-Levanon 
(“The Forest of Lebanon”), Rieti considers the Temple in a more traditional 
light, as an allegory of the different worlds: the sublunar world, the celestial 
spheres, and the separated intellects. The final part of this work consists of 
a series of answers to the question Ubi sunt? (loosely translated as, “what has 
become of the Temple and of its objects?”): 
Where are the Cherubim? Where are the Ark and the Tables that were left 
there so that we may remember that the Torah is the very mystery of being 
and lies at the root of the life of every soul? […] The Ark represents the 
part of the world which is comprised of a body sustained by the intellec-
tual form surrounding it […] the Cherubim are there in order to show that 
all beings in this world are separated, actual intellects .9
The poet is not interested in the material Temple; what is at stake here, for 
him, is gaining access to another level of reality which the edifice, its acces-
sories, and its rites point to.
The third of Rieti’s texts we will examine, Filosofia naturale e fatti 
de Dio (“Natural philosophy and things concerning God”) was written in 
Italian—in a central Italian dialect, more specifically—but transcribed into 
Hebrew characters. Intended for students, this work on physics and meta-
physics includes some remarkable allegories, the most elaborate of which 
centers on the Temple. Associating an answer he received in a dream to a 
question that has been haunting him—is there a hierarchy between the vari-
ous biblical books?—Rieti conceives the grandiose and complex image of 
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a palace within which correspondences between the mashal (the figure, the 
allegory) and the nimshal (the figured meaning) abound:10
And I saw a magnificent edifice in the uppermost part of the world. It was 
the most sacred and remarkable thing I had ever seen, and it seemed to 
me that the heavens did not surround it at all. Its walls were of fine silver, 
and it was covered with shapes of pure gold which shone so clearly and 
brightly that at first glance they looked exactly like stars; upon a closer 
look, however, one could see that even though they were myriad, they all 
constituted variations on twenty-seven figures. Its roof was made of the 
same material, and propped up by forty-eight wonderful columns with the 
same filigree. One of them stood at the center while the others encircled 
it. The central column shone like a sun and those around it were like stars. 
And I saw seven others that mingled with them and had the sheen of pale 
moonshine. All together, I counted fifty-five.
Inside the temple I saw four small clouds of the finest crystal, woven 
into a completely ethereal covering. They indicated five precincts within 
the temple. It seemed to me impossible that gazing upon so much radi-
ance and majesty combined should not trouble the eye and spirit of the 
onlooker.
Outside, I saw that there were sixty small rooms dotted around the 
temple and connected to it, each with a separate entry leading inside it. 
They all resembled the temple in their ornamentation, apart from those 
which never showed themselves; but they were as tall as a man.
Again and again, I counted six hundred and thirteen windows around 
the temple. But nothing I had ever seen equalled the luminosity of these 
splendid figures, combined with the serene atmosphere of the temple; and 
no balas or earthly ruby, any more than any ruby on Venus or Jupiter in 
the heavens, has ever had a similar color. There was a magnificent en-
trance on the eastern side.
And all around this hung a very precious and fine cloud, which was 
itself surrounded by another dreadful, heavy cloud, casting an impenetra-
ble and deadly gloom all around.
Inside, the temple seemed almost completely filled with the most 
beautiful little birds I had ever seen. They fluttered tirelessly from one end 
of the temple to the other. They kept singing verses of great delicacy and 
sweetness, more joyful and jubilant than any human voice could express. 
Every now and then they perched somewhere, amusing themselves by 
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listening to each other, and sometimes they seemed to me to be contem-
plating something nobler and higher than themselves.
[…] Take a close look at this entire splendid figure, because you may 
have never seen anything similar; it describes Paradise in terms of the 
Holy Scripture, that is, Torath Mosheh, the Torah of Moses, in the firm 
belief that the one corresponds to the other.11 
In this image, the intrinsic correspondence (“intrinsic unity,” in Rieti’s 
words) between the Temple, the Scripture, and Paradise is made explicit.
Having depicted this vision, the author presents the “intention” (that is, 
the significance) of its every detail, before concluding with a general defini-
tion of allegorical representation: the more images the mind creates (to adorn 
the memory), the more pleasure the soul experiences, like a woman who is 
all the more beautiful and adulated for being decked in beautiful and enticing 
veils that have been finely pleated. The human psyche is seen as an empty 
space to be furnished (“to adorn the memory”), and allegorical images are 
both mnemonic tools and factors of pleasure (which, one might add, is aes-
thetic: “the soul experiences pleasure”).12
The Temple as Encyclopedia: Avraham Portaleone
Mosheh of Rieti was very popular with Italian Jews until the beginning 
of the seventeenth century. After that point, his memory was completely for-
gotten, probably because cultural changes made his works appear outdated. 
It is precisely during this period that the Temple of Jerusalem stopped al-
legorically evoking another dimension and started to be studied for its own 
sake. Just as Galileo rejected the idea that there is a difference between the 
physics of the supra- and sub-lunar regions, the two versions of the Temple 
became one, and Jewish intellectuals began to focus on establishing its his-
torical and architectural reality. Spinoza took a similar approach to biblical 
exegesis, vigorously denouncing allegorical interpretations as well as their 
major Jewish proponent, Maimonides. Instead, the Dutch philosopher in-
sisted on the principle of sola scriptura, according to which texts are suf-
ficient unto themselves and do not allude to other worlds of meaning.
Among Italian Jews, the most ambitious attempt at describing the actual 
reality of the Temple of Jerusalem and its rites came from a Mantuan author 
who was also a physician, and whose works we analyzed in the previous 
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chapter: Avraham Portaleone (1542-1612). In reality, his project was, as dis-
cussed, the outcome of a more complex intellectual process, rooted in a re-
ligious imperative which dictated that all Jewish texts, however profane and 
whatever their discipline, had to have some sort of religious justification. The 
extensive body of scholarly works which Portaleone produced (to be read 
and quoted more often by Christians than by Jews) originated in his wish to 
expiate the sins of his youth, during which he had shown excessive interest in 
such profane disciplines as philosophy and science. Twenty-five years after 
producing a resolutely modern philosophical and scientific treatise in Latin 
advocating the experimental method, the brilliant physician repented, resort-
ing to the rhetoric of the Catholic Counter-Reformation, while adhering to 
Jewish cultural coordinates, in his new Hebrew text Shiltey ha-Gibborym, 
which we have already discussed briefly, and which absolutely and unques-
tionably deferred to the elders, the masters of the Talmud.
Attempting to expiate the sin of “secularization” by giving his children the 
opportunity to study Jewish writings on sacrifice, Portaleone compiled an an-
thology of biblical and rabbinical texts to be read on different days of the week. 
He insists, however, on the fact that the exercise will be more productive if 
readers can picture themselves in the (Second) Temple of Jerusalem, the bet-
ter to identify with the believers who took part in the rites; hence the need to 
reproduce the architecture and the rites of the Sanctuary “as they were”:
When the children of Israel have all returned to God, they shall be able 
to pray throughout their Land and in the Temple they have built, turning 
towards the Western Wall […] and they shall envision themselves inside 
the Sanctuary when they pray.13
Accordingly, Portaleone gives a rich and detailed account of the Temple, 
basing his descriptions on both Jewish and non-Jewish sources. The first part 
of his volume is devoted to this description, and constitutes a sort of prepara-
tion for the anthology that makes up its second part.
An almost mystical religious exigency presides over his work of histori-
cal reconstruction: the reader must be able to envision himself standing in 
the Temple. Portaleone’s keen awareness of the temporal gap he has to over-
come gives birth to a scientific quest. Ceasing to be an allegorical signifier, 




Interestingly enough, whereas Portaleone turned away from allegories, 
his Christian contemporary Philippe d’Aquin—a converted Jew—continued 
to regard the Tabernacle as an allegory of the three worlds (divine, celestial, 
and earthly);14 similarly, for the Jesuit Juan Battista Villalpando, the Temple 
of Jerusalem was a blueprint for the perfect harmony between the differ-
ent dimensions of the human being and the universe.15 This seems to sug-
gest that, when it came to representations of the Temple, Jews—particularly 
members of the Italian Jewish community, which was probably the Jewish 
community in Europe most open to the non-Jewish world—were in some 
cases more “modern” than Christians.16 
As in Rieti’s poem, the Temple becomes the cornerstone of an encyclope-
dia of contemporary knowledge. Thus, an account of the musical accompani-
ments for the sacrifices leads the learned Portaleone to compose a treatise on 
polyphonic music; a discussion of frankincense offerings becomes a pretext 
for botanical reflections; an allusion to the salt sprinkled on victims leads 
to a disquisition on chemistry, and so on. The Temple becomes a kind of 
“theatre of memory,”17 but has no mystical connotations: these encyclopedic 
digressions have a very clear-cut framework, and are associated with ex-
tremely precise architectural descriptions, suggesting that the scientific em-
piricist remained unchanged by his “conversion.” Portaleone walks his read-
ers through the courtyards of the Sanctuary and makes them witness its rites. 
His descriptions are based on canonical rabbinical texts and—this is quite 
remarkable—on numerous non-Jewish sources. His Shiltey ha-Gibborym is 
thus a work born of an expiatory imperative which offers its Jewish readers 
a synopsis of contemporary knowledge and allows them to conjure a three-
dimensional image of the Temple of Jerusalem in their mind’s eye by visu-
ally evoking its different sections, its ritual objects, and the life that unfolded 
within its sacred walls.
Of course, Portaleone was neither the first nor the most prominent Jewish 
author to give a detailed account of the Temple: there is a long tradition 
of such descriptions, from Hilkhoth Beyth ha-beḥyrah (“The Laws of the 
House of Election”), a treatise incorporated in Maimonides’ code Mishneh 
Torah to the commentaries Maimonides and the sixteenth-century Italian 
scholar Ovadiyah of Bertinoro wrote on a treatise from the Mishnah entitled 
Middoth (“Measures”), and to other subsequent works. However, more than 
any other author, Portaleone emphasized the visuality of his descriptions. It 
can sometimes seem as though illustrations are all that is lacking from his 
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book; indeed, when the Christian Blasio Ugolini, who published thirty-four 
volumes in folio on the rites and customs of the Jews between 1744 and 
1769, later translated a few chapters from Shiltey ha-Gibborym into Latin, he 
added illustrations.18 (See fig. 1)
Scale Models of the Temple
It was outside of Italy that the representation of the Temple would un-
dergo another important change several decades later, most probably in 1641, 
when Jacob Judah Leon (1602?—1675), a Dutch rabbi who would come to 
be known as “Templo,”19 took Portaleone’s virtual evocation of the Temple 
one step further, producing a three-dimensional model. This scale model was 
exhibited to the public in several cities, including Amsterdam and London, 
conferring a degree of celebrity to its author. Jacob Judah also devoted an il-
lustrated book to the Temple, Retrato del templo de Selomo (1642). Meant to 
explain his scale model, the book was translated into several languages and 
sold thousands of copies. (See fig. 2)
Jacob Judah’s projects were spurred on by representatives of the Colle-
giants, a Dutch religious group with millenarian tendencies, which Spinoza 
would associate with after his excommunication from the Jewish commu-
nity. Could there be a connection between the Millenarian current of thought 
and three-dimensional representations of the Temple? The historian Richard 
Popkin’s careful investigation of this question suggests that the Millenarians 
were interested in realistic representations of the Temple because they were 
preparing for the advent of the Messianic era, when the Jews would return to 
their Land and the Temple would be reconstructed.20 If this is true, a religious 
motivation underlies Jacob Judah’s and Portaleone’s displacement of allegory 
with a three-dimensional space which is sufficient unto itself and does not al-
lude to another sphere of reality. In other words, the “modern” overlap within 
a single space of the human and heavenly dimensions, the separation of which 
had long legitimated allegory, may have had religious roots. Let us not forget 
that this change in representation focused on the Temple, that privileged ob-
ject of the Jewish imagery. 
Although we left Italy when we turned to Jacob Judah Templo, a manu-
script source suggests that as early as 1570 another Italian Jew had con-
structed a scale model of the Temple for his personal use: the dramatist 
Leone Sommo, who was, like Portaleone, from Mantua.21 
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Fig. 1. Jacob Jéhuda Léon (called “Templo”), Retrato del templo de Selomo, 
Middelburg 1642 
Fig. 2. The golden altar and the marble table. Illustration to the Latin transla-
tion of Avraham Portaleone's Shiltey ha-Gibborym (The Shields of the Brave), in 
Blasio Ugolini, Thesaurus Antiquitatum Sacrarum, vol. 9, Venice 1748, columns 
CCCXI-CCCXII.
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By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, realistic depictions of the 
Sanctuary proliferated in the works Italian Jewish authors, who sometimes 
used them for educational purposes, with or without resorting to scale models.
In 1696, Mosheh ben Gershom Ḥefetz (Gentili) published Ḥanukath 
ha-bayith (“The Inauguration of the House”) in Venice. This remarkably 
learned and accurate work is exclusively based on Jewish sources:22 there 
are around twenty, ranging from the Mishnah to seventeenth-century authors 
(Maimonides is the author who is quoted most often). Interestingly, Ḥefetz 
rarely quotes Portaleone, probably because the latter referred so much to 
non-Jewish sources: “external” contributions were not looked on favorably 
during that period. Even though the argument of his book follows the logic of 
Talmudic commentaries, it nevertheless does occasionally resort to geomet-
rical or physical demonstrations (especially optical experiments), some of 
which emphasize the tree-dimensional character of the descriptions. A very 
accurate three-dimensional drawing illustrates the text (fig. 3, fig.4.).
In spite of its strictly Talmudic approach, Ḥanukhath ha-bayith was in 
many ways merely a work of erudition devoid of any judicial impact: an 
antiquarian work of historical investigation based on Jewish sources only. 
The author underlines this aspect of his book when he explains that he wrote 
it in the spirit of “Darosh we-qabbel sakhar” (“Study, and get a reward”), a 
Talmudic formula which asserts the intrinsic value of scholarship, even in 
the absence of any judicial implications.23 Significantly, Azariyah de’ Rossi, 
who probably initiated this antiquarian trend in the Jewish world and was its 
most prestigious representative, quoted the same formula in order to justify 
his own historical and philological investigations.24
Fig. 3. Mosheh ben Gershom Ḥefetz (Gentili), Ḥanukath ha-bayith (“The Inauguration 
of the House”) (Venice: 1696), fol. 3b: representation of the line of vision into the 
Sancta sanctorum, as seen from the entrance of the Temple courtyard.
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Fig. 4. Mosheh ben Gershom Ḥefetz (Gentili), Ḥanukath ha-bayith (“The Inauguration 
of the House”) (Venice: 1696): a model of the Temple according to Talmudic sources 
and later Jewish authors.
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In turn, the kabbalist Immanuel ben Abraham Ḥay Ricchi’s Ma‘aseh 
Ḥoshev (“A Work of Thoughtfulness,” published in Venice in 1716) does not 
focus on the Temple so much as on the Tabernacle. Like Ḥefetz’s book, this 
work is exclusively based on Jewish sources, Talmudic and medieval, includ-
ing a reference to the Zohar. In other words, it addresses Jewish readers well 
acquainted with the traditional concepts and methodology of their own re-
ligious culture. A major exponent of the Lurianic kabbalah, Ricchi showed 
no interest whatsoever in the wider culture of the non-Jewish world in his 
works, instead emphasizing Israel’s special relationship with the divinity. Yet 
he explains in his introduction to Ma‘aseh Ḥoshev that his book is based on a 
small cardboard scale model of the Tabernacle which he made for his young 
students. This suggests that even in a literary work exclusively focused on the 
Jewish religious heritage, which on the face of it seemed indifferent to realistic 
reconstructions, the author felt compelled to undertake historical researches 
on the Temple (or the Tabernacle) and represent it in three dimensions.
Kabbalah and Bi-dimensional  
Representations of the Temple
Although the transformation of spatial perception revealed by the evolu-
tion of the representations of the Temple followed a linear historical path, this 
did not stop the resurgence of an ancient intellectual and religious universe 
in a text entitled Mishkeney ‘elyon (“The Tabernacles of the Most High”), by 
the kabbalist and poet of Padua Mosheh Ḥayyim Luzzatto (1707-1746).25 The 
object of this book is not so much the historical Temple as the Temple the 
prophet Ezekiel imagined in chapters 40-47 of his eponymous book: that is, 
the third Temple, the most perfect one, which will come down from the heav-
ens, heralding the final redemption. This Temple corresponds to the world of 
divine emanations, the sefyroth, according to the kabbalistic principle which 
posits the existence of correspondences between the lower and upper worlds: 
its physical structure is a perfect replica of the upper world, and each of its 
parts alludes to a particular aspect of the world of divine emanations. Its gates, 
for instance, are apertures in the walls created by the concentrated energy of 
the divine influx in order to sustain the inferior beings, while their propor-
tions—described in great detail by Ezekiel and discussed by Luzzatto—have 
a very precise meaning, because they indicate God`s names and their numeri-
cal values. The world of divine lights is hierarchical: each one of its various 
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parts must sustain a different category of beings with its energy—the souls of 
Israel, the different classes of angels, and the other creatures.
In this text, a two-dimensional image replaces the illusion of depth af-
forded by three-dimensional representation: we are a long way from the 
perception of space which made other writers imagine and describe three-
dimensional volumes before recreating them in scale models. As a matter 
of fact, the reader is under the impression that Luzzatto only conceived the 
map of Temple—which corresponds to the world of the sefyroth—in terms 
of two privileged sets of coordinates: up/down, right/left. Indeed, the author 
declares that his description of the Temple seeks to follow the downward 
movement of divine emanations, as they flow down from the upper to the 
lower realms. The text’s modern editor rightly appended a bi-dimensional 
map representing the set of buildings and spaces which compose this ideal 
Temple in the kabbalist’s account.
The kabbalist thus conceives of a two-dimensional image, as in allegories; 
yet it is not an allegory. Whereas in allegories one plane of reality evokes an-
other on the basis of their external resemblances, kabbalistic images pretend 
to adhere to reality, insofar as the human mind can conceive of the reality of 
the divine world. Thus, according to the great thirteenth-century kabbalist 
Yosef Gikatilla, whenever the Biblical text mentions “the hand of God,” this 
neither refers to the literal meaning of the word “hand” nor to some allegori-
cal meaning: instead, it evokes the intrinsic likenesses (“an analogous sign”) 
which link the divine entity and the physical hand.26 In Luzzatto’s text, there 
is a correspondence between every detail, however small, of the image of the 
third Temple and the worlds of divine lights, which it allows us to visualize 
by deploying “analogous signs” while also visually prolonging these divine 
dimensions in the sensible world. According to Luzzatto, redemption con-
sists of moving from the level of likeness which exists between the upper and 
lower Temples to sameness, as the heavenly Sanctuary extends all the way 
down to earth, becoming one with the terrestrial Sanctuary:
The two Sanctuaries, upper and lower, lean towards each other […]. One 
day, the two Sanctuaries will not only be alike, but the upper Sanctuary 
will extend all the way down. The rabbis said that the third Temple is the 
work of God, because the celestial edifice shall not shift, but shall extend 
all the way down, at which point a physical structure shall be erected 
around it, for this world. The two structures shall then merge into one and 
shall never be set asunder.27 
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Luzzatto could hardly be described as a minor writer who was part of 
a marginal trend; quite on the contrary, his work was very influential, in 
the past in Europe and now in Israel. Moreover, his systematic approach to 
Kabbalah—reminiscent of the new Catholic scholasticism—was adopted by 
other major Italian Jewish authors. The prevalence in his works of features 
which might be termed medieval—particularly the image of a hierarchical 
bi-dimensional world—cautions us against sweepingly linear and progres-
sive accounts of intellectual history, and Jewish intellectual history in par-
ticular: indeed, it would not be tenable to assert that this history evolved 
straightforwardly and linearly from allegorical to realistic representation.
The fact that the widespread popularity which Kabbalah enjoyed in Jewish 
communities in the modern period coexisted with the dissemination of a new 
vision of the world that was founded in scientific rationalism represents a 
conundrum for historians. In any case, focusing on the Temple, a privileged 
object of Jewish representation, whether allegorical, realistic, or symbolic, 
helped us trace some important changes in spatial representation. This is a 




The Myth of Politics  
in the Jewish Communities  
of the Italian City-States
In 1638, the Venetian rabbi Simone (Simḥah) Luzzatto described the Jewish 
nation as “a nation incapable of any form of political governance while they 
are in their current state, [and] so preoccupied [...] with their particular predic-
ament that they fail to take any interest in the universal.”1 A marginal group so 
completely removed from power and confined to a narrow range of economic 
activities could hardly concern itself with “the universal.” At an intellectual 
level, this meant that the Jews had difficulty thinking of the political and so-
cial reality of their society as a whole—beyond the confines of the Jewish 
community—and analyzing these concepts. And yet, as we shall see, between 
the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, a few Italian Jews 
applied themselves to this task, producing interesting works which attempted 
to represent the universal from the perspective of the particular. 
During that period, the Italian peninsula was a sort of experimental labo-
ratory for new political ideas and practices. For centuries, its strong commer-
cial, industrial, and financial performance, combined with its almost chronic 
institutional instability and the extreme political fragmentation of its terri-
tory, had laid the ground for major breakthroughs in political thought. In this 
country, Jews could not truly be said to be foreigners, as their presence pre-
dated the fall of the kingdom of Judea. Nonetheless, being well-established 
had not prevented them from remaining marginalized, as Italy had never had 
more than 50,000 Jews, and their involvement in its public sphere was very 
limited. Indeed, even during the period of integration, it was inconceivable 
that the Jews might actively participate in Italian politics. 
Yoḥanan Alemanno in Praise of Florence
The first significant Jewish author to write on political issues was Yoḥanan 
Alemanno (ca. 1434-ca.1504). He spent years in the Florence of the Medici, 
at a time when Lorenzo the Magnificent was in power, taking part in the 
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cultural life of the city. He was active in neo-Platonic circles and particularly 
close to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.2
Yoḥanan Alemanno remains largely unpublished to this day. However, 
recent studies by Arthur M. Lesley, Abraham Melamed, Moshe Idel, and 
Fabrizio Lelli provide a good overview of his works.3 Alemanno elaborates 
on a sort of Jewish version of Florentine neo-Platonism. In his two great 
works, Ḥesheq Shelomo (“The Desire of Solomon”) and Ḥay ha-olamym 
(“The Immortal,” or “The Eternal”), he describes the rise of the human soul 
as it moves through different phases, from worldly concerns to a quasi-mys-
tical fusion with the intellect agent. King Solomon, who excelled at all the 
sciences and was elevated by his love (or desire, ḥesheq) for Good—which 
coincided with intellectual contemplation—epitomizes this process, for 
Alemanno. However, he views Lorenzo de’ Medici as the contemporary em-
bodiment of the figure of the philosopher-king. He describes him as follows:
A man named Lorenzo de’ Medici was extracted from the mountain of 
this land, and he was more precious than gold; with circumspection and 
a spiritual intelligence that lies beyond the ken of the people, he com-
mands and rules over the surrounding areas to their outermost edges […] 
and he does not position himself in the community as someone whose 
power is founded on force and ostentatious physical power, unlike the 
other kings, princes and rulers of the world. Rather he governs with dis-
cernment and great humility: this is the treasure (otzaro) from which he 
draws his strength. And everything he wishes for is in the spirit of the 
knowledge and fear of God.4
Alemanno then praises the qualities of the inhabitants of the city, naming 
seven of them. The impression this creates is of an industrious republic that 
is able to rule itself, favors the art of discourse over violence, and aspires 
to unity while overcoming ideological differences, and where one’s true 
thoughts are concealed. But above all it seems to be a city where the practi-
cal approach—i.e., political action—is born of speculative knowledge.5 This 
characteristic combination of ideological control and enticement to philo-
sophical speculation evokes Florence under Lorenzo de’ Medici’s enlight-
ened government. 
Alemanno ends his account of each virtue with a reference to his own self-
improvement: “I acquired this quality (…) I strove to adopt this behavior.” 
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In this respect, he seems to be part of the intellectual life of the city, which 
encouraged individual spiritual and speculative exploration, even as it hin-
dered open debate and the elaboration of a political and social discourse 
based on observations of reality. On the other hand, Alemanno does not show 
interest in the Jewish community as a distinct social entity. King Solomon 
represents a sort of myth of origins for him, an ideal source of inspiration 
for the improvement of his Jewish readers and students. Although his works 
make space for politics in between rhetorical and metaphysical speculations, 
his thought does not allow for an examination of the role of force in political 
action. For lack of the conceptual tools that would allow him to understand 
the actual predicament of the Jews, Alemanno overlooks their marginal and 
precarious position. Yet, this precariousness was far from exceptional when 
Lorenzo de’ Medici was in power, as Jews were not the only ones to depend 
on the good will of the republican Prince.
The Project of a “Modern” Jewish Society  
in the Works of Avraham Portaleone
A century later, the writings of the Mantuan Jewish physician Avraham 
Portaleone, outlined a dramatically new relationship to politics. His encyclo-
pedic Shiltey ha-Gibborym (1612) devotes a few interesting pages to politics 
and the military arts. 
Explaining the role priests and Levites played in the service of the 
Sanctuary, the author mentions the existence of a third group of people, the 
Israelites, and subdivides them into different classes. Proceeding to describe 
each one of these classes, Portaleone emphasizes the fact that he is drawing 
from personal experience: 
I am not aware that any other author has described these classes in any 
detail, except for Maimonides who wrote something […] about priests. 
This is why I have decided to provide readers with brief insights which 
are not drawn from books.6
Portaleone explains that there are two main types of Israelites: those who 
contribute to the well-being of society and those who teach men the ways of 
the Torah and Mitzwoth (the commandments).
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According to Portaleone, membership in this last subsection has seven-
teen degrees, ranging from respectable men who devote themselves to study-
ing the sacred texts to prophets. This list is temporally and thematically con-
sistent with the focus of his book on the Sanctuary. However, Portaleone’s 
account of the first type of Israelites—those who represent civil society and 
the public sphere, whether on a military, administrative, or strictly politi-
cal level—actually evokes a contemporary nation, and therefore strays from 
both a historical perspective and the Jewish context. Let us try to explain this 
anachronism.
When he lists the professions which make up civil society, Portaleone 
seems particularly drawn to occupations involving ceaseless movement and 
effort: manual work, but also intellectual labor. He gives a detailed descrip-
tion of the extraction and transformation of minerals and of field work. His 
evocation of merchants constrained to live peripatetic lives so as to provide 
for their families is clearly sympathetic. The work of those who deploy 
scientific knowledge and numerical skills in order to make physical labor 
more efficient prompts him to coin a phrase inspired from a Biblical say-
ing, be-ze‘ath af tevunatam (through the sweat of hard intellectual graft). 
These short descriptions cannot fail to recall the portrait of sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Italy which Piero Camporesi painted in The Beautiful 
Lands, which describes: 
These cities full of craftsmen and workers, of workshops where resource-
ful men […] alter, mold, and translate into the language of usefulness and 
beauty the stone and metals extracted from caves and mines through the 
sweat and blood of other laborers.7
Portaleone describes sedentary merchants spending their time at home, 
resting, or trading their goods for money or drafts, and does not even men-
tion brokers and other financial occupations; as a result, he either does not 
account for the more specifically Jewish professions of the period or dis-
credits them. As for those at the top of the social pyramid—landowners—he 
describes them in the following terms:
the man of high standing who dwells at his court, under the vine and fig-
tree, partaking of the finest produce of the land with no need for work, he 
is noble and dignified.8
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This implicit criticism of a particular medieval conception of society also 
tacitly questions the role it allocates to Jews. Portaleone’s sympathy for the 
manual arts and all activities involving movement suggests that, despite his 
“conversion” and return to the intense devotion of his fathers’ religion, he 
has not lost the modern sensibility that once led him to choose experience 
and scientific reasoning over auctoritates.9
It is probably worth reminding ourselves that Portaleone’s classifications 
describe a non-existent, and purely imaginary, Jewish society. He takes an 
exclusivist stance, focusing only on the people of Israel and making every-
thing else revolve around them. This stance may exhibit a wish for what one 
might call—borrowing from Zionist terminology—the “normalization” of 
the Jewish condition.
Portaleone’s portrait of the military sphere and activities seems to confirm 
this hypothesis. Versed in science and technology, he was well-acquainted 
with this field and wished to impart his knowledge to his readers. But how 
could a digression on the military arts fit in to an essay on the Temple? 
Portaleone begins by resorting to a familiar strategy, which consists of as-
serting that the Jewish people and their legislators have a particular claim to 
this discipline. 
Portaleone explains that many learned Gentiles have devoted their whole 
lives to studying what to do in times of war and peace. In contrast, the Torah 
effortlessly enlightens the Jews, teaching them “in a second” both what path 
to take in civilian life (be-darkhey ha-‘olam) and how to avoid evil, idola-
trous peoples under the protection of divine Wisdom. One of the first les-
sons Revelation teaches the Jews is how to deploy troops. When the Romans 
followed the biblical battle plan, they became unbeatable, as the writings 
of both Sallust and Titus Livius show. Portaleone reiterates the notion of 
biblical precedence at the end of the chapter: as well as confirming its signifi-
cance in his eyes, this leads him to argue that the Jews have a right to debate 
military matters: 
One must remember that our Lord is majestic in holiness, dreadful in 
praises and works miracles: why couldn’t we also debate military mat-
ters with justice, measure, and reason? Thus, all those who answer to the 
name of Israel must realize that God spoke unto us as well; and that we 
have no need of erudite books on these matters, which are against reli-
gious teachings.10
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After a digression regarding the proper deployment of troops, Portaleone 
proceeds to describe a modern army. In order to place these remarks in a 
Jewish context, he imagines the priest in charge of a war making a speech 
which expands on a passage from Deuteronomy, chapter 20. Wavering be-
tween biblical and contemporary perspectives, he describes ruthless enemies 
armed in the modern and ancient fashions.11 The Jewish people must prepare 
for war, Portaleone suggests, because God wills it, even though he could 
have led the fight Himself. In his speech, the imaginary priest explains: 
You too must do your part. Do not gaze at the sky like a dim-witted idler, 
like a fool counting the stars; so numerous that they cannot be counted 
[...]. It falls to you, O blessed by the Lord, to take up arms and kill those 
who hate you, Ismael, Moab and the converts, to vindicate yourselves 
from your enemies, who are rising to destroy you.12
One may wonder what provoked this rather belligerent tone. Did the pre-
dicament of Mantuan Jews—and of Italian Jews, more generally—justify 
such vindictive feelings? It would be tempting to attribute these pugnacious 
lines to the creation of the ghetto in Mantua in 1610 and 1611, at the same 
time as Shiltey ha-Gibborym13 was published. Yet Portaleone states that he 
wrote his book between 1606 and 1607. What is more, recent scholarship 
suggests that the impact of the creation of the ghettoes on Jewish communi-
ties was less severe than was once thought. Could Portaleone’s bellicosity be 
attributed to the fact that Italian society was becoming more entrenched at 
the turn of the sixteenth century? Much as the Catholic Church redefined its 
religious and intellectual arenas in the wake of the Council of Trent, Jewish 
attempts to rethink their own identity led them close to a form of national 
exclusivism. But this did not keep society as a whole from moving toward a 
sort of proto-modernity, fostering tensions in religious quarters.
The priest’s speech ends as it began, on a combination of modern insights 
and religious justifications. Envisioning a Jewish “ghost-army” focused al-
most exclusively on artillery, at the expense of cavalry, he goes so far as to 
state the number of firearms it should ideally own: 50 canons, 3,000 muskets, 
and 5,000 “Spanish” harquebuses. Discomforted by the foreign-sounding 
names of these weapons, Portaleone manages to link them to the biblical 
qesheth neḥushah (the antique bronze ark mentioned in Psalms 18:36 and 
Job 20:24), which allows him to refer to the musket as qesheth. The extreme 
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and almost ideal modernity of this army is obvious: in particular, the focus 
Portaleone places on its artillery defies contemporary notions on military 
strategy. Indeed, it anticipates future developments, even if strategists as tal-
ented as the Swedish King Gustav Adolph in fact still deployed one lancer 
for two musketeers twenty years later.14
Portaleone finds biblical references in support of his marked preference 
for artillery: Mosheh explicitly told the Jews (Deuteronomy 17:16) that the 
king should not multiply the number of his horses, while God reminded 
Joshua (Joshua 11:6) to burn the horses and chariots of the Cananeans. Thus 
the cavalry, which was a privileged part of medieval warfare, is rejected in 
favor of a modernity heralded by the Bible.
Portaleone’s concern with biblical justification makes it impossible for 
him to assess military techniques dispassionately—i.e., solely in light of 
their usefulness. Instead, he feels compelled to expound on this issue, de-
spite coming from a social background which leaves him completely unfa-
miliar with military drills. As well as evoking the penitent’s characteristic 
tendency to consider everything in a religious light, this attempt to mark 
out such a secular sphere as sacred reveals the frustration of a talented man 
confined to the margins of society, as the following example will illustrate. 
The detailed account Portaleone gives his readers of the handling of weap-
ons in the book corresponds exactly to an engraving by Jacob de Gheyn 
on the same question in Maniement d’armes, d’arquebuses, mousquetz et 
piques (Handling Weapons, Harquebuses, Muskets and Pikes), which was 
published in Amsterdam in 1608. Although the two authors give exactly the 
same account of providing individual soldiers with weapons,15 there are sig-
nificant differences in the way they present this process. Portaleone describes 
it without resorting to illustrations, relying instead on a tale in which past 
and present overlap. Although he gives detailed descriptions to his readers, 
he evokes a fictional army and targets an audience which may or may not be 
familiar with the concepts of war. Moreover, he feels compelled to include 
in it a religious background which is both extraneous, as evidenced by his 
depiction of the Temple, and fictitious, as exemplified by the discourse of 
the Kohen mashuaḥ, the priest who spurs the troops to war. The Dutch au-
thor had no such concerns. His illustrations needed no additional justifica-
tions: they were merely meant to instruct soldiers and officers in military 
drill. Moreover, the servicemen themselves and amateur students of weap-
onry were the expected readers for this type of book. For the same reason, it 
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was natural that the Prince of Orange—a politician and military strategist—
should back his work. In contrast, Portaleone composed his own Hebrew 
book with his children or students in mind.
In sum, Portaleone does not appear interested in questions of power; 
instead, his considerations on society and the military arts are character-
ized by:
1) a fundamentalist desire to integrate secular concerns into the religious 
sphere;
2) a tension between the social usefulness of the knowledge Portaleone 
imparts to his readers and the reality of Jewish social marginality;
3) a belief in the “normalcy” of the Jews, which borrows from the tradi-
tional motif of Jewish self-sufficiency and has aggressive undertones.
The Praise of the Venetian Republic
Among the Italian Jewish intellectuals and Jewish intellectuals who lived 
in Italy for parts of their lives and wrote about politics, one of the most 
notable is Yitzḥaq Abravanel (1437-1508). This important figure, who was, 
within the limits of his condition as a Jew, personally invested in political is-
sues as an advisor to princes and governors, transmitted his ideas on the best 
form of government not in a specific treatise, but in his comments in Hebrew 
on the Bible. The most “political” of the Jews of the late fifteenth century 
thus turned to a religious literary genre to express his thought. Furthermore, 
his ideas refer to biblical history and the Jewish precepts that inspired it, and 
therefore refer to the realm of the ideal, with little reference to the observa-
tion of reality. 
The two passages of his commentary on the Torah that are most sig-
nificant for political doctrine, Deuteronomy 17:8 (which refers to the Jews 
possibly having a king when they are established in the Promised Land16) 
and Exodus 18 (the advice given by Yitro to Moses on how to administer 
justice17), demonstrate a certain aversion to monarchical government, and 
certainly to absolute monarchy. 
In Abravanel’s view, the king of Israel—and it is on this figure that the 
Spanish author concentrates his analysis—is primarily subordinated to the 
Torah, which is the divine Law. Furthermore, his power is moderated by two 
types of advisers: the Sanhedrin and the courts (batey dyn). Thus, Abravanel 
sees the regime proposed by the Torah as a mixed system. Furthermore, 
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establishing a monarchy is not seen as a mitzwah—a positive command-
ment—but simply as a possibility. 
Abravanel wrote the commentary to Exodus when he was in Venice, act-
ing as advisor to the Republic of San Marco. In the various Councils of the 
Republic among which power was distributed he identifies the intermedi-
ary bodies that Yitro recommended to Moses to alleviate the weight of jus-
tice.18 But this distribution, which for various authors represented the key 
to the solidity of the Venetian regime, is barely mentioned by the Jewish 
commentator. It is true that, with his citation, Abravanel implicitly attributes 
to Venetian institutions conformity with divine Law, but his citation is quick 
and scant—far from the genre of the direct apology. 
In comparison, entirely and explicitly apologetic is the brief writing of 
another important author, David de’ Pomi (Spoleto 1525—Venice 1593), 
who lived in central Italy—essentially in Umbria—and then moved to 
Venice.19 De Pomi, a member of a prestigious Italian Jewish family, was a 
well-regarded physician. As a writer, he intended nearly all of his work to 
familiarize Christian readers with aspects of Jewish culture, both biblical 
and rabbinic—we might speak of “civilization”— including showing them 
its moral elevation and closeness to Christianity. We are dealing, in his case, 
with work both informative and apologetic. 
A brief piece in Italian by De Pomi, written between 1577 and 1587,20 
is political in character: Breve discorso nel quale si mostra la maestà di-
vina haver particolar cura e custodia della repubblica Venetiana e che li 
oderni dì essa sono nel pubblico governo alle divine Mosaice constitutioni 
conformi (Brief discourse showing divine majesty having special care and 
protection of the Venetian Republic whose public governance is now in 
compliance with the divine Mosaic Constitutions). As indicated in the title, 
De Pomi wants to demonstrate that the Venetian Republic is constituted ac-
cording to divine rule and that—as Abravanel wrote—its institutions, and 
in particular its advisors, corresponded to the Mosaic model. Furthermore, 
returning to one of his previous writings, De Pomi interprets some biblical 
passages (Isaiah 27:1-3 and Daniel 11:21-30) as prophesies of a Venetian 
victory over the Turkish fleet at the Battle of Lepanto and in subsequent 
years. 
De Pomi not only uses a more explicitly laudatory tone toward Venice 
than Abravanel does, he also focuses on the ancient administration of justice 
according to Jewish rules—not only biblical, but also rabbinic: the monarchic 
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institution, the Sanhedrin, and the much smaller courts.21 His many citations 
from the Mishneh Torah, the fundamental legal code of Maimonides, which 
was virtually unknown to the Christian public at that time, are character-
istic of his work: De Pomi uses a text lauding the Republic of Venice to 
transmit some knowledge about Jewish civilization. Praising the Venetian 
constitution, he also indirectly lauds rabbinical law, which conforms to that 
constitution.
His designation of a mixed government as ideal, and the limits that he 
demonstrates are imposed on the power of the king, who must strictly com-
ply with the rule of the Torah, show that De Pomi, like Abravanel before him, 
had a clear anti-monarchical orientation. He believed that Jewish decadence 
derived from the lack of respect for biblical and rabbinic institutions: 
While this order was observed, the Jews happily dominated, but as the 
rules and laws started to be broken, their dominion began to decline, 
such that finally, because of our sins, the masters became the servants 
of all.22
De Pomi suggests that the Jews’ condition of weakness and servitude has 
a political-religious origin, which implicitly means that it does not result 
from the sin of not recognizing Jesus as Messiah, as argued by Christian 
theologians. This idea is confirmed in the trilingual Dittionario De Pomi 
wrote, where, in the definition of the word “king,” he noted that the contem-
porary Jewish condition is the product of a lack of respect for the rules of the 
Torah with regard to the limits of monarchical power. Wanting to be “like all 
other peoples,” and thus not recognizing the divine origins of their political 
and military successes, the Jews lost all of their strength. In other words, 
God left them because they did not recognize their special election, and not 
because—as Christian theology maintained—they did not accept that their 
special election had been transferred to the universal community of believers 
in Jesus:
Our fathers gained all their marvelous victories not through multitudes 
of people, nor the horses they purchased, but only through the infinitely 
triumphant divine power. When, therefore, they started to ally now with 
one, now with the other lord with earthly power, heaven started to turn its 
back on our princes, along with the people, and still we bear the penalty.23
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Simḥa Luzzatto’s Apologia  
as a Pattern of Universal Political Thought
Simone Luzzatto (1583-1663) represents a third form of Jewish intel-
lectual self-positioning in relation to politics.24 Luzzatto was Rosh Yeshyvah 
of the Venetian Jewish community—i.e. its leading rabbinical authority—at 
a time when it was one of the most prestigious Jewish communities in the 
world, while also being a meeting point for Jews from Northern Africa, the 
Ottoman Empire, and Northern Europe. 
It is worth emphasizing that Luzzatto’s most ambitious books—Discorso 
circa il stato de gl’hebrei and Socrate, ovvero dell’humano sapere25—were 
written in Italian: in other words, he chose to address the intellectual commu-
nity at large, irrespective of religious differences. This open-minded stance 
contrasted with the ethnically and religiously exclusivist tendencies of con-
temporary Jewish Italian culture, which had led to a refusal to resort to any 
language other than Hebrew. Moreover, the popularity of theological and 
kabbalistic approaches had taken politics off the Jewish agenda. Luzzatto 
was perfectly aware of this, and on various occasions he brought attention 
to the pernicious widening of the gap which separated Jewish culture from 
the sciences.26 
Published in Venice in 1638, Luzzatto’s Discorso circa il stato de 
gl’hebrei is an essay on the continued existence of the Jewish people in a 
big city, namely Venice. Demonstrating its author’s understanding of po-
litical economy, this brilliant book describes the social identity, economic 
activities, and intellectual concerns of the Jewish community. This aspect 
of Luzzatto’s work is strikingly realistic, and totally devoid of the exalted 
idealization which characterizes Portaleone’s account of the Jews. Luzzatto’s 
assertion that one would be hard pressed to define Jewish customs, exempli-
fies his position. Following a general introduction on the contradictions and 
paradoxes of the human soul and manmade society—by way of Anaxagoras, 
Plato, and Solomon, together with a few examples taken from Roman his-
tory—Luzzatto explains:
If […] it is difficult to define the particular customs of an individual, how 
can one determine those of an entire Nation? [...] The soul of their Nation 
is so debased and weakened as to be incapable of any form of political 
governance while they are in their current state. So preoccupied are they 
with their particular predicament that they fail to take any interest in the 
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universal and are parsimonious to the point of meanness. They are great ad-
mirers of ancient times but poor observers of current affairs [...] Whatever 
their faults may be, they nevertheless also exhibit many noteworthy quali-
ties. They are steady and wonderfully unwavering in their belief in, and 
observance of, their Religion. […] They are admirably constant—if not 
always in the presence of danger, then at least in the face of adversity.
The Jews are thus described as being devoid of any interest in the uni-
versal and incapable of political organization. In the context of Luzzatto’s 
essay, these characteristics were to the advantage of the States which had 
taken them in, insofar as a scattered people with neither leaders nor political 
ambition would not pose a threat to their local institutions. 
We saw Alemanno grant political qualities reflecting the ideal virtues of 
King Solomon to a contemporary city and person from outside the Jewish 
sphere, while Portaleone tried to integrate the political, social, and military 
realities of his time to the Jewish experience. Luzzatto adopts the perspective 
of an outsider, in a bid to avoid disguising the moral and political weaknesses 
of his co-religionists. His concern for realism is genuine, and he does not let 
Portaleone’s national mysticism water it down. Wishing to elaborate upon a 
political theory of universal import, as his Socrate makes clear, he reflects on 
several questions and texts from outside the Jewish tradition. In that respect, 
his Discorso circa il stato degl’ebrei anticipates the completely objective 
perspective which Spinoza claimed to adopt in his Tractatus theologico-
politicus thirty-two years later. Yet, whereas the Dutch philosopher sided 
with Reason and aspired to rid himself of religious dogmas and partial vi-
sions, the Jewish Luzzatto could not be so independent: instead, he couched 
his observations in the partisan genre of the Apologia.
In an important article about Simone Luzzatto,27 Abraham Melamed 
shows that the Venetian rabbi reviews Tacitus’ indictment of the Jews not 
only in order to dismiss the charges leveled at them by a number of contem-
porary Christian authors,28 but also in order to hint at his Machiavellian vi-
sion of history and politics. As Luzzatto could not openly mention an author 
as subversive as Machiavelli, he 
like many other Italian thinkers of the period, solved his problem by turn-
ing to classical sources. When it was too dangerous to quote Machiavelli, 
he turned to Tacitus.29
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But the Venetian rabbi is forced to resort to a more convoluted subterfuge 
than non-Jewish authors by integrating his general, “universal,” ideas in an 
Apologia. Even as they articulate a defense of the Jews and Judaism, the ar-
guments Luzzatto develops in his Discorso have more far-reaching implica-
tions. In other words, as a member of the minority under discussion, Luzzatto 
make the particular case of the Jews the focus of his universal thought. 
This leads him to find surprising rationales for the most hermetic religious 
rites by ascribing political motivations to them. Thus, commenting on the ban 
on pork, Luzzatto quotes a passage from a classical author in order to intro-
duce Machiavelli’s notion that religion is an instrumentum regni: the most 
absurd rites, he writes, help monarchs to bend the minds of their subjects and 
test the limits of their obedience.30 Nevertheless, he covers himself by adding 
that “God’s decrees exceed the scope of our investigations and defy human 
understanding.”31 Dismissing the charge of superstition Tacitus leveled at the 
Jews, Luzzatto declares—still quoting the Classics32—that although supersti-
tion helps rulers to assert their power, it can be very harmful if it takes over 
their own minds. He develops this idea in an interesting comparison: 
The world is akin to a big market; God apportions riches between us so 
we may purchase what is on display and for sale. The most widespread 
among these riches are prudence and strength, and they bear God’s seal 
because He is science and strength. With these riches, we can cope with 
everything that depends on the will of man. Real religion belongs to those 
who ask God for this abundance of wealth (pecunia).33
As well as obviously referring to Machiavelli—prudence and strength are 
the Prince’s virtues34—this passage glorifies and consecrates capitalism and 
the market society with religious language.35
Throughout his essay, Luzzatto develops a political theory based on the 
observation of actual facts and the rejection of the principle of authority.36 
At a time when Italian society is still dynamic and thriving, despite worrying 
signs of early decadence, he privileges active lives over contemplative exist-
ences, and realistic policies over utopias.37
Although his perspective is mystical and visionary, Portaleone shares this 
stance. The realistic point of view which these authors privilege leads them 
to turn away from theology when interpreting reality, and to give up on both 
the notion that the Jews are intrinsically different—as is preached by the 
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kabbalists—and the idea that the people of Israel are chosen. Whether what 
spurs them on is the logic of scientific discourse—as in Portaleone’s case—or 
Machiavelli’s empirical approach to history—as in Luzzatto’s—these Italian 
Jewish thinkers cannot conceive of the election of the people of Israel as 
formulated by Sephardic philosophers such as Yitzḥaq Abravanel, Menasseh 
ben Israel, or Yitzḥaq Cardoso. These Sephardic Jews shared in the Christian 
notion of the singularity of the Jewish people—whether God had chosen or 
cursed it—and had absorbed the Spanish notion of pure blood,38 applying it 
to the Jewish people in a process which evokes René Girard’s “antagonistic 
mimesis.”39
In contrast, even deeply pious thinkers such as Portaleone conceived of 
the Jewish nation independently of theological concerns, as a nation which 
ought to be on an equal footing with others and need not be considered supe-
rior. Indeed, as Spinoza remarks at the opening of his Tractatus theologico-
politicus,40 only the imagination—as opposed to an accurate perception of 





A Link to Humanity: 
Judaism as Nation and Universal Religion
Scholars have long pondered the presence—or absence—of political 
ideas in Jewish thought in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. On the one 
hand, some argue that Jewish thought essentially became disengaged from 
the political sphere during that period in both the Muslim and the Christian 
worlds, for the obvious reason that political reflections were irrelevant in 
the absence of either a state or an autonomous political life. On the other 
hand, many agree with Leo Strauss that, unlike Christian thought but like 
Muslim thought, Jewish thought is founded on a religious tradition that does 
not differentiate between the earthly and celestial spheres, but instead incor-
porates the political into the theological. Proponents of this second position 
assert that Jewish political thought is not to be found in specifically political 
texts—as it is in the Greco-Roman-Christian tradition—but lies scattered in 
other types of documents, such as legal or even theological texts. 
Abraham Melamed sums up this approach in a well-documented and 
thought-provoking article, “Is there a Jewish Political Thought? The Medieval 
Case Reconsidered.”1 Noting that there is no Jewish political thought in the 
traditional sense of the phrase, Melamed proposes to expand or alter the 
sphere of “political thought” in the Jewish tradition to other literary genres, 
such as judicial responsa or moral literature. In this sense, Jewish culture 
did produce political thought, although not by the standards of the Greco-
Roman-Christian canons from which this intellectual discipline derives in 
the Western tradition. 
Melamed’s argument is broadly valid. And yet, even if we were to skip 
over well-known cases—such as that of Maimonides, who had a distinct 
influence over the Christian world2—in order to focus on the so-called mod-
ern era, it would still be possible to find instances of political thought in the 
“traditional” sense of the phrase in several Jewish works. 
Unsurprisingly, these writings are to be found in the textual production 
of the most intellectually advanced Jewish community of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries: the Italian Jewish community, which had assimilated 
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and had, through contact with the culture of the Italian Renaissance and 
post-Renaissance, developed disciplines that were neglected or completely 
unknown (and in some cases condemned) by Jews of other regions. These 
disciplines included rhetoric, historiography, philology, science, and pro-
fane poetry, which thrived with extraordinary intensity and continuity in 
that community. 
Political expression flourished alongside these disciplines, although 
its development was sporadic rather than systematic. Instead of tackling 
themes typical of political thought, it consisted for the most part of observa-
tions on the highly “apolitical” condition of the Jews at the time. Although a 
few authors effectively turned to traditional political categories, they either 
adopted a negative stance, remarking on the present non-applicability of 
these categories to their existence, or focused on portents of change in the 
condition of the Jewish people, arguing that the Jews can and must reclaim 
their political identity, just like other peoples. This involved variants on 
familiar Jewish themes hinging on their relationship with others, and on the 
tension between exile and the prospect of reconstruction. Yet the rhetoric 
these authors deployed departs significantly from tradition: in their writ-
ings, they underlined the national character of the Jewish religion, to the 
detriment of its theological importance. In this way, these Italian Jewish 
authors made political expression in the traditional sense of the phrase3 pos-
sible for the Jews. 
“A nation incapable, in its present condition,  
of any political government”: Simone Luzzatto’s  
Discourse Concerning the Condition of the Jews
As we saw in the previous chapter, in Discourse Concerning the Condi-
tion of the Jews, published in 1638,4 the Venician Rabbi Simone Luzzatto 
gave what one might call an anthropologic, rather than apologetic, account 
of the condition of his coreligionists,5 adopting the perspective of an exter-
nal observer. The result is a precise and at times impious description of the 
rites, beliefs, and behaviors of contemporary Jews, based on categories bor-
rowed from external assessments of the Jewish tradition. Thus, the account 
Luzzatto gives of the Jewish intellectuals of his time is founded on notions 
drawn from Greco-Roman literary and philosophical culture. For instance, 
he resorts to the notions of the “particular” and the “universal” in order to 
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evoke their political predicament. Although central to his argument, these 
notions have no equivalent in Hebrew, at least not in the sense Luzzatto 
intended.
Indeed, the very fact that this Discourse was written in Italian—rather 
than in Hebrew as was customary for Jewish writers—is noteworthy, be-
cause it induced him to use categories borrowed from the culture of the 
“Other.” Although it is true that addressing the city authorities required him 
to write in Italian, Luzzatto nevertheless seems to have been completely at 
ease developing an “objective” argument in a language that was in a sense 
“extraneous” to the Jewish reality. As the Jewish rabbi’s only other published 
text, the philosophical treatise Socrate ovvero dell’humano sapere (Venice, 
1651),6 was also written in Italian, it seems that he participated in the general 
propensity of the Italian Jewish community of that period to adopt the Italian 
language.7 
The following is the introduction Luzzatto gives in his Discourse to his 
account of the rites and customs of the Jews at the time, which was briefly 
discussed above:
If […] it is difficult to define the particular customs of an individual, how 
can one determine those of an entire Nation? This is especially prob-
lematic in the case of the Jewish people, who are so dispersed all over 
the world that it is impossible to speak about them with any certainty 
or decisiveness. Across the universe, just as the waters of a river flow-
ing through a village receive impressions from the many lands it runs 
through, the members of the Jewish people living in other nations have 
acquired a range of different customs. In the same way that those who 
live in Venice have very different ways than those from Constantinople, 
the latter diverge from those of Damascus and Cagliari, and all of them 
differ from the Germans and the Poles. Yet, if anyone wished to inquire 
after their universal customs, it might be said that the soul of their Nation 
is so debased and weakened as to be incapable of any form of politi-
cal governance while they are in their current state. So preoccupied are 
they with their particular predicament that they fail to take any interest 
in the universal and are parsimonious to the point of meanness. They are 
great admirers of ancient times but poor observers of current affairs, and 
many of them are also bad-mannered and little versed in the doctrines 
and knowledge of languages. Others also say that they are dutiful, indeed 
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scrupulous, in their observance of their Laws. Whatever their faults may 
be, they nevertheless also exhibit many noteworthy qualities. They are 
steady and wonderfully unwavering in their belief in, and observance of, 
their Religion. The dogmas of their Faith have remained uniform over 
the course of the 1,550 years they have been scattered all over the world. 
They are admirably constant—if not always in the presence of danger, 
then at least in the face of adversity. They have a unique understanding 
of the Sacred Writings and their interpretation. They show human charity 
and hospitality to all the members of their Nation, whether or not these 
are foreign to them: thus, the Persian Jew empathizes with the suffering 
of the Italian, and distance does not dissolve their bond, or affect the uni-
formity of their Religion.
The account Luzzatto gives of exile in this excerpt is significant. 
Describing the Jews journeying across different peoples and absorbing the 
various “customs” and “ways” of those with whom they come in contact, 
he almost entirely neglects to mention the suffering associated with exile, 
which is a commonplace in Jewish literature. Similarly, the essentially posi-
tive slant he gives to the image of the river flowing through different lands 
contrasts with the way that metaphor is usually deployed in Jewish Italian 
works.8
Although Luzzatto’s remarks are based on objective observations, he also 
doubtless seeks to justify his thesis that his community is harmless when, a 
few pages later, he emphasizes the political passivity of the Jews of his time.9 
Even under the most trying circumstances, as in 1492 Spain, they never dared 
rebel against authority:
… Since proselytizing is not a Jewish precept, they never had any thought 
of universally raising the issue of their People, and believed that every-
thing that happened to them was caused by a superior cause rather than 
human action. In the time of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabel, as a great 
number of them—nearly half a million—resided in Castilia and other 
nearby realms, and were forced to convert or go into exile, 300,000 of 
them refused to convert to Christianity. Yet none of them dared to rise 
resolutely against that miserable banishment: instead, they scattered all 
over the world. This shows that contemporary Jewish customs incline 
them to subjection and obedience towards their princes. (P. 57)
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However, Luzzatto does not merely set out to make unflattering observa-
tions. True, the docility which makes the Jews easy to subjugate and prone to 
focus on their particular sphere, as opposed to the “universal”—wider wordly 
events—is the consequence of their fatalism; nonetheless passivity does not 
completely pervade their souls. Their focus on the “particular” does not entail 
isolation in petty egoism. Although the author proceeds to assert that it is true 
that Jews generally show little interest in the scientific and literary production 
of the wider culture, preferring to concentrate on studying their own texts, 
they nevertheless know how to be open to others. According to Luzzatto, this 
capacity to reach out is dictated by their very religion, which has universal 
dimensions that are not at odds with the particularity of the Law. According 
to their religion, men have a common origin because they share the same fa-
ther, Adam. Indeed, the injunction to respect other religions (except those that 
preach appalling and unnatural behavior) prohibits offending their divinities. 
The “particular beliefs” of the Jews do not exempt them from having a “link 
to humanity” and entering into a “reciprocal friendship” with humankind, as 
there are “various degrees of connection between men”; therefore
… Together with those who are alien to their religion, the Jews belong 
and are bound to that human community which observes the precepts of 
natural morality and has some knowledge of a superior cause. (P. 52r)
At the time, it was widely believed that the humanity of Men resided in 
acknowledging the existence of a superior cause and sharing in the precepts 
of natural morality. Beyond that, according to the Venetian rabbi, everything 
is merely impiety and superstition, which Jewish Law has always tried to 
eradicate. Indeed, this is especially true of superstition, as this “abuse,… or 
excrement of the true Religion and legitimate cult of God” is particularly 
insidious and underhanded. In sum, for Luzzatto, at the heart of “Judaism” 
lies a desire
… to eradicate superstition, because the orderly succession of causes, and 
even the anatomy of the merest creature, are good reasons to believe, and 
refute Atheism. (p. 66r)
In other words, atheism is at odds with the proper deployment of rea-
son and with the Jewish religion—inasmuch as proper religious behavior 
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conforms to reason, is at odds with superstition and immorality (as demon-
strated by regular biblical injunctions against idolatry and its rites) and is 
universal. 
Luzzatto’s position and ideological strategy are clear: turning to the 
Venetian authorities, he wishes to present the Jews as loyal subjects, too 
weakened to be capable of vain political ambitions, and, therefore, rebel-
lion. At the same time, Luzzatto’s account suggests that even though their 
culture is only concerned with essentially religious and apolitical matters the 
Jews are not exclusivist; instead, they consider that all those whose religion 
and ethics conform to reason (even when they are not rooted in it) share in 
the same humanity, whatever their rites. Even as he recognizes the material 
and political decadence of the Jews and their disinterest in the universal, he 
vindicates their religion, which sets out to uncover superstition. However, 
the qualities of this religion do not seem to reside in its exclusive election 
so much as in its universal dimension. The flip side of the inadequacy of 
the Jews in the realm of the political universal is their aptitude to achieve a 
religious universal. 
Even though one must not forget that Luzzatto’s Discourse is apologetic 
in nature, the sheer breadth and rigor of his argumentation, together with the 
fact that it echoes positions he adopted in other contexts,10 suggest that it 
expresses the Venetian rabbi’s true position.
During the so-called first “period of the ghetto,” during which Luzzatto 
writes, considerable progress had already been made to create common cul-
tural ground between Jews and Christians, in order that they might understand 
each other. This common ground resided in a natural morality and a theisti-
cally-inspired religiosity which need not be confessional but were resolutely 
at odds with atheism; it was also founded in the beginning of their historiog-
raphy11 and in an embryonic form of religious anthropology that shied away 
from theological polemics. The Venetian rabbi presents the Jews as a nation 
on historical-anthropological grounds: although decadence has made them 
“incapable in their present condition of any political state,” they nevertheless 
constitute a nation.12 This nation owes its unity to the strong chains of reli-
gion: it deploys what little secular culture it has to religious ends, in order to 
achieve a better understanding of the scriptures. In the past, it excelled at the 
art of war, literature, and the sciences; but as a result of exile, not only have 
its members become weakened, but “every light of knowledge is almost ex-
tinguished in them and any splendor of erudition almost obscured” (p. 74a). 
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Yet, “not every spark was extinguished” (75b) during its long exile, and one 
may speak of its “literary occupations” despite its limited engagement with 
the “human disciplines.” 
It may seem rather surprising that the preeminent rabbi of the prestigious 
Venetian Jewish community should present Jewish exilic culture as crippled 
and limited. Although this idea is not shocking in itself, as evocations of 
intellectual decadence were in fact typical of Jewish historical accounts, it 
is startling to come across it outside of a religious context bemoaning the 
collective sins of the Jews and lamenting their decreasing observation of re-
ligious rites and declining interest in studying the Torah. In this text, history 
is kept separate from theology, confirming—as Melamed has shown13—that 
Luzzatto was well-acquainted with the writings of Machiavelli, which were 
well-known despite being banned.
In the Discourse Concerning the Condition of the Jews, Luzzatto does not 
offer a way to transcend these limits: however, in some of his rare texts in 
Hebrew he praises and encourages the Jews’ receptivity to the sciences and 
contrasts it to “pious ignorance,” probably referring to the kabbalists, whose 
popularity he denounced during those same years.14
The belief that Judaism could be loyal to its traditions while being in-
vested in the general progress of the sciences, open to humanity and respect-
ful of differences, actively engaged in the fight against superstition and keen 
to prove the vanity of atheism, and cherished by all rational ethical men who 
place their faith in a Supreme Being was held by the Venetian rabbi and 
formed a coherent scheme, which might be termed “modern.”15
The celebrated third chapter of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-politicus, 
published in 1670 (that is, thirty years after the Discourse) did not disa-
gree, even if it adopted a different tone. Speaking on the “Vocation of the 
Hebrews,” the Dutch philosopher insisted on the political character of this 
vocation, since “the Lord is not so nigh to any other nation as He is to the 
Jews [...] for in respect of intellect and virtue [...] God was [...] equally 
gracious to all.”16 Thus, according to Spinoza, the Jews did constitute a 
nation with an honorable political and military past which was currently 
cemented by established religious rites, although it lacked the particular 
qualities of prophecy, that is, a proximity to God and an understanding of 
his decrees. These traits led Spinoza to declare that one day the Jews would 
perhaps rebuild their state, “if the foundations of their religion have not 
emasculated their minds,”17 echoing Luzzatto’s evocation of the “debased 
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and weakened” soul of the Jews “in their current state”—that is, under the 
conditions of exile.
These aspects of Luzzatto’s position—his notion that the Jews form a na-
tion and that this has no theological implications for their election, together 
with his vision of the Jewish religion as neither closed nor exclusive, but on 
the contrary open to humanity—had, in truth, already been developed by 
other Jewish Italian thinkers before him. 
We have already analyzed the “political” sections of Avraham Portaleone’s 
Shiltey ha-Gibborym (1612), in which the Mantuan doctor imagines a Jewish 
nation “capable of having a universal dimension,” to quote Luzzatto; that is, 
a nation possessing all the social strata of a “normal” society, from farmers 
to craftsmen and a civil elite, as well as its own army.18
As Luzzzatto would recall a few decades later, the call Portaleone made 
to the Jews—through the mouthpiece of a priest in charge of the war—to 
acquire a theoretical and practical knowledge of the art of war sounded like 
an attempt to bring them out of their passivity:
You too must do your part. Do not gaze at the sky like a dim-witted idler, 
like a fool counting the stars; so numerous that they cannot be counted 
[...]. It falls to you, O blessed by the Lord, it is up to you to take up arms 
and kill those who hate you, Ismael, Moab and the converts, to vindicate 
yourselves from your enemies, who are rising to destroy you. (36v)
These lines invite a few remarks. The first is that the Jewish author shows 
a very modern contempt for “idle contemplation,” which itself evokes the 
way medieval science was perceived at the end of the Renaissance. In this 
sense, Portaleone belongs to a small group of resolutely “modern” Jewish 
Italian scientists, along with the likes of the mathematician and astronomer 
Yosef Shelomo Delmedigo (1591-1655) and Simone Luzzatto himself, who 
had a reputation as a good mathematician.19
Portaleone’s helpless call to arms evokes Luzzatto’s account of the weak-
ened Jewish people. Indeed, although one of these accounts is utopian and 
the other objective, it is worth noting that even an author as tormented and 
as contradictory as Portaleone—he was at once an objective scientist and a 
devout follower of a traditional and partly kabbalistic pietas—voiced the 
idea that the Jews formed a nation: a nation that had lost touch with both the 
sciences and the habit of action, but could rediscover both.
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Abraham, the Common Father:  
The Universalism of David de’ Pomi.
Simone Luzzatto’s conception of Judaism—the notion that it is an open 
and universal religion—had also already been advanced fifty years earlier by 
another Jewish author, David de’ Pomi, in a Latin text titled De me dico he-
braeo enarratio apologica (An Apologetic Discourse on the Jewish Doctor), 
published in Venice in 1588. De’ Pomi’s objective was to defend the probity 
of doctors in general, and of Jewish doctors in particular, as Christians were 
suspicious of them and reluctant to engage their services, fearing that they 
did not have their patients’ best interests at heart. In 1584, Pope Gregory XIII 
had forbidden Jewish physicians to heal Christian patients. However, de’ 
Pomi’s book quickly moves from this question to the global relationship 
between Judaism and Christianity. Like any Jewish author wishing to enter 
into a dialogue with Christians without renouncing his own particularity, de’ 
Pomi embraces a pluralistic vision and begins by acknowledging that men 
are naturally diverse “in religion, grade, and dignity.”20 He then follows a 
two-pronged strategy: first, he demonstrates the beauty and humanity of the 
Jewish religion, quoting a series of ancient Jewish maxims of universal import 
(taken from the mishnaic treatise Pirkey Avoth); and second, he attempts to 
show how religious diversity need not impede true friendship. Rather “auda-
ciously,” as he himself admits,21 the author brings to the fore the fundamental 
affinity between Judaism and Christianity, illustrating it by citing numerous 
passages from the Gospels and some carefully selected letters by St. Paul.22 
De’ Pomi describes the foundations of an Abrahamic religion encompass-
ing the Jews, the Christians, and the Muslims (although he has some reser-
vations about the latter, probably given the situation in Venice during the 
Turkish-Venetian war). Abraham, their common father,
possessed the necessary science to attain the greatest virtue: he was exem-
plary among men for his faith, temperance, honesty, innocence, and piety.23
Their real common enemies are the idolaters, those who deny the true 
cult of God; however, in Europe—in Christian countries, that is—this type 
of enemy does not exist, and has never existed. In sum, Christians and Jews 
are brothers,
but that is not enough, because all men are brothers, except those Nations 
rejected by God for one and only reason, their cult of idolatry.24
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On the one hand, the Jewish doctor feels compelled to show that the Mosaic 
Law believes that the enemies of the Jews can be counted precisely and con-
sist of those peoples who dissuaded the Jews from their divine cult and lived 
in the Jews’ promised land, neither of which applies to the Christians. Indeed, 
if it is true—as Josephus Flavius asserts—that the Romans, who went on to 
become Christians, were descended from the Edomites, then the following 
verse from Deuteronomy (23:3) may apply to them: “Thou shalt not abhor an 
Edomite; for he is thy brother.”25 On the other hand, de’ Pomi lists several of 
the repeated references the New Testament makes to the Jewishness of Jesus 
and Paul, fully endorsing it. He concludes that not only are these two reli-
gions not at odds, but the chain of “carnal and spiritual”26 affinities linking 
them far outweighs their differences, which in the end are minimal.27 Jews 
and Christians are God’s witnesses, and spread moral and religious virtues28 
while also pursuing indulgence and charity.29
Thus, according to de’ Pomi, there is a Judeo-Christian (and partially 
Muslim) civilization founded on the cult of a common God, which does not 
preclude particular attitudinal differences. Although one may object that this 
book is a work of apologetics, much like Luzzatto’s Discourse, the Jewish 
doctor’s previous works nevertheless seem to suggest that his ecumenism was 
heartfelt. In particular, his Discorso intorno a l’humana miseria, e sopra’l 
modo di fuggirla30— a text on ethics published alongside an Italian version 
of the Ecclesiastes31—is saturated with a non-confessional religiosity: exclu-
sively basing himself on the Book of Ecclesiastes, which he considers to be 
a moral treatise the true meaning of which was as misunderstood by the Jews 
as it was by the Christians, de’ Pomi warns his readers against pessimism, 
skepticism, and excess. In his later Enarratio apologica, de’ Pomi includes 
a series of non-confessional rabbinic maxims of universal moral import in 
the Appendix (“Sciences of the Ancient Jews”), in order to confirm the Jews’ 
capacity to rise to ethical universality. 
Between the end of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth cen-
turies, Italian Jews thus variously began to conceive of themselves as form-
ing a nation materially and intellectually weakened by exile: their constant 
references to their political and military past—as opposed to their religious 
election—reinforce this impression further. Although particular rituals and 
beliefs cemented this nation, its religion fundamentally encompassed hu-
manity as a whole, since it considered Adam, or Abraham, the common 
father of all men, or believers, whatever their individual confessions. 
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The Jews thus had the right to re-integrate into the community of nations, 
rediscovering the path to social—and perhaps even political—normalcy, 
and aspiring to the dignity owed to all those who shared basic moral and 
religious precepts.
Leone Modena naturally comes to mind in this context. Just like Luzzatto, 
Modena gave an objective account of “Jewish rites” in his Historia de’ riti 
ebraici,32 later confirming the anthropological—indeed in some ways al-
most post-theological—vision he develops in other works.33 The Venetian 
rabbi encouraged the Jews to translate the Bible into literary Tuscan, rather 
than medieval Judeo-Italian,34 and also probably covertly tried to reform the 
Jewish religion by omitting some of its more “particularistic” rites and de-
scribing its characteristics in biblical, rather than rabbinic, terms.35 
The Return of Exclusivism
This was only one strand of the Jewish Italian culture of the period. An 
entirely different current developed in parallel, reaching its peak at the be-
ginning of the eighteenth century.
We have already evoked the significant chapter of Jewish intellectual his-
tory that corresponds to the spread of kabbalistic sensibility in the second 
half of the sixteenth century, in the wake of the works and teachings of fig-
ures such as Mosheh Cordovero and Yitzḥaq Luria, in Safed and Galilea. 
As the study of Kabbalah took off, an esoteric doctrine which had been the 
preserve of a few initiates progressively became the shared heritage of all 
believers, including the most unsophisticated.36 Naturally, this new sensibil-
ity called for collections of the new interpretations of Kabbalah. Even as 
early as 1558, the publication of the first print edition of the Zohar and other 
important kabbalistic writings was not opposed by anti-kabbalists so much 
as by those rabbis who, although they acknowledged Kabbalah as possess-
ing supreme knowledge, feared that its dissemination would require read-
ing rather unorthodox works, as well as making them vulnerable to a fresh 
outbreak of ecclesiastical censorship at a time when Italian Jews were still 
smarting from the burning of the Talmud decreed by the Church a few years 
previously.37
It is not possible to delineate the contrast between old and new intel-
lectual attitudes here. Suffice it to say that Kabbalah brought to the fore the 
particularity and superiority of the Jewish people, grounding these attributes 
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in the belief that they were the depository of the most profound truths about 
God and the world, which teachers had transmitted from one generation to 
the next, starting with Moses, who received them from God Himself.
Kabbalah opened a rift between the Jews—who were not only the de-
positories of these truths but also could act upon the divine world through 
the mediation of certain practices—and non-Jews; moreover, Kabbalah was 
at odds with philosophy and the sciences, as any revealed and true doctrine 
may be when dealing with human and uncertain knowledge. 
Whether they were kabbalists or the proponents of a scientific, proto-
nationalistic and universalistic spirit, Italian Jews were at the vanguard of 
the Jewish world: they were the first to understand and study the teachings 
of the masters of Galilee, which they also disseminated by printing them. In 
sum, Italy was where the Land of Israel met the rest of the Jewish world—
both Sephardi and Ashkenazi—which was itself rapidly conquered by this 
devotion and love for the study and practice of Kabbalah. Although the near 
hegemony of Kabbalah lasted for almost two centuries, it is difficult to ex-
plain how the doctrine was able to become so widespread so rapidly in so 
“modern” a state as Italy. The religious and epistemological crisis which 
made space for the Reform and for so-called “post-Tridentine” Catholicism 
in the Christian world of the late Renaissance probably generated a spiritual 
void in the Jewish sphere that modernists such as Simone Luzzatto were 
unable to fill. There are echoes of a futile resistance to Kabbalah—to “this” 
Kabbalah—from Luzzatto himself, as well as from other rabbis of the pe-
riod, such as Leone Modena.38 However, despite not being in short supply, 
the opponents of Kabbalah could clearly not express themselves publicly: 
their interventions were anonymous, and they had difficulty publishing their 
works, which often remained in manuscript form. Indeed, they were some-
times even forced into voluntary exile from their native city, as happened to 
the poet Ya‘aqov Francés in the wake of the outcry caused by his rational-
ist verse, even though he opposed Sabbateanism, rather than Kabbalah in 
general.39 
The spread through Italy of a number of complex, suggestive, and total-
izing doctrines bearing some formal resemblance to science but at odds with 
it and denouncing its futility—if not outright harmfulnesss—suggests that, 
despite the fact that the most modern Jewish culture was evolving in that 
region, it was also in a sense being “orientalized” by ideas coming from the 
Land of Israel. 
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Italy had several great representatives of Kabbalah at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, yet, so problematic was their relationship with science, 
philosophy, and the belief in Jewish exclusivity which marked their vision of 
the Other that they were on their way out. Their followers would essentially 
be confined to Eastern Europe, while in Italy Jews would reestablish contact 
with “the letters and the sciences” and start collaborating again with their 
Christian fellow citizens, allowing for the re-emergence of the rationalists’ 
universalist stance. Although one may wonder to what extent this new-found 
harmony made them lose their particularity, as they merged with the com-
mon culture of so-called “modernity,” what is certain is that the notion that 
Judaism constitutes a nation started to disappear as Italian Jews increasingly 
began to see themselves as the Jewish citizens of the Italian nation. 
105
The Italian and Latin Works of Lazzaro da Viterbo, Sixteenth-Century Jewish Humanist
6
The Italian and Latin Works  
of Lazzaro da Viterbo, 
Sixteenth-Century Jewish Humanist
Lazzaro da Viterbo: A Jewish Humanist
In the second half of the 1500s, the Jewish community in Rome passed 
through an extremely delicate period, the result of the intolerant attitude of the 
Catholic Church, which was engaged in the so-called Counter-Reformation. 
One of the responses of the community’s intellectual elite was to advocate 
for the rights of Jews from within the traditional ecclesiastical legal frame-
work, showing in some cases that the Jewish religion shared some funda-
mental notions with Christianity and that Jews corresponded to the model of 
religiosity sought by the Catholic Church at that time. To do this, they needed 
to express their own traditional notions in a language acceptable to their 
counteraprts—Latin or Italian—and with cultural references that were simi-
larly acceptable—the classic philosophers and authors, the New Testament, 
the Church Fathers, and other more recent Christian writers. Thus this period 
gave rise to what can be considered a belated Jewish humanism, undoubtedly 
brought about by contingent necessities and defensive in nature, but rooted 
in an orientation that was in any case widespread among the members of the 
Jewish elite, and that would continue into subsequent years. 
Judging from the work of Lazzaro da Viterbo, one of the most signifi-
cant representatives of this trend, the level of such production was clearly 
elevated, demonstrating, in addition to a vast rabbinical culture, perfect con-
trol of the linguistic and cultural tools of the “other,” in this case meaning 
Christians as a whole. 
Lazzaro da Viterbo (Ely‘ezer Matzliaḥ ben Avraham ha-Kohen mi-Vit-
erbo in Hebrew) is not unknown to scholars, though he has probably not yet 
received the attention he deserves. He was the author of at least three texts: 
a versed Italian version of Me‘on ha-shoalym (a long chapter of the well-
known fourteenth-century Jewish poem Miqdash me‘at by Mosheh of Rieti); 
a work, written in Latin and dedicated to Cardinal Guglielmo Sirleto,1 on 
the validity of the Jewish textual tradition of the Bible; and the Tractatus de 
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Anno Jubilaei, also in Latin, dedicated to Pope Gregory XIII, who had pro-
claimed 1575 a Holy Year.2 To this we can add a teshuvah, or legal response, 
expressed in his capacity as a member of the Roman rabbinate.3
If we exclude this last text, which is technical in nature, and the brief 
Hebrew dedication to the translation of Me‘on ha-shoalym, the work of this 
rabbi and Roman doctor4 is entirely in Italian and Latin. This quality aligns 
him with native central Italian contemporaries such as Mosè Allatino5 and 
David de’ Pomi (who married Lazzaro’s sister),6 or to Northern Italian (more 
specifically Mantuan) authors like the playwright Yehudah Sommo7 and, 
in part, Azariyah de’ Rossi8 and Avraham Portaleone.9 It also makes him a 
member of a limited group of Jewish Italian intellectuals who connected, or 
at least tried to connect, with the Christian world. We can justifiably grant 
these writers a denomination little-used in classical Renaissance historiog-
raphy: humanist Jews (or Jewish humanists): writers or scholars who were 
perfectly at ease in the Hebrew language and its literature, which they knew 
deeply and even intimately, but who wrote part or all of their works in Italian 
and Latin. In 1895, David Kaufmann wrote: “The history of the ‘humanistic’ 
movement among the Jews of Italy has yet to be written,”10 and this still ap-
plies today, with regard not to special research, but to the phenomenon as a 
whole.11
The Italian Translation of Me‘on ha-shoalym
The poem Miqdash me‘at (Little Sanctuary) by Mosheh ben Yitzḥaq of 
Rieti (1388-c.1465) was written in terza rima and conceived as a Jewish ver-
sion of Dante’s12 Divina Commedia. It found considerable popularity among 
Italian Jews from the late fifteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth 
century.13 One of its parts was particularly successful, copied separately by 
scribes from various regions and translated into Italian many times, always 
retaining the poetic meter of the original (the Dantesque tercet); at least three 
of these translations were made by Roman authors within a relatively brief 
period, in 1585, 1602, and 1609. This part was called Me‘on ha-shoalym 
(The Residence of the Beggars), with reference to the first words, made up 
of 115 tercets and constituting the second chapter of the second section of 
the Miqdash me‘at. This chapter is concentrated on the Temple itself, after 
the first section, which is dedicated to the “outer courtyard,” or the profane 
sciences. The Me‘on ha-shoalym follows the majestic vision of Paradise de-
scribed in the first chapter, expresses the moral and intellectual insufficiency 
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experienced by the poet, who had just been made the receptacle of a revela-
tion; and precedes the allegory of the “City of God,” formulated when the 
author was still “blinded” by this vision. 
Apart from its position in the narrative fabric of the poem, this long chap-
ter can stand alone as an independent text, and this is how it was interpreted 
by its translators14 and by numerous copyists.15 It is a prayer in three roughly 
delimited parts, intended for the day of Kippur (explicitly recalled in the fi-
nale; also evoked is the yom teru‘ah, the day of the sounding of the shofar).16
The first part (around fifty verses) is made up of the confession of sins 
(widduy); the second (around thirty verses) is, according to the intellectualist 
vein represented by Rieti, a form of purification consisting of the enuncia-
tion of a series of truths about God and the heavenly and earthly realms; the 
third part, also composed of about thirty tercets, is the selyḥah, or request for 
God’s forgiveness.
In Me‘on ha-shoalym, biblical language (with some expressions that are 
Talmudic or taken from the philosophic and scientific lexicon) is adapted, 
without forcing, to the prosody of the original Italian (tercets of hendecasyl-
lables) in a fluid succession that makes this chapter one of the most important 
in Italian Jewish literature and in all Jewish religious literature of the late 
Medieval period.
The first printed translation was done by Lazzaro da Viterbo. The transla-
tor preceded his work with two dedications, one in Hebrew and one in Italian, 
both to Donna Corcos, the daughter and sister of important Sephardic leaders 
in the Roman community. In the Hebrew text, the dedicatee is assigned the 
laudatory attributes typical of Italian Jewish literature of the Renaissance: 
beautiful, good, generous, and modest, and above all intelligent. The poet 
hopes that Donna Corcos will recite this version “with her lovely voice” on 
the day of Kippur, and that this will help him to expiate his sins. The Italian 
dedication, of equal length (one and a half pages) reveals that Lazzaro wrote 
this translation “more for [his] amusement than to give it out,” i.e., to publish 
it, and that being “asked by certain of my loving young people to give them 
a copy,” he had decided to dedicate it to Donna Corcos. In this case as well, 
he noted regarding the dedicatee (described more piously than in the parallel 
Hebrew text: “full of spirit, clothed in piety, adorned with holiness, and de-
votion, and divine religion”) that, “When the time comes [...] he would like 
to hear her sing some verse.”
The translation is fluid and extremely faithful to the original, as can be 
observed by comparing it to the Hebrew text, which is reproduced in the 
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appendix. Some of his renderings are poetically remarkable. It is obvious, as 
Lazzaro observes in the Italian dedication, that “all the words will not cor-
respond point by point to their original; being an extremely difficult thing, 
perhaps impossible, that verses in rhyme, transferred from one language to 
another, although in verse and in rhyme, should completely balance out.” In 
any case, despite the inevitable approximations in correspondence between 
individual words, the Italian text shows no particular awkwardness; its meter 
is perfect and it is easy to comprehend. In sum, Lazzaro is gifted with a 
true literary talent, though this manifests itself in a translation rather than an 
original work, as he himself reminds us in the same dedication: “As I myself 
am unable (like a dry font) to give you something of my own, I will give you 
something from another.”17
His reasons for doing this translation, like those of others who translated 
this or other Jewish texts, must have been essentially personal. The Italian 
text was not actually intended for liturgical purposes, but neither could it 
be viewed as a useable translation, like versions of the Bible intended for 
use by women and schoolchildren. Thus his intention should be read as the 
desire to produce, in the language of daily communication (which in those 
years had actually assumed a literary dignity as well), a text perceived as 
an exemplar of his own “national” cultural tradition, and of Jewish poetry 
tout court. At the same time, this text—of a penitential and wisdom-sharing 
nature, like the others translated in these decades—had to appear consonant 
with the Catholic religious sensibility of the time, which, as we can see, was 
shared by Jews living in the same region. Thus this translation can indeed be 
considered, in its own right, an example of “spiritual rhymes,” a form wide-
spread within Italian Catholic literature in those years.
The Search for a Common Religious Space between  
Christians and Jews: The Tractatus de Anno Jubilaei
The Tractatus de Anno Jubilaei is a 46-page opera di circostanza 
(a work written for a specific occasion), dedicated and addressed to Pope 
Gregory XIII (1572-1585). It is undated but surely written before the 1575 
Jubilee proclaimed by that Pontiff. The purpose of the Tractatus is to plead 
the case for the readmission of the Jews into the Papal States after their ex-
pulsion by decree in 1569 (with the exceptions of Rome and Ancona, which 
had not been concerned by the expulsion).
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Only in the final pages does the reader discover that the text was written 
for contingent purposes; indeed, the Tractatus is presented as a description 
of the Jewish roots of the institution of Jubilee, including an explanation of 
the meaning of the word kadosh (in connection to the Holy Year) and the 
meaning of shemyttah (remission), as well as the allegorical interpretation of 
the menorah (seven-armed candelabrum) and the exegesis of Psalm 67, all 
topics connected to the Jubilee. 
Lazzaro goes beyond a simple erudite description: all of these topics 
come to support a textual exegesis that culminates in a very intense reli-
gious vision in which the elements of intellectual contemplation and mys-
tical union with the divine are repeated and emphasized. This intellectual 
and spiritual level is made possible, the author insists, by a “conversion” 
in which liberation from the slavery of the senses (reflecting the freeing of 
the slaves instituted by the biblical Jubilee) is fundamental. Lazzaro returns 
often to this intellectual-ascetic vision of humanity, citing the psalms,18 the 
Talmud,19 and Christian authors like Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius 
(third-fourth century),20 but above all autonomously developing the idea that 
sanctification is preparation for the intellectual conjoining with God, and that 
the Judaic Law is a means to attain this conjunction. 
Man, who is a temple of God and is formed in his image, must elevate 
his mind—through his own works—to the deepest secrets of God, so that 
the soul is elevated to the most sublime heights and is shaped by divine 
thoughts as if he were in God, and God in him. For this reason, the Holy 
Law commands many things, which allow humanity to arrive at specula-
tion on divine topics.21
Spinoza would have liked Lazzaro’s interpretation of the Jewish Sabbath: by 
abstaining from any servile labor on that day, he states humanity dedicated 
itself to the intellectual contemplation of God, which led to tranquility of 
the soul:
But by considering the works of God, meditating on the celestial ones 
and keeping the works of God in the highest veneration, let us truly rest 
in Him, and this means not to venture outside of our place. Because this 
place is the justice of the soul, it is truth and sanctification, the quiet and 
calm of the spirit: this is the true Sabbath.22
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The profound sense of freedom of Jubilee—considered a “Sabatum maxi-
mum”—is the liberation from every sensual desire,23 and knowledge is the 
path humanity must take to rejoin with God and receive his wisdom, an ex-
perience that was fully granted only to Moses:
Knowledge is the means that allows us to join with God himself.24
This concept of the conversion that leads to the intellectual contemplation 
of God, closely related to the Neo-Platonic sensibility of the Renaissance, 
could have an autonomous source within the Jewish tradition in the doctrine 
of Maimonides, described in The Guide of the Perplexed. It is interesting to 
note that in this case, the focus of consideration was not the Aristotelian in-
spiration of the philosopher of Cordoba, but the mystical upshot of his work.25
Maimonides, the author cited and used by Thomas Aquinas, could eas-
ily appear in a text addressed to a Pontiff.26 The other explicit citations from 
Jewish literature are from the Bible or from authors accepted by the Christian 
tradition of thought and historiography, such as Philo and Josephus.27 Rabbis’ 
statements were often accompanied by citations of Christian authors, with 
the clear goal of showing the proximity of Jewish and Christian doctrine. 
Firmianus Lactantius, for example, is used to support Rav Catina’s state-
ment in the Talmud Bavly Sanhedrin (f. 97a) about the world that will last 
for six thousand years, and the Sabbath, with its eternal repose of the seventh 
millennium, was treated as a notion derived from both Jewish teachers and 
Augustine.28 With regard to the value of children praying for their deceased 
father, and the soul’s passage from Purgatory before being received into the 
grace of God,29 although the first idea at least (again attributed to “Jewish 
teachers”) is certainly part of Jewish theory and practice, we can assume that 
both concepts are mentioned insofar as they perfectly correspond to the orien-
tation of the Catholic Church during that period.30 Finally, the benediction that 
humanity must address to God for both good and evil received, a notion dis-
cussed in a famous passage from the Talmud Bavly Berakhoth (f. 60b), is pre-
ceded by a citation of “the Divine Augustine” with a similar meaning: “Omnia 
a voluntate Dei proveniebant, et ideo in omnibus laudandus est Deo.”31
Lazzaro’s most frequently cited author is Augustine (eleven times, from 
six different works),32 and this is perhaps not by chance: a number of state-
ments on the will of God as the sole origin of human success (which is there-
fore independent of both human behavior [“industria”] and the nature of 
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materiality) and on the divine aid necessary for humanity to do good (“Ipse 
enim facit ut velimus bonum”),33 together with the aspiration to intellectual 
contemplation, seem to represent a characteristic element of Lazzaro da 
Viterbo’s religious orientation. 
The Tractatus de anno Jubilaei explicitly designates an intellectual space 
common to Jews and Christians. Not only were the cited Jewish authors cho-
sen from among those recognized by Christian tradition, and the rabbis of the 
Talmud flanked by the authority of their tradition to validate their statements, 
but Lazzaro da Viterbo also developed, however briefly, some kabbalistic no-
tions drawn from Yosef Gikatilla’s Sefer Yetzyrah and Sha‘arey orah (known 
in the Latin translation respectively as “Liber creationis” and “Portae lucis”), 
which were well known to Christian kabbalists.34 Furthermore, a detailed ex-
egesis of Psalm 67 was accompanied by a drawing of the seven verses of the 
psalm arranged like the arms of the Menorah—which was common enough 
in Jewish prayer books, but was accompanied in this case by the same draw-
ing for the Latin version as well.35
The Roman rabbi goes even further in the suggesting a commonality of 
Jewish and Christian religious notions, indicating some possible parallelisms 
between a series of passages from the Old and New Testaments.36 
Given the conclusion of the text—the request for readmission of the Jews 
into the areas from which they had been expelled—it is difficult to believe 
that this proposal of common space was not a tactic to gain the favorable 
regard of the Pope and his entourage. The Tractatus suggested that Jews 
and Christians shared the same ethical (ascetic) and religious (mystic and 
contemplative) values, and of course the same foundational texts, the books 
of the Bible. The only stubbornness (“obstinacy”) that Lazzaro dwells on is 
not that of the Jews who refuse the truth of Christ but that of human nature, 
which is therefore universal and not denominational: the refusal to abandon 
servitude to worldly things (“saeculum”) and achieve true freedom, which is 
service to God.37
Lazzaro found himself in an extremely delicate position. He had to de-
fend the Jews without claiming that they were the possessors of religious 
truth, and without placing them in an inferior position, and he had to do all of 
this in a potentially hostile environment, where the pressure to convert was 
strong. To get an idea of the difficulty of his task, we need only recall the 
dedicatees of the three works in non-Hebraic languages that we have seen. 
Donna Corcos, the dedicatee of the poetic translation, was the daughter of 
one of the most prestigious representatives of the Roman Jewish community, 
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an influential member (ḥashuv zaken, Parnas) of the Castilian “Scola”38 
who, however, converted during the pontificate of Gregory XIII.39 Cardinal 
Guglielmo Sirleto, dedicatee of the writings on the Jewish textual tradition, 
had since 1568 been patron of the “House of Catechumens,” where new con-
verts to Catholicism were hosted and instructed. He also oversaw the appli-
cation of both the papal bull “Cum nimis absurdum,” which ordered a series 
of restrictions on the Jews, and Church decrees against Hebrew books.40 As 
for Pope Gregory XIII, his name is associated with the papal bull of 1584, 
which obligated Jews to attend a Christian sermon once a week, and the con-
firmation of the ban on Jewish doctors treating Christian patients. 
While taking into account the intended character of the text as a whole, 
we must note that its author moved with a certain ease through the classics 
of the Christian tradition, not only the books of the New Testament but also 
those of the Church Fathers (Firmianus Lactantius, Augustine, Gregory the 
Great) and the great thinkers and popes of the Medieval and Renaissance 
periods (Isidore, Boniface VIII, Nicholas V). Thus, by the end of the 1500s, 
these sources would become part of the library of an educated Jew, by choice 
or by necessity.41 Throughout this brief treatise, as with other writings by 
contemporaneous Jewish authors, we are faced with a phenomenon similar 
to that of Christian scholars of Judaism, which has not been sufficiently fea-
tured in historical research: not only were there Christian scholars interested 
in Jewish literature, but there were also a good number of erudite Jews who 
demonstrated a knowledge of not just the classical philosophical tradition, 
but also Christian doctrine. 
We must also remember the language of the text: a rich and fluid Latin 
with Ciceroan influences, which must have surprised the readers of the 
Roman Curia—that was likely also part of the purpose of the Tractatus.
A Defensive Strategy:  
The Defense of Jewish Scriptural Tradition
On an unspecified date, as previously mentioned, “Lazarus hebreus 
Viterbienses” wrote a brief essay, in Latin and dedicated to Cardinal Sirleto, 
on the reliability of the transmission of the biblical text by the Jews, respond-
ing to attacks from Christians who accused them of having changed passages 
announcing the coming of the Messiah, Jesus Christ. This was an ancient ac-
cusation by the Christians, originating in the second century and appearing 
in the Dialogue with Trypho by Justin Martyr, for example. 
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Lazzaro states that his co-religionists—who had always recognized 
Hebrew as a holy language,42 designating the biblical texts written in it as 
“most holy” because they were the work of God—did not even minimally 
alter those texts. On the contrary, they had carefully preserved them accord-
ing to their laws, which they believed must be followed to ensure eternal life; 
a sacrilege as impious as altering the word of God was therefore unthinkable. 
To this religious justification he added an empirical one: the identicalness 
of the biblical texts possessed by Jews throughout the world, whether “itali 
iudei, galli, hispani, alemani, greci, africani, et tandem qui trans Eufratem 
habitant.” We can see in this passage, incidentally, Lazzaro’s awareness of 
the different areas of the Jewish diaspora. A similar awareness will be dem-
onstrated nearly a half-century later, in 1638, in another text by an Italian 
rabbi intended for non-Jewish readers, Discourse on the Condition of the 
Jews by Simone Luzzatto. 
As he did in the Tractatus de anno Jubilaei, Lazzaro takes recourse to 
notions shared with his interlocutors, supporting his thesis with citations 
from Christian authors. To a defender of Catholic reform like Sirleto, it cer-
tainly seemed acceptable to say that the psalms were more stylistically rich 
and “mellifluous” than any speech or heroic poem; these were the years of 
Catholic suspicion of profane literature. The Jews were described in this text 
as believers, respectful of the Divine Law, and aspirants to eternal happiness. 
For Lazzaro—and, by implication, for his Christian interlocutor—the fact 
that they did not chase after the pleasures of worldly life, riches, honors, and 
power is evidence that this statement did not need to be proven.43 In sum, this 
description portrayed the Jew as the ideal type of religious person, one that 
fits the model envisioned by the guiding forces of Catholic reform. So strong 
was the Roman rabbi’s desire to present his illustrious recipient with an ac-
ceptable reading from the point of view of the Catholic tradition that he was 
even willing to admit (if hypothetically) that it was the Jews’ own fault that 
they had been dispersed and persecuted.44 However, this fault of the Jews 
was left undefined: it could be putting the Messiah to death, but it is more 
likely the sins enumerated by the Talmud Bavly.45
With regard to Jewish faithfulness in the protection and transmission of 
the biblical text, prestigious witnesses in its favor include Thomas Aquinas, 
who considered the Jews “a cabinet [that protects] the Sacred Scriptures,”46 
and Agostino Giustiniani, Bishop of Nebbio, who in his Psalterium nebiense 
(Genoa 1516, the first polyglot edition of a book of the Bible) agrees with 
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the Jewish reading of the verse of Psalm 22:17 (21:17 in the Christian tradi-
tion), interpreted traditionally by Christians from the Vulgate on as a proph-
ecy of the crucifixion of Jesus.47 Addressing another controversial passage,48 
Lazzaro insists on the correctness of the Jewish version, which, he adds, is 
perfectly adapted for both Christian and Jewish exegesis. 
For Lazzaro, the important thing was to exonerate the Jews from the igno-
minious accusation of corrupting the scriptures in order to eliminate justifica-
tions for Christianity’s truth. The Roman rabbi insisted at length on the enor-
mous care that had been taken with the text, preserving it from possible cor-
ruptions through a series of measures such as the counting of not only verses 
but also words, and even the letters of each individual book of the Bible. The 
Hebrew words were then, he recounted, given attributes of mnemonic sym-
bols, based on a correspondence between letters and numbers. The Jewish 
scholars also counted the various ways in which the words were written: 
the number of occurrences with vowel points (“scriptio plena”) and without 
(“scriptio defectiva”) and the occurrences with different vowelizations. 
According to the author, this enormous task of protecting the sacred text, 
called mesara (a wording used by Lazzaro instead of the more common ma-
sora49) was the work of Ezra and his Academy (the Keneseth ha-ghedola, 
“Great Assembly”) upon his return from Babylonian exile. The oral tradition, 
handed down through the generations both through vowels and through ac-
cents (going back to Moses, who had received it as revelation), could easily 
have been corrupted during the years of exile, and so the textual intercession 
of Ezra and his colleagues was urgent and necessary: 
That great academy, and Ezra the first in it, knew that the Hebrew lan-
guage and the sacred scripture were full of so many minutiae, points and 
nuances that the details could be corrupted by some means, Thus they 
devised a way to preserve it intact at all times, and to be able to restore 
to it final completeness and clarity, should the need arise. Those excel-
lent people then began to create a sort of conduit for the memory that 
would be handed down through the generations: they called it Masera, or 
tradition, and left in writing all the signs and rules that had preserved the 
sacred page in its originality and purity.50
Lazzaro takes a decidedly partisan stance toward the dating of the vow-
elization and accentuation of the biblical text of the time of Ezra, com-
pletely ignoring the “discoveries” of the great grammarian Elia Levita, 
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already published in 1538 in the introductions to his Masoreth ha-masoreth 
(Tradition of the Tradition).51
Levita had contested the attribution to Ezra and his Academy, with regard 
to both the indispensable graphic aids to the correct reading of the Scriptures 
and the masora, the well-known apparatus intended to protect the text from 
corruption. With rapid and dense argumentation, the German grammarian 
attributed the editing of the first scriptures to the Masters of Tiberias, who 
lived in a post-Talmudic era. If the masora had started during those years in 
Tiberias, he added, many other scholars over the generations made useful 
contributions. Although he insisted on the conformity of these theses with 
the statements of the Talmudic teachers, Levita was aware of his novelty: 
with a typically “humanistic” attitude, he criticizes previous authors and de-
clares that “the truth is recognizable [in itself].”52 Of course, even Levita 
did not believe that the authors of Tiberias had innovated in the reading of 
the Bible; he argued that they limited themselves to inventing a system of 
symbols that would preserve the oral tradition, which arose from the Sinai 
tradition. But dating the invention of these symbols to a relatively late era 
was a delicate gesture in itself in that it removed every aura of holiness from 
this apparatus, taken in its “materiality.”
In a text like Lazzaro’s, explicit in its apologetic nature, there was likely 
no space for a critical attitude that—even in limited amounts—reduced the 
antiquity, and therefore the authority, of traditional scriptural Judaism. This 
attitude later found a prestigious foe in Azariyah de’ Rossi (who was never-
theless, on other topics, one of the most exacting critics of the rabbinic tradi-
tion among Jewish authors)53 and, some decades later, created difficulties in 
the Protestant camp as well.54
From the brief presentation of his writings, Lazzaro da Viterbo appears to 
be a man gifted with an intense mystical-intellectual faith: a talented rabbi and 
doctor, skilled translator of poetry from Hebrew into Italian, and lucid writer 
in Latin, he testifies to the intellectual level of the Roman Jewish elite in the 
late 1500s. Although the culture of that community was heavily conditioned by 
the presence of the Catholic curia, it nevertheless succeeded in expressing its 
autonomy and originality. It is interesting to note how an author like Lazzaro 
expressed his deep knowledge of the Jewish tradition essentially in Italian and 
Latin. This appropriation of the tools and content of the culture of the “other” 
can perhaps be interpreted as a sign of modernity, even if, in this case, it was 
a forced modernity, imposed by the particular situation of the Jews of Rome.
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APPENDIx: TRANSLATION OF Me‘on hA-ShoAlyM
Paraphrases of the Hebrew Text
The poet begins by addressing the “Place of the supplicants, supreme 
end of those who ask for mercy, whose source of benediction spreads life,” 
an allusion to the Third Temple announced by the prophet Ezekiel, or the 
Celestial Temple, identified with an emanation or manifestation of God. 
The supplicant starts with the declaration of his inadequacy (“my spring 
is like a drop of water in the Ganges compared to the river of the Ancients”) 
and the fear that arises from both the Highness of the Divine Name—in-
deed, the author merely “draws near to the door of the evocation of God”—
and the paucity of his own value (“dust that blows in the darkness, without 
direction”).
The soul and body must not fight each other, but must recall how precari-
ous life is, and that punishment could come to both. Here begins a loving 
prayer to his own soul, in twelve tercets and characterized by an anaphora 
that is repeated five times: “My soul” (nafshy). The author exhorts the soul 
to flee from the ruined field in which it wanders: “your oars are deceit and 
falsehood” (using an aquatic metaphor frequently used in all Rieti’s works), 
“and you cross a sea of bitter waters” (note the alliteration in w-ma‘avarekh 
ba-yam hem mey marym). The soul is a prisoner of the material body, de-
scended from above to serve God and “drink His water.” When the cup is 
full, to vanish from that ephemeral shade that is earthly life, it must return 
to its origins. 
This exhortation to the soul concludes with a call to action, so that “the 
already drawn-in wings of my desire [ḥishqy, a Platonically-inspired term 
that characterizes Rieti’s religious thought]55 do not exert themselves in 
vain, and their feathers are not torn by enemy spirits.” Indeed, a corrupt 
life is followed by the fire that burns the human soul, and the passage of the 
soul from a sacred place to a profane one. And so the final appeal is heard, 
recognizing he who created the root of existence. This hearing reawakens 
the soul, which has passed through a period of darkness and vanity in the 
human body.
The inadequacies of the author are innumerable: he is directed toward the 
good, but unable to achieve it; he listens to the word of God, but then forgets 
it; he rebels like a student with his teacher; he evades reproaches, values his 
own instinct, and has a heart within him that burns like fire.
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A list of sins in poetic form follows, in six tercets, the liturgical for-
mula, in which the failings of humanity are enunciated in alphabetical order 
(Elohay hen eda‘ ky ashamty / bagadty gazalty wa-adabber / dofy we-gam 
harea‘ hare‘oty etc.).
Sin is now so well-rooted as to become a habit that prevents the percep-
tion of desecrations, and thus the thoughts depart from God. For this reason, 
the author once again addresses his own soul, calling on it to present itself 
before the Lord of the world, at the moment of judgment, as a penitent vir-
gin. So, to save itself, the soul will have to manifest the same energy it has 
already employed to cast off its treasures and sacrifice to demons, which are 
only shadows: virginal breasts, adds the poet, were led to a place of men-
struation and impurity. 
But the root, or essence, of the supplicant was undermined by his folly, 
enough to prevent his beholding the light and finding the path taught by God: 
he thus turns to God to redeem his soul, according to the ancient promise, 
and “the water of mercy spills” onto the sinner.
At this point begins what could be considered the second part of the 
text—the evocation of a series of behaviors proposed by the author to expi-
ate his own sins (four tercets with the anaphora we-im, “and if”):56 if forgive-
ness is granted through tears, the poet will go off into a secret place and cry, 
lamenting as if for the loss of a loved one; if prayer is enough, he will offer 
a sacrifice of words on his altar; if pain is what is required, his heart will dis-
solve at the enunciation of sins; if penitence is necessary, the author is ready 
to publicly repent, lamenting, clapping his hands (a sign of pain and grief 
from the biblical age), and tearing his hair.
He who knocks on the door of divine mercy shall perhaps obtain grace; 
perhaps God will guide his soul back onto the path and cease to remain 
concealed, but show again the light of his presence. “Forgive me, o Lord, 
pardon me,” erupts the poet, “I didn’t mean to irritate you, it is my heart that 
perverted me!”
If sin is essentially related to thoughts, the author has prepared a text 
(sefer) to serve as a sacrifice of expiation. This text consists of the enuncia-
tion of fundamental religious principles (inspired in part by Maimonides) 
whose function is clearly to purify perverted thoughts. The first principle 
is the necessary existence of God, followed by his singularity, immutabil-
ity, eternality (absence of beginning), simplicity (absence of parts), and 
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incorporeality (absence of perceivable body). It continues on, saying that the 
attributes of God add nothing to his essence and that the world was created 
by Him, through wisdom, from nothing. In this world, the first place is occu-
pied by the angels, saints that are pure and made of incorruptible substance. 
They are arranged in ten degrees, singing the praises of God and enjoying his 
intellectual contemplation, some of them being charged with the judgment 
of earthly things. Since he who was, is, and shall be can only be feared, one 
cannot help but be amazed and thank him for the beauty and pleasingness of 
that heightened world. 
The angels are followed by a dense crowd of souls, which are returned in 
flight to the place of their origin and, based on their actions, meet either the 
fullness of life or darkness and absence of pleasure.
Then come the celestial bodies of impressive majesty, made of a pure 
material, spherical in form, united as they are to the separate intellects: their 
movements tell of the extraordinary acts of God. In their great diversity they 
are—miraculously—directed toward a single goal. Their sizes are frighten-
ing; astronomical movements like epicycles and eccentrics must be the sub-
ject of grand science. Above them are the fixed stars, with their properties 
and their astrological aspects, while the sun and the moon are tasked with 
indicating the weather. 
Matter follows, ready to receive its four forms from the last sphere (an al-
lusion to the Aristotelian causes) and the qualities (a possible reference to the 
categories): here, therefore, are the elements and the corruptible creatures, 
composed and with a temperament, and subdivided into mineral, vegeta-
ble, animal, and rational beings, each with its internal constituent proportion. 
Only the species persist, while the assembled individuals are destined to die, 
after the universe deviated off its course (Rieti probably alludes here to the 
mortality of the human race after the sin of Adam).
“Given all this,” continues the author, speaking to God, “we cannot deny 
Your infinite science. You have rendered the body a receptacle of the soul, 
made of a simple and intellectual substance, which leads me to know Your 
ways; because it is not possible to give any definition of You (dimyon mash-
weh; literally “equivalent image”), and yet this is not even the beginning of 
the praises of God.”
After this “purification” of thoughts through the description of the fun-
damental elements of the celestial and the material worlds, we return to the 
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declaration of sins and the pleas for forgiveness which represent the third and 
last part of the text. Recalled here is “the day of sounding” (yom teru‘ah), an 
explicit allusion to the sound of the shofar and therefore to Kippur, which 
culminates the period of penitence. 
The poet prays for God to turn his golden scepter toward him and protect 
him in the shade of his hand, because his banner is Love: he is repentant, and 
his heart has been replenished with Grace. God can make blessings come 
down from heaven and send the Redeemer, who will gather up the people 
within our lifetime and put an end to their suffering. He can sustain the peni-
tent just as he led the children of Israel when he gifted them with the faith 
of the elect.
This prayer to the Lord continues with the request to provide the soul with 
new instruments to serve Him and, above all, to avoid leading the speaker 
into temptation; that his poor words may be welcomed; that his progeny as 
well—whom the poet hopes to see up to the fourth generation—may not be 
lacking in the fundamental needs: food, housing, and science (hokhmah we-
‘iyun, literally, “science and rational investigation”—a formulation typical 
of an author like Rieti, who attributes an existential value to knowledge). If 
the merit of his children was not sufficient, could God consider the merit of 
his Fathers? In any case, the real enemy is still instinct, which he compares 
to a swollen river or a bear waiting in ambush. So the poet prays to God to 
save his soul on the day that he offers Him his gift. Here Rieti uses some 
sophisticated alliteration: kishut kosht nikhsaf ly mi-kesef / emunah omen 
emeth amarym (a well-adorned offer, more coveted than silver / true faith, 
words of truth). 
The final verses present an anaphora of the word yom (day) in reference 
to the day of judgment for which this text is intended: it is a day of affliction 
(an allusion to the biblical command in Leviticus 23:27 related to the day 
of Kippur, “Afflict your souls”), but also a day of expiation (yom kippur) in 
which God will accept the prayers offered as a sacrifice, and a day of faith 
(bitaḥon) in which God will rebuild the destroyed homeland of Israel, and 
finally, a day in which the penitent will rediscover God, who will allow him 
to drink from the gushing fountain of his dwelling place. The circle of invo-
cation of the divine water, dispenser of grace and mercy, begun in the first 
verses, closes at the penultimate verse, before the ultimate appeal to give 
peace to his soul and the solemn declaration of love for the Law, which is 




IL TEMPIO di M. Moise di Riete, trasportato 
in vulgare Italiano, da M. Lazaro da Viterbo
Hebrew Text
ְמעֹון ַהּשֹׁוֲאִלים
Tempio d’ogni Orator fin’e desio
Di chi pietà ricerca, e gratie tante,
Fonte di vita benedetto, e pio.
ְמעֹון ַהּשֹׁוֲאִלים ַּתְכִלית ֵחֶפץ
ָּכל ְמַבֵּקׁש ֶחֶסד ְוַרֲחִמים
ּוַמְעיַן ִּבְרָכְתָך ַחּיִים יֵָפץ
Vengo hoggi humil col cor, dentro tremante,
Sò che’l mio rivo, è breve stilla al Gange,
Al gran fiume di quei che furo avante.
ָּבאִתי ַהּיֹום ָמְך ּוֵמַעי הֹוִמים
יֹוֵדַע ִבּי ִּכי ֶדֶלף ְלגִיחֹון 
מֹוָצא ֵמיַמי ֶאל נַַחל ְקדּוִמים
Con viso chino, il corpo steso piange,
Senza vigor, e’l cor dirotto in tutto.
Forse perdoni Iddio, si strugge et ange?
ִמְתנֵַּפל ַעל ָּפנִים ַׁשח ַעל ָּגחֹון
ִּבְכנִיעּות ַחיִל ּוְׁשִבירּות ַהֵּלב 
אּוַלי ְּתַכֵּפר ֵאל אּוַלי ָּתחֹן 
Contrito, afflitto, macro, e in viso asciutto,
Alto tremando, et ho sicuro molto,
Fronte impudica, e di Can viso brutto.
ְּבַבַעת ֶרֶתת ּוִמעּוט ֵחֶלב
ְּבִחְלחּול ַרב ּוָבטּוַח ֲאנִי
ִּכי ֵמַצח זֹונָה ִלי ּוְפנֵי ֶכֶלב
Surgomi con preghier, povero e stolto,
Ma per doppia cagion, l’alma diffida
In arido deserto, ov’io son colto.
ְוָאקּום ִּבְתִחּנָה ָסָכל ָענִי 
ְונְִׁשָמִתי ִלְׁשַּתיִם ְּתַבֵהל
ְּבִמְדַּבר ִצָּמאֹון ְמקֹום ָׁשְכנִי
Pe’l santo alto tuo nome, ò luce fida,
E per lo basso mio stato di terra,
Ch’in tenebre ne và, senz’altra guida.
ַעל עֶֹצם ֵׁשם ָקְדָׁשְך אֹור ִּכי יֵָהל
ַעל נְִמיכּות ֶעְרִּכי ֶׁשהּוא ֵאֶפר
הֹוֵלְך ַּבחֶֹשְך ְוֵאין ְמנֵַהל
Scrivo in carta, e nel cor, che chiude e serra,
Di molte colpe mie, picciola parte,
E l’alti lodi tue, spiega e disserra.
ְוֶאְכּתֹב ַעל ֵלָבב ַּגם ַעל ֵסֶפר 
ֵמרֹב ֲעוֹונֹוַתי ְמַעט ִמזְָער
ֵמרֹב ְּתִהָּלָתְך ִאְמֵרי ֶׁשֶפר 
Ma con timor m’appresso à ricordarte, 
E qual cera il mio cor si sface e strugge
Ché l’error mio, non ha termin’in parte.
ַאְך ְּבמֹוָרא ֶאְתָקֵרב ֶאל ַׁשַער
זְִכָרְך ְוִלִּבי ַּכּדֹונַג יִַּמס
ִּכי ַרב ִמְריִי ִלגְבּול ֹלא יְׁשַֹער
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Ah trist’alma, ch’a torto grida, e rugge
Del corpo, et ei con lei và combattendo
Nel gran giudicio, ch’ambedue distrugge 
אֹוי ַלּנֶֶפׁש ַעל ּגּוף ִּתזְַעק ָחָמס
ְוגּוף ְּבנֶֶפׁש ֵמִריב ְונְִלָחם
יֹום ֵּתת ַהִּדין ִוְהיֹוָתם ָלַמס
Non pensor prima mai, che non volendo
Ch’al fin la vita, ver me sia con lai,
Sotto tempo, fortuna, e caso horrendo.
ֹלא זְָכרּו ֵמרֹאׁש ִּכי ַעל ָּכְרָחם
סֹוף ַהַחּיִים ִרָּמה ְותֹוֵלָעה
ֵעת ָוֶפגַע יְִקֵרם ְונָס ֵלָחם
Anima inpria che’l mal ne giunga, e guai,
Torna pentita, e scampa fuor dal suolo
Misero dove ancor’errando stai.
נְַפִׁשי ֶּפן ִּתְדָּבַקנִי ָהָרָעה
ׁשּוִבי ׁשּוִבי ִהָּמְלִטי ִמּתֹוְך
ְׂשֵדה ֵחֶרם ֲאֶׁשר ַאְּת ּבֹו תֹוָעה
Anima i remi tuoi, son fraude e duolo
E varchi un mar, d’amara acqua, e d’orgoglio,
E l’Angelo di Dio, sententia il nolo.
נְַפִׁשי ְמׁשֹוַטיְִך ִמְרָמה ָותְֹך 
ּוַמְעָּבֵרְך ַּבּיָם ֵהם ֵמי ָמִרים
ּוַמְלָאְך ִּבְׂשָפתֹו ִּדינְֵך יְַחּתְֹך 
Alma se post’hai nido in alto scoglio,
Qual Capria corri in van segue le peste,
Qual chi tramonti, chiama il suo cordoglio.
נְַפִׁשי ַׂשְמְּת ַּכּצּוִרים ְּבצּוִרים
ִקּנְֵך ּוְמרּוָצֵתְך ַּגם ִּכְצִבּיָה
רֹוֶדֶפת ִריק ְּכקֹוֵרא ֶּבָהִרים
Se preda sei da luogo alto, e celeste,
E son com’ombra i tuoi fugaci giorni,
Perché t’affondi in la corporea veste?
נְַפִׁשי ִאם ַאְּת ִמָּמרֹום ִּכְׁשבּויָה
ּוְכֵצל עֹוֵבר ִמְסַּפר יְֵמי ֶחְלֵּדְך
ַמה ּזֶה ִּתְׁשַּתְּקִעי ּתֹוְך ְּגִוּיָה
Sei peregrina in terra, acciò t’adorni,
Tuo velo à server Dio, e ber sue acque,
Con l’urna piena, dunque a’lui si torni.
ָלגּור ָּבָאֶרץ ָּבאת ִלְלּבֹוׁש ַמֵּדְך
ַלֲעבֹור ּבֹו צֶֹרְך ִלְׁשּתֹות ֵמיָמיו 
ׁשּוִבי ֵאָליו ָאז ִעם ְמֹלאת ַּכֵּדְך 
Sia grande, e vivi l’uomo, e da che nacque,
Appo’l gran Creator del tutto un’ombra,
E tutti con pietà, nutrir gli piacque.
נְַפִׁשי ַאף יִגְַּדל ִאיׁש יְִרּבּו יָָמיו
ַאיִן ְוֶאֶפס הּוא ְלמּול יֹוֵצר
ַהּכֹל ּוְמַכְלְּכֵלם ְּבנִחּוָמיו
Alma, fin che’l Cortil di fuor s’ingombra, 
A che ammantata, in le sue stanze entrare,
Non speri per viltà, che’l cor t’adombra.
ַמע ִמי ֶבָחֵצר נְַפִׁשי ֵעת יִּשָׁ




Anima eleva il cor, tempo è di fare,
Ché non sudin in vano i moti varij,
L’ale del mio desir sparse à volare.
נְַפִׁשי ְּתנִי ֵלָבב ֵעת ַלֲעׂשֹות 
 ֶּפן יִיגְעּו ָלִריק ִּבְתנּוָעָתם 
ַּכנְֵפי ִחְׁשִקי ֵאֶּלה ַהְּפרּוׂשֹות
O furie, ò spirti amari, lor contrarij,
Faransi incontra, ò sterperan lor vanni,
Corrompendole ancor, come avversarij.
ֶּפן יְִפְּגעּו ָמֵרי נֶֶפׁש אֹוָתם
יְִמְרטּו נֹוָצָתם אֹו ִאם ֵליִלין 
ְמַחּיְִבים ֶהְפֵסד ְּתכּונָָתם
Alma non sai, com’arder con affanni, 
Fan l’alma umana, in pene, in ira, in foco,
E sospinta in profan, da sacri scanni.
נְַפִׁשי ֲהָׁשַמַעְּת ֵּכיַצד צֹוִלין
נְִׁשַמת ֱאנֹוׁש ְּבֵאׁש ַאף ְוָחרֹון
ֵאיְך נְִדֵחית ִמּקֶֹדׁש ִלְמקֹום ֻחִּלין 
Pensa a l’ultimo segno, anima un poco,
Sappi chi à l’esser tuo, principio ha dato,
Ciò più ti sveglia, che chiamar non roco.
נְַפִׁשי ִׁשְמִעי ָלאֹות ָהַאֲחרֹון
ְּדִעי נֹוֵתן ׁשֶֹרׁש ְמִציאּוֵתְך 
זֶה יְִעיֵרְך ִמּקֹוֵרא ְבגָרֹון
Ché pensando io ch’i giorni del tuo stato
Meco, passan in nebbie, e vane schieggie,
Corrotto ho le mie vie, da te guidate.
ִּכי ָחַׁשְבִּתי ֲאנִי יְֵמי ִׁשְבֵּתְך
ִעִּמי ָכלּו ְבחֶֹשְך ְוֶהֶבל
ִׁשַחִּתי ְדָרַכי ַאְך ֹלא ִבְלֵּתְך
Io mi vergogno, et à chi il tutto regge,
Dico mia colpa, e dal dritto sentiero,
Torcendo l’error mio, mai si corregge.
ָלֵכן ּבְֹשִּתי ְוִלְפנֵי ָכל סֹוֵבל
אַֹמר ָאּנָא ָחָטאִתי ְויָָׁשר
ֶהֱעֵויִתי ָוַאגְִּדיל ְלַחֵּבל
Il pregar mio Signor, com’è sincero,
Sì grave è l’error mio a perdonarsi, 
Ch’al cor l’ho litigat’oggi, ancora intiero.
ֱאֹלַהי ֵאיְך ְּתִפָּלִתי ִתְכַׁשר
ֵהן ֲעוֹונִי הּוא גָדֹול ִמּנְׂשֹוא
ַּגם עֹוד ַהּיֹום ּתֹוְך ְלָבִבי נְִקַׁשר
L’opre del van desir mio, che gonfiarsi,
Con l’onde sue, pur lodo, e mi compiaccio,
Disegno il bene, e per me non può farsi.
ֵהן ְּפֻעּלֹות יְִצִרי ָהָרע ְּבׂשֹוא
יֶֶתר ַּגָּליו ֲאנִי ֲאַׁשְּבֵחם 
ֶאְרמֹז ֶאל טֹוב ְוֹלא אּוַכל ָעׂשה
L’aborrito da te, stringo et abbraccio
E quel che vieti in licito contesto,
Le tue parole intendo, e da me scaccio.
ְוָכל ְׂשנּוִאים ָלְך ִלי ֶאָּקֵחם
ֲאֶׁשר ָאַסְרָּת אֹותֹו ֲאַטֵהר 
 ּוְדָבֶריָך ֶאְׁשַמע ְוֶאְׁשָּכֵחם
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E ne precetti tuoi non son già presto,
Ma qual Scolar, contra al Dottor audace,
Corre il mio piede al mal veloce, e desto.
ַּגם ְּבִמְצוֹוֶתיָך ֹלא ֶאּזֵָהר
ֲאָבל ְּכמֹו ַתְלִמיד ַעל ַרב חֹוֵלק
ְוַרגְַלי ְלָרָעה ָרִצים ַמֵהר
Chi mi riprende, fuggo, e mi dispiace,
In aspro il viso mio come dur sasso,
Il cor dentro arde come ardente face.
ּוְדַבר מּוָסר ִמּנֶגְִדּי ֲאַסֵּלק
ְוֶאת ָּפנַי ַּכַחָּלִמיׁש ַׂשְמִּתי 
ִלִּבי ַחם ְּבִקְרִּבי ְּכֵאׁש ּדֹוֵלק 
Io sò Signor mia colpa, e mai son lasso
Di mentir, di rubbar, di parlar male,
E fò ch’ognun vien dietro al mio mal passo.
ֱאֹלַהי ֵהן ֵאַדע ִּכי ָאַׁשְמִּתי
ָּבגְַדִּתי ָּגזְַלִּתי ָוֲאַדֵּבר
ּדִֹפי ְוגַם ָהֵרַע ֲהֵרעֹוִתי
Il dir dei Correttor, fo rotto e frale,
Son empio, adulator, pien di lussuria,
Et à peccati l’accompagno eguale.
ִוּכּוַח מֹוִכיִחים עֹוד ֲאַׁשֵּבר
זְַדִּתי זָנִיִתי ְוגַם ֲחנּוָפה
ֶאל ַחָּטִאים ַרִּבים ֵהן ֲאַחֵּבר
Sempre erro, e son immondo, e con gran furia,
A carra il Genio rio, m’empie il cor tutto,
Et ogni mia parola è falsa e spuria.
ָטִעיִתי ִטֵּמאִתי ְוַכּסּוָפה
ַמְרְּכבֹות יֵֶצר ָהָרע ִּבְלָבִבי 
ִּכּזְַבִּתי ּוְבַכַחׁש ָאנִיד ָׂשָפה
Ribellar, e schernir son bene instrutto,
E consume il mio ben, falso giurando,
Grand’e’l debito mio, senz’alcun frutto.
ַלְצִּתי ָמַרְדִּתי ְוִלְכלֹות טּוִבי 
נִַאְצִּתי נְִׁשַּבְעִּתי ָׁשְוא ְוֶׁשֶקר
ַסְרִּתי ָעִויִתי ָלֵכן ַרב חֹוִבי
Come inimico in infinito errando,
Tort’ho le strade mie, dur’in cervice,
E com’empio à disfar vò pur cercando.
ָּפַׁשְעִּתי ָצַרְרִּתי ַעד ֵאין ֵחֶקר
יִתי עֶֹרף ִקְלַקְלִּתי ֶּדֶרְך ִקּשִׁ
ַׁשְעִּתי ִׁשַחִּתי ַעד ְלַבֵּקר 
Son d’immonditia già vaso infelice,
Lasciando i tuoi precetti, nome e regno,
Com’huom che l’alma sua rapir gli lice.
ַּגם ִּתַעְבִּתי ַעְצִמי ִּכְכִלי גֶֶרף 
ָעזְַבִּתי ִמְצוֹוֶתיָך ְוִׁשְמָך 
ּוַמְלכּוָתְך ְּכִאיׁש נְַפׁשֹו טֹוֵרף
E per uso opro il mal, nel popul degno,
E non m’accorgo lasso, s’io profano,
Tua legge, ò rompa di tua vigna il segno.
ְוַרע ֶּדֶרְך ֶהְרֵּגל ּתֹוְך ַעֶּמָך 
ַאַעׂש ְוֹלא ַאְרִּגיׁש ִאם ֲאַחֵּלל 
ָּדָתְך אֹו ֶאְפרֹץ ֶּגֶדר ַּכְרְמָך
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Chapter 6
L’occasion per tutto cerco insano,
E la tentation sveglio al peccato,
Notte, e dì seco e’l cor, l’occhio, e la mano.
ּוְבָכל ְמקֹום ּתֹוֲאנָה ֶאְתּבֹוֵלל 
ַּגם ִּבְמִסֵּבי ַסְרסּוֵרי ַחָּטָאה 
ֵעינַי ְוִלִּבי ָׁשם יֹוָמם ָוֵליל
Il cor mio pensa ogni tempo onorato
Disunir me, da la tua faccia vera, 
Con diversi pensier, dal dritto stato.
ֵּכן ְּבָכל ֵעת נְִכַּבד ִלִּבי נָָטה
ְלַהְפִסיק ִּדּבּוָקְך ֶמּנִי ֵאִלי 
ָּטה ְּבַמֲחָׁשבֹות נְָכִרּיֹות ַהּשִׁ
Dura isola, alma mia, mattina e sera
E monti erti gridando, ascendi, e monta,
Vergine sconsolata, in vesta nera.
ָלֵכן נְַפִׁשי ֶאל ִאי נִגְזַר ֲעִלי 
ְוְנְַׁשִּכיָמה ְלַהר ַעז ְוָקֶׁשה
ְוִכְבתּוָלה ֲחגּוַרת ַׂשק ֱאִלי
Che’il mio censor qual’usuraro ponta,
De la mia pueritia, i giorni gai,
E di mia gioventù numera e conta.
ִּכי ַׂשר ְמֻמּנֶה ָעַלי ְּכנֹוֶׁשה
יְֵמי נְעּוַרי יְִדרֹש ֶחְׁשּבֹון 
ַעל ְּבחּורֹוַתי ֹלא יֱֶחֶׁשה 
Deh trista anima mia, quando verrai
Al Signor in giuditio à tal trascorso,
Che dirai tu? o che avantaggio harai?
אֹויָה נְַפִׁשי ְּבבֹוא ִלְפנֵי ִרּבֹון
ָהעֹוָלִמים ָּכל ַמֲעַׂשי ֵאֶּלה
ַמה ַּתֲענִי ַמה ָּתִׂשיִמי קֹוְלּבֹון
Ché strugge l’ira sua, la carne e’l dorso,
Deh dimmi s’havrai ingegno a fuggir quella
Qual fù à celar il mal oprare incorso?
ְּבבֹוא זְַעמֹו ַעד ָּבָׂשר יְַכֶּלה
ֲהִתְמְצִאי כַֹח ְלִהּנֵָצל
ַּכֲאֶׁשר ָמָצאת ָּבַרע ְלִהָּפֵלא
Quando a privarti d’ogni cosa bella,
E d’ogni ornato, tue virtù s’unirno
Per imolar à i demoni, ombra fella.57
יֹום נֹוֲעדּו יְַחָּדו ְלִהְתנֵַּצל
ּכֹחֹוַתיְִך ֶעְדיָם ְוִכְתֵריֶהן
ִדים ֶׁשֵהם ַּכֵּצל ִלזְּבֹוַח ַלּשֵׁ
E le cose più care in te perirno
A luoco immondo, trascinate l’hanno,
Quì le lor caste mamme espresse girno.
ּטֹובֹות ַּגם יְָקרֹות ֵמֶהן 
ִלְמקֹום ֶוֶסת ְוֻטְמָאה נִגְָררֹות 
ָׁשָּמה ִעּסּו ַּדֵּדי ְּבתּוֵליֶהן
Signor li miei travagli, pien d’affanno,
Han girato, e coperto, il capo mio.
E qual ecclisse, l’occhi ombrato m’hanno.
ִרּבֹונֹו ֶׁשל עֹוָלם ֵמרֹב ָצרֹות
ֲאָפפּונִי ְוָצפּו ַעל רֹאִׁשי 
ָחְׁשכּו ֵעינַי ְּכֶחְׁשַכת ְמאֹורֹות
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E per pazzia del mio principio rio,
Tornare à quella via non hò saputo, 
Che dignaste mostrarne, ò Santo IDDIO.
ּוִמִּסְכלּות ִמְתַחֶּקה ַעל ָׁשְרִׁשי
ֵהן ֹלא ֵאַדע אֶֹפן ַהֲחזָָרה 
ַלֶּדֶרְך הֹוֵריָת ָאז ְקדֹוִׁשי 
Ingenocchion dimando il tuo aiuto,
A liberar quest’alma stanca, e satia,
Com’hai promesso, al dì magno, e temuto.
ֶאְכַרע ֶאּקֹד ֶאְׁשַאל ִמְּמָך ֶעזְָרה 
הֹוֵסף ֵׁשנִית ִלְקנֹות ֶאת נֶֶפׁש זֹאת
ְּכִהְבַטְחָּת ַעם זּו ְליֹום נֹוָרא
Manda hor Michel, ch’in me, l’acque di gratia
Sparga, e torn’io à veder tua dolce essenza,
Lasso, se’l penso men, me n’empij e satia.
ּוְׁשַלח נָא ִמיָכֵאל ִלי ְלַהּזֹות
ֵמיֵמי ֶחֶסד ְויָׁשּוב נֱֶאָלח
ַאַחר יֵאּוׁש נָָעְמָך ַלֲחזֹות
Se per pianger, perdoni, et hai clemenza,
Ecco ch’io piango in loco occulto, e cavo,
Com’huom per huom, si duol senza prudenza.
ְוִאם ִּבְבִכי ּוִבזְָעָקה ִּתְסַלח
ֶאְבֶּכה ְּבִמְסָּתִרים ַּגם ֲאקֹונֵן
ִקינַת ָאָדם ְלגֶֶבר ֹלא יְִצַלח
Se per pregar io nel pregar m’aggravo,
Parando58 il sacrificio del mio dire,
Su l’ara e del peccato temo, e pavo.
ִאם ִּבְתִפָּלה ִהנְנִי ִמְתַחּנֵן 
ָקְרַּבן ֲאָמַרי ֶאֱערְֹך ַעל ַּגג
ִמזְְּבִחי זֶה ְוַעל ֵחְטא ֶאְתאֹונֵן
Se cor contrito ottien, ecco perire
Lo spirto, e’l cor gia liquefatto e lento
Mentre conta l’iniquo suo fallire.
ִאם ְּבֵׁשֶבר ֵלָבב ֵהן יְִתמֹוגָג 
ִלִּבי ְוגַם רּוִחי ֵעת יְָפֵרט
ֲאֶׁשר ֵהזִיד ְוֶאת ֲאֶׁשר ָׁשגָג
Se penitentia vale, ecco io mi pento,
Gridando ohime, con batter palma à palma, 
E pelarme per doglia, il capo, e’l mento.
ִאם ִּבְתׁשּוָבה ִהנְנִי ִמְתָחֵרט
אַֹמר אֹוי ִלי ְוַעל יֵָרְך סֹוֵפק
ְוַכף ֶאל ַּכף ּוְׂשָעִרי ֲאָמֵרט
Torno e confesso la mia grande salma,
Chiedo alle porte di pietà perdono
Con tutto il cor, gratia impetrando all’alma.
ְוָׁשב ּוִמְתַוֶּדה ַאַחר ּדֹוֵפק
ַּדְלתֹות ַרֲחִמים ּוְסִליָחה ּדֹוֵרׁש 
ְּבָכל ֵלָבב אּוַלי ָרצֹון יֵָפק
Aiutami da chi sviato sono,
E drizza l’alma mia à solco dritto,
Sempre qual arator perfetto, e bono.
ָעזְֵרנִי ֵאל ַמִּדיִחי ְלגֵָרׁש




L’alto tuo lume, non li sia interditto,
Né più celato, e sgrava ogni suo peso, 
Dacci pene infernal, del gran conflitto.
ְואֹור ְׁשִכינָָתְך ִּבְמרֹוֶמיָה
לא תֹוִסיף ִמֶּמּנִי ְלִהָּסֵתר 
ְוֹלא ִתָּכֵרת ִהיא ֵמַעֶּמיָה
Perdon perdon, per quell ch’io t’abbi offeso,
Deh59 santo di Iacob, ch’io son sommerso,
E serva anco’l tuo servo, al ben difeso
ְסַלח ְסַלח ֵאִלי ַהֵּתר ַהֵּתר
ְמחֹל ְמחֹל נָא ְקדֹוׁש יֲַעקֹב
ְוַעְבְּדָך ַּגם ְלטֹוָבה הֹוֵתר 
Ch’alletto stato son da cor perverso,
Non per spiacerti, ma l’aspide occulto,
Opra l’inganno suo torto, e traverso.
יַאנִי ְוֵלב ָעקֹב  ִלִּבי ִהּשִׁ
ַאְך ֹלא ְלַהְכִעיָסְך נְִתַּכַּונְִּתי
ֶׁשָּבִעָּסה ָעקֹוב יְַעקֹב ְׂשאֹור
Per l’error ch’in pensier Signor ho sculto,
Ho preparato in carta, et in parola
Vittime sacre, al tuo sacrato culto.
ִרּבֹונֹו ֶׁשל עֹוָלם ִהְתּבֹונַנְִּתי
ַעל ֵחְטא ַהַּמְחָׁשָבה עֹוד ְליֵַחד
ַׁשְלֵמי ּתֹוָדה ְּבֵסֶפר ּכֹונַנְִּתי
Dal nome di tua essenza, unica e sola,
Comincio, ordino et orno il mio poema,
Né tua necessità, si nega ò invola.
ם ַעְצמּוָתְך ַהִּמְתַאֵחד  ּוִמּשֵׁ
ַאְתִחיל ַאְכִּתיר ֵסֶדר ַמֲהָלִלי
ְוִחּיּוב יִחּוָדְך ֹלא ֲאַכֵחד
Da quella intendo, e pigli il mio gran thema,
Ché lei semplice e sol, né in te si trova
Principio, ò senso, ò parte alcuna estrema.
ָאִכין ֶמּנּו ֶאַּקח ְּבִמּלּוִלי
ִּכי ֵאין ְלָך ֵׁשנִי ְוֹלא ִׁשּנּוי
ֵראִׁשית ְוַהְרָּכָבה ְוחּוׁש ִּבְכִלי
Né l’epiteto in te, cos’altra innova,
E con l’alto saper tuo senza pari, 
Creasti il mondo, et ogni cosa nova.
ְוִאם ָּבא זְִכְרָך יֹום ְּבִכּנּוי
ֹלא ְלתַֹאר נֹוָסף ּוְבָחְכָמָתְך 
ָּבָראָת ֵמַאיִן עֹוָלם ָּבנּוי
L’angeli eccelsi tuoi familiari
Con santa lode, tuo nome essaltando,
Nell’alto regno tuo, son primi e chiari.
ּבֹו ַמְלָאִכים ְמָׁשְרֵתי ֵביָתְך
ה ּוְבָטֳהָרה ְמֻסָּגִלים ִּבְקֻדּשָׁ
יֹוְׁשִבים ִראׁשֹונָה מּול ַמְלכּוָתְך
Compresi in dieci gradi, e ben pensando, 
Altro non son, che semplice intelletto
Eterni sempre, senz’andar mancando.
ּוְבַמְדֵרגֹות ֶעֶׂשר ֵהם נְִכָלִלים 
ּוְמִציאּוָתם ֵׂשֶכל ָּפׁשּוט ְוזְַך
ְוַעד עֹוָלם נֶַצח ֵאינָם ָּכִלים
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L’ammirande tue lodi, al tuo conspetto,
Cantan mai sempre, e te veder lor luce,
Dal mental’occhio, e san’esser tuo effetto.
ּוַמְתִמיִדים ְּבנֹוְראֹות ֻעּזְָך
ִׁשירֹות ְוֻתְׁשָּבחֹות ְוֵהם ְּבאֹור 
ּוְבֵעין ַמָּדע ָּכל ֶאָחד יֱֶחזְַך
Di quei per giudicar mandi alto duce,
Il mondo tutto, et ogni tuo creato,
Chi ben, chi mal, tuo detto al fin conduce.
ֵמֶהם ְׁשלּוִחים ָלְך ַאִּדיר נָאֹור
ָלִדין עֹוָלם ּוִמְׁשַּפט ָּכל ִּבְריָה 
ֲאֶׁשר ְּתָבֵרְך ַּגם ֲאֶׁשר ָּתאֹר
Di te che sempre sei, sarai, sei stato,
Chi non harà timor? e in ogni passo,
Con gran stupor d’ognun, sarai lodato.
ָלֵכן הֶֹוה יְִהיֶה ְוָהיָה
ִמי ֹלא יִָרֲאָך ּוְבָכל ִמְצָעד
ְלָך יְִתַמּה ְויִֵּתן הֹוָדיָה
Di bellezza, di fausto e dolce spasso
Empien tuoi servi, e luce son gradita,
E nutrimento al cor’afflitto e lasso.
ְליִֹפי נַֹעם ִעם ָׂשׂשֹון נֹוַעד
ָׁשם ִעם ֵאֶּלה ְואֹור ְלָכל עֹוֵבד 
ְוֵתת ֶלֶחם ְלַבב ֱאנֹוׁש יְִסַעד
Questi seguita poi turba infinita
D’humani spirti, e di là volan tutti,
Ivi tornan’a’sorte alla partita.
ִעם ַאֲחרֹונֵיֶהם ַחיִל ָּכֵבד
ם ְּתעּוֶפינָה ֶׁשל נְָׁשמֹות ִמּשָׁ
ְוָׁשם ָּתׁשְֹבנָה ֶאל ְמקֹום זֶֶבד 
A l’opre lor, quì troveran per frutti,
Tesor di vita, e salute, e sovente
Cumuli oscuri di ben privi e brutti.
ְוֵכן ְלָפֳעָלם ָׁשם ִּתְמֶצאנָה
אֹוְצרֹות יֶַׁשע ְוגִנְזֵי ַחּיִים
אֹוְצרֹות חֶֹשְך ְוֶהְעֵּדר ֶעְדנָה
L’alti corpi celesti, nostra mente
Empien con lor grandezza di stupore
Di corpo e di sostanza trasparente.
ֵמיִמּיִים ַאַחר ַהּגּוִפים ַהּשְׁ
ַהַּמְבִהיִלים נֶֶפׁש ְּבגֵאּוָתם
ִּגְׁשָמם ָטהֹור ּוְבֶעֶצם נְִקּיִים 
Figura han circolar, e co’l splendore
Dell’alma san tua Gloria, e con gl’effetti,
Haranno l’opre del tuo gran valore.
ְּדמּות ַּכּדּור ָלֶהם ּוְבנְַפׁשֹוָתם
ַמִּכיִרים יְָקָרְך ּוַמִּגיִדים
ִּפְלֵאי ַמֲעֶׂשיָך ִּבְתנּוָעָתם
In varie spetie, et uniti intelletti,
Seguita ognun sua via, con gran prudenza,
Dal dolce amato lor tratti, et alletti.
ּוְלצּורֹות ִמינִּיֹות ִמְתיֲַחִדים 
ָּכל ֶאָחד ְלַעְצמֹו ּוְבַמֲהָלְך
ִמְתַחּיֵב ֶאל ֶחְׁשָקם ַּבּנְִפָרִדים 
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Chapter 6
L’infinit’arte e tua gran providenza,
Chi potrà dir Signor, quand’à un fin solo,
Accordi ogni lor moto, e differenza.
ָלֵכן צּוִרי ִמי יְַחֶּוה ָּגְדָלְך
ְּבכֹונֶנְָך ֻּכָּלם ִעם ָהְפְּכֶהם 
ְלַצד ַּתְכִלית ַאַחת ִעם רֹב ֵחיָלְך 
La lor proportion unisce a volo
Co’l diametro longo il corpo magno,
Ove spaventa di Geometri il stolo.
ּוְלֶאָחד נְִקָׁשִרים ְּבֶעְרֵכיֶהם
ַעל אֶֹרְך ָקְטָרם ּגֶֹדל ּגּוָפם 
ַהַּמְבִעית ִּבְמִדיָדה ֵמִבין ָּבֶהם
L’epiciclo à l’eccentrico compagno
I varij Poli, e l’altre cose belle
D’alta scienza, e non opra da ragno.
ַּגְלַּגל ֶהֵּקף ֲאֶׁשר ְּבֶהֵּקָפם
ֵצאת ַהֶּמְרָּכז ִחּלּוף ַהְּקָטִבים 
ַהַּמְפִליגִים ָחְכָמה ְּבֵצרּוָפם
In questi fissi le lucenti stelle
Con lor proprietà stati, et aspetti,
E la reflession de lor fiammelle.
ּוְבגַּבֹוָתם ֲהמֹון ַהּכֹוָכִבים
ְוִסְדֵרי ַמָּצָבם ּוְסגָֻּלָתם 
ְוׁשּוב נִיצֹוֵציֶהם ִמְתָעְרִבים
Ecco il Sole, e la Luna in via esperti
A girar sempre sopra ogni sapere,
Al variar de tempi segni certi.
ֶׁשֶמׁש יֵָרַח ַעל ְמִסּלֹוָתם
ִמְתַעְּגִלים נֶֶעְלֵמי ִבינָה 
ְלאֹות ּוְלמֹוֲעִדים ִּבְתקּוָפ(ו)ָתם
Poi la materia, il ciel con suo piacere
Fa ch’a ricever quella atta diventi
Le quattro forme, e sue qualità vere.
ַאַחר חֶֹמר ֲאֶׁשר ַּבֲהָכנָה
נְִקנֵית ִמן ַהַּגְלַּגל ִקֵּבל צּורֹות
ַאְרַּבע ְוֵאיֻכּיֹות ֵהם ְלָמנָה
Queste son prime forme, et elementi
Di ciò che nasce, ò more sotto il cielo
Uniti, e misti co’temperamenti.
ֵהן ֵהן ַהיְסֹודֹות ַּגם יְִצירֹות 
ָפִלים ַההֹוֹות נְִפָסדֹות ַּבּשְׁ
ְּבֵערּוב ּוְבֶמזֶג ִמְתַחְּברֹות 
Forma lor quantitate giust’a pelo
Inanimato pianta animal’huomo,
Ma terminati ben tra’l caldo e’l gelo.
ְוַכֻּמּיֹות נְִלָקִחים ְׁשקּוִלים 
ּדֹוֵמם צֹוֵמַח ְוַחי ּוְמַדֵּבר
ַהּיֹוְצִאים ֵמֶהם ּוֻמגְָּבִלים
E per che ogni composto è frale, e domo,
E l’individuo per se poco dura
Ciascun passando qual caduco pomo
ְוִלְהיֹותֹו נִָּתְך ָּכל ִמְתַחֵּבר 
ֲארֹו ִּבְפָרט ְוִאי ֶאְפָׁשר ִהּשָׁ
ֲאָבל (ב)ְּכִדין ְּבנֵי ֲחלֹוף עֹוֵבר
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Quinci ben provedeo l’alma natura
Succedendo in le specie restorarlo
Poi ch’a durar la via, non fù sicura.
ִהְסִּכים ַהֶּטַבע ְּבֵסֶדר נֱֶחַרט 
ְוחֹוזֵר ֲחִליָלה נְִמָׁשְך ְּבִמין
ַאַחר ֶׁשֶּדֶרְך ַהִּקּיּום יַָרט 
Il saper tuo Signor, chì mai negarlo
Potrà ch’à darli termine non lice,
O l’esser tuo santissimo occultarlo?
ָלֵכן ֱאֹלַהי ִמי ֹלא יֲַאִמין
ְּבָחְכָמָתְך ִּכי ֵאין ָלּה ֵקץ ּוגְבּול
ּוְמִציאּוָתְך ָקדֹוׁש ִמי זֶה יְַטִמין
Fatt’hai nostra materia suscitrice
D’anima rationale, e d’intelletto
Imisto, ma di lui albergatrice.
ַׂשְמָּת ֵאל יֹוֵצר חֶֹמר ְּבֵבית ִקּבּול 
ְוקֹוֵלט נֶֶפׁש ֵמֶעֶצם ִׂשְכִלי
ְּבִלי ֵערּוב ְוהּוא ָלּה ֵּבית זְבּול
Da lui vien quella luce, che fà retto
Mio piede alle tue vie attento, e bono:
Dunque simil non hai Signor perfetto.
ִמֶּמּנָה ַהַּמְׁשִלים נֵר ְלַרגְִלי
ַעל ָּפֳעָלְך ִלְדָרִכים ְלֵדָעה 
ְוִאם ִּדְמיֹון ַמְׁשֶוה ֵאין ָלְך ֶאְצִלי
Quest’è giorno cor mio d’horribil suono
Cor mio, ah figliuol vano, ah figliuol tristo
Che dà d’infamia pena, e non perdono.
ִלִּבי ִלִּבי יֹום זֶה יֹום ְּתרּוָעה
ֶאְצַעק הֹוי ְמֻׁשָּלח הֹוי ֵּבן ֵמִביׁש 
מּוָעה ַמְלִקין ַעל ֹלא טֹוָבה ַהּשְׁ
E si d’honor disprezzi il vero acquisto
Per il velen di neghittosa vita,
Scrivi à tuo libro pur ch’ancor sia visto.
ֵּכן ִאם ִּתְבזֶה ִקנְיַן ָראמֹות ָּגִביׁש
ָלֵתת רֹוׁש ָהִרּשּׁול מּול יְָקָרְך 
ְּכתֹב ַאִּפנְְקָסְך ִּדין ֵעֶסק ִּביׁש 
E questa mia dottrina così ordita,
Principio è de sue lodi, né potrete
Dir l’alta gloria sua haver finita.
ְוָחְכמֹות ִסְדִרי זֶה ַהּנֱֶעָרְך
ָראֵׁשי ְתִהּלֹות ֵהן ְוַאל ּתֹאַמר
ִסּיְַמִּתינְהּו ֻּתְׁשַּבְחֵּתיּה ְּדָמָרְך
Signor del mondo à te drizzo con sete
Lo spirto, e l’alma, e pien d’affetto il core
Ligato quasi un bù con fune, ò rete.
ִרּבֹונֹו ֶׁשל עֹוָלם רּוִחי ַהַּמר
ר ָאִכין ְונְִׁשָמִתי עֹוד ֲאיַּשֵׁ
ְוֵכן ִלִּבי ַהָּלן ְּכתֹוא ִמְכָמר
E si t’è grato, e piace alto Signore
Tua verga d’or mi porgi con baldanza
Co’l nome tuo mio bon procuratore?
ִאם טֹוב ְּבֵעינֶיָך ְוִאם ָּכֵׁשר
הֹוֵׁשט נָא ִלי ַׁשְרִביט זְָהְבָך 
ר  ֵמִליץ יֶֹשר ּוְבִׁשְמָך ֶאְתַאּשֵׁ
130
Chapter 6
E come servo in te post’hò speranza
A te l’occhio alzo sempre, e’l vero santo
Canto, riponi in Dio la tua fidanza.
ּוְכמֹו ֶעֶבד ֵּכן ֶאֱחֶסה ְּבָך 
א ַעיִן ָּתִמיד ָלְך ָּכָאמּור  ֶאּשָׂ
ַהְׁשֵלְך ַעל ה‘ יְָהְבָך
L’ombra della tua man per ogni canto
Sia mia custodia, e’l suo vessillo amore,
E l’opra tua favor m’è gratia, e manto.
ּוְבֵצל יָָדְך נָא ִׂשיֵמנִי ָׁשמּור 
ִּכי ֶמְמַׁשְלָּתְך ְוִדגְָלְך ַאֲהָבה
ּוָפֳעָלְך ָעַלי ֶחֶסד ָּגמּור
Trahe di travaglio fuor la pien d’errore
Anima mia pentita, trista, e satia
Di mia stoltitia ingrata al suo fattore.
ַהִּציָלה ִמֵּטרּוף ַהּשֹׁוֵבָבה
נְַפִׁשי ִּכי נִַחְמִּתי ַאֲחֵרי ׁשּוִבי
ִמִּסְכלּוִתי ּוְכִפיַרת ַהּטֹוָבה
Ché per pietà’l cor mio pien hai di gratia
E di me vede, ma qual prima in volto
Appar né più né men con sua disgratia.
ִּכי ֲחָסִדים ָחנַנְָּת ֶאת ִלִּבי
ְוַרֲחִמים ּוְכָאז ַמְרֵאהּו ַרע
ְוֹלא נֹוַדע ִּכי ָבאּו ֶאל ִקְרִּבי
Deh Signor fà che successo da stolto
Non succeda al tuo servo, e vogli amarlo,
E da grande sentenza sia assolto.
ָאּנָא ֱאֹלַהי ַאל נָא יֱֶאַרע
ִלי ִּבגְַלל זֶה ְּכִמְקֶרה ַהְּכִסיל 
ֲחמֹל ָעַלי ּוגְזַר ִּדינִי ְקַרע
E l’opre mie non le rodi mai tarlo,
E gratia piova giù d’ogni pianeta
D’ogni Ciel, d’ogni segno à consolarlo.
ּוַמֲעַׂשי ֹלא יֹאְכֵלם ָחִסיל
הֹוֵרד נְִתיבֹות ֵמַחְדֵרי ֵתיָמן
ִּבְרכֹות ָׁשַמיִם ִמִּכיָמה ּוְכִסיל
E manda al Popul tuo quel gran Profeta
Predichi a’i figli, il Redentor ne viene
A congregarli, e farli gente lieta.
ּוְׁשַלח ְלַעְּמָך ִציר נֱֶאָמן
ר ְלָבנִים ִּביַאת ּגֹוֵאל יְַבּשֵׂ
ִויַקֵּבץ ְלֵעינַי ַעם ֹלא ַאְלָמן 
Né me macchi mai stil de peccatori,
E di chi è morto per santificarte
Le cenere ricorda, e lor arene.
ּוְבנִימּוֵסי חֹוְטִאים ֹלא ֶאְתָּגֵאל 
ְוַהֵּמִתים ַעד סֹוד ֱאָלהּוָתְך 
ֶאת ֲעָפָרם ִלזְּכֹור ֵאל נָא הֹוֵאל 
E come ci portaste in quella parte
Con l’ali tue à darci60 eletta fede
Aiutan’hoggi in strada d’adorarte.
ּוְכָאז נְָׂשאָתנּו ַעל ֶאְבָרָתְך 
ְּבִתָּתְך ָלנּו ֱאמּונָה נְִבֶחֶרת 
ְסָעֵדנִי ַהּיֹום ִּבנְִתיָבָתְך 
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Novi instromenti l’alma mia richiede
Acciò ti servi, e torni à te pentita
Nascosa al mal si61 sia per tua mercede.
ְוַחֵּדׁש ְלנְַפִׁשי ְּכֵלי ָׁשֵרת
ַלֲעבֹוד ָלְך ְוָלׁשּוב ִּבְתׁשּוָבה
ִלְהיֹות ָאז ְּביֹום ַרע נְִסֶּתֶרת
Creasti me per tua gratia infinita,
E manco al dover mio qual huon mendico
L’arte è assai longa, e breve è nostra vita.
ִּכי ֶחֶסד ְּבָראַתנִי ּונְָדָבה 
ְוֶאגְַרע ֵמֻחִּקי ְּכַדל ֶאְביֹון
ַהּיֹום ָקֵצר ּוְמָלאָכה ְמֻרָּבה
Deh salva me da vergognoso intrico
Nella breve mia vita vana e stanca,
Non mi tentar Signor, ch’io te’l supplico.
ְּפֵדנִי ֵמֶחְרָּפה ּוִבּזָיֹון
ִּביֵמי ֶהְבִלי ְויֹוֵתר ֵמֵהָּמה
ַאל ְּתִביֵאנִי ִליֵדי נִָּסיֹון
Ben che’l domandi [e sia]62 di scienza manca
Quest’alma mia con l’occhi pien di pianto
Lava la macchia mia, e’l rosso imbianca.
ְוגַם ִּכי ִתְׁשַאל ְוֹלא ֵמָחְכָמה
נְִׁשָמִתי זֹאת ּוְבִדְמֵעי ֵעינַי 
ַמְרֵאה ָׁשנִי ַהְלֵּבן ְוָסר ִּכְתָמּה
Mentre il mio don mi passa innanzi alquanto, 
E la mia oration da terra s’ode,
Con pietà, con perdon, piglia’l mio canto.
ֵעת ִמנְָחִתי ַּתֲעבֹר ַעל ָּפנָי
ְוִאְמָרִתי ְתַצְפֵצף ֵמָעָפר
ַרֵחם ְוָׂשא ְוַקֵּבל ֶהגְיֹונָי
Nella tua legge di mirabil lode,
Ré mio sia’l mio consiglio, e di bon core
Il seme mio ti serva, e senza frode.
ּוְבתֹוָרָתְך ַמְלִּכי ִמְלִּכי יְִׁשַּפר
ַהְרֵאנִי נְִפָלאֹות ְוֶאת זְַרִעי
יַַעְבדּוָך ְּבֵלב טֹוב ִמּשֹׁור ָּפר 
Né mai li manchi ò vivo Pastore,
Vitto, e vestito, e sapere, e scienza,
Et abbracci io’l mio quarto successore.
ְוֹלא יְֶחַסר ֵמֶהם ֵאל ַחי רֹוִעי
ָמזֹון ּוְלבּוׁש ְוָחְכָמה ְוִעּיּון
ְויֶֶלד ַעל ִּבְרַּכי ּדֹור ְרִביִעי
Per Israel che piange à penitenza
Empite di pietade, e basti hormai
Tua casa empin d’offerte in tua presenza.
ּוְלָׁשֵבי יְִׂשָרֵאל ֵעת יְִבָּכיּון
ִהָּמֵלא ַרֲחִמים ְותֹאַמר ַּדי
ּוְכָאז ִמֶּדֶׁשן ֵּביָתְך יְִרָויּון 
E si’l merto de figli poco fai, 
Unisci seco i meriti paterni, 
Che’l nome tuo potente aperto l’hai.
ְוִאם זְכּות ָּבנִים ֵאינֹו ְּכַדאי
ָצֵרף נָא ִעָּמֶהם זְכּות ָאבֹות
נִגְֵליָת ָאז ֲאֵליֶהם ְּבֵאל ַׁשַּדי 
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E così tutti i cuori, e membri interni
Te crederanno da l’Orto à l’Occaso,
Gratioso Signor de beni eterni.
ּוְבֵכן יֲַאִמינּו ַהְּלָבבֹות
ִמִּמזְַרח ֶׁשֶמׁש ְוַעד ְמבֹואֹו
ְּבָך צּור עֹוָלִמים חֹונֵן טֹובֹות
Dell’error suo ciascun ben persuaso,
Che torni à te Signor pietoso aspetta,
Che vedi il cuor d’ogni huom dentro al suo vaso.
ְויָׁשּוב ְויִּנֵָחם ִאיׁש ֵמֶחְטאֹו 
ְלָפנֶיָך ֵאל ַרחּום ְוַחּנּון
רֹוֶאה ְלַבב ָּכל ִאיׁש ּוַמְחּבֹואֹו
Qual vengo hoggi io con mille canti in fretta
Chiedendo à te perdon vivo, e leale,
Temendo l’ira tua più che saetta.
ָּכמֹונִי ַהּיֹום ְּבֶאֶלף ִרּנּון 
ְמַבֵּקׁש ְסִליָחה ַחי ְוַקּיָם 
יֵָרא זַַעְמָך ִמָּבָרק ָׁשנּון
Temo questo mio genio che m’assale
Come torrente turbido, e sonante,
Né può chetarsi, e’l mio pregar non vale.
יֵָרא ִּכי יֵֶצר זֶה נָָהר ַּבְעיָם
ָּגדֹול ֵמֶהם ְוַהְׁשֵקט ֹלא יּוַכל 
ַּגם ִּכי ַאְרֶּבה ַּתֲחנּון ְּכחֹול ַהּיָם 
M’ha consumato in fin’à l’alma avante,
E sta qual’Orsa al guado ascosa, et erta
E tutti miei pensier misura inante.
אֹוי ִּכי ַעד ַהּנֶֶפׁש אֹוִתי ָאַכל 
ּוְכדֹב אֹוֵרב הּוא ִלי ְּבִמְסָּתִרים
ְוגַם ָּכל יְצּוַרי ָמַדד ְוָכל
Salva hoggi l’alma mia mentre l’offerta
Ornata, e vera, e più cara ch’argento
Con vera fede io t’offerisco, e certa.
ְּגַאל נְַפִׁשי יֹום ְּתרּוָמה ָאִרים
ִקּשּׁוט קְֹשְט נְִכַסף ִלי ִמֶּכֶסף
ֱאמּונָה אֶֹמן ֱאֶמת ֲאָמִרים
Dì d’afflizion di cuor, né mai più spento
Il mio sol sia, e la mia luna asperghi
Sette volte il suo lume in augumento.
יֹום ִעּנּוי ֵלב ְועֹוד ֹלא יֵָאֵסף
ִׁשְמִׁשי ְוגַם יְֵרִחי יְִהי נָכֹון 
 ֶאל ֵעת ִׁשְבָעַתיִם אֹוָרם ּתֹוֵסף
Dì di perdon è sempre in63 me alberghi
Mentre l’offerta pur conduco a fine
Di quest’orar, e come incenso emerghi.
יֹום ִּכּפּור ִלי ְוָלנֶַצח ִּתְׁשּכֹן
ֵּבין ְּכֵתַפי ַּבֲהִביִאי ָקְרָּבן
ְּתִפָּלה זֹאת ְוִכְקטֶֹרת ִּתּכֹון 
Dì di speranza à murar le ruine
Delle città di tua provincia tutta
Et Israel ritorni al suo confine.
יֹום ִּבָּטחֹון ֲאֶׁשר ִּתְבנֶה ָחְרַּבן
ָעֵרי ַאְדָמְתָך ַעד ַהָּקֶצה
ְויְִׂשָרֵאל ָׁשִבים ֶאל יִּשּׁוָבן
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Dì che sete ho di te grande, et asciutta, 
E fa ch’io veda, e bevi se ti piace
L’aqua del fonte in casa tua condutta.
יֹום ָלְך ֶאְצָמא ּוְתִפָּלִתי ְרֵצה
ַהְרֵאנִי נָא ְוַהְׁשֵקנִי ֲהלֹום
ֵמי ַמְעיָן ָאז ִמֵּביְתָך יֵֵצא
Grida anco à l’alma mia pace pace,
E tua legge intenda io ché più che gemme,
E più che l’oro è cara alta, e verace
ֱאמֹר ַּגם ְלנְַפִׁשי ָׁשלֹום ָׁשלֹום
ּוְבסֹוד ָּדָתְך ֶסָלה ֹלא ֶאָּכֵלם
יְָקָרה ִהיא ִמַּפז ְויֲַהלֹום




Leone Modena’s Magen we-ḥerev  
as an Anti-Catholic Apologia
The Venetian rabbi Leone (Yehudah Ariyeh) Modena’s anti-Catholic Magen 
we-ḥerev (The Shield and the Sword) has usually been read as an exemplar—
possibly the last—of a religious polemical genre that developed in the Middle 
Ages. By stressing how the work fits into a long tradition, such a reading high-
lights the ways it both differs from and resembles the texts that preceded it.1 In 
this article I wish to concentrate on the work’s Jewish and Christian cultural 
context, the guiding idea behind this analysis being that terms and concepts 
which belong within an established tradition can at times take on new mean-
ings when reapplied in a different context. There is no lack of originality in 
Magen we-ḥerev, but it is also possible to read in a new light those elements 
that, on first reading, would seem to be no more than repetitions of familiar 
devices. Leone Modena wrote this work, an anti-Christian apologia, in 1643, 
five years before his death.2 Two centuries later, Abraham Geiger described 
the work—still in manuscript form—in a marginal comment in his edition of 
another of Modena’s works, Magen we-tzinnah (The Shield and the Target);3 it 
was not until 1960 that an edition was produced by Shlomo Simonsohn.4
Magen we-ḥerev is divided into five sections (maḥanoth, or camps, as the 
author called them, using the language of polemical jousting), themselves 
divided into chapters (ma‘arakhoth, or “battle orders”) on original sin, the 
Trinity, the Incarnation, the virginity of Mary, and the Messiah. According 
to the initial plan, which Modena was unable to complete, there should have 
been three more sections, on the death and resurrection of Jesus,5 the eternity 
of the Torah,6 and miracles.7 
In the introduction to his edition, Shlomo Simonsohn asserts that the 
author does not depart from the traditional framework of medieval Judeo-
Christian polemic. He does, however, remind the reader that Modena pro-
posed avoiding as far as possible a scripturalist approach, i. e., an analysis of 
biblical verses contesting their Christian interpretations, favouring instead a 
purely logical approach.8 The following study attempts to demonstrate that, 
when compared with the Jewish polemical tradition, Modena’s method is, in 
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fact, innovative, and thus in tune with the profound changes then sweeping 
across the intellectual scene in Europe. Moreover, some aspects of the work 
are innovative even within this context. It is true that its originality is not 
immediately apparent: the arguments propounded appear to be drawn from 
a familiar arsenal, and at first glance the logic followed would seem to be 
within the philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Maimonides. The work’s 
modernity would seem to lie purely on the stylistic level, for Modena’s 
Hebrew, though dependent on rabbinical Hebrew for both vocabulary and 
phrasing, is remarkably vivacious and supple, rendering with clarity the au-
thor’s thoughts, both in discussing theoretical questions and in passages that 
are closer to the language of everyday speech. 
It is also true that Modena’s avowed intention was not to innovate:9 if 
novelty there was, it depended in part on the nature of the work it was prepar-
ing to criticize. His work was in fact an answer to the most recent and com-
prehensive anti-Jewish text, Pietro Colonna Galatino’s De arcanis catholicae 
veritatis, published a hundred and thirty years earlier and reprinted several 
times.10 We do not know whether there were particular circumstances that 
drove Modena to write a major text like this at such an advanced age, and 
can only guess at his intended readership. The only theory advanced to date 
has come from Howard Adelman, who suggests that Modena’s true aim was 
to oppose Christian missionaries’ use of Kabbalah for conversion purposes.11 
Magen we-ḥerev is in many ways, however, a modern and original work, 
its originality residing in its sustained rational method, the consistent use of 
which results in a historical vision being applied to fields hitherto not subject 
to this kind of examination and a type of analysis that could be described as 
pre-anthropological. 
Asynchronous Criticism
The polemical target of Magen we-ḥerev was thus Pietro Galatino’s De ar-
canis catholicae veritatis, a choice dictated by the importance of that work. 
According to Modena, refuting the arguments in Galatino’s book would re-
fute all the anti-Jewish arguments before and after it, for 
he alone, among the numerous authors who have written religious polem-
ics against the Jews, said and wrote all that was possible by their method. 
He took into consideration everything in the Bible, our commentators 
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and the texts of the Talmudic scholars; he overlooked nothing, from the 
smallest to the greatest point, which could have supported our position. 
[... ] Every other work written against the Jews by Christian authors on 
these subjects—and I know almost all of them—plagiarised this book, 
without adding anything. And, as the principal author in the field, he was 
first among the liars and forgers.12 
In reality Magen we-ḥerev follows Galatino’s book only in part, sporadi-
cally; Modena’s logical progression is his alone and, moreover, places his 
argument on an entirely different level. The different cultural contexts of the 
two authors easily explain the differing tone of their works. 
De arcanis catholicae veritatis was written in support of the “Christian 
Kabbalist” Johannes Reuchlin (1485-1527) in his struggle against the 
Dominicans, especially Jakob Hoogstraten. The text is presented as a dia-
logue in which Reuchlin (Capnius) and Hoogstraten (Hogostratus) put ques-
tions to Galatino. The work’s central premise is that the Christian truths are 
to be found within traditional Hebrew texts, not only the Bible but also the 
Talmud and Kabbalist literature, if they are read correctly. Obviously, these 
truths are generally expressed in veiled terms, which is why the only possible 
interpretation of the texts—considered, moreover, by Talmudic scholars and 
medieval Jewish authorities such as Maimonides to be the truest and most 
profound one—is of a spiritual or mystical nature. To the question of “whether 
the Talmud should be accepted by Christians,”13 Galatino answers decisively 
that it should, as a reading which takes account of the Talmud’s enigmatic 
language would reveal “arcane” truths of Christianity. Contemporary Jewish 
sages (“nostri tempori”; “universus recentiorum magistrorum et iuniorum 
Talmudistarum coetus”) understood only the outer crust of the scriptures, their 
literal and historical meaning; they could rightfully be considered blind, almost 
devoid of intellectual insight.14 De arcanis catholicae veritatis thus aimed to 
use the Jews’ own arms—their texts—to force them to recognise their errors.15 
Recourse to hebraica veritas, or Jewish texts in their original language, thus 
served as an instrument of religious polemic, but also re-established the mean-
ing of the scriptures, which had become corrupted in their Latin and Greek 
versions;16 the philological insistence that characterises humanism, albeit used 
for apologetic purposes, was obviously present in Galatino. 
In his other works, most particularly De vera theologia and De sacra 
scriptura recte interpretanda,17 Galatino accentuated the tendency to mystical 
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interpretation, adding to it an elitist aspect: the sacred mysteries could not be 
made available to all, which is why God revealed the correct method of exege-
sis to the Elect, allowing them to lift the veils enfolding the secret knowledge.18 
The Kabbalah forms part of the classical Jewish corpus that, according to 
Galatino, contained Christian truths. De arcanis in effect presented a num-
ber of explanations inspired by the Jewish esoteric tradition. Moreover, he 
considered himself a “Christian Kabbalist,” the latest in a line that began 
with Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and culminated in Egidio da Viterbo.19 
Galatino did not, however, need to resort to Kabbalah to show that Jewish 
texts announced Christianity, for in his opinion the Talmud itself—which is 
considered an esoteric corpus—expressed these truths, and it is effectively 
upon the Talmud (and the midrash) that he principally drew. One is there-
fore forced to moderate quite extensively (in spite of his self-definition) the 
historiographical assessment that classifies Galatino as among the Christian 
Kabbalists,20 and which probably influenced Adelman’s judgement regarding 
Magen we-Ḥerev’s intended readership. 
Modena worked in a context that differed significantly from Galatino’s. 
Mystical or spiritual interpretation was no longer the order of the day among 
Catholics, the Protestant “heresies” had become established confessions, and 
knowledge of Hebrew was no longer rare among Christians. The Venetian 
rabbi’s approach was therefore informed by other criteria: he almost com-
pletely abandoned the scriptural examination so central to Judeo-Christian 
polemic and cited the Talmudic scholars only where their affirmations 
seemed to him to be rational, or at least to be reasonable opinions (sevara).21 
For Modena, then, the primary criterion for examining religious thinking 
must be reason: recourse to auctoritas had virtually no place in his argu-
ment, other than in correcting the mystical reading of the Bible by certain 
Christians. Even then the authority is that of good sense, which forces an 
understanding of the text according to its obvious meaning. 
A Model for Rational Religion
Between apologia—defence of the Jewish religion—and polemics—
criticism of Christianity—or, in other words, between the “shield” and the 
“sword” of Magen we-ḥerev, the second is certainly uppermost. If that is 
explained by the nature of the work, proposing as it does to deny Christianity 
any legitimacy by refuting Christian claims to biblical roots, it is, on the 
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other hand, interesting to note that Modena constructs a positive model for 
religion through his criticism of Christianity, through negation. This religion 
of his is largely suffused with the spirit of rationalism: it is a Judaism based 
on reason, or at least on the reasonable, avoiding everything contrary to the 
laws of understanding and good sense. In the rational Judaism that is gradu-
ally taking shape in the text, the attribute (rational) at times appears to have 
more weight than the substantive (Judaism), for it is the responsibility of the 
intellect to judge what is a just belief; the correspondence between Jewish 
religion and reason noted by Modena is thus immediately subjected to a con-
dition, no less so because of its hypothetical character: 
If we were to find in the Torah something that clashed with reason, we 
would adapt the Torah to fit with reason, rather than adapt reason to the 
Torah.22 
In talking about “adapting” the Torah to reason, Modena built on the 
rationalist position of Averroes and Maimonides, who, in the event that 
reason and scripture diverged, expected the latter to be “interpreted” until 
the necessary consonance was found. Modena could not fall back on inter-
pretation—especially allegorical interpretation—to reestablish the rational 
meaning of the scriptures, as it was on exactly this kind of reading that the 
Christian apologists based the arguments they used to justify their dogma. 
Christianity’s weakness lay in its systematic recourse to irrational beliefs. 
Contrasting at all levels with the rules of logic, these beliefs corresponded 
neither to sensible knowledge nor to intellectual understanding, whatever its 
degree of formal rigour. How, for instance, was it possible to claim that Jesus 
saved all mankind and by his death banished idolatry, when 
Christians do not make up one percent of the world’s population [...].23 
We can see that the majority of men do not accept the cult [of Jesus] and 
would thus be condemned to the perdition of their souls.24 
Christians might well claim that with the coming of the Messiah mankind 
had been freed from curse, wrote Modena: good sense denied the claim, for 
“our senses affirm that men die, that they toil to nourish themselves with the 
fruit of the land, that women bring forth children in pain.” We might “deny 
our condition: it is nonetheless visible enough.”25 
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On a higher level than sensible understanding, though based upon it, 
intellectual understanding also attested to the impossibility—or, expressed 
more clearly, the inconceivableness—of certain Christian beliefs, according 
to Modena. For him, Christian theology did not follow the usual order of 
intellectual understanding, whereby the understood is preceded by an intel-
ligible abstract (muskalym mufshatym mi-ḥomer), placing, in other words, 
the imagined object in a coherent, non-contradictory context of the con-
ceivable. It followed the opposite strategy of the imagination (tziyyur ve-
dimiyon26), which conceives of an object at will and justifies it a posteriori. 
The Christians imagined Jesus to be God, which led them to construct in-
creasingly incomprehensible dogmas to justify his human nature and death. 
The difficulties inherent in conceiving of the Trinity—three persons simul-
taneously equal and different with all the subtle differentiations between the 
modes and essences of the three persons—naturally gave rise to numerous 
heresies.27 The Christians framed the facts to fit the theory or, as Modena 
stated it more popularly, “[the Christians] cut off the toes to fit into their 
shoes.” In other words, they built a dogmatic structure from false premises, 
and were thus forced to draw a series of irrational and absurd conclusions. 
Drawing on Maimonides (The Guide of the Perplexed, I:50) and Yosef 
Albo (Sefer ha-‘Iqqarym, 1:22 and 3:25), Modena spelled out his plausibility 
criterion for a belief: 
Belief is not something that is spoken only in words, but something con-
ceived of in the soul, in the belief that the thing exists outside of the mind 
contemplating it. It can refer to an order of things not found in nature (like 
the transformation of Moses’s staff into a snake), but not one that goes 
against the intellect (as would be the case—for example—with simulta-
neous being and not-being). [ ... ] In the Torah of Moses, the founder of 
the first among religions, ail the commandments concerned sensible or 
thinkable truths.28 
The principle applied above all to the concept of original sin, the notion 
that Modena considered to be the basis of the Christian belief system. The 
idea that the first man committed a sin that stained and diminished his soul, 
a degeneration that was then passed down into the souls of every man, was 
a false, even an absurd, idea. The sacrifice of Jesus, man, and God neces-
sitated by such an extreme notion, was but a flatus vocis unacceptable to 
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the intellect; the union of the human and divine natures of Jesus and the 
transmission of the sacrifice from the one to the other “is nothing more than 
words, of which we cannot really conceive.”29 
Another conclusion that follows inevitably from the basic assumptions 
(original sin inherited by souls, the incarnation of God the Redeemer), and 
one the Christians did not fail to draw, was that the souls of the just who 
died before Jesus must be consigned forever to limbo, a region of hell from 
whence they are freed by Christ. But heaven and hell, argued Modena, were 
merely imagined by man to represent in his mind the rewards and punish-
ments for acts committed on earth; if the idea of reward and punishment 
was therefore a logical necessity, its precise nature—rejoicing in the divine 
presence or suffering spiritual and bodily torment, by fire for instance—was 
the pure fruit of the imagination, as were the terms gan ‘eden, heaven, and 
gehinnom, hell. Limbo was a case of pure invention (hamtzaah ‘al hamtzaah, 
beduta ‘al beduta), designed to justify the absurd idea (“that cannot be con-
tained in thought”30) of the punishment of the pre-Christian just. Because of 
the notion of original sin affecting all souls from the very first man, and that 
of the consequent coming of Jesus the Redeemer and his death, the position 
of the just who had served God constituted a problem, concluded Modena. 
Thus the new invention, limbo, became a necessity.31 
The Stumbling Block of Original Sin
Modena’s refutation of Christianity operates according to a logical struc-
ture. From the beginning it attacks original sin, the idea it takes as central, to 
show it up as inconsistent: the rest of the argument follows seamlessly. 
Placing himself within a well-established Jewish interpretive tradition,32 
Modena diminished the extent of the first man’s sin compared to the Christian 
notion33 by criticising the very notion of its being “original” or “radical.” The 
consequence of Adam’s sin was physical and not spiritual. Individual souls 
come directly from God rather than the bodily parents: they are thus pure and 
are rewarded or punished according to their behaviour in earthly life. There 
is no original stain and therefore no need for a redeemer of souls.34 
In comparison with his predecessors, Modena distinguishes himself by 
the precision with which he develops his argument and by his frequent use of 
Christian sources, not only the Gospels—for which there were precedents—
but also such a theological authority as Thomas Aquinas.35 
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Modena quotes and summarises the chapters of the Summa Theologica 
that deal with original sin; these texts seem to suggest that at the beginning 
of his study, as a free thinker untrammelled by prejudice taking a purely 
rational approach, Thomas came to conclusions identical to those reached 
in the Jewish tradition.36 At the end, he introduced by main force (daḥaq et 
‘atzmo) a conclusion that conformed to Christian dogma, breaking his line 
of reasoning. Having developed the idea that the son does not bear the con-
sequences of the father’s sin, for only the physical, bodily element (“not as a 
leper begets a leper through some defect in his sperm”) and not the soul are 
influenced by inheritance, Thomas concluded that all men could be consid-
ered a single man, insofar as they all inherit from their first parent.37 
But if, according to Modena, sin had consequences for the body, what 
might they be? Somewhat surprisingly, it is his polemical target, Pietro 
Galatino—the author of the anti-Jewish work which provoked the writing 
of Magen we-ḥerev—that he chooses to quote on the subject. He is “in 
total agreement”38 with the affirmations of De arcanis catholicae veritatis, 
which he mentions and then proceeds to develop. Galatino had defined 
original sin itself as being an absence of original justice—in other words, 
as the rupture of internal harmony, based on the subjugation of the will and 
lesser psychological faculties to reason—and its effects as “fomes peccati, 
scilicet concupiscentia,” impulsion to sin, following Augustine. He con-
firmed the latter definition in his identification of sin for the Jews: using 
a number of genuine and false midrashym, Galatino identified it with the 
yetzer ha-ra‘, which he interprets as “plasma, sive figmentum malum,” 
an evil conformation (from yatzar, to form) manifested in a disposition 
towards sexual corruption.39 
The sin of the first man therefore led to a weakening of the flesh, which 
expressed itself through disproportionate sexual proclivities, and the puri-
fication announced by the prophets dealt with this sullying of the flesh. As 
Modena wrote to a Catholic correspondent, apparently some years before 
he wrote Magen we-ḥerev, this belief had been denied by “some Jewish 
schismatic sects like the Sadducees and the Samaritans” but adopted by 
“the true Jews, which is to say the scribes and the Pharisees, whose doctrine 
was also followed by Your Lord in his articles of faith,” as demonstrated 
by the Gospel according to Matthew, chapter 23, verses 2-3: “The scribes 
and the Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat: All therefore whatsoever they bid you 
observe, that observe and do.”40 Modena finds support for these affirmations 
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in other, more recent, Christian authors: he mentions briefly, but without 
naming them, a number of “important sages” (ḥakhamym gedolym) whose 
theses (“quite the equal of our own”41) he had read in “The History of the 
Council of Trent.” 
Coincidence Between Jewish and Protestant Theses
The Istoria del concilio tridentino, written by the Servetian friar Paolo 
Sarpi, a contemporary and fellow-citizen of Modena who held the influen-
tial position of state theologian in the Venetian Republic, is a major piece 
of critical historiography on the official positions of the Church of Rome, 
detailing the discussion on original sin which took place in Trent in May/
June of 1546.42 
In the course of the discussion, the Dominican Ambrosio Catarino de-
clared that original sin, the punishment meted out to the first man and all 
mankind, consisted in concupiscence and the forfeiting of justice (harmony 
between the various faculties), and denied that this sin was passed down in a 
hereditary, physical, manner. This position was rejected. As for the extreme 
version of this idea, which laid aside the fault of the soul to stress the iden-
tification between sin and physical inclination—the version supported by 
Modena—it was seen as a Protestant proposition and was correspondingly 
condemned. 
Sarpi wrote that the discussion became so complicated that “the bishops, 
of whom very few had a theological understanding [...] were confused by the 
scholastic and complex manner in which the subject was handled.” One of 
the condemned propositions was referred to by Sarpi in the following terms: 
Original sin is an inclination to evil in nature corrupting children, in such 
wise that when reason begins to manifest itself, it provokes a horror of the 
divine and an immersion in the worldly.43 
Whether Modena’s reference to Sarpi’s work, which was not specific, 
was deliberately allusive or not, the parallels between the Jewish position 
and that condemned as Protestant is interesting.44 It allows for the possibil-
ity of a partial but significant dogmatic convergence between the two reli-
gions, for whatever reason. The interest that certain aspects of the Jewish 
religion held for the Protestants, including the central position afforded 
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reading of the Bible and the Old Testament in particular, was perhaps the 
principal attraction; or the Jews’ hope that the new religion, by fracturing 
Christian unity, would perhaps inaugurate a more peaceful era.45 In reality, 
for this objective convergence to be understood the term Protestant must 
be qualified. If there is a closeness between Modena’s position and that of 
some Christians, the Christians in question are members of minority hereti-
cal movements such as the anti-Trinitarians, rather than the Lutherans or the 
Calvinists. 
The proximity expressed itself above all in a rational approach to scrip-
tural interpretation and regarding Christian dogmas, which Modena shared 
with both “avowed” and potential anti-Trinitarians. Criticism of the Trinity 
inevitably follows this approach.46 
Modena was disposed to admit ab extra multiplicity, or attributes, as-
pects, or manifestations of God. The philosophers (Modena was thinking 
of Maimonides47) expressed them through the distinction between the in-
tellect, the intelligence, and the intelligible, specifying that to God, who is 
knowledge made manifest, these three different things are one; the kabba-
lists called them sefyroth, as Menaḥem Recanati wrote in his commentary 
on the Torah; Plato spoke of “ideas.”48 But if we assume an essential identity 
between unity and multiplicity (ab infra multiplicity), we are forced into 
a series of insurmountable contradictions that infringe upon the thinkable-
ness criterion and limit the notion to a purely verbal expression stripped of 
significance.49 Having exposed the rational difficulties inherent in belief in 
the Trinity, Modena examined the “common places” of the scriptures, which 
according to the Christians justified such a belief, criticized them by using 
the obvious sense method and concluded by stating the following principle: 
If a thing as profound as the unity and trinity of God that does not imply 
His multiplicity was a cornerstone of belief, it would have been stated by 
Moses as a fundamental principle, explicitly and not with allusions, in 
an extremely clear way, so that everyone from the sage to the common 
man could understand it; for the one, just as much as the other, aspires to 
happiness. Moses explained the commandments in the richest detail, and 
beliefs a fortiori. The deeper they are, the more they need elucidating.50 
This was precisely the position expounded by the Venetian anti-Trini-
tarian Niccolò Paruta in De Uno Vero Deo Iehova,51 a major work already 
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referred to by the Karaite Isaac Troki in his apologia for Judaism.52 On read-
ing the Bible, Paruta wrote: 
All we need to know of God in this mortal life and which contributes to 
our felicity is clear and lucid in the divine texts to render unnecessary the 
toil of interpretation and deduction. In this way God wished  not only to 
provide the simple explanation but also to give all of us a healthy and 
solid understanding of Himself: we know that faith is founded not upon 
human explanations but on His clear and explicit word.53 
Such an important principle (tantae rei54) should have been expressed 
clearly and without ambiguity; this is the only way to show the path to salva-
tion, and the faithful would then have had no trouble accepting it. 
The Trinity was thus conceded by Paruta, but stripped of its essential 
character. God—Iehova—is One, the Father, which is how he was under-
stood by Jesus, Paul, the apostles, and the evangelists. If the Old and New 
Testaments are read correctly, there is not the faintest allusion to the division 
of the divinity into three persons, whereas a distinction is made between “the 
existent God, the Father, from whom all things come (ex quo omnia), the 
Lord Jesus-Christ, Son of God, through whom all things come (per quem 
omnia) and the Holy Spirit, who dispenses all good things (donorum omnium 
distributore).”55 
Jesus, according to Paruta, was a man and at the same time he was the son 
of God: Jesus said so himself, while never claiming to be God.56 Despite his 
rejection of the incarnation, Paruta remained a Christian.57 While the anti-
Trinitarians insisted on the exceptional nature of Jesus, man and superman, 
they did not break through the barrier of his radical humanization: that was to 
be the contribution of Modena, a rabbi who made no secret of his sympathy 
for the historical Jesus. 
Modena, Historian of Religions, and the Historical Jesus
Modena pointed out a number of times the erroneous interpretation of the 
Gospels by the earliest Christian theologians, who forced them doctrinally; on 
this point, he was in complete agreement with the anti-Trinitarians.58 Pursuing 
the analysis involving the definition of original sin as a desire for the pleasures 
of the flesh and its punishment as the weakening of the body, making it more 
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vulnerable to temptation, Modena attempted to understand Jesus as an ascetic 
wanting to free man from this sin, trying to expiate the sin through his own 
increasingly modest behaviour and self-chastisement, intended to mortify evil 
instincts. His disciples were encouraged to act likewise. This might have in-
fluenced the divine decision to institute the messianic age, characterized, in 
Modena’s interpretation, by man’s return to his original state of purity:59 
God could have accomplished through him [Jesus] what he reserved for 
the messianic age.60 
This, however, was not the result, as was plain to all: sin and all its poi-
sonous consequences still held sway in the world. That is why, “we hope that 
God’s promise will be redeemed in our age and that He will send the true 
Messiah through whom He will save us.”61 
Jesus was therefore, in Modena’s opinion, a man of profound morality, 
even messianic potential. This led him to continue enquiring into the man 
called Jesus—a historical Jesus. His reconstruction began with the categori-
cal rejection of the Toledoth Yeshu, the Jewish accounts of the life of Jesus, 
which tended to belittle him, as being “lies written by someone who was 
prejudiced against him and wanted to cast shame on him. And every Jew 
who believes those lies is as deserving of that shame.”62 
Modena’s historical work relied on Christian and Jewish sources63 both 
ancient and modern, particularly Carlo Sigonio’s De Republica hebraeorum 
libri VII, published in Bologna in 1582, which he surpassed in historical 
contextualisation concerning the life and character of Jesus. Sigonio’s his-
torical analysis stopped short of the figure of Christ, who was for him the 
end-point of Jewish history, to whom all the laws, prophesies, and acts of 
the Children of Israel mysteriously referred.64 Unimpeded by such finality, 
Modena reached conclusions that he announced with solemnity (perhaps 
conscious of the novelty of the undertaking) and obvious satisfaction: 
I came to conclusions which seem to me truthful and sound, as though I 
had lived in his times, alongside him.65 
His affirmation gives a glimpse of a “modern” historical conscience, re-
lying on psychological transfer into a past stripped of mystical aspects and 
completely secularised. Historical access to the most sacred arena—the 
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character and life of Jesus—to which European historiography would come 
only much later represents Modena’s not insignificant contribution to the 
secularisation of the social sciences. 
According to Modena, Jesus not only adhered totally to the teachings of 
the Pharisees, which is to say that he believed in not only the written but also 
the oral Torah, excepting the minor detail of the ritual washing of the hands, 
the divine origin of which he denied.66 Disturbed by something that could 
constitute the beginnings of a rebellion against their authority in a period 
already destabilised by a plethora of sects, the Pharisees embarked on the 
persecution of a young troublemaker, who was, moreover, from a humble 
background. Jesus reacted by becoming more extreme in his positions and 
declaring himself to the small group of disciples he had gathered around him 
to be the “son of God.” He could not claim to be God, as the pharaohs and 
Alexander the Great had done, for while they were in a position to hide their 
human failings from the public gaze, he would have been considered a mad-
man by the scholars and men in the street alike, and would have risked being 
lynched by a mob before he could ever be brought to trial. Identification of 
God with the mortal individual, Modena reminded his readers, belonged to 
the sophistry of later theologians. 
Wishing nonetheless to claim a position of superiority, Jesus could still 
call himself “son” (ben) of God, a title considered superior to that of “slave” 
(‘eved) of God, which was reserved for the prophets, or “servant” (mesharet), 
which referred to the angels. Modena cited a number of passages from the 
Gospels—which he translated into Hebrew, something remarkable in it-
self—to recall the fact that Jesus always spoke in terms of a divine mission 
and knowledge of God, but never of filiation in a strict sense and certainly 
not of identification with the divinity. Jesus achieved his ends all the same, 
concluded Modena, insofar as he was considered the being closest to God, 
and so his authority was indisputable. 
Curiously enough, Modena attributes this hierarchy of “slave,” “servant,” 
and “son” to popular belief (ha-hamon we-ha-‘am)67, initially making no 
mention of the source text in the midrash. He cites that text later (p. 64) to 
contest Christian usage of the text, but ignores it when discussing Jesus. 
In the Midrash Tanḥuma,68 in the interpretation of Isaiah 52: 13, reference 
is made to a being superior to Abraham, Moses, and the very angels: the 
Messiah. Modena’s silence on this topic is somewhat strange, his reasons 
hard to understand.69 
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This midrash had been at the centre of a dispute between Nahmanides and 
Pablo Christiani, in 1263.70 The Jewish author interpreted it in an apocalyptic 
way: the Messiah is superior to Abraham, Moses, and the angels because he 
will do more than them for redemption, ordering the Pope and every king to 
leave the Jewish people free to serve God and live without fear in Rome until 
its destruction. Modena’s historical perspective and more moderate attitude 
are pointed up more clearly in comparison with the text of the fourteenth-
century Catalan rabbi.71 The historical perspective of the Venetian rabbi has 
already been noted,72 and we will return later to his moderation, contrasted 
with the apocalyptic mentality. 
To grasp the modernity of Modena’s analysis, it must be remembered that 
unconditional humanization of the Christ figure would seem to be a step too 
far for the Christians. Paruta made him a mediator between God and the world, 
a sort of intermediary being, somewhere between the creator and the created. 
Faust Socin, a dogmatic essential for the anti-Trinitarians, insisted that Christ 
was a man—a key point of his “heretical” doctrine—and that he had not ex-
isted for all eternity. He did add, however, that he ascended to heaven after his 
birth, summoned by God, receiving from God the possibility of resurrection, 
and hence immortality, to which those who believe in him may aspire.73 
For the Italian historian Luigi Salvatorelli,74 historical inquiry into the ori-
gins of Christianity began with the English Deists, who were philosophers 
rather than historians, for “Christian Europe could not be expected to submit 
for criticism its sacred texts, the facts pertaining to the salvation and the di-
vine person of the Redeemer out of mere historical curiosity.” John Locke was 
representative of the new school of thought that displaced both Catholic and 
Protestant dogma, publishing his Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul’s 
Epistle, by Consulting St. Paul Himself between 1705 and 1707. Later, ac-
cording to Salvatorelli, Voltaire occupied a central role, with his description in 
the Histoire de l’établissement du christianisme (1777) of Judea in the time of 
Jesus. Voltaire denied in this work that Jesus ever intended to found a religion 
and—like Modena—provided his own explanation for the title “son of God.” 
Albert Schweitzer, author of a “history of histories” of the life of Jesus, 
offered a later date for the first attempts at biography, suggesting that they 
appeared in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries. The German au-
thors, followers of an enlightened religion, wrote, according to Schweitzer, 




What the Christians came to only very late and with much hesitation was 
relatively easy for a believer in the only non-Christian religion extant in pre-
modern Europe; all the more so for a Jewish rationalist like Modena, who 
was critical of Christianity without being hostile to it. 
History and Anthropology:  
The Beginnings of national Consciousness
Having sketched his historical depiction of the life of Jesus and his con-
temporaries, Modena attempted to explain the reasons for the great success 
of Christianity, a religion lacking, in his opinion, any real internal coherence. 
Here Modena became a historian of religious mentalities. 
It is not astonishing that the Nations, called Gentiles, accepted the 
Christian faith as time went on. For the fundamental idea on which all the 
rest depend, that the Holy Spirit entered a virgin womb and engendered a 
god, held nothing new or difficult (raḥoq) for them. They already believed 
that Apollo, Mars, and the other gods desired and needed mortal women, 
that they engendered the children of the gods and of men, and that they 
could suffer violent death. Differences in quantity and method in the links 
between the human and the divine were no obstacle to their belief, all the 
more so as the new religion was shot through with some of the truths of 
the Torah, which tempered the absurdities of their divinities. Over time, 
Christian propaganda towards the Gentiles intensified; by continually 
inventing and altering elements of their belief they gradually distanced 
themselves from both the Jewish faith and the intentions of Jesus, com-
ing to resemble the pagans ever more closely. They finally managed to 
impose their religion under the Emperor Constantine. As for the Children 
of Israel, the people close to the blessed God, in whom He and Moses, 
his faithful servant, had inculcated the understanding that God is utterly 
non-corporeal, being far above all terrestrial baseness, no hammer or axe 
or iron instrument could make them accept such absurdities: that God 
entered the womb of a woman, virgin or otherwise, and was born of her 
like any base and ephemeral creature, in short, like an ordinary man. Let 
His name be praised and glorified, for He has given us understanding, 
intelligence and wisdom; may his Holy Name, blessed-is-He, be exalted, 
magnified, and praised.76 
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In this remarkable passage, in which Modena tries to account for the 
reason Christianity penetrated among the pagans, we should note his ex-
planation of how the message of Jesus is assimilated into that of the Jews, 
from which Christianity distanced itself; the Jewish insistence on the non-
corporeal nature of God, proudly asserted in the face of violence and tor-
ture (a phrase that could have been uttered by an Iberian crypto-Jew or a 
heretical Christian); and finally his definition of the Jewish people as the 
“people of God,” since they were gifted with intelligence and, one could 
add, rationality. 
Reducing the range of original sin, Modena sketched a religion without 
drama; he wanted it to be in keeping with reason, denying as he did the logi-
cal possibility of the Trinity, and steering clear of the paradoxes and extreme 
beliefs that the birth of God from the womb of a woman and the incarnation 
represented to him; this religious attitude is, finally, a stranger to eschatol-
ogy. As we have seen, the Messiah was only a human redeemer and redemp-
tion in itself was a matter of the body rather than the spirit; eschatological 
calculations based on the midrash had no authority in his eyes, and belief 
in the Messiah’s coming was not a dogma as it was for the Christians, but a 
simple emunah nekhonah, or just belief.77 Emphasising the secondary nature 
of the messianic belief for the Jews, Modena wrote that 
[ ... ] We could even accept their idea that the Messiah has come, but we 
still would not be one and the same with them, for we share neither the 
same doctrine nor the same rules, as well as all the other differences that 
separate us.78 
The relatively secondary nature of messianic belief had already been 
expressed by Ḥasday Crescas (Or Adonai, 3, 8, 3) and Yosef Albo (Sefer 
ha-‘Iqqarym, 4, 42); according to them, whoever did not accept this belief 
broke a commandment and was considered a heretic, but did not cast doubt 
on the Torah in general. Modena, however, emphasised what we could call 
an “anthropological” concept. For him, the Jewish people was defined by 
certain behaviour—and beliefs were in a sense forms of behaviour. In other 
words, religion represented the culture of a people, and believing in the pre-
cepts of another religion in no way prejudiced what we might call a sense 
of “national” identity. The Historia de riti ebraici79 could be understood in 
the same spirit, as the aim of this work, which was written in Italian and 
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enjoyed considerable popularity with Christian readers all over Europe, was 
to propagate among non-Jews an understanding of the religious and social 
practices of the Jews, satisfying a curiosity that was more ethnographic than 
theologico-religious in the strict sense of the term. The people-belief cor-
relation, which only works in this direction (according to this perspective, 
beliefs spring from belonging to a people, whereas the opposite—national 
identity arising out of a belief—is untrue) would seem to be supported by the 
affirmation that follows in Magen we-ḥerev: 
I often say that I believe in the coming of the Messiah because I am a Jew, 
but not that I am a Jew because I believe in the coming of the Messiah.80 
The concept of the nation implicit in Modena’s work excluded the politi-
cal level. The Messiah would not serve as the people’s guide, assembling the 
lost tribes of Israel and rebuilding the Temple in Jerusalem, as was under-
stood by Maimonides,81 nor would he subjugate the Pope and the nations 
of the world, as Nahmanides claimed; he would be the man who allowed 
mankind to return to a state of physical purity, lost through original sin. This 
messianism, confined to the moral sphere, retained a universal appeal since 
it concerned all mankind, without special relevance to the Jews. The Jewish 
nation was a concept more ethnological than political.82
Modena’s moderate stance constituted a step toward a Jewish acceptance 
of actual history. Magen we-ḥerev was a plea for a realistic religious position 
and was as free from ill-considered eschatology as it was free of the theologi-
cal absurdities rejected by good sense (sekhel yashar, sevara83). It could be 
envisaged as the Jewish counterpart to the search for decorum and socially 
acceptable manners that fuelled certain anti-Jewish positions. 
Good Sense and Good Manners
At the 1632 Geneva trial of Nicolas Antoine, a Protestant pastor accused 
of Judaising, the judges declared themselves astonished that the defendant 
could be attracted to the rites of the Jews, for as they put it, 
[They] have delivered themselves up to a spirit of blindness, their syna-
gogues are purest confusion, with neither reverence nor devotion, strange 
cries and screams and all manner of lewd gestures.84
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Antoine had tried to convert to Judaism in Venice, but the city’s rabbis re-
fused his application, surely for opportunistic reasons.85 The Geneva judges 
may well have been thinking of the services conducted in Italian synagogues 
when they expressed their “aesthetic” scorn for Jewish rites; Modena pro-
vided indirect testimony on the conduct of such services, in a ritual respon-
sum composed between 1604 and 1606 on the legitimacy of singing in syna-
gogue according to the rules of musical science. Modena’s response was 
categorical: 
[ ... ] If these gifted people want to improve themselves according to 
the rules of the art, for the greater glory of God, are they guilty? God 
forbid! Should we impose cantors who bray like donkeys without the 
slightest modulation of their voices, in application of the verse it crieth 
out against me (Jeremiah 12:8)? And should we, who in ancient times 
employed the art of music in our praises and prayers, become the object 
of the scorn of Nations, seeing us deprived of our former knowledge, 
reduced to baying at the God of our Fathers like dogs or cawing at Him 
like ravens?86 
A famous Jewish convert to Christianity who professed to be a pupil of 
Modena, Giulio Morosini (previously Samuel Nahmias), also stressed the 
lack of order in Jewish prayers. He described the qiddush, the sanctification 
of the Shabbat, in the following terms: 
When the head of the house sings or calls, all the others shout with him, 
doing just as he does: and the number, variety, and lack of harmony be-
tween the voices generates great confusion.87 
Aesthetics appeared to be a significant factor in the repugnance to 
Judaism which incited Nahmias, the grandson of a Castillian New Christian 
who had reverted to the ancestral religion, to convert to Catholicism. In his 
work La via della fede mostrata agli ebrei he emphasised the superstitious 
and physically unattractive rites of his former coreligionists, in short their 
lack of “civilization.”88 “Superstition” is a key term in his argument, applied 
by Morosini to the religious-scriptural domain (superstition meant any belief 
or rite that did not correspond to the true religion as taught in the Bible), but 
also to the realm of good sense and, to a certain degree, good manners: “You 
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celebrate numerous rites which are manifestly superstitions, in the basic 
sense of the word (nel senso che ognuno le piglia).”89 
Morosini was not a theologian; his criticism of Judaism was essentially 
based on its ritual aspect. If, however, the term “superstition” is taken in not 
only the context of practice but also that of belief (a sickness of the soul “ca-
pable of extinguishing natural light,” “a religious cult counter to reason and 
the sane idea one should have of the supreme being,” as the Encyclopédie90 
was to define it a hundred years later), parallels can be found, somewhat par-
adoxical, but nevertheless significant, between the positions of Modena, the 
orthodox rabbi,91 and Morosini, the apostate with a horror of Judaism. Both 
aspired to a kind of reasonable and socially acceptable religiosity, in which 
conceptual absurdities (found in Christianity, according to Modena) and at-
titudes neither civilised nor in accordance with the scriptures (the province, 
according to Morosini, of Judaism) had no place . Modena’s apologia can be 
read as being either against Christianity or in favour of a rational religion, a 
requirement similar, though differently expressed, to that made by a number 
of his Christian contemporaries.
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The Immortality of the Soul 
and Opening Up to the Christian World
The Immortality of the Soul  
as a Philosophical and Religious Subject 
Inherited from a medieval debate and continuing well into the early mod-
ern period, the question of the immortality of the soul was one of the main 
issues in the philosophical and theological literature of the Renaissance. 
Both Platonism and Christian thought had developed the idea of separation 
between the body and the soul, and—as something of a correlate—the idea 
of the corruptible nature of the former and the incorruptible nature of the 
latter. The body was made of matter, and was thus destined to decomposi-
tion and death; the soul had a divine essence, and therefore lived forever in 
a celestial world after departing from its earthly residence. To deny this idea 
meant to share a thoroughly materialistic vision of the world and, therefore, 
a disbelief in the partially divine nature of man, who was—according to the 
Bible—created in God’s image and resemblance. God had breathed the soul 
into Adam’s nostrils; as far as his body was concerned, then, man was subject 
to the natural laws of reproduction, whereas the soul was created anew by 
God for every man.
Besides, the materialistic vision was problematic on ethical ground. 
According to the Christian doctrine, man—or, to put it better, his spiritual 
component—had to receive rewards or punishments for his behaviour dur-
ing his life; since it was clear that this absolute, divine justice was not al-
ways implemented in this world, one had to assume that there was another 
world, in which all human, blatant injustices would be corrected, once and 
forever.
An epistemological dimension was added to this issue by the Aristotelian 
theory of knowledge. In his very detailed analysis of the process of knowl-
edge in De Anima and in other books, Aristotle did not come to a clear con-
clusion as to the capacity of the intellective soul—supposedly able to for-
mulate universal concepts devoid of material ground—to act independently 
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of the body. The different interpretations of some controversial passages of 
the Stagirite philosopher, generally read in European medieval universi-
ties through the commentary of Averroes, served as a basis for opposite 
conceptions, one spiritualistic and the other materialistic (the so-called 
Alexandrist position, after Alexander of Aphrodisias).1 Furthermore, the 
Arabic reading of Aristotle’s theory of knowledge had led to the necessity 
of imagining an agent of divine nature, or an active mind independent from 
the man, one which enabled the process of cognition by bringing forth 
the universal notions that lay in potentiality within the human, or passive, 
intellect. But if knowledge consisted of the union between the individual 
human intellect and the unique active intellect, then every formulation of 
universal notions entailed that man must join with this active and unique 
intellect; through the act of understanding man himself became intellect 
and therefore lost his individuality. As an intellectual soul in action, man 
had to be united with other men who had developed the same, disembodied 
ideas. 
This concept, however, was the opposite of the Christian doctrine of pun-
ishment and reward, which identified the individuality of man’s soul as a 
condition for his moral responsibility. The issue provoked a bitter theological 
and philosophical debate among Christians, leading to the dogmatic formu-
lations that defined the orthodox position.2
As Paul Richard Blum put it in his chapter on the immortality of the soul 
in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, we have here a 
multi-faceted question: the exegetic issue—the interpretation of Aristotle, 
with his indisputable philosophical authority—implied the epistemological 
one; this, in turn, led to the religious-ethical issue, which also implied a cos-
mological dimension: the place of the human soul in a well defined universe 
made of corruptible and incorruptible beings.3 
The answers given to these questions produced effects that went well 
beyond the walls of the university. The danger for the official Christian doc-
trine did not result only from the possibility of a materialistic view—which 
was, after all, quite rare—but also, and maybe more hazardously, from 
the separation of the rational and the religious sphere: a view identified as 
“Averroistic.” As a result of his reading of Aristotle’s texts, a philosopher 
could very well support the idea of mortality of the soul from a mere philo-
sophical point of view, yet reaffirm his belief in immortality because that was 
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the truth affirmed by the divine revelation and by the Fathers of the Church. 
The question became so sensitive that in the Fifth Lateran Council, in 1513, 
an authoritative declaration was issued on the immortality and individuality 
of the soul, imposing not only upon theologians but also upon university 
philosophers the task of proving rationally those truths.
This is not the place to expand on the history of this issue in the Christian 
intellectual world. Let us remark only upon two major works: Theologia 
platonica de immortalitate animorum by the Florentine humanist Marsilio 
Ficino (1469-74) and Tractatus de immortalitate animae by the university 
teacher Pietro Pomponazzi (1516). 
The first book is a true “summa,” the main reference for the Neo-Platonic 
scheme that saw the human soul as being in an intermediate position, or 
the “third essence,” between the superior level of God and the angels and 
the inferior one of matter and its qualities, and thus representing the link 
between those two levels: aspiring to the divinity, while at the same time 
filling the corruptible matter of the body. The immortality of the soul was 
demonstrated by Ficino in many ways, following the method of Aristotelian 
logic but assuming the Neo-Platonic idea, which became a central notion of 
the Renaissance, accompanied by and founding another important notion, 
that of the dignity of man.
Pomponazzi’s Tractatus was of a completely different nature, not only 
because it was the output of a typical representative of Aristotelian philoso-
phy as taught at the university (Pomponazzi, who was a professor at Padua, 
was the most prestigious lecturer of his time), but also because it radically 
criticized the intellectual scheme followed by Thomas Aquinas. Thomas’ 
method was held long after him (lasting until our days) as the official posi-
tion of the Roman Church regarding the substantial agreement between the 
truths of reason and the truths of faith. According to Pomponazzi, one had 
to believe in the immortality of the soul because such was the teaching of 
the Church, depositary of the divine revelation; but philosophy could not 
reach the same conclusion, and nor did Aristotle. This was the conclusion 
of the Paduan philosopher. Pomponazzi’s book was burned, but as it was 
preceded by some other, less radical works, which opened the way for it, so 
it was followed by a great number of texts reacting to it, all adhering to the 




After the decline of Aristotelian epistemology, the issue of the immor-
tality of the soul continued to be discussed: the first edition of Descartes’ 
Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641) bore the subtitle in qua existen-
tia et animae immortalitatis demonstrantur. Moreover, besides the strictly 
philosophical analysis, both the immortality of the soul and its purity and 
longing for God in the afterlife were at the centre of the Christian devotion 
in the so-called Baroque period.
What was the Jewish position on this issue? Did the Jews take part in 
the controversy? As far as the Renaissance and early modern periods are 
concerned, the subject has yet to be studied globally. Two cases, how-
ever, have been the object of several researches: firstly the controversy in 
Amsterdam, during the first two decades of the seventeenth century, fuelled 
by the anti-rabbinic position of Uriel da Costa, and secondly the debate be-
tween the Jewish poet Sara Copio Sullam and the Catholic priest Baldassare 
Bonifaccio, which took place in Venice in the same years and which can be 
placed in relation to the Amsterdam controversy. Even though these cases 
have already been deeply investigated, they still deserve a brief comment 
in light of our concern with the issues of Jewish-Christian relations and of 
the growing secularization of European culture. Besides, they will be better 
understood if they are placed in continuity with the texts of other Jewish 
intellectuals of the Renaissance, specifically in Italy, who dealt with the 
same issue. 
It is difficult to find a common line of thought in these Jewish authors; 
there were Neo-Platonists—who referred themselves to Plato either di-
rectly or indirectly, through, for instance, references to the Kabbalah; and 
there were Aristotelians—who followed the Arab-Jewish tradition that en-
compassed Averroes, Maimonides, and Gersonides. This intellectual tradi-
tion had concerns and methodologies similar but not identical to those of 
Christian scholasticism. Nobody made the immortality of the soul a central 
issue of their work, or more exactly, as we shall see, of their Hebrew work. 
In other words, the “sub-genre” of demonstrations concerning the immortal-
ity of the soul, so common in the Christian theology and philosophy of the 
period, seems not to have been a Jewish-Hebrew genre.
Among the Neo-Platonic authors we can count Mosheh of Rieti (1388—
ca. 1465) and Yehudah Moscato (c. 1530—c. 1593); according to both, the 
immortality of the soul was a fact, upon which a poet-philosopher like the 
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first or an exegete-rhetorician like the second could elaborate, sometimes in 
a lyrical manner; but they never tried to prove it in an argumentative way. 
The writings of Yitzḥaq Abravanel (1437—1508), the exiled Spaniard who 
lived his last years in Italy, must also be examined. In Renaissance Italy, 
Abravanel wrote extensively on that matter, and his position is clearly Neo-
Platonic; his Jewish references, on the other side, probably belong more to 
the Spanish than to the Italian tradition. As for an “orthodox” Aristotelian 
position, the main representative was doubtlessly Eliyah Del Medigo (ca. 
1458—1493), whose assertions on the matter of the soul’s immortality were, 
to say the least, ambiguous, and deserve therefore a special attention.
In order to understand the positions of these authors, we should bear 
in mind what, at different levels, the most influential Jewish philosophers, 
Maimonides, Nahmanides, Ḥasdai Crescas, and Yosef Albo, wrote on this 
issue. 
The Discussion among Jewish Thinkers  
of the Middle Ages
Maimonides—as the philosopher and author of the Guide of the 
Perplexed, not in his capacities as a jurist or as the author of a list of dog-
mas—admitted the difficulty of proving rationally the immortality of the 
soul: a notion even more difficult to prove than that of the creation of the 
world.4 In this context, he did not explicitly confront the issue, stopping 
at merely indicating that the Torah prepares for the perfection of the body 
and the soul, and that the later leads to a condition of eternal happiness.5 
The soul, which separates itself from the body, is the form of that body 
(in Aristotelian sense), that is, it is the intellect that has reached true knowl-
edge of God (according to its limits) and can thus avoid death.6 This is the 
true objective (takhlyth aḥaron) of the Torah. 
As for his dogmatic affirmations, those that appear in his other, non-phil-
osophical works, Maimonides writes more extensively, holding a position 
resolutely spiritual: the souls of the righteous will live in the world to come 
(‘olam ha-ba), rejoicing in the spiritual and intellectual contemplation of the 
divine presence. The resurrection of the dead is but an intermediate stage: the 
resurrected people will indeed end up dying again, according to Maimonides, 
and eternity will be reached only in the world to come, when souls will no 
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longer be bound to bodies. Even when he writes as a jurist, Maimonides 
emphasizes the intellectual aspect of human behaviour. The merits of the 
soul are essentially intellectual, and consequently the highest reward in the 
afterlife consists of pure intellectual contemplation of the divine, without the 
burden of the body and the duties of earthly life:
The soul will continue to exist for eternity, just like God, who was its 
cause, having perceived it, as has been explained by the first philosophy. 
This constitutes the greatest good to which no other good could be com-
pared, since how could one compare eternity without end to something 
ephemeral?7
The Catalan Nahmanides (Mosheh ben Naḥman or Ghirondi, in Catalan 
Bonastruc ça Porta, 1194-1270), for his part, is fond of the description of 
man’s destiny after death as recounted by the Jewish tradition, which he 
considers of divine origin, and as such superior to human philosophy; he is 
not, therefore, interested in the rational foundation of the notion of immor-
tality. Referring to the teachings of the rabbis (Ḥazal) in the Talmud and the 
Midrash that he is often compelled to interpret, the Catalan author provides 
a very precise description of the rewards and punishments of souls in the af-
terlife, their characteristics, and their duration in the various sections of what 
can be called hell and heaven. As for the relationship between the resurrec-
tion and eternal life, he objected to Maimonides’ assertion that in the future 
world the souls of the righteous, after living in the celestial paradise (gan 
‘eden), would be reunited forever with their bodies. 
What need did he [Maimonides] have to try and prove that in that world 
there are not bodies but only souls? Even a Jewish schoolchild knows that 
the soul of a just man who dies remains in the good, that is, the good of 
the superior world in which there is no matter and no body.8 
Nahmanides concludes that Maimonides wanted to draw attention to the 
fact that, even after the reconnection of souls with bodies at the time of res-
urrection, people (including the Messiah) will die anew and will obtain their 
reward in the spiritual world of the soul. For Nahmanides, however, after the 
resurrection, the risen people will live for eternity, with a body of angelic 
characteristics and separated from corruptible matter. 
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Besides, commenting on the book of Job, Nahmanides makes allusions to 
the kabbalistic theory of the transmigration of the souls, though, following 
his custom, he doesn’t insist on its importance.9 
The position of Gersonides (Levy ben Gershom, Provence 1288-1344), 
expressed in the famous and controversial treatise Milḥamoth Adonay 
(The Wars of the Lord, 1st ed. Riva di Trento, 1560) can be considered a 
clarification and accentuation of the rationalistic position of Maimonides. 
In fact, in the first part of this work, the Provençal philosopher and scientist 
offers a long and complex demonstration of the necessity of the immortal-
ity of the “acquired intellect,” that is, the material (human) intellect that is 
appropriated by the eternal intelligibles, present in the “Agent Intellect.”10 
“The acquired intellect,” writes Gersonides, “is immortal; for what it ap-
prehends of these objects of knowledge is itself an intellect in the Agent 
Intellect.” He proceeds with a syllogism: “The acquired intellect is im-
material, and an immaterial substance does not have the conditions requi-
site for corruption; and whatever lacks these conditions is incorruptible.”11 
Immortality is therefore a function of learning and concerns the intellectual 
soul. 
For the Catalan philosopher Ḥasday Crescas (ca. 1340-1410/11), discus-
sion on the immortality of the soul is within a more ample reflection on the 
perfection required by the Torah: this reflection leads to a sum condemna-
tion of the intellectualistic school of Maimonides, and to a shifting of em-
phasis from intellectual perfection to love of the faithful toward God. That 
the intellect augments its capacity until it reaches immortality thanks to the 
intellection of the universals; that the intensity of its beatitude in the afterlife 
depends on the loftiness of its intellections: these are two typical affirmations 
of Maimonides’ intellectualism that, according to Crescas, are in complete 
opposition to the Torah and tradition, as well as absurd from a rational point 
of view.
The conflict of intellectualism with the Torah and the tradition is rather 
simple to demonstrate. The texts, Crescas writes, show abundantly that 
action, not intellection, and especially execution of the mitzwoth, leads to 
a reward in this world and the next. Demonstrating the rational absurd-
ity of the intellectualistic optics is more complicated; it relies on a great 




What Crescas aims to prove, above all, is that not the intellect but rather 
the soul in its entirety—which also possesses intellectual faculties—is im-
mortal, as a substance separate from matter that survives material corrup-
tion.12 The soul is, therefore, immortal by nature—even if it can be destroyed 
by some evils—and remains individual after it abandons the material body. 
The idea of one universal intellect resulting from the union of single “Passive 
Intellects” (human) with the “Agent Intellect” (divine), which had stirred 
many polemical storms in the Christian world of the thirteenth century, is 
therefore discarded by Crescas as impious and absurd.13 
Having developed the idea that action is superior to intellection, Crescas 
then arrives at the notion of love for God as man’s authentic objective. The 
soul that loves God, pursuing its true objective, perfects itself, and in this 
way obtains eternal immortality and happiness.
It is therefore clear that the perfection required by the Torah is to obey 
[God] with the greatest zeal, observing His commandments and being 
careful not to violate His prohibitions; with joy and light heart, which are 
the secret to service and true love. This is apparent in many rabbinic texts. 
Since this is the perfection required by the Torah, it necessarily results in 
eternal happiness and immortality [for the soul].14
The causal bond between love for God and immortality is argued by 
Crescas rationally as well. If the soul’s perfection lies in loving the Good, 
love for the Summum Bonum, which is God, leads to the maximum per-
fection of the soul. Moreover—and here Crescas refers to the thought of 
Empedocles15—if, in nature, love is a cause of unity among the elements, the 
same must be true for the spiritual realm: the more intense the love (ahavah) 
for God (until it becomes passion; the Hebrew word ḥesheq will enter the 
discussion further ahead) the stronger the union (devequth) of the soul with 
God will be. Perfection and bond with God have a worth equal to that of im-
mortality and beatitude.16
The shifting of emphasis in respect to Maimonides and Gersonides is 
evident. After Crescas—with rare exceptions such as in the work of Eliyah 
Del Medigo—the immortality of the soul will be treated in the devotional 
religious sphere, even if—occasional—demonstrations are conducted in ac-
cordance with the scholastic dialectic. The intellectualistic concern, which 
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linked immortality to intellectual knowledge, will be definitively abandoned. 
Love for God, religious zeal and fear of sin, not intellectual comprehension 
of the divine (even if it eventually flows into love) become then the most 
diffused religious values within the Jewish world, including the Italian one. 
As for the author of the best known list of Jewish articles of faith, Yosef 
Albo (1380-1412), he is not concerned with finding a rational justification for 
the idea of immortality. His preoccupation is exclusively dogmatic. In Sefer 
ha-‘Iqqarym17 (IV, 29-30), Albo states four possible opinions on the remuner-
ation of human actions from which can be extracted his conclusions regard-
ing the nature of the soul. The first postulate (inspired by Aristotle) negates 
the existence of remuneration; the soul is, in effect, a function of the body 
and dies along with it. The second (inspired by Alexander of Aphrodisias’s 
reading of Aristotle) admits to a material remuneration; the soul is a function 
of the body—and consequently vanishes with its death—but thanks to the 
intellectual faculty it can enter into contact with God, who rewards man in 
the course of his life. The third (which is Maimonides’) maintains a uniquely 
spiritual remuneration in the world to come on the basis of intellectual re-
sults achieved during life on earth; according to this conception, the soul is 
separate and immortal and its most noble part is the intellectual one. Albo 
objects that, noting that embracing this extremely elitist conception would 
exclude from immortality people who are not particularly gifted intellectu-
ally but who have merits on the basis of their religious devotion. The fourth 
postulate, which is Albo’s and, according to him, also the authentic position 
of the Torah and the rabbis, contemplates a material remuneration during the 
earthly life, as well as a spiritual remuneration destined for the soul after the 
death of the body. The texts of the Torah and the masters of the Talmud, ac-
cording to Albo, speak explicitly to that end.18
These, then, were the theological suppositions reflected upon by the 
Italian Jewish thinkers. None of them, until the spread of the Kabbalah of 
Safed in the seventeenth century, concerned themselves with the descrip-
tion of the destiny of the soul after death, the pleasures of paradise and the 
torments of hell.19 There were various attitudes, but for the most part the im-
mortality of the soul was taken by them an indubious belief that sustains and 
justifies religious devotion. This belief, in time, becomes one of the hinges 
of their faith, which allows the opening of—or at least the will to open—a 
religious dialogue with the Christians. 
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Neo-Platonists and Aristotelians 
The Soul: A Protagonist in Mosheh of Rieti’s Poetry
Mosheh ben Yitzḥaq of Rieti (1388-ca. 1465) was an extremely promi-
nent poet, philosopher, and medic among the Italian Jews in the fifteenth 
century, well known until the end of the sixteenth century. He was later for-
gotten, and while he was rediscovered in the nineteenth century, the full ex-
tent of the value and originality of his work, in verse as well as in prose, is 
still to be fully appreciated. In almost all of his writings the soul plays an 
important role. It is probably the protagonist of Ya‘ar ha-Levanon (Forest of 
Lebanon),20 a difficult and interesting text, written in rhymed prose, in which 
a female character, No’ah (whose name could be translated as “Wandering”), 
identified as the “daughter of the King,” laments being separated from her 
father and compelled to roam a hostile land. The allusion to the separation of 
the soul from its celestial source is rather clear; this female character, how-
ever, also possesses typical traits of the spiritual projection of the people of 
Israel, the Shekhynah, also in exile, awaiting redemption, which will restore 
her affectionate closeness to the divine father. The inspiration behind the 
lyrical narration of this double exile is clearly Neo-Platonic and Kabbalistic. 
Without a doubt, Mosheh of Rieti believed in the immortality of the soul; a 
position in itself evident for a rabbi, but one that would have been true for any 
observant Jewish person as well. As Nahmanides had noted, even a Jewish 
schoolchild knew that after death the soul separates itself from the body and 
returns to its celestial sphere. What is interesting here is to find out the use 
of this belief, whether leaning to the Aristotelian-Maimonidean perspective 
oriented toward intellectualism or to a more “pietistic,” devotional attitude.
His most ambitious writing, Miqdash me‘at (Little Sanctuary), a “Jewish 
response” to the Divine Comedy by Dante Alighieri,21 consists, for the most 
part, of a journey to the afterlife, or more precisely to the Jewish paradise, 
where the author encounters the souls of saintly Jews: prophets, teachers, 
martyrs, and children who have died innocent. His guide on this celestial 
journey is his father, who had died when Mosheh was a young boy. It is ap-
parent that such an imagined journey implied the idea of the immortality of 
the souls, or at least of the just ones. 
An entire chapter of the poem consists of a direct discourse between the 
author and his soul, until the latter becomes cognizant of its sins in view 
of divine justice. Rieti calls it nefesh, even if the philosophers used to call 
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the intellectual soul neshamah, probably writing under the influence of the 
Psalms, especially 103 and 104, in which the poet holds a dialogue with 
his own interiority. The soul is described as “celestial prisoner,” “a fleeing 
shadow that stays behind in a cadaver” but will rise up again when its chalice 
becomes full of earthly water. It must assume consciousness of how man’s 
neshamah, corresponding here to the vegetative soul, can be punished after 
death, burning in fire and pushed far away from the world of Sanctity. 
My soul (nafshy), be careful
that the stretched out wings of passion (ḥesheq) 
will not grow tired in their motion
And bitter spirits do not encounter it
To tear its feathers; or demons
Who will corrupt its qualities 
My soul, haven’t you heard how the soul (neshamah)  
burns in the fire of wrath 
And is thrown out of the holy place to a profane one?22
In a previous chapter of the poem, in the context of a eulogy of Aristotle, 
Mosheh of Rieti had sharply settled scores with the thought of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, which constituted a dangerous deviation from the thought of 
the Stagirite: “In one part of the sciences, there is a root that gives off poison: 
it’s Alexander. / Even the Guide [an allusion to the Guide of the Perplexed by 
Maimonides] brings back the arguments.”23 The reference is certainly made 
to the idea, attributed to Alexander, that the soul is nothing but a disposition 
of the body and therefore dies with it. 
Mosheh returns to the question of the survival of the soul post-mortem in 
an elegy composed on the occasion of the death of his wife.24 The questions 
that are posed in this case are existential, not theoretical, in nature. They 
arise from suffering, and are posed in a direct way, in an urgent and anxious 
tone: will the souls of the two lovers find each other in the afterlife? Will 
the actions taken during the earthly life attain for them different destinies? 
Philosophy and dogma do not come to the author’s rescue here: his questions 
remain without an answer. It is necessary to note that the author does not cast 
a doubt on the immortality of the soul but on the forms of this immortality, 
the way in which the soul will live in the dimension beyond the earthly life.25
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Mosheh of Rieti had received a traditional philosophical education, 
founded upon Arab and Jewish Aristotelianism, whose most prominent fig-
ures were Aristotle, Porphyry (the author of Isagoge), Al-Ghazali, Averroes, 
naturally Maimonides, and finally Mosheh Narboni and Gersonides (with 
whom he is in partial disagreement on some nonspecified points).26 For him, 
philosophy and religion are not in conflict, but are rather complementary: 
the first is not “impure” but instead constitutes a neutral instrument, neces-
sary to ascend the ladder of knowledge that culminates in the Torah. Mosheh 
associates the conceptual instruments that Aristotelianism offers him with a 
dimension that is clearly Neo-Platonic, in accordance with his lyrical pro-
pensity. On this subject, besides the importance he attributed to the subject 
of the soul and its exile in the body, one must also remember the insistence 
on the notion of ḥesheq, or desire, eros, the stimulus placed in man that as-
pires to lift itself toward the superior spheres of knowledge and being.27 Two 
successive Italian Jewish thinkers, Yoḥanan Alemanno (ca.1435-ca.1504)28 
and Yehudah Moscato, both with Neo-Platonic inclinations, will also insist 
on the importance of the ḥesheq, which dates back to Plato (particularly in 
the Phaedo and the Symposium) and which was taken up again in Italy and 
developed poetically by Dante (the model of Mosheh of Rieti).29 Another 
important Jewish philosopher, originally from Iberia but active in Italy, 
Yehudah Abravanel (“Leone Ebreo,” son of the famous Yitzḥaq) makes such 
a notion the subject of the famous Dialogues of Love (published for the first 
time in their entirety in Rome in 1535).
Oftentimes the Neo-Platonic sensitivity of the Jewish thinkers is expressed 
through a Kabbalistic language, and Mosheh of Rieti—as we have seen—is 
not an exception. In his writings, the references to the wide-spread kabba-
listic literature in Italy of his time—such as the Sefer Yetzyrah, perceived as 
kabbalistic text, the Sefer ha-Bahir, the Castilian Kabbalah, among which 
the Sefer ha-Zohar and the works of Nahmanides—are associated, in a har-
monious way, with Neo-Platonic notions: here can be found the beginnings 
of a synthesis that is destined to unfold among both Jewish and Christian 
thinkers in the following period of the so-called Renaissance. It should be 
noted that this complementarity between Aristotelian philosophy, Platonic 
subjects, and Kabbalah will subside between the end of the sixteenth century 
and the beginning of the eighteenth, when the Jewish kabbalists would pro-
claim themselves enemies irreducible to philosophy.30
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To summarize, for a philosopher-poet such as Mosheh of Rieti, the sub-
ject of the soul and its relation to the body and the divine is central, but it is 
treated in a more lyrical than argumentative manner. This approach would be 
appreciated in a later period, when the emphasis would be placed on an inter-
nalized and spiritualized religious devotion. The pages from Miqdash me’at 
cited above, in which the poet addresses his own soul, are the only ones 
that have survived the oblivion of his work; they were copied as a model 
of Jewish poetry31 and translated into Italian in four different versions by 
Jewish authors, who evidently considered them an example of “spiritual po-
etry”32 befitting the Baroque sensitivity of the time. 
Yitzhaq Abravanel:  
The Conciliation between Kabbalah and Philosophy
Yitzḥaq Abravanel was one of the most prominent figures of the Spanish 
community before and immediately after the expulsion of the Jews from that 
country in 1492. This “philosopher and man of the State”33 is considered 
one of the Jewish thinkers most open to non-Jewish cultures, in particular 
the cultures of Hellenistic and classical Greece and Christian theology from 
the patristic to the medieval period. The culture of the Renaissance certainly 
had an important influence on Abravanel, who lived the last years of his life 
exiled in Italy. At the same time, he was an heir to the Spanish Jewish culture 
in which the Kabbalah, considered a traditional revealed teaching, occupies 
a central place. 
It is exactly by going back to the Kabbalah that Abravanel affirms the idea 
of the transmigration of souls (gilgul ha-nefashoth), that circulate within their 
celestial world and reincarnate themselves in different human bodies—per-
haps even in animals—in accordance with their merits and faults. A further 
elaboration of this conception concerns the reincarnation of the souls at the be-
ginning of each new cosmic cycle.34 At the end of each cycle of 4900 years, in 
fact, in the next millennium or cosmic jubilee, as matter becomes annihilated, 
the souls lose their individuality in order to become reabsorbed into the divine 
world. Everything begins anew—back to being materialized and the descent of 
the souls into bodies assigned to them—at the start of the next cycle.
Despite attributing these doctrines to the Jewish tradition as revealed 
by God to the prophets, Abravanel feels compelled to justify them accord-
ing to philosophical criteria. As has been noted,35 his sources are more 
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Renaissance-Platonic than kabbalistic in the true sense: his continuous refer-
ences to prisca theologia, to Hermes Trismegistus (whom he identifies with 
Ḥanokh), to the “divine” Socrates and to Plato, render him a very likely 
reader of Marsilio Ficino.
Abravanel’s doctrine on the soul, therefore, belongs to a Renaissance 
thinker par excellence. Nevertheless, it does not seem that Italian Jewish 
thinkers of that period, or of successive periods, at least until the seven-
teenth century, were formulating such precise and articulate conceptions of 
the soul’s destiny in the afterlife, nor that they were embracing in such an 
explicit way the theory of transmigration, which, in the Jewish sphere, was 
only maintained by the kabbalists.
Before the spread of Lurianic Kabbalah and the teaching of influential 
figures such as Mosheh Zacuto (ca. 1610-1697), there are no comprehensive 
visions in Italy of the afterlife that are directly inspired by the Kabbalah.36 As 
a Jewish thinker, Yitzḥaq Abravanel, although engaged in the philosophical 
culture of the Renaissance, which was essentially Italian in origin, neverthe-
less should be considered as fully belonging to the Spanish philosophical-
kabbalistic tradition.37
Eliyah Del Medigo (ca. 1458-1493):  
The Ambiguity of a Late Aristotelian
It is not surprising that Eliyah Del Medigo, who can be defined as one of 
the last Jewish philosophers entirely faithful to the Aristotelian perspective,38 
treats the subject of the immortality of the soul in an entirely different way. 
Del Medigo, originally of Crete, lived in Padua, teaching at the prestigious 
university, a bastion of Aristotelianism, where the most significant debates on 
the question of the soul took place. At the same time, he was heir to a Jewish 
philosophical tradition that read Aristotle through Averroes’ commentaries 
and shared a great part of the positions of the Cordovan philosopher.39 
Del Medigo expressed his thoughts on the question of the soul at the invi-
tation of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, writing two treatises in Latin which 
he then himself translated into Hebrew as the “Questions on the soul.”40
As a good Aristotelian philosopher, Del Medigo assimilates the question 
of the soul into that of the intellect, bringing the subject of the immortality 
back to a gnoseological level. The questions that he poses are the same that 
occupied the Christian theologians: is the acquired intellect, a product of the 
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union between the passive and active intellect, unique for all individuals, or 
should only individuals who reach that condition be counted? In other words, 
do single intellects lose their individuality when they conceive of universal 
notions? The question was implicitly linked to that of the individual im-
mortality of the soul—for Del Medigo does not note it—which would be 
inconceivable if the intellects united themselves in a universal intellect. The 
response of the Cretan philosopher is inspired by the “moderate” position of 
Averroes: the acquired intellect is unique, but the paths to attaining the intel-
ligible are numerous. It seems the reader is left to draw his own conclusions 
from this as to the immortality of the soul.
One interesting aspect of these writings is the ambiguity with which 
the relationship between philosophy and religion is formulated. On the one 
hand, Del Medigo criticizes the Christian theologians, as well as the Jewish 
and Muslim ones, for mixing religion and philosophy: the idea that God has 
miraculously created individual and eternal souls, for example, could be, 
according to him, exactly what the Torah requires of every Jew to believe, 
but is unsubstantiated from a philosophical point of view. It is not surprising 
that the masses embrace such beliefs, argues Del Medigo, but the theologians 
should abstain from seeking rational justifications. Philosophy and religion, 
to which we can respectively apply reason and faith (emunah), should remain 
separate. On the other hand, having praised Aristotle and Averroes on their 
position vis-à-vis the intellect and the soul, Del Medigo denies that theirs is 
also his position. His belief, he states, is that of the Torah, and philosophy 
may contain elements that are contrary to it. 
This position must be compared with the one put forward later in Beḥynath 
ha-dath (Examination of Religion, composed in Candia in 1490 and published 
for the first time in Basel in 1629 in a book written by his descendant Joseph 
Del Medigo). Beḥynath ha-dath is a book of small dimensions but remarkable 
historical significance, such that it was considered by various scholars to be 
the swan song of medieval Jewish rationalism and the attempt to harmonize 
Reason and Revelation.41 In this work, Del Medigo analyzes the claim that 
the method to apply to notions revealed prophetically (at least to the principal 
ones) is different from the method applied in philosophical research.42 This is 
not a question of theorizing a “double path” that leads to the same results: re-
vealed religion and philosophy can in effect lead to different conclusions, and 
the attempts of rationalistic theologians (including Maimonides) to achieve 
a harmonization between the two ways are criticized for being neither truly 
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religious nor truly philosophical.43 In case of contradiction between the two 
dispositions, the Jew must adhere to the Torah, which is certain, while philos-
ophy—especially in the final phase of its research—has uncertain boundaries. 
The preference for religion, however, is valid as long as it does not oblige one 
to believe conceptual absurdities or to negate reasonable evidence, as is the 
case with Christianity: that irrational religion must be refuted.
The fundamental notions of the Jewish religion, according to Del Medigo, 
even if they cannot—and should not—be demonstrated by a rational way, do 
not enter into opposition with the “first intelligibles,” which are naturally 
present in the human intellect.44 It is evident, he continues, that the ideas of 
the Jewish religion (including those concerning the soul) do not contradict 
those fundamental laws of the working of human thought: “Our holy Torah 
does not oblige us at all to believe in contradictory principles, nor to refute 
the first intelligibles, or to believe in concepts like to those first ones, or in 
reasonable experience”;45 an affirmation which seems in partial contradiction 
with that of his Latin works on the soul, and which casts some doubt on Del 
Medigo’s actual position. 
Rhetoric and Religion:  
Yehudah Moscato (1532/33 - 1590)
The spiritual fervor of Mosheh of Rieti, who makes use of both Neo-
Platonic and kabbalistic elements, and builds upon an Aristotelian base, can 
be found a hundred years later in the work of one of the most refined intel-
lectuals of sixteenth-century Jewish Italy, the Mantuan Yehudah Moscato.46 
Moscato’s name is connected with two important works: the Qol Yehudah 
(The Voice of Yehuda, Venice, 1594), a classic commentary on the Kuzary 
by Yehudah ha-Levy, and the collection of sermons Nefutzoth Yehudah 
(The Dispersion of Yehudah, Venice, 1589). The issue of the soul is con-
fronted directly in the second sermon of the collection. Here, one can find 
the same references as in Rieti, first of all to the desire (teshuqah)47 that 
God has placed in man so that he can rise up from material objects to their 
first form and cause, God; then to the soul, also called in this text “daughter 
of the King,”48 which has to be brought back to its celestial seat, but with 
care taken that it not sink into the material abyss; and finally to the intellec-
tual character of this perfection, which corresponds to the eternal happiness 
described by the “medieval” philosophers, osher we-hatzlaḥah nitzḥyth.49 
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The tzaddyq, the just man, is the one who knows how to contemplate the 
divine truth in the correct way, “without distortion or confusion.” The con-
templation that Moscato alludes to is probably not a simple knowledge of 
the argumentative type but a disposition of the soul, which focuses on the 
eternal object of knowledge:
Derekh tzaddyqym la‘ad, the path of the just is eternal. [...] The just con-
template the firmament of the knowledge of His truth, which is blessed, 
without distortions or confusion, in such a way that their very direction 
(derekh) is the permanent and eternal intelligible. Their way of searching 
thus reaches a just and true knowledge of God.50
This contemplative outcome of knowledge, inspired by Maimonides 
but also by Plato, does not exclude, or devalue, matter. On the contrary, for 
Moscato, only through an “internal alchemy” capable of transforming ele-
ments without value into gold, or in other words elevating the lower com-
ponents of the soul, man “will be united with his Creator in an eternal beati-
tude,”51 saved by the stormy ocean of the earthly world (zeman).52 If he does 
not practice this elevation of the material components of the soul, a reversal 
will occur and “its gold will become dull.” The elevation of the body, rather 
than its refusal, can be seen as a typical feature of the Humanistic sensitivity, 
which disconnects itself from the ascetic disposition of medieval culture, be 
it Christian or Jewish.
The immortality of the soul is not, in the work of Moscato, the result of 
rational argumentation typical of scholasticism but rather the fundamental 
nucleus of a complex exegetical and rhetorical discourse.53 This is in agree-
ment with the typology of these writings—which are sermons, not lessons—
and is, on the other hand, in harmony with the Platonic inspiration of a good 
part of the Christian literature of his time, known as “Humanistic.” 
The Attempted Dialogue with Christians 
David de Pomi (1525-1593):  
Judaism as a Religion Based in Ethics
The second half of the sixteenth century and the seventeenth century, 
in Europe, are not only marked by the birth of a new science and a new 
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rationality: there is also a period of a new devotion based on an interior vi-
sion, an exploration of the landscape of the soul. The transient nature of life, 
as a valley of deception, corruption, and sin, together with the longing for 
another, purer dimension, not subject to the ravaging of time, were also com-
monplaces of the religious literature of the time.
The Italian Jews shared this sensitivity with the Christians; or at least, this 
was the face that they showed to the Christians when they wrote in Italian 
or translated into Italian some of their religious poetry. Indeed, many of the 
poetic translations made by Italian Jews from the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury to the first half of the seventeenth century had the soul as their subject 
or protagonist.54 
The biblical translations and commentaries followed the same token. In 
1572, the physician and lexicographer David de Pomi published a book in 
Venice entitled Discorso intorno a l’humana miseria, e sopr’al modo di fug-
girla (Discourse on Human Misery, and on the Way of Escaping from It), 
which accompanied his Italian translation and commentary on the book of 
Ecclesiastes. The book of Ecclesiastes was seen (quite curiously, considering 
its plain meaning) as a text warning men against skepticism, pessimism, and 
over-indulgence in worldly pleasures. In his Discorso, De Pomi writes about 
the physical misery of man, from birth to old age, on man’s more common 
sins—particularly sexual ones—and on the behaviour of the righteous. The 
first part of the book “shows that human happiness is in the future, not in this 
transient and frail life.”55 
The commentary of Ecclesiastes itself is replete with references to the 
true happiness of the afterlife. The verse 10:15, “The labour of the foolish 
wearieth every one of them, because he knoweth not how to go to the city” 
has, for example, this commentary:
As it occurs to the peasant, who, not aware of the refined pleasure of the 
town, does not want to leave the freedom of the farm, in spite of the ef-
forts it demands, it happens to the stupid man: he does not understand the 
delights of Paradise and therefore devotes himself to earthly pleasures. At 
the end of the day, he will receive eternal suffering.56
In this commentary, de Pomi, as Ficino and all the spiritualist thinkers 
had, takes Epicurus and his materialist followers as the main adversaries; 
because, de Pomi writes, they affirmed that the soul perished with the body, 
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and followed the concupiscent desires because they did not believe in the 
eternal good.57 
De Pomi was a Jew who wrote in Italian and addressed a Christian-Italian 
audience. Interestingly enough, he chose a philosophical-moral text from his 
own Jewish tradition in order to illustrate a universal moral discourse. He 
probably assumed—as was more explicitly demonstrated in his Latin work 
De medico haebreo enarratio apologica (Apologetic discourse on the Jewish 
physician, Venice, 1588)—that fundamental religious and moral values were 
shared by Christians and Jews: especially the condemnation of the flesh and 
the exaltation of the immortal spirit, and that these values were rooted in 
the Jewish tradition. In De Pomi’s work as a whole, some clear hints to a 
common religious outlook can be found, going back to the biblical figure of 
Abraham; Islam is not excluded from this “universal” attitude, although its 
inclusion does have some reservations.58
Sara Copio Sullam: The Immortality of the Soul  
as Shared Value of Jews and Christians
One of the more interesting examples of a common ground based on 
the belief of the immortality of the soul is the debate that took place in 
Venice in 1621.59 In that year, a young Jewish woman, Sara Copio Sullam, 
published a Manifesto in which she publicly defended herself against ac-
cusations of denying the immortality of the soul.60 Renowned for her liter-
ary skills, and for presiding over a salon littéraire, Sara Copio was herself 
a poet, writing in Italian. Her well-known correspondence with the poet 
Ansaldo Cebà, started by Sara, who had read and admired his poem Ester, 
is an eloquent example of Baroque literature and illustrates how Christians 
were not ready to accept the idea that a talented Jew could participate in the 
world of general culture while remaining a Jew: Cebà tried in almost every 
letter to convince the “beautiful Jewess” to convert to Christianity, but with 
no success.61
But let us go back to the debate that took place in 1621. 
The Christian intellectual Baldassare Bonifaccio, who would later be-
come Bishop of Capo d’Istria, began a religious-philosophical exchange 
with Sara Copio on the questions of the immortality of the soul and original 
sin. The Venetian addressed him in a letter in which she denied the heredi-
tary character of Adam’s sin. A soul, she argued, is not passed on to the next 
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generation, and furthermore the stain of the original sin is not transmitted. In 
addition to these arguments, most probably inspired by the Venetian Rabbi 
Leon of Modena—a close acquaintance62 of hers—she added some further 
hypotheses concerning the eternal nature of matter, which elicited in turn a 
strong reply from Bonifaccio. 
In his reply, the Discorso sull’immortalità dell’anima, a work trying to 
synthesize the traditional demonstrations of the theological-philosophical 
tradition, Bonifaccio denounced publicly the heterodoxy of such ideas.63 He 
stated that, by denying the immortality of the soul, Sara Copio chose to ac-
cept the authority of Aristotle and the plague-ridden doctrine of Epicurus 
over the “oracles of the prophets.” Bonifaccio added that these doctrines 
were clearly affirmed in the scriptures, and that by denying them Copio sepa-
rated herself from her own people. 
Even though Bonifaccio was adamant that Copio should convert if she 
wanted her soul to become immortal, one nevertheless notes that the con-
troversy was based much more upon a difference of ideas than it was upon 
religious affiliation. As a matter of fact, argued the Christian Bonifaccio, by 
not accepting the immortality of the soul, Copio was renouncing to a doc-
trine of her own religion, a doctrine that her fellow Jews subscribed to. The 
controversy had thus implicitly, and notwithstanding the declarations of the 
Christian side, crossed the boundaries of religions.
Copio replied with her Manifesto, in which she vigorously denied that 
she was questioning the immortality of the soul. In the context of her argu-
ment, the inter-religious character of this religious idea is stressed. Sara 
Copio places this emphasis in strategic parts of her text, both at the begin-
ning and at the end. In her address “To the reader,” she announces that the 
controversy is vain, because no one, Jewish or Christian, can contradict 
the immortality of the soul. The text itself starts with a series of vigorous 
affirmations:
The soul of man, Mr. Baldassare, is incorruptible, immortal, and divine. 
It is innate, a creation of God in our bodies at the very moment when our 
organized being is ready, in the maternal womb, to receive it. This truth 
is as certain and infallible for me as it is—I believe—for every Jew and 
every Christian […] so much so that I have asked myself what good it 
serves to present such a treatise now, and especially here in Venice, what 
purpose does it serve to publish such things among Christians?64
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As a conclusion, Sara wrote: “Live happily and hope that the immortality 
that you preach will be yours if you indeed live by following your Christian 
law, just as I declare to follow my Jewish law.”65
Sara Copio thus defended the legitimacy of her own religion while si-
multaneously expressing her respect for an equally legitimate Christianity. 
Incidentally, in another passage of her Manifesto, she referred to Jesus as 
the “Christ,” that is as the Messiah, and she praised him for his response to 
the Sadduceans, who themselves denied the immortality of the soul. (These 
were the same Sadduceans who aroused the sympathy of Uriel da Costa, as 
shall be discussed.) At the same time, Sara Copio demonstrated her fidelity to 
Judaism, writing that devotion to Jewish Law prevented her from attacking 
Baldassare too vigorously. Let us note here the moral aspect of this remark, 
which a Christian reader could perfectly understand. In other words, she sug-
gested that Judaism, no less than Christianity, was a religion of humility and 
of authentic devotion. 
Copio explicitly refused to engage in a religious controversy with 
Baldassare, as she did in correspondence with Cebà.66 The only religious 
values she was ready to share with her Christian correspondents were devo-
tion and the immortality of the soul. 
This moral and devotional aspect of Judaism, which would have confused 
Christians who regarded Judaism as a lower form of religion—or the Jews as 
a sort of sub-species in the Homo-religious category—is illustrated by some 
of the sonnets that Sara Copio composed for other occasions. One of the son-
nets begins with an invocation to God:
O Lord, You who observe the perpetual burning 
Of my heart for You as an holocaust;
You who know that a desire other than a fragile honour
Pushes me to implore You, shedding tears.67
In another sonnet she addresses the soul: 
O you, divine form of the mortal life
And sublime goal of God’s work.68
She ends with a reminder of the impossibility of human reasoning com-
prehending the ephemeral and divine worlds.
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In this common-ground dialogue (the sonnets make no mention of sec-
tarian affiliation), and within the context of those Italian and European in-
tellectual and religious scenes that departed progressively from scholasti-
cism, Jewish religious spirit is described as being as intense as Christianity, 
and thus fully comprehensible to Christians. A dividing line was increas-
ingly drawn less between different religions and more between believ-
ers and non-believers, between religious men and atheists. Concerning 
the question of the immortality of the soul, Jews and Christians could 
fully concur with each other, together differentiating themselves from 
Materialists. 
The Tragic Consequences of the Issue:  
The Case of Uriel da Costa
The dramatic episode of the converso Uriel da Costa is the only case 
of a public controversy on the immortality of the soul that took place 
within the Jewish world. This happened in the Sephardic community of 
Amsterdam, whose social and intellectual composition was very peculiar. 
Uriel Da Costa believed that the soul was not at all a separate substance 
but that it resided in the blood, and therefore was mortal. This position 
stood in total contradiction with the rabbinic teaching. Materialism—if 
not atheism—penetrated into Judaism via the former Iberian conversos.69 
Rather than enter into details of this process here, we need only remark 
that the intense polemic was carried out primarily in Portuguese: both da 
Costa’s Exame das tradições phariseas (1624) and the related Samuel da 
Silva’s Tratado da immortalitade da alma (1623) were written in this lan-
guage.70 So were the texts on the same issue authored by Moses Raphael 
d’Aguilar71 and Isaac Cardoso.72 Menasheh ben Israel wrote in Spanish 
and Latin.73 In 1568, Daniel Arón Afia had already published the Spanish 
Las Opiniones sacadas de los más auténticos y antigos philósofos que 
sobre la alma escrivieron y sus definiciones (The Opinions of the Most 
Authentic and Ancient Philosophers Who Wrote About the Soul, and 
Their Definitions).74
To sum up, when the Jews devoted specific texts to the immortality of 
the soul, emphasizing either the ethical and devotional aspect of the topic or 
its problematic side, they did so in Latin or in their various vernacular lan-
guages—Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish—but not in Hebrew. Exceptions 
175
The Immortality of the Soul and Opening Up to the Christian World
are the books written in Hebrew by the three main rabbis of Amsterdam, 
Saul Levi Morteira, Isaac Aboab de Fonseca,75 and Menasheh ben Israel. 
However, Levi Mortera’s text was never published and is now lost;76 and 
as for Menasheh ben Israel’s Hebrew text Nishmath ḥayym (Living Soul),77 
it was apparently more successful among the Christians than among 
the Jews.78
We can thus speak of a common Italian Jewish-Christian view on the 
immortality of the soul, and an internal Jewish controversy in Amsterdam, 
which ended with the opening of a dialogue with the Christians. We can con-
sider these two historical events as manifestations of the same phenomenon: 
a growing commonality of religious interests among Jews and Christians, 
focused on that issue. After all, the Jewish reaction in Amsterdam against the 
materialistic positions of Da Costa was in unison with the Christian position, 
and indeed was possibly determined by it, as Steven Nadler convincingly 
argues, with regard to the partially similar case of Spinoza, in his Spinoza’s 
Heresy.79
Another possible conclusion is that the Jews did not consider the im-
mortality of the soul to be a problematic issue within their own religious 
and philosophical thought. They rarely wrote specific texts on it, nor did 
they engage in any controversy on the topic, and when they did, they wrote 
for non-Jewish readers—like Pico della Mirandola—or for Jewish readers 
with a Christian education, as many Jews possessed in Amsterdam. After all, 
Menasheh ben Israel was turning towards the Christians in order to create, 
along with them, a common front against those who denied the immortal-
ity of the soul. The same was happening in Venice at the same time—albeit 
in a less direct way—in the polemic between Sara Copio and Baldassare 
Bonifaccio.80
The Jews generally believed in the immortality of the soul, and quite 
naturally shared this conviction with the Christians. Both were concerned 
about the dangers of materialism and atheism, to such an extent that they 
were able to make it the basis of a common intellectual ground. They did not 
share the experience described by Uriel da Costa when he wrote about his 
“Christian years” in Portugal:
In truth, the most distressful and wretched time in my life was when I be-
lieved that eternal bliss or misery awaited man and that according to his 
works he would earn that bliss or that misery.81
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Salomone Fiorentino (1743-1815):  
Jewish Ideas in Italian Poetry 
Salomone Fiorentino lived in a later period than the one generally taken 
into consideration for the purposes of this book. Nevertheless, this poet, who 
despite his excellent knowledge of Hebrew wrote exclusively in Italian, can 
be seen in a line of continuity with the other authors considered thus far. At 
the same time, he represents, in a certain sense, the point at which Italian 
Jews arrived at modernism. 
Fiorentino was, culturally and politically, a Francophile and anti-Ma-
terialist, an admirer of scientific progress, and a man of profoundly re-
ligious spirit.82 The histories of Italian literature, though not neglecting 
him completely, reserve a very limited space for him and do not suffi-
ciently explicate the contribution he made to Italian literature by his use 
of some typically Jewish subjects. At the same time, histories of Jewish 
culture—which pass him by almost completely—might profit by seeing 
him as someone who, having stripping himself of the language of his own 
religious tradition and avoiding explicit references to it, nevertheless pre-
sented its values in a Western language, translating them linguistically and 
conceptually.
Jewish subjects are already present in Fiorentino’s youthful sonnets. In 
fact, it was not common, at the end of the eighteenth century, to describe 
in verse such subjects as the universal flood, Elijah’s ascent to Heaven, a 
“Comparison between Jefte and Abraham,” or to respond poetically to the 
question: “One searches for the reason why the Mosaic law instills the duties 
of the son towards the father and silences the duties of the father towards the 
son.”83 We should not let ourselves be misled by these themes: despite their 
didactic-moralistic character, the fluidity of the expression and the sincer-
ity of the author render these compositions perfectly appreciable even for a 
modern reader.
The relative fame of Fiorentino, however, has to do with the Elegie 
(Elegies), written on the occasion of the death of his wife, especially the 
first three of the six he composed, which are known as “The Disease,” “The 
Death,” and “The Vision.”84 With utmost sincerity, without hesitating to 
capture his most painful emotions, which in some cases were contradictory, 
Fiorentino runs through the stages of an event fundamental to his existence 
and his philosophical-religious conceptions. 
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The Elegie are a cathartic journey which attempts to make sense of an 
incurable injury. In effect, even after receiving a nocturnal vision of his 
wife, who reveals to him how unjustified it is to suffer for an earthly loss, 
the author still finds no peace: “But sighing, I still search for comfort.”85
Written in hendecasyllabic tercets—the meter of the Divine Comedy—
these Elegie are rich in references to Dante and Petrarch. In her posthumous 
apparition, the wife exhibits many characteristics of Dante’s Beatrice: the 
poet does not see her as she was at her death but “In that amorous state, and 
that countenance / that would transform men into gods.”86 This donna angeli-
cata, who transforms men into divine beings, is seen glowing with celestial 
light, while remaining at the same time humble and noble: 
The face seemed lovingly humble:
And from the damp eyes a certain ray
Superhuman, it rained, noble.87
This eighteenth-century Beatrice, however, was also reminiscent of 
Petrarch’s Laura (interestingly, Fiorentino’s wife was in fact called Laura 
Gallico): “Her dress was white and scattered in the aura”88 and the poet, prey 
to his unsatisfied desire to find his wife again, “pushes like mad, the wander-
ing and empty foot.”89
In these Elegie, the reference to God is both discrete and evident at the 
same time, for despite the pain, the author worships with devout thoughts 
and words a God who is “arcanely just,”90 the power and will of God that 
like to separate the two halves of one whole.91 There is not a single reference 
that is explicitly Jewish in these verses; a Christian could easily have written 
the Jewish Fiorentino’s declarations of intense religiosity—even if, at that 
time, the non-confessional religiosity was being expressed, above all, in a 
deistic form.
It is the social references of his poetry that render Fiorentino an explicitly 
Jewish author. The loved woman in this Elegie is not a young and beautiful 
lover to whom the author is linked with a consuming passion, but a wife who 
passes away at the age of forty-five. The spectators to the author’s pain are 
his children: reunited around the dinner table, they bring their father, who 
is dreamily seeking in their manners something of his dead wife, back to 
reality—and his responsibility. The theatre and witness of his excruciating 
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solitude is the nuptial bed; a “disturbing pity” pushes the poet to rediscover 
what by now is “a field devoid of love.”92
It can be noted that these are the elements of a bourgeois poetry, in which 
there is nothing typically Jewish. Nonetheless, it is exactly these elements 
that betray a mandatory choice, dependent upon the social situation and the 
cultural tradition of the Italian Jews. Like Jews in other countries, Italian 
Jews saw in the family the initial—and fundamental—nucleus of society, 
without possible deviations. The Jewish community, it should be noted, was 
a micro-society, founded upon religion, which admitted a bond, even if it is 
only a sentimental one, between man and woman only within the limits of 
marriage. 
Only the comic literature of medieval Spain and that of Immanuel of 
Rome (ca. 1261—after 1328) alluded to extra-marital love, usually in the 
form of erotic adventures. Stories of amorous passions are, therefore, almost 
entirely absent in the Jewish literary corpus, and no inspirational muses exist 
for this genre. On the other hand, one cannot find in the history of Jewish 
culture—again, apart from medieval Spain and the brief period in which 
Immanuel of Rome wrote—an autonomous artistic sphere. The Jews did not 
have circles, academies, literary currents and clubs, or patrons.93 Moreover, 
the artist, as such, did not have his own legitimacy: in order to write poetry, 
he first had to demonstrate that he had been engaged in the study of the 
Talmud and religious law. Literature was a hobby, not a profession, and was 
allowed only if religious duties had been fulfilled. 
The absence of a cultural and artistic autonomy in the socio-religious 
sphere, which was founded upon the family and the community, leads to the 
superimposition of the two spheres: art is expressed in religious terms, not 
artistic ones. The inspiration behind poetic verses could then be a wife; the 
drama and the events that are the subjects of the poetry would be those of the 
family or community life, such as a wedding or the death of an eminent rabbi 
or the wife herself.
Being inspired to write poetry by the death of one’s wife is an extremely 
rare circumstance, almost non-existent, in the history of Italian literature.94 
Salomone Fiorentino, however, has an illustrious precedent in the history of 
Italian Jewish literature, the poet and philosopher Mosheh of Rieti, whom 
we have already mentioned. Mosheh’s elegy, composed upon the death of his 
wife and cited above, is a text interwoven, as was customary, with biblical 
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and talmudic references, but written in original meter and, above all, ex-
pressing a strong and sincere emotion. This poem, just like Fiorentino’s, pre-
sents different stages of the process of the loss of a loved one: the announce-
ment of death, the pain of the bereaved, and the lengthy elaboration of the 
bereavement. A celestial vision of his wife, which contains not Dantesque 
but Kabbalistic references, is present as well.
Fiorentino’s wife passed away at the age of forty-five, and her husband 
felt it necessary to justify the composition of a poem in memory of a mature 
wife.95 In Rieti’s case, his wife was actually seventy. This, however, did not 
diminish the intensity of the surviving husband’s emotions. In this fifteenth-
century elegy, the wife is also described in a familiar context, as a wise edu-
cator of her children. Here too, the drama of the insane and useless search of 
the widower for the deceased spouse is domestic. It is his own house that ad-
monishes him: “I look for her, agitated, as a madman, all over the house, say-
ing to myself: ‘My sister,96 perhaps I will find you, I have been accustomed to 
your image in this place, for more than fifty years.’ But at the fall of night, a 
stone screams from the wall: ‘What are you looking for? The superior forces 
have won, they have imprisoned her in a coffin, stretched out.’”97
As mentioned above, the wife of Salomone Fiorentino appears before the 
husband in a nocturnal vision. In her visit she announces a consoling truth: 
the earthly life is not the true one, and therefore mourning the death of a 
loved one is unjustifiable: 
Life is this one that Time does not measure 
The one whose face is the Always, and its reverse is the Never
While it runs blessed and goes secure.98
In this life without time, the immortal souls of the husband and wife will 
reunite in happiness. 
In a fourth elegy, entitled “La rimembranza” (“Remembrance”), the poet 
returns to his mistake, which was a result of the senses, in considering a di-
vine favor an injury. Instead of suffering over the death of his wife, he should 
have been happy about the passing of her soul to eternal life. The fifth and 
sixth elegies are entirely dedicated to a reflection on Time and Eternity.
The subject of the immortality of the soul is present in Fiorentino’s other 
writings: a lengthy composition entitled “The Spirituality and Immortality 
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of the Soul”99 and an intervention in a polemic on the subject with several 
Italian rabbis.100 In none of these texts does the author refer to the sources of 
the Jewish tradition—biblical or rabbinic—as authoritative. The arguments 
are always either rational or religious, but never confessional. Eighteenth-
century rationalism no longer ran in parallel to revealed religion, as had been 
the case in medieval theology, but was completely disinterested in revela-
tion as a source of truth, even when it evidently took on a religious tone. 
Mendelssohn’s Phaedon is the best example of a work on the immortality 
of the soul, founded on rational arguments while permeated with religious 
spirit. At the time, the Athenian setting of the dialogue obviously (and inten-
tionally) impedes any recourse to the texts and traditions of the European 
religions, Christianity and Judaism.
One of these texts by Fiorentino has, in actuality, an explicit religious 
content. In order to write on a noble subject such as the immortality of the 
soul, the poet evokes God in a way that is reminiscent of Maimonides’ con-
ception: “Of each cause first Cause / being necessary and infinite” (p. 7). 
Criticizing several Materialist conceptions, the poet insists on the idea that 
“beyond the tomb / life can be found.” One of the most significant argu-
ments used to sustain this idea is based on the claim that in nature nothing 
is destroyed, but everything is transformed; life and death are not as dis-
jointed as they appear to the senses, but exist in reality in a relationship of 
continuity. If this is true for matter, why should it not be true for the soul 
as well?101 
What happens to the soul after death, however, remains a mystery, as 
is its connection to the body; the only thing that can be affirmed is its im-
mortality. All the ways of the Lord are likewise mysterious—here we are 
reminded of the “arcanely just” God of the first elegy. A century and a half 
after Sara Copio, Fiorentino insists on this aspect of divinity: his laws and 
his designs are “arcane” and incomprehensible to the limited knowledge of 
humans. This, however, can be confirmed of God with certainty: that he is 
absolutely just and infinitely good. A good and just God, wrapped neverthe-
less in mystery as his essence (which does not hinder rendering him as a 
possible subject of a fervent cult), an immortal soul: these seem to be the 
religious notions that the Italian Jews bring with them when, stripped of 
explicit references to Judaism but undoubtedly nourished by its conceptions, 
they turn toward a non-Jewish audience.102
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Modern Ideas in Biblical Hebrew: Shemuel Romanelli
The religious language of the Italian Jews, from the end of the eighteenth 
century onwards, should likely not have differed depending on whether 
the words spoken were addressed to community members or others. The 
Mantuan poet, translator, and “anthropologist” Shemuel Romanelli (1757-
1814), an intellectual in the modern sense, is an eloquent example of this 
orientation. He published in Berlin in 1792 a Hebrew poem of thirty sesti-
nas, entitled Ruaḥ nakhon (A Just Spirit), dedicated to a protagonist of the 
Berliner Haskalah, David Friedländer.103
In this composition, Romanelli took on the religio-philosophical subject 
of the immortality of the soul or, more precisely, the existence of an en-
tity called soul that transcends matter. He did so in a sophisticated bibli-
cal Hebrew—so carefully researched that he felt compelled to clarify his 
own verses with annotations—with evident references to the Jewish tradi-
tion. His form of argumentation, however, has nothing confessional. Just like 
Fiorentino, Romanelli does not present biblical texts or rabbinic affirmations 
as sources of authority; his argumentation is based on logic and observation. 
This method does not, however, succeed in arriving at exact and certain re-
sults. If the enemies are indeed the Materialists, who maintain that soul and 
thought are one unique whole, and are tightly connected to the body, the re-
sponse of the author, beyond indicating that he visualizes an admired vision 
of the Universe in which all elements are connected among themselves in a 
beautiful harmony, cannot go beyond the proclamation of the mystery: 
But what is this link, and what is the soul?
And matter, what is it? Who could say,
who would know it all and could explain it?
…
Everything has a force (an invisible hand
operates in it with its law) which maintains it:
this is its soul, its life, without which there would be chaos.104
Every being, therefore, has a soul, and the Universe is described as a 
hierarchy of beings equipped with forces, that is, of increasingly noble souls 
that little by little ascend in the hierarchy. This is as far as human knowl-
edge can reach; whoever is pushed by arrogance to explore beyond these 
limits runs the risk of being intellectually affected, affirms Romanelli, in an 
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idea reminiscent of another Mantuan poet of the previous century, Ya‘aqov 
Francès.105
Having once affirmed—without having explained—the existence of the 
soul, Romanelli asks himself if it is indeed immortal. Even here, the au-
thor is not capable of furnishing real demonstrations, apart from noting that 
in merely wondering whether they have souls, men distinguish themselves 
from animals. His argument comes down to a version of the famous wager 
of Pascal: 
What do you lose, if you believe? What do you not lose,
if you do not believe? You could not, however, understand,
even if you give it your best.106
Jewish Religiosity: A Neglected Heritage
Quite paradoxically, Romanelli’s religiosity, though expressed in 
Hebrew, is not directly inspired by Jewish sources, while Fiorentino’s was. 
The Tuscan poet, who wrote exclusively in Italian, was no doubt a religious 
man. While his religious fervour went beyond the boundaries of one religion, 
it was never theless grounded in Judaism. The exchange of sonnets between 
the female poet Corilla Olympica, who presided over a literary academy, 
and Fiorentino, who had just been admitted into it, is revealing. Olympica is 
surprised by the personality of the poet:
Destiny has looked kindly on my wish
It has allowed me to finally meet you
And to discover that in your poems there is a God
Who inspires you with strange and unknown grace
…
If I were to gaze upon you with surprise
What would then occur if by the same path
I was to rediscover the truth?107
The God that is described here could well have been Apollo, who allowed 
Fiorentino to compose new poetical forms. It is possible, however, to read 
“the strange and unknown grace” as referring to poetry that is surprisingly 
both familiar and unexpected, poetry written by a Jew expressing himself 
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in Italian with his faith grounded in Judaism. It is a “strange” culture that is 
nevertheless perfectly understood by a Christian.
Fiorentino’s response reveals just how important the religious element in 
his work was. Instead of thanking or even flattering his distinguished corre-
spondent, he elaborates on the final lines of Olympica’s sonnet, in which she 
sees the possibility of understanding the truth. In the sonnet he composed as 
a response to hers, he speaks of only one topic—how the acts of God seem 
unfathomable for humans. He concludes by describing the limits of poetry, 
which, while it may have certain brilliance, is nevertheless unable to pierce 
through the secrets of the divine.
Arcane, impenetrable, profound 
Are the ways of the one who gave the being to nothing
And to his justice and his goodness correspond
What he did, and wanted, and accepted.
…
You may be able to follow these brilliant poems 
But you will see that a veil which is covering over many truths
Has written on it the words: Adore and keep silent.108
What we have here is an image of the Jew very different from the one 
to which we are accustomed in Christian literature: the Jew as blind and 
obstinate, refusing to see the light; the unhappy Jew bearing the burden im-
posed by God the legislator. We can therefore well appreciate how the poet 
Olympica was surprised by the fact that she could receive religious instruc-
tion from a Jew.
Fiorentino’s other intervention on the subject of immortality occurs—not 
in poetry but in philosophical-scientific prose—in the context of an exchange 
of opinions among rabbis of central Italy on the subject of the resurrection. 
The debate, as David Malkiel notes, takes place against a scientific backdrop 
despite the fact that the interventions refer to religious concepts (in this case 
Kabbalistic ones).109 His point of departure was the book of the English theo-
logian Thomas Burnet (ca. 1635—1717) De statu mortuorum et resurgen-
tium, published in 1723. Burnet’s works were characterized by an attempt to 
reconcile modern post-Christian science with the Bible; the fact that some 
representatives of Orthodox Judaism in Italy were freely referring to these 
subjects and texts, originating in the Protestant world, is quite remarkable. 
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Finally, it is important to note that a profoundly religious person such 
as Salomone Fiorentino, who actively participated in the life of the Jewish 
community,110 wrote a poem in praise of Galileo Galilei at a time when the 
Church condemned his theories.111 The same Fiorentino adamantly criticized 
religious fanaticism, without outlining its origin and characteristics.
The fanaticism of the black crest
Polishes the iron with the cloth it wears
Blooded by religion.112
An intense faith, a mentality decisively open to scientific progress and reli-
gious and cultural tolerance—these are the characteristics that these men and 
women of Jewish culture brought forth as their contributions to nineteenth-
century Italy, in the years just before the gates of the ghettoes were opened. 
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Kabbalah and Rationalism 
in the Works of Mosheh Ḥayyim Luzzatto 
and some Kabbalists of his time
Ranging from poetry to mysticism and from logic to morality, Mosheh 
Ḥayyim Luzzatto’s works are so wide-ranging that finding their unifying 
elements can be difficult. This diversity challenges attempts at classify-
ing him historically: is Luzzatto a modern author heralding a new age in 
Hebrew literature?1 Or does he represent the final manifestation of a kab-
balistic sensibility on the wane in Western Europe? The history of the recep-
tion of his works is equally problematic: Eastern European communities of 
different orientations2 hailed him almost immediately as a master worthy 
of veneration, and this fervor continues to this day in religious Israeli cir-
cles, inspiring a rich variety of studies and publications.3 The Paduan au-
thor’s works were recently rediscovered in Israel, where many understand 
them to articulate a New Age sensibility: an authentic religious experience 
expressed in modern terms. Poet and mystic, modern man and kabbalist, 
Luzzatto lends himself well to this kind of research. Indeed, the persecution 
he suffered at the hands of the rabbinic establishment gives him the aura of 
a victim of intolerance.4 
Yet, in the West, he has been forgotten for almost a century. His memory 
was not helped when a few nineteenth-century Italian scholars, adhering 
closely to the critical method, reread him unsympathetically, complaining 
about his fascination with Kabbalah, which they considered an obscurantist 
discipline. Their lack of enthusiasm for kabbalistic studies was neverthe-
less tempered with admiration for his great theological and poetic talent. His 
well-known descendant, Samuel David Luzzatto (Shadal), clearly took this 
position:
R. Moses Chajim Luzzatto […] a great genius, but unfortunately born 
in times too infelicitous and dark […] devised a system which was all 
his own and founded upon the most abstruse questions of Theology—
questions which are beyond human investigation. He had a talent for 
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interpreting all the mysterious doctrines of the modern kabbalistic school 
according to this system, and in so doing made his own hypotheses appear 
like the simple development and explanation of Kabbalah.5 
According to Shadal, Mosheh Ḥayyim Luzzatto develops personal theo-
logical concepts but presents them in kabbalistic terms, ill-serving his theo-
logical genius. This was also the view of Samuel David Luzzatto’s contem-
porary, Yosef Almanzi, whose early—and excellent—biographical account 
of the Paduan kabbalist and poet at once praised and criticized him.6
Simon Ginzburg gave a more nuanced assessment of the kabbalist in The 
Life and Works of Moses Hayyim Luzzatto (Philadelphia, 1931). Despite its 
Romanticism, this work constitutes the most important biographical mono-
graph on the kabbalist and poet. Ginzburg understands Kabbalah as a dy-
namic force, especially in periods of isolation, as was the case during the 
period of the ghetto, when legalism tended to fossilize Jewish life. Ginzburg 
felt that Luzzatto’s poetic talent rivaled the literary gifts of Yehudah ha-Levy, 
and restored beauty to the stagnant Hebrew language. Luzzatto’s kabbalistic 
works were, for Ginzburg, a product of their age, and he read them as a form 
of resistance against legalism animated by a messianic spirit and argued that 
they testified thus to the vitality of Jewish life.7 Ginzburg nevertheless be-
moaned the fact that:
a splendid combination of poetic emotion and mythological material, 
which Luzzatto, like Milton, could have embodied into a national epic, 
was turned into fruitless kabbalistic speculation.8
To this he added:
Had Moses Hayyim Luzzatto lived at an earlier date—he would no doubt 
have become a great religious leader, had he lived later—he would have 
become a great poet of the modern school. But living in a transition pe-
riod as he did, tragedy was knocking at his door the first day he was ush-
ered into this world.9 
More recent critical appraisals of Luzzatto’s works have been equally 
mixed. Although there have been a few analyses of his poetic works,10 as well 
as a biography based on a new examination of his correspondence,11 most 
of these studies have concentrated on the messianic aspects of Luzzatto’s 
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thought, both from a theoretical point of view (including an exploration of 
the Sabbatean question) and from an experiential perspective (focusing on 
the revelations which a celestial voice or maggid12 made to Luzzatto). Other 
studies have concentrated on the question of the feminine dimension of the 
sefyroth.13 Finally, an important monograph has examined, among other 
things, the links between the Paduan author’s rhetoric and his kabbalistic 
thought.14 Some of the points discussed in this last work deserve further ex-
amination, in particular its exploration of the relationship of Luzzatto’s works 
with both the Lurianic kabbalistic tradition and the philosophical-scientific 
thought of the age in which they were written.15 Among other things, such an 
investigation needs to meet the demands of Jewish intellectual historiogra-
phy by contextualizing the Jewish experience. This means starting from the 
premise that, in a single period and place, Jews and non-Jews must have had 
analogous behaviors and perceptions of reality; different religious cultures 
merely expressed similar contents differently, because the society that lived 
within the walls of the Ghetto was not completely cut off from the outside 
world. Indeed, Luzzatto’s own works are almost explicitly in conversation 
with ideas coming from outside the ghetto. 
Luzzatto wrote solely in Hebrew. His kabbalistic, logical/rhetorical,16 ethi-
cal, and poetic works all fit within the Jewish tradition. A theoretician, rather 
than an encyclopedic writer, Luzzatto did not often cite other works or au-
thors; among his rare quotations, there are no references to any non-Jewish 
texts. The sources of his brief logical/rhetorical treatises are evident, and he 
never sought to dissimulate them, even if he did not mention any names and 
titles. Yet, there is an even deeper consonance between his thought and the 
philosophical-scientific ideas of his time. The texts that provide evidence for 
this are considered to have been exclusively intended for Jews, because the 
doctrine they articulate was developed within the confines of the religious 
intellectual “sanctuary” of Kabbalah. This is not to say that Luzzatto alludes, 
however implicitly, to this or that non-Jewish author. Instead, it is the general 
tonality of some of his important kabbalistic works which makes him an au-
thor of his time, even if only up to a point (we will address these reservations 
later): a writer who lived at a time when one could not ignore the new demands 
that rationality and scientific developments placed even on religious thought.
In other words, it seems appropriate to situate Luzzatto’s works within 
the framework of early eighteenth-century European religious thought, when 
Cartesianism deeply influenced the way problems were approached and 
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methods developed. Clearly sensitive to the concerns of his time, the Paduan 
kabbalist responded to them in his own way, by attempting to offer a new 
reading of a doctrinal corpus which was a priori indifferent to such modern 
demands, and which constituted the shared heritage of all Jewish communi-
ties, in every region of the Jewish Diaspora. There is a rationalistic slant in the 
reading Luzzatto proposed, so much so that one might risk describing him as 
a rational theologian. In this sense, his descendant, Samuel David, who was 
struck by the power of his theological reflections, appraised him correctly.
Mosheh Ḥayyim Luzzatto may well have sought to accentuate the ration-
alistic character of his thought following the well-known events that obliged 
him to alter the nature of his writings from 1730 onward. From then on, he 
was no longer permitted to base his works on the revelations of celestial 
voices, and was ordered to stop publishing on kabbalistic material.17 Yet, the 
peremptory character of his rationalistic statements, as well as their impor-
tance in his eyes and the urgency of his tone, suggest a genuine exigency 
rather than a literary strategy.18 
Of course, the rationalistic aspects of Luzzatto’s thought do not preclude 
the fact that the young Paduan was also a mystic, the recipient of celestial rev-
elations and the organizer of a group which aspired to perform tiqqunym (the 
restoration of the divine world). He believed in gilgulym (the reincarnation of 
souls), and believed he was the reincarnation of great personalities of the past. 
He was at one and the same time a mystic and a rationalist, and saw no contra-
diction in this. He adhered to a mystical form of religiosity which found col-
lective expression during the years of belief in Shabbetay Tzevy, and survived 
discreetly in Italy at least until the beginning of the nineteenth century, if 
not beyond that.19 He nevertheless also embodied the intellectual elite’s need 
to confront the most dynamic aspects of European culture. In other words, 
Luzzatto defended Kabbalah from the charges its rationalist critics leveled 
at it, even as he at least partly accepted the criteria on which they based their 
attacks. In order to situate this aspect of his work, one must retrace the history 
of the criticisms Kabbalah received in Italy before the era of Luzzatto.
Covert Critiques of Kabbalah
In 1558, the year of the polemics surrounding the first printed edition 
of the Zohar and other important kabbalistic texts, hostility to Kabbalah on 
doctrinal grounds was confined to a brief, anonymous text. We deduce the 
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existence of this critical pamphlet from the responses which it provoked 
from its adversaries. Drawing on observations found in Eliyah Delmedigo’s 
book, Beḥynath ha-dath (An Examination of Religion, composed in 1490 
and published in 1629), the anonymous author of the anti-kabbalist pamphlet 
questions the antiquity of the Zohar and voices reservations about the doc-
trine of the sefyroth, which he considers potentially heretical. Additionally, 
he reasons that the search for concealed and secret meanings within the di-
vine commandments may potentially have an adverse impact on healthy re-
ligious behavior, which should be based on the study of Talmud and on basic 
obedience to the divine laws.20 
In the following years, and particularly throughout the seventeenth cen-
tury, Kabbalah was the cornerstone of the dominant culture of Italian Jews. 
It determined the theoretical orientation of the elite, spread through the dis-
semination of its ritual behaviors, and played an important role in shaping 
mentalities. Any opposition to Kabbalah manifested itself in resistance to a 
tendency that pervaded all aspects of Jewish life and affected the population 
at all levels. Significant yet sporadic, this resistance was censored by the rab-
binic authorities and in some cases was not made public: it is in large part 
thanks to its censors and virulent attackers that we know about it today.
It is possible to reconstruct the main criticisms leveled at Kabbalah, 
particularly Lurianic Kabbalah, which associated the doctrine of Yitzḥaq 
Luria—as transmitted by his disciple Ḥayyim Vital Calabrese—to the doc-
trines of the Zohar and earlier kabbalists such as Nahmanides. It is also pos-
sible to trace the intellectual model which the critics of Kabbalah proposed 
as an alternative.
The major accusation directed against the kabbalists concerned the fact 
that they considered the Kabbalah to be “the true wisdom”—the ḥokhmath 
ha-emeth—but had neither verified the historical authenticity of its teachings 
nor produced a theoretical justification of their truthfulness. The Venecian 
rabbi Yehudah Ariyeh Modena (1571—1648) stringently raises both of 
these points in Ary nohem (A Lion Roars), which, significantly, remained 
unedited until 1840.21 For Modena, Kabbalah is neither a true tradition nor a 
true science. It is not a tradition because the great rabbis of the past—from 
the Talmudic era onward—never mention it. Additionally, it seems evident 
to him that the major kabbalistic texts—particularly those collected in the 
Zohar, which have an aura of holiness and are attributed to the master of 
the Mishnah, Shim‘on bar Yoḥai—are in reality apocryphal writings which 
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were edited many centuries later. According to Modena, the kabbalists imi-
tated ancient philosophers and manufactured their texts out of apocrypha in 
the style of Jewish writings. It was not easy to make such assertions, and 
Modena fully expected those who believed in the texts to rebut him stiffly: 
“And I know that I must fortify myself with shield and armor, in order to 
protect myself against their violent verbal arrows.”22 
For Modena, Kabbalah is not an authentic tradition, but neither is it a sci-
ence. Shifting to a theoretical argument, he presents a detailed epistemological 
analysis grounded in a definition of science (ḥokhmah). The Venetian rabbi 
argues that in order to be considered a science, a discipline must insist on 
reaching the truth (understood as the coincidence of a mental representation 
with reality) in its particular field through rational argumentation. In this sense, 
physics and mathematics are clearly sciences, as they follow a line of reason-
ing in order to reach rapid and authoritative conclusions. Similarly, astronomy 
is a science, as are, in a certain sense, rational theology (as long as it adheres 
to the proper rules of demonstration) and logic (the instrument for grasping the 
truth).23 Developing this line of argument, Modena cites Nahmanides, Meyr 
ibn Gabbay and Mosheh Cordovero in order to show that the kabbalists not 
only refused to investigate questions pertaining to the science of truth through 
rational argumentation, or sevara, but actually denounce such investigations 
as irreverent. The only proofs they produce are based on authority: they quote 
other quotations, and write books referencing other books. As the kabbalists 
do not think it apposite to extricate themselves from this circle of self-jus-
tification, their discipline is not a science. It is precisely sevara which leads 
Yehudah Ariyeh Modena to castigate the esoteric doctrine and its supporters.24 
The criteria which Modena invokes in his critique of Kabbalah are analo-
gous to those he made in a previous work in order to criticize Catholic the-
ology;25 there, his discussion of Catholicism focused both on the historical 
reality of Jesus’ ideas and on the rationality of Catholic doctrine. Modena’s 
evaluation of Catholicism was negative on both counts: one the one hand, 
the “historical Jesus” differed significantly from the Catholic Jesus, and on 
the other, Catholic theology was based on hypotheses that were unaccepta-
ble to reason. However, his critique of Kabbalah is even harsher. The saying 
“tiqqun ha-regel la-na‘al” (“to correct the foot to suit the shoe”) applies to 
both doctrines: both forge a series of notions with no historical or theoreti-
cal precedent, and are constrained to distort the biblical text as they adapt 
it to them, giving it non-literal interpretations. However, whereas Catholic 
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theology leaves a certain amount of room for rational discussion, the only 
possible strategy for the kabbalists is unquestioning assent. 
Modena’s positive alternative to Kabbalah is implicit in his critique: a 
religion open to moderate rationalism, and in particular to the rational justi-
fication of fundamental beliefs such as the unity of God, the creation of the 
world, and providence. Considered as a whole, the Venetian rabbi’s complete 
works define a “cultural project” which was soon destined for failure, at least 
as far as mainstream Jewish thought was concerned. Modena wanted Jews to 
know and appreciate the sciences, be versed in the Latin classics, and engage 
with Hebrew literature, but also to engage with the most modern productions 
of the Italian language and literature (he explicitly uses the term “modern”).26 
He also thought they should be familiar with Christianity, without accepting 
or denigrating its dogmas. He probably wished for a Jewish religion more 
solidly based on the Bible than was the Judaism of his day, and trimmed of 
some of the exclusive practices and beliefs that impeded its diffusion.27 
Seventeenth-century kabbalists departed significantly from this model. 
They turned to the East—in particular to Safed—for the light of truth.28 They 
generally did not bother to justify Luria’s complex doctrines on divinity, 
and when they did they invoked the notion of the ruaḥ ha-qodesh, the Holy 
Spirit (a degree of prophecy) that descended upon the Master of Galilee. 
Rhetorically, their writings took the form of a series of assertions, often 
opening with a magisterial injunction such as “Know,” or “You must know 
that…”; from a systemic point of view, their teachings did not conform to the 
traditional categories of rational theology—which in Jewish thought devel-
oped from the tenth-century Sa‘adiyah Gaon to the fifteenth-century Yosef 
Albo—but instead followed a peculiar course inspired by Yitzḥaq Luria’s 
emanationism. When, as sometimes happened, exegetical logic did prevail, 
their ideas took the form of peculiar biblical commentaries. Moreover, theirs 
was a theoretically and culturally exclusive doctrine: they presented the Jews 
as repositories of the science of truth and protagonists for the restoration of 
the divine world, and were suspicious of, or even hostile toward, anything 
that was not Jewish or not expressed in Hebrew.29
A few years after Modena, Ya‘aqov Francés (1615-1667) of Mantua, who 
was probably the best Hebrew poet of his generation, launched another cri-
tique of Kabbalah. In a controversial poem,30 Francés denounces Kabbalah, 
not on the grounds of its doctrine—which he held in high esteem—but be-
cause its dissemination is detrimental to what should constitute the canonical 
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knowledge of a learned Jew. Francés complains that the kabbalists of his age 
neglect the study of traditional Jewish texts—such as the Talmud—let alone 
philosophy and science, and thus aim to scale the peaks of divine wisdom 
without proper preparation. He considers silence to be the only authentic 
discourse on the divine, but instead:
Today, whoever does not speak of the Creator
Is not considered a creature.31
[…]
The Kabbalah is talked about in the marketplaces:
It is tossed about in everyone’s heads.32
In these lines, he evokes the complex and detailed account Kabbalah makes 
of the divine world, contradicting the notion of absolute transcendence pro-
posed by classical Jewish philosophy, in particular that of Maimonides.33
Commenting on the kabbalists’ ignorance of science and pretensions to 
perfect knowledge of the celestial worlds, Francés asks: “How can a man 
who is ignorant of the laws of nature (derekh ha teva‘) and the creatures of 
the earth and sky (“he does not know the course of the raptor / that every eagle 
discerns”34), how can he scan the face of the firmament with his speculations?”
Francés also denounces the kabbalists’ methodology, which he considers 
fraudulent: characteristically introduced by the term “certainly” (wadday), 
the truths which they claim to utter are none other than the fruit of their imag-
inations (badday); the truth cannot grow in this arid soil.35 While this denun-
ciation echoes Modena’s main criticism of the kabbalists, Francés also con-
demns them on moral grounds: he who practices Kabbalah is guilty, because
he searches for secrets, only because
they don’t have to be proven.36
Even if Francés targeted the inexpert kabbalists of his day rather than the 
doctrine of Kabbalah per se, the ideal program of studies which he proposes 
at the end of his poem nevertheless does not seem to leave much scope for 
Kabbalah.37 The man the poet envisions will only come to know divine se-
crets after a slow and lengthy process (as instructed by philosophers, from 
Sa‘adiyah to Maimonides). Avoiding great leaps forward “like the marten,” 
he will “call the divine Torah his sister / and philosophy his friend.”38
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Francés’ poem, which was published in 1660 or 1661, was censored by 
the leaders of the Mantuan community, who forbade its reading and probably 
ordered its destruction. Francés wrote many other poems with violent under-
tones against those he considered to be his persecutors, but they remained in 
manuscript form until the nineteenth century. It is possibly as a result of these 
events that Ya‘aqov had to leave Mantua for Florence.39
In 1704, Francés’ text was reprinted by the rabbi of Ancona, Shimshon 
Morpurgo, in the appendix of a book he published anonymously, ‘Etz ha-
da‘ath (The Tree of Wisdom). This book was a commentary of Beḥynath olam 
(Examination of the World) by Yeda’yiah Bedersi, who had defended philo-
sophical enquiry in a famous fourteenth-century polemic.40 Needless to say, 
reprinting Francés’ poem in such a context was not a neutral act. Morpurgo 
does not deny endorsing a moderate rationalism, in which scientific and philo-
sophical research accompany, clarify, and support religion rather than being 
at odds with it. For Morpurgo, philosophy should not be condemned because 
a few philosophers deviated from the straight path of religion; in fact, the 
kabbalists too could lose their way, as Francés’ poetic testimony pointed out. 
Morpurgo’s decision to publish his book anonymously and print a controver-
sial poem condemned by the rabbis point to his desire to pursue a concealed 
polemic against the hegemony of kabbalistic culture, while also suggesting 
that he may have feared the reactions this new book could provoke.41
Morpurgo’s book was criticized by the kabbalist rabbi of Mantua, Avi‘ad 
Sar Shalom Basilea (1680-1743) in a text entitled Emunath ḥakhamym 
(Belief of the Wise).42 Basilea did not launch a direct attack against the au-
thor of ‘Etz ha-da‘ath; despite having identified him, he did not call him by 
name and maintained a respectful stance towards him, limiting himself to a 
few observations on the contents of the book. However, the Mantuan kab-
balist adopted a much more virulent stance against Francés’s poetry which 
Morpurgo had reprinted.
In a lengthy passage, Basilea declares Francés to be impure (mezoham) 
and devoid of any rabbinic qualifications.43 Rejecting the notion that there is 
a link between adhering to Kabbalah and being ignorant of the Jewish sci-
ences, he seeks to disprove this idea by listing the many contemporary Italian 
rabbis who were distinguished scholars in both Kabbalah and Talmud. As for 
the exact sciences, his own interests in mathematics, geometry, optics, and 
astronomy implicitly demonstrated that one could be both a kabbalist and a 
scientist. Basilea also responds to Francés’ and Modena’s criticisms of the 
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kabbalists’ diregard for the logic of rational proof by appealing to the truth-
fulness of authentic tradition. In his view, the tradition of Kabbalah is even 
more faithful to the revealed sources than Talmud is; moreover, he proposes 
that this does not prevent it from being a true science, either in terms of its 
content, which is true, or its method: just as is the case with the human sci-
ences one cannot study Kabbalah without respecting its particular order and 
progression (ba-seder ha-rauy we-ha-nakhon).44 In essence, then, Kabbalah 
is a tradition which is true in content and scientific in method.45
Basilea seems to have oscillated between a completely anti-philosophical 
stance and the acceptance of rational discussion: 
I will enter into discussion [with the opponents of Kabbalah] in order to 
know the truth, according to the instructions of the intellect and of our great 
teachers […] on the condition that the opponents of Kabbalah listen to me 
in order to understand, not in order to object, and that they accept the con-
clusions of this discussion according to the rules of philosophical debate.46
Invoking his teacher, the great kabbalist Mosheh Zacuto, Basilea asserts that 
philosophy is for goyyim, as its deductions can prove erroneous. Jews have 
no need for it, he argues, because they arrive at knowledge through tradition: 
“One learns the ḥokhmah [the true, received science] from a teacher, while 
one learns the bynah [deductive science] by oneself.”47
The polemical tone adopted by Basilea in much of his book is itself clear 
evidence of infighting in the Jewish world. A close examination of the refer-
ences Basilea makes to the rationalists of his time brings out these tensions: 
he speaks of contemporary Jews who not only deny the secrets of the Torah 
but lack respect for the Talmudic rabbis, presuming to “separate the wheat 
from the chaff” in their teachings.48 Moreover, he writes, Christian authors 
are comparatively less radical in their rationalist critique of the Bible than 
these Jews,49 as they appeal less to Jewish religious texts than to the profane 
writings of non-Jews,50 and they pay more credit to these works than non-
Jewish readers.51 According to him, the mere fact that a text has non-Jewish 
origins increases its prestige in their eyes. He notes that they teach the com-
mentaries of the rationalist Avraham Ibn Ezra in schools, convincing their 
students of the falsity of certain traditional beliefs although they are mani-
festly true, for example the belief in the existence of demons.52 Basilea even 
admits having to expend more effort correcting the erroneous tendencies of 
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his coreligionists than entering into discussions with representatives of the 
Christian religion.53 Indeed, quoting Pietro Galatino, he asserts that Christians 
reproach the Jews for not respecting their own laws.54 Evidently, the medi-
eval genre of the disputatio between different religions was in decline, and 
religious apologies were progressively taking over: aimed at skeptical un-
believers and rationalists of all confessions, these rallied the proponents of 
different faiths to a common front.
In order to address the criticisms of his contemporaries, the Mantuan 
rabbi devised a strategy involving the introduction of elements pertaining 
to the human sciences into his account of Kabbalah: we will examine these 
elements in greater detail further along. This is the context in which Luzzatto 
should be situated: between loyalty to Kabbalah and adherence to a certain 
scientific model, which could evidently no longer be refuted solely on the 
basis of authority.
Often considered Italy’s most esoterically inclined Italian community, 
Livorno was the site of additional indirect resistance to Kabbalah. Yosef 
Ergas, its most prestigious representative between the late seventeenth- and 
early eighteenth-centuries, recounted in the first teshuvah (legal response) of 
his important collection, Divrey Yosef, that in 1710:
A certain person became agitated, and began to publicly defame the sci-
ence of truth [i.e. Kabbalah], and those that study it, railing in particular 
against the holy Yitzḥaq Luria. Some people of no value, who thought of 
themselves as wise, but who were actually worthless, rallied around this 
person, and began to criticize the wise and devoted men who were better 
than they and their fathers.55 
Although the question at stake was relatively trivial (whether to omit two 
words from the prayers said during the Days of Penitence), Ergas’ response 
gives us an insight into tensions that were not manifested more directly. It 
seems likely that his reference to people “who thought of themselves as 
wise” alludes to the advocates of a certain type of critical-rational culture: 
the same individuals that Basilea criticized.
Another case of resistance to Kabbalah, which was also censored by the 
authorities of the Jewish community, was recorded by a Christian source. In 
his famous Bibliotheca Rabbinica (1675), Giulio Bartolocci speaks of “a vo-
luminous book against Kabbalah and the sefyroth,” written by the Venetian 
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rabbi Mordeḥay Corcos. Objecting to this work, however, the rabbis from 
Corcos’ city appealed to the public authorities in order to halt its publication 
and were apparently successful.56 
Against Obscurantism: The Strategy of Dialogue
The works of Yosef Ergas and Mosheh Ḥayyim Luzzatto—the leading 
early eighteenth-century theoreticians of Kabbalah—should be read in light 
of these criticisms. Each of them chose to compose a dialogue between a 
kabbalist and a rationalist57 in which the latter led the kabbalist to justify 
Kabbalah from a historical, and above all theoretical, perspective. Although 
these dialogues were not voluminous, their authors considered them fairly 
important. In both dialogues, the kabbalists are seen through the eyes of the 
rationalists and seem to be devout ignoramuses, whose ideas are obscure and 
confused, and who do not follow the ways of reason, instead relying solely 
on the principle of authority. 
Shomer emunym (Guardian of Faith) is a dialogue by Yosef Ergas, pub-
lished posthumously in Amsterdam in 1735 or 1736. According to the author, 
it constitutes a simply written introduction to Yitzḥaq Luria’s Kabbalah, or, 
more precisely, an attempt to “correctly elucidate the writings of Ha’Ary 
[the acrostic of Ashkenazy Rabby Yitzḥaq, i.e. Luria].”58 Ergas begins with 
a historical justification of Kabbalah, indirectly answering Leone Modena’s 
criticisms, then proceeds to introduce the principal tenets of the doctrine, 
giving them a philosophical explanation and, in some cases, justification: 
this is evidently what Ergas meant by “elucidating” Lurianic Kabbalah. In 
doing so, he seeks to circumvent two problems of Jewish religious studies: 
a decreasing interest in the “science of the truth,” and—for those who still 
believe in and practice it—an engagement with the Lurianic doctrine that is 
excessively cursory and precludes the study of previous kabbalistic texts.59 
According to Shealtiel—who is the rationalist interrogator in Ergas’s dia-
logue and represents those who approach Judaism literally, ignoring its eso-
teric dimension—any discussion with the kabbalists is superfluous, because: 
All of their discourses are founded on their faith in their teachers […], and 
one cannot refute them with intellect (sekhel), or reason (sevara), or true 
opinion, because they would not listen: the arguments would not enter 
into their ears. I therefore do not see the usefulness of talking with them. 
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The kabbalist Yehoyada‘ (whose name translates to “God knows”) con-
cedes that Kabbalah is founded on traditional teachings, but reminds his in-
terlocutor that it leaves space for discussion:
We do not refrain from researching, investigating, and questioning the 
discourses of the kabbalists and the foundations on which their premises 
rest. On the contrary, it is our habit to discuss (lefalpel) their meanings, 
just as we discuss the halakhah, i.e. legal matters.60
The “rationalist” agrees to converse, even if there is scant space for free 
discussion: the legal pilpul operates within precise limits, which are set be-
fore each debate. 
Granted the last word, the kabbalist ends by warning against an a priori 
refusal of kabbalistic ideas in the absence of counter-arguments, if research 
proves that they are close to the literal sense of the rabbinic statements in 
Talmud. In other words, although not entirely justified (let alone founded) 
on rational grounds, the doctrine the kabbalist proposes at least does not run 
contrary to reason. Furthermore, he implicitly reverses Modena’s argument 
against Kabbalah’s distorted, non-literal interpretation of texts (“the adapta-
tion of the foot to the shoe”) by defending kabbalistic exegesis for being 
closest to the literal sense—at least regarding the teachings of the Talmudic 
masters, if not the Bible. Throughout the successive arguments he goes on to 
develop, Ergas maintains that Talmudic discussions cannot really be under-
stood without reference to Kabbalah.61 
Shomer emunym bears the mark of rationalism, despite a few dogmatic 
and authoritarian statements, such as when it asserts that anyone who know-
ingly denies the theory of the sefyroth is a heretic, or that one must believe 
the rabbis even if one does not fully understand them.62 Although the kab-
balist’s interlocutor objects that Kabbalah contains several abstruse (zarym) 
and irrational elements which are not acceptable (mityashevym)63 to a learned 
person (ḥakham), the kabbalist explains that these difficulties derive from a 
methodologically flawed approach to its study. He argues that, like any other 
human science, Kabbalah has a particular order (seder rauy we-nakhon): one 
must respect this order in order to understand the works of the kabbalists 
and grasp their correct meaning (kawwanah).64 The notion—which Basilea 
also formulates—that Kabbalah is a discipline with its own particular order 
places it on a par with the sciences, at least from a methodological point of 
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view. However, the idea that the doctrine has to be explained in order to be-
come intelligible is perhaps even more important. From Menaḥem Azariyah 
to Mosheh Zacuto, the major seventeenth-century kabbalists set forth the 
doctrine of Kabbalah without resorting to this second, explicative level, in-
stead following the descriptive, exegetical rhetoric of Yitzḥaq Luria. In con-
trast, Ergas—and with him Luzzatto—felt compelled to clarify Kabbalah, 
which led them to articulate a series of ideas drawn from the sphere of rea-
son. Hoping, as they explained, that this would bring Jewish scholars back to 
Kabbalah, they also recognized that founding a doctrine on tradition, no mat-
ter how prestigious, was no longer enough in their day and age. Naturally, 
we must ask if this decision was born of genuine conviction, or if it was 
merely a defensive strategy. In other words, was their determination to resort 
to rational explanation the result of an a posteriori concession to making 
Kabbalah comprehensible for the uninitiated, or did these important eight-
eenth-century thinkers believe that kabbalistic notions should be based on 
intellectual-philosophical constructions (although these in fact constituted 
two separate categories for Ergas and Luzzatto, as we will see)?
Whatever the case may be, what is clear is that one had to be something of 
a rationalist theologian in order to be a kabbalist in the eighteenth century. In 
other words, the criticisms Modena and Francés leveled at the kabbalists did 
not hold completely. As Ergas’ anti-kabbalist interlocutor, Shealtiel, declares 
(touching on the fundamental question of the existence of the sefyroth):
I must speak the truth: I never thought that the kabbalists analyzed this 
subtle material in order to explain it or make it acceptably elegant or 
rational (le-ha-‘amydam w-le-yashevam be-tuv ta‘am u-sevara). I effec-
tively acknowledge that everything you say would be acceptable for any 
thinking person (nekhoḥym la-mevyn), and gives sufficient grounds for 
declaring rationally necessary your tradition of the existence of the sefy-
roth and the superior worlds.65
In a dialogue between a philosopher and a kabbalist which later editors 
entitled Ḥoqer w-mequbbal (A Philosopher and a Kabbalist),66 Luzzatto also 
felt compelled to enter the realm of reason in order to discuss Kabbalah.67 
In a dense introduction to his dialogue, Luzzatto denounces the deca-
dent state of true knowledge, the prophetic knowledge which was revealed 
and transmitted to Israel alone, and which a long exile has overshadowed. 
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Whereas non-Jews, who arrived at their sciences rationally, were not sub-
jected to this profound crisis, Jews now found themselves in possession of 
limited knowledge, and were reduced to simple, literal statements about 
the Scriptures. This lost prophetic knowledge of the intimate meaning of 
the Torah, for Luzzatto, was intellectual: a position which brings him very 
close to Maimonides. The soul, which Luzzatto identifies with the intellect 
(sekhel), was created in order to grasp (le-haskil) the light of divinity. Indeed, 
the content of Luzzatto’s introduction is rather similar to, and possibly in-
spired by, Maimonides’ well-known introduction to the Mishneh Torah.68 
Even so, for Luzzatto this understanding will come from kabbalistic knowl-
edge, which is exclusively the prerogative of Israel.69 Although it is true that 
the teachings of Luria and his disciples reintroduced prophecy after the long 
“sleep of exile,” their doctrine has in fact become obscure and difficult, and 
requires much additional study; in contrast, as we will see, clarity is an im-
portant part of Luzzatto’s own works.70
Luzzatto goes on to say that it is hardly surprising if the scholars of his 
time consider the “true science” to be constituted of empty formulas, or even 
if they judge these formulas clumsy and unacceptable, and doubt if the Zohar 
may be attributed to the great teacher Shim‘on bar Yoḥay. Whereas scholars 
are in search of clear (meyusheveth) and in-depth knowledge, according to 
Luzzatto, in its current state, Kabbalah presents itself to them as an obscure 
book (sefer ḥatum), where one definition follows upon the other—the se-
fyroth and the partzufym, the various worlds and their dynamics—forming 
a series of statements unsupported by the merest attempt at intelligibility 
(zikhron shel ghirsa, akh belo sevara).71 
The task Luzzatto assigns himself, then, is to recover the lost meaning 
of the true knowledge: he seeks to clarify the obscure notions—that is, the 
notions that have become obscure—of the true science, Kabbalah. In order 
to accomplish this and convince those endowed with a clear intellect that 
Kabbalah not only is not a nonsensical doctrine, but is the truest and most 
complete of the sciences, Luzzatto deems it necessary to couch this science in 
the language of rational philosophy, or, to be more precise, rational theology. 
The ḥoqer—the philosopher interlocutor in Luzzatto’s dialogue—begins 
by expressing his reservations. Even though persons of unquestionable piety 
(ḥasydym) follow Kabbalah, their arguments appear abstruse (zarym), and 
in some instances absolutely vain and empty (devarym shel mah bekhakh), 
as in the case of the discourse on the sefyroth. This leads him to request 
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elucidations which, if they cannot reach the level of logical necessity, will 
at least not be at odds with straightforward reasoning (ha-sekhel ha-yashar). 
Naturally, the philosopher is rapidly won over by the kabbalist’s disquisi-
tions, and especially by his style of argumentation, which is worthy of true 
science in its rigor and clarity. Thanks to the explanations of the kabba-
list—Luzzatto’s alter-ego—nonsense metamorphoses into knowledge of the 
highest order. The text emphasizes the purposefully “historical” character of 
Luzzatto’s elucidations, demonstrating his ambition to see Kabbalah recover 
its true status in his own times. The rationalist concludes:
I could not stand the things I heard about this knowledge. I judged them 
foolish and banal, and could not find anything in them that could be called 
science. Yet, in this generation, I affirm that we are confronted with an 
extraordinary science, and it is good that every intelligent person should 
abandon all the other intellectual pursuits in the world in order to follow 
this great and holy science. In comparison, all other intellectual pursuits 
have no value.72 
The idea of engaging in a rational discussion with Kabbalah’s detractors 
is also present in Basilea’s text. Significantly, the Mantuan kabbalist calls 
for a public debate on the crucial subject of the antiquity of the Zohar and 
of Kabbalah in general, in which reason and the conclusions of indisputably 
authoritative teachers will be the only decisive criteria. In fact, he warns his 
(Jewish) rationalist opponents against the prejudices they might show by 
rejecting evidence merely in order to deny prestige to the ancient traditions 
of their own culture.73 Evidently, in the early eighteenth century, the public 
space where one debated one’s opinions was just as much of a concrete real-
ity as was the attraction that many Jews felt for rationalist critique. 
Although Basilea did not write a dialogue between a kabbalist and a ra-
tionalist, his Emunath ḥakhamym makes an interesting reference to debates 
that actually took place.74 In this book, the Mantuan rabbi mentions hav-
ing assiduously studied philosophical and scientific texts in his youth before 
going on to read Kabbalah—as developed by Mosheh Cordovero—which he 
found in no way at odds with rational inquiry: “and I showed [these ideas] 
to several philosophers of our people, believers who asked me many ques-
tions on difficult topics touching on the science of the secrets of the Torah.” 
He then repeated this experiment at the age of forty-four, reading Lurianic 
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Kabbalah with Shemuel Norzi. Basilea mentions proving the truth of the 
notion of tzimtzum—the contraction of the Divinity—to various Jewish phi-
losophers solely on the basis of philosophical proofs, before publicly repeat-
ing his demonstration and only making reference to topics pertaining to the 
natural sciences.
Basilea thus invites his reader into a discussion guided by a single im-
perative: rationality, on the grounds that “the truth will emerge only through 
debate, and we will both profit.” Nevertheless, the authority of the Torah and 
the Talmudic masters also carry weight as proof, because their truths are as 
evident as tangible experience.75 
Rational Reductions of Kabbalah
In their different ways, two Italian kabbalist-philosophers who lived 
four centuries apart, Yoḥanan Alemanno (1434–post-1504) and Eliyahu 
Benamozegh (1823–1900), observed similarities between certain kabbalistic 
notions and some aspects of the philosophical thought of their own time. 
Alemanno, who lived in the Florence of Lorenzo de’ Medici and Pico della 
Mirandola, identifies the sefyroth with “spiritual numbers” of Pythagorean-
Platonic origin.76 Contemporary with Positivism and Post-Hegelian Idealism, 
Benamozegh devotes himself to finding equivalents for various kabbalistic 
concepts in the terminology used in those schools of philosophical thought.77 
Rather than merely assessing the relative merits of Jewish and non-Jewish 
doctrines, both Alemanno and Benamozegh focus on understanding and elu-
cidating their own conceptual tradition in light of the intellectual coordinates 
of the culture surrounding them. 
It is difficult to ascertain whether eighteenth-century Italian kabbalists 
shared the same motivations. Certainly they explicitly regarded Kabbalah as 
the true doctrine; for them, it was as superior to philosophy as divine revela-
tion was to human thought. However, this did not imply a coherently elabo-
rated opposition between Kabbalah and philosophy. Their audience was 
essentially, or exclusively, Jewish. They aimed their partially philosophical 
readings at those educated “modern” Jews who had grown increasingly wary 
of the “mythical” language and dogmatic tone of Lurianic Kabbalah and were 
distancing themselves from it, lured away by post-Cartesian rationalism. 
As the kabbalist Avi‘ad Sar Shalom Basilea is more of a scientist that 
a theologian, his calling does not lead him to elaborate a logical-rational 
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reduction of Kabbalah. Instead, he seeks scientific and empirical confirma-
tions for various kabbalistic notions, such as the gilgul (the transmigration 
of souls), the effectual value of the pronunciation of the names of God,78 
and the existence of spirits. He suggests there is a striking harmony between 
rabbinical affirmations and the conclusions of modern science: he maintains 
that the Talmudic rabbis—who are infinitely wiser than his own contem-
poraries—already declared that the Earth was spherical in form,79 and that 
their astronomical observations anticipated those of contemporary scientists, 
as well as his own.80 Furthermore, the configuration of the highest sefyroth 
is confirmed by the science of anatomy, which has identified the tripartite 
structure of the brain.81 
The theoretical framework of Basilea’s magnum opus, Emunath 
ḥakhamym, is especially interesting, because it attempts to justify compul-
sory belief in the affirmations of the masters of the Jewish tradition, the 
Talmudists and the kabbalists. According to Basilea, both philosophy and 
science are founded solely on hypotheses, which are neither empirically cer-
tain nor logically necessary. If these hypotheses change, so do the entire con-
structions they support. Although Aristotelian physics and metaphysics had 
long constituted the peak of human knowledge for philosophers—including 
many Jewish thinkers, especially Maimonides—they had recently been dis-
placed by Cartesianism. Notions which for centuries had been accepted as 
true, and which generations of philosophers had toiled over—prima materia, 
form and matter, substance and accident, the active intellect and separated 
intellects, etc.—had been discarded as though suddenly irrelevant. Moreover, 
if past theories could prove to have been vain, it was clear that this could 
eventually happen to current theories. It was a small step that separated this 
realization from the belief the only true certainty lay in tradition (Talmudic-
kabbalistic).82 Basilea’s expertise in contemporary science is thus associated 
with an extreme traditionalism, founded on the notion of the weakness of 
the human intellect, which has produced dreams and madness and mistaken 
them for the truth. The Mantuan rabbi condems medieval philosophy for not 
being Jewish enough, and turns instead to the emunath ḥakhamym (faith in 
the masters of the tradition), in the belief that there is no other solid ground 
to stand on in that period of epistemological transition. The Jewish tradition 
is just as true as sensitive perception, even though our inability to find a 
true explanation means that we must sometimes content ourselves with mere 
awareness, as in the case of magnetism and the tides.83 
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As for Yosef Ergas, the Livornese rabbi admits that there are some 
points of contact between philosophy and Kabbalah, particularly in ideas 
of unity, incorporeity, and the immutability of God, although, quoting the 
fourteenth-century Menaḥem Recanati, he specifies that the only philosophy 
he takes into account predates Aristotle—which we may easily infer means 
Pythagoras and Plato.84 In effect, his Shomer emunym essentially attempts to 
explain the major notions of Lurianic Kabbalah according to standard philo-
sophical categories. Although Ergas considers Pythagoras and Plato to be 
close to Kabbalah, he nevertheless constantly (although obviously only im-
plicitly) evokes neo-Platonic ideas, especially in his accounts of the emana-
tions which exist between the eyn sof and the sefyroth; moreover, his account 
of the cosmological system of the spheres85—which is tied to the theory of 
the four physical elements86—has Aristotelian roots, as do the principle of 
causality and the idea of rational necessity. In other words, Ergas’s concep-
tual frame of reference is entirely medieval. 
Ergas feels obliged to “explain” Lurianic Kabbalah in order to save it 
from accusations of irrationality,87 but attempts this rescue operation by turn-
ing to categories that were already considered irrelevant by intellectuals who 
kept abreast of contemporary epistemological shifts. This included Jewish 
scholars, even religious ones such as Basilea. 
Nevertheless, Ergas’ explanations and clarifications are noteworthy. He 
considers the existence of the sefyroth—which is central to kabbalistic doc-
trine—to be a logical necessity in order to explain the transition from unity 
to multiplicity, and from perfection to imperfection; that is, from God to the 
world (or worlds). Implicitly alluding to Platonic ideas, Ergas describes the 
sefyroth (divine emanations) as the “model” and the “ideal type” (defus) of 
being.88
This relationship may also be considered from the perspective of the rela-
tionship between living beings and the divinity. Intermediate entities existing 
between the created worlds (the material one included) and the absolutely 
transcendent eyn sof, the sefyroth justify and enable the existence of com-
mandment, prayer, sacrifice, and the Torah itself, all of which reside in the 
world of multiplicity but are directed toward the unreachable eminence of 
God. In effect, humans cannot address themselves directly to God, who lies 
beyond the reach of representation, and therefore their prayers state what they 
are capable of knowing: his attributes, the actions of which correspond to 
the sefyroth, another important philosophical “reduction.” Man might, for 
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example, evoke the divine attribute (which is to say, the sefyrah) of greatness, 
while always keeping in mind (this is kawwanah, or intention) his aspiration 
to elevate himself to the eyn sof. In other words, it is through the sefyroth 
that humans attempt to reach the unknowable and ineffable when they pray, 
keep the commandments, perform sacrifices, study the Torah, and engage in 
all acts of religious value.89 There can be no relationship between humankind 
and God without the sefyroth, given the absolute transcendence of the divine: 
For us, the recipients of the Torah, philosophical notions [of the unity, 
incorporeity and immutability of God] are not sufficient. In order to com-
prehend the Torah and its commandments we must know the secrets of 
existence and of the production of intermediate causes—i.e. the sefyroth—
by the eyn sof, blessed be His name. Most elements of the divine cult 
depend on the knowledge of their existence, the order of their connections, 
and their unification through the commandments of the Torah. No one can 
serve God perfectly without knowing the characteristics of this science.90 
Ergas insists on this necessity, presenting it as though it logically con-
firms the existence of the sefyroth. However, he specifies that this is only an 
a posteriori justification demonstrating the non-irreconcilability of Kabbalah 
and Reason, because the existence of the sefyroth is a fact, decided by God, 
and communicated to the Jews through the prophets: “kabbalistic notions 
have no need of proof.”91 
The imaginative and mysterious definitions proposed by Yitzḥaq Luria 
and his disciple, Ḥayyim Vital, thus become clear and intellectually satis-
fying (devarym nekhoḥym la-mevyn), even though they are the product of 
revelations rather than human reasoning.92 Ergas describes the kabbalistic 
notion of ziwwug (union) as the union between an emanating (mashpia‘) and 
an emanated body (mushpa‘), and defines ‘ibbur (pregnancy) as the passage 
from a thin and invisible existence to a thick and visible one.93 He gives an 
intellectual and neo-Platonic account of the hithlabbeshuth (garment), ex-
plaining it according to a system wherein intermediate entities know and 
contemplate each other:
The garment and the enfolding (hithkaleluth) of one sefyrah by another 
have the meaning (‘inyiano) of knowledge; an entity knows another en-
tity, and enfolds and clothes it with its comprehension.94 
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In more complex passages, Ergas deploys the notions of mashal (alle-
gory) and sod (esoteric interpretation, which seems to be equivalent with 
mashal)95 in order to explain the more material and anthropomorphic images 
of Lurianic Kabbalah: shi‘ur qomah (measurement of the dimensions of the 
world of the sefyroth), and tzimtzum (contraction of the divine to permit the 
creation of the worlds). In order to understand shi‘ur qomah, it is necessary 
to think of an intermediate entity, or sefyrah, being enfolded by another, just 
as the body clothes the soul. The compound formed by these two divine enti-
ties, in which each directs a lower one according to precise and measurable 
relations, may be represented by the image of man, his dimensions being the 
object of measurement. 
The notion of tzimtzum being more difficult to explain, Ergas is compelled 
to refer at length to Mosheh Cordovero’s96 and Menaḥem ’Azariyah Fano’s 
differences of opinion on the meaning of the divine will—ratzon (a notion 
which is central to Luzzatto’s elaboration)—in order to conclude that tzimt-
zum does refer to the Divinity so much as to divine energy. Ergas describes 
tzimtzum as the image (mashal) of an act which is hard to grasp: God reducing 
his own infinite energy in order to create space for the creation of the worlds. 
Aware of having provided a personal explanation, Ergas develops a purely 
logical reflection, based on the categories of the finite and the infinite.97
The “theological” dimension of Ergas’ work is clearer still in two other 
important stances he adopts. The first is his enunciation of the principles 
of faith as they appear in kabbalistic writings (particularly in the Zohar), 
although he formulates them with a clarity that leaves no room for doubt, in 
order to respond to his rationalist interlocutor. The second is a description of 
the various types of divine providence (hashgaḥah). In both cases, Kabbalah 
becomes theology, because Ergas invokes the particular terminology and 
problems of this discipline. 
We shall limit ourselves to listing Ergas’ principles of faith (‘iqqarey ha-
emunah), although it is worth noting at the outset that this kind of treatment 
had fallen out of favor two centuries earlier, after Yitzḥaq Abrabanel had 
modified the principles set down by Maimonides, Ḥasday Crescas, and Yosef 
Albo.98 Ergas’ ‘Iqqarym—which have not yet been studied by specialists of 
Jewish dogma99—are important both because they are founded exclusively 
on kabbalistic sources and because they demonstrate that in the eighteenth 
century, even a kabbalist felt the need to proceed systematically. As we shall 
see, Luzzatto will go on to develop a similarly systematic stance and declare 
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it one of the fundamental requisites of all knowledge, and in particular of 
the supreme knowledge, Kabbalah. According to Ergas, there are six kabba-
listic-theological dogmas which all the Masters of Israel have received, and 
which carry an obligation for all the faithful: “whoever accepts the celestial 
yoke must believe in them [the principles]; he who rejects them has no share 
in the God of Israel and in His Torah.”100
These principles a as follows: 1) God fills the world, there is no place 
devoid of his power; 2) God supports the world, attends to it, and directs it; 
3) God is alone in his world; 4) God does not receive influence or benefit 
from any other being; 5) He is not a body, nor energy in a body, and does not 
mix with nor associate with any body; 6) He is not knowable; the only thing 
we know about him is that he exists, and that his existence is necessary.101
The other section of Ergas’ work worth mentioning here is a passage 
on providence102 which responds to the same classificatory imperative as 
his profession of the dogmas, and is not founded on theoretical kabbalistic 
sources. In the first part of a series of ten affirmations, Ergas analyzes the 
general or individual manifestations of divine providence on various earthly 
beings based on his own theological deductions. In the second part, he ex-
plores the causes of suffering and premature death with reference to kabba-
listic beliefs, such as the reincarnation (gilgul), the defense against demoniac 
accusers (mekatregym), and the evil eye (‘ayin ha-ra‘).
Ergas’ theses on providence were criticized by several important Hassidic 
masters for being too “philosophical,” even though they did on the whole 
commend Shomer emunym.103 Although he did not acknowledge it, Ergas 
based his ideas on Maimonides,104 who in turn referred back to Aristotle, in 
order to argue that whereas providence applies to humans on an individual 
basis, its impact on minerals, plants, and animals is only general—in other 
words, collective, common to an entire species. He links whatever happens 
individually to these lower beings to chance, an idea which is at odds with 
the principle that every event, from the greatest to the most infinitesimal, 
from “the horn of the unicorn to the eggs of lice,” is dependent on the direct 
will of God.
Whereas in the first part of his analysis of providence Ergas’ arguments 
could be considered too rationalist-Maimonidean for a religious thinker, in 
the second part the reader is reminded that Kabbalah contains practices and 
beliefs that have little to do with rational theology. Ergas clearly notes that 
philosophy and Kabbalah diverge on questions relating to the belief in the 
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efficacy of amulets, the performative power of pronouncing the names of 
the divine, demonology, the nature of the soul, and the punishments inflicted 
upon it. There is a limit to how much Kabbalah may be rationalized, and its 
practices overstep this limit. 
Although something of a pre-Enlightenment wind, as the writings of 
Yosef Attias testify,105 blew on the Jewish community of Leghorn, where 
Ergas resided, the city also later hailed kabbalists such as Ḥayyim Yosef 
David Azulay (Jerusalem 1724—Leghorn 1806), an immensely erudite man 
with partially “modern” tendencies who nevertheless also supported himself 
by writing amulets.106 
In Padua, a city with a prestigious university, the young Moses Ḥayyim 
Luzzatto displayed a propensity for rationality from his first writings, while 
also receiving the celestial revelations of a maggid. Similarly, although the 
passion for and competence in the sciences of Avi‘ad Sar Shalom Basilea 
of Mantua is well-established,107 the following passage from his Emunath 
ḥakhamym provides a fairly balanced perspective on the whole spectrum of 
ideas and beliefs held by eighteenth-century Italian kabbalists:
A great philosopher of our people, who lived in an earlier age than ours, 
though not too long ago, completely rejected the existence of demons. 
A house was shown to him in Venice, in which the noises of spirits were 
heard at night, in particular from a window that faced a narrow alley, as 
is common in that city. The demon would knock at night, and when the 
house was opened there was no one to be found inside, nor could there 
have been anyone inside. […] Yet [that philosopher] asserted: “I see all 
this, and nevertheless, I do not believe it.”108
Like Ergas, Luzzatto proposes a reduction of Kabbalah grounded in ra-
tional theology, starting from Ḥoqer w-meqqubal, a dialogue illustrating sev-
eral fundamental principles of Kabbalah with exemplary clarity. Indeed, clar-
ity is what Luzzatto seeks to achieve in this and other works which could be 
described as attempting to divulge Kabbalah. Luzzatto feels that the written 
transmission of meaning imposes limits on clarity, because the transmission 
will be incomplete if the reader does not strive to understand the author’s in-
tentions. Yet he believes that it is just as impossible to find explanations that 
will be clear and satisfying for every reader as it is to find spectacles suitable 
for every eye.109 
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Although Luzzatto touches on many topics in his dialogue, we will focus 
on his definition of Kabbalah and its field of application, as it is obviously 
central to the kabbalist’s conversation with his rationalist interlocutor, who 
thinks according to different categories. Luzzatto writes that the object of 
that doctrine cannot be God, who lies beyond any possible thought or discus-
sion. Instead, what is at stake is the way God directs the world. Kabbalah is 
nothing other than
the explanation of the procedure of He whose name is blessed, the order 
of the rules of direction (hanhagah) through which the Holy One, blessed 
is He, directs and articulates all the events occurring in His world with 
great wisdom. 110
As for the sefyroth, they make the divine will tangible, and he creates and di-
rects the world through them: the world depends entirely on these entities.111 
Luzzatto grounds the fields of application of Kabbalah in categories remi-
niscent of traditional philosophical classifications: God, humankind, soul, 
world. The parallel between these systems of classification nevertheless stops 
there, as they differ radically in their content. The topic of God, as devel-
oped in Kabbalah, focuses on—and is limited to—knowledge of the diffusion 
(hithpashetuth) of his supreme light, the only thing that we may know of him. 
As for humankind, it is not conceived on its own terms but relative to the 
bonds which it has with the divine worlds and can act on: the human body is 
considered to represent these worlds in operation, while the soul is conceived 
of in relation to the divine service it performs, conditioning worldly events 
until the final redemption. This includes the theory of the reincarnation of 
souls (gilgul). Finally, the world is not studied according to philosophical 
or scientific methods, which are not only superficial but erroneous; instead, 
under the influence (hashpa‘ah) of the sefyroth, an esoteric reading of the 
world effectively leads to knowledge of the functioning of the worlds and the 
sefyroth themselves, in parallel with events in the inferior world.112
None of this is proven rationally. Instead, it is revealed by God. 
Nevertheless, “the intellect may experience pleasure and may be enriched 
in its natural need to know and understand.”113 All the explanations given 
by the kabbalist conform to rational imperatives, even though they are not 
rational in origin: Kabbalah is not portrayed as a doctrine blindly adopted by 
simple intellects incapable of reflection, but as true ḥokhmah, that is to say a 
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praiseworthy and coherent knowledge which has the merit of explaining the 
totality of the created world in both its being and its becoming. 
Throughout his works, Luzzatto praises straight reason (sekhel yashar), 
which is one of the criteria for evaluation in Kabbalah.114 On close examina-
tion, the Paduan kabbalist is reminiscent of medieval Jewish philosophers: 
like the great Jewish rationalist Sa‘adiyah Gaon,115 he considers knowledge 
and understanding to be religious obligations—mitzwoth. Nevertheless, for 
Luzzatto, this commandment does not imply the rational comprehension of 
the Torah, but concerns the precise knowledge of the entire system of the 
divine guidance of the world.116 Luzzatto writes that humans were created for 
the purpose of knowledge, and more precisely, “the knowledge [hassagah] 
of the glory of the Creator […] for which they were given cognizance and 
abundant knowledge.”117 This closely echoes Maimonides: “true praise of 
God is the comprehension [hassagah] of His greatness […] and only human-
kind praises him with words that indicate that which he has understood with 
his intellect.”118
The true, life-giving light comes from cognizance and knowledge, writes 
Luzzatto;119 this is not the light born of the act of comprehension in itself, 
but the divine light that descends into the world as a consequence of human 
understanding. Luzzatto’s brand of intellectualism fits within a kabbalistic 
context, wherein each human action corresponds to a divine action (and vice 
versa); again, this evokes medieval philosophers, including Maimonides, 
for whom the act of comprehension unites the passive intellect with the 
active—divine—intellect.120 
For Luzzatto, human history is a history of intellectual decadence. 
Whereas the ancients were closer to true intellectual knowledge, more recent 
generations have become distracted from their true purpose, and pursue their 
activities while being immersed in materialism.121 Redemption (tiqqun) will 
therefore be a return to full knowledge. Once the unity of God is revealed, hu-
mankind wil be able “to bask in the splendor of His holiness, and completely 
and permanently understand deeper things than before, without limits.”122 
A Theology That Implies Kabbalah
The rational reduction of Kabbalah is particularly in evidence in Luzzatto’s 
other dialogue, Da‘ath tevunoth, which may be translated as “Knowledge of 
Clear Things” or “Knowledge of Comprehensible Things.”123 
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This dialogue does not pit a rationalist against a kabbalist. Instead, its in-
terlocutors are the soul and the intellect: it dramatizes the soul turning to the 
intellect in order to understand principles of faith which it believes in, but is 
unable to justify rationally—providence, reward, the Messiah, and the resur-
rection of the dead. The soul’s position is clear: it requests havanah (compre-
hension), yedi‘ah (knowledge), and sevara (rational thought) for principles 
in which it has a simple faith. 
Throughout this book, Luzzatto behaves like a rational theologian and re-
fers to traditional theological categories. The questions he addresses are: the 
origin of evil, and consequently original sin and free will; the necessary ex-
istence of God and the contingency of beings; God’s attributes; humankind 
as final cause of creation; and, finally, redemption. However, the content of 
this theology is more or less obviously supported by kabbalistic notions, and 
this certainly bestows a certain originality on Luzzatto’s rational construc-
tion. In other words, Da‘ath tevunoth is not, like Ergas’ Shomer emunym, an 
attempt at reading Kabbalah in light of philosophical categories. Instead, it 
is a theological treatise constructed according to a rational model, which im-
plies Kabbalah without alluding to it explicitly.124 Luzzatto’s only kabbalistic 
references are to sections of the Zohar, which he conveniently calls mid-
rash.125 Even a reader completely unfamiliar with kabbalistic notions would 
be perfectly capable of understanding the dialogue. 
It certainly seems possible to think this was part of a “strategy”: al-
though he did not dissimulate his kabbalistic activities during that difficult 
period, the Paduan author nevertheless tended to emphasize the absolutely 
orthodox character of his thought, couching it in the language of traditional 
theology without recourse to Kabbalah.Yet, a few months after complet-
ing Da‘ath tevunoth, Luzzatto wrote Kelalym rishonym (First Principles): 
although more or less parallel in content to Da‘ath tevunoth, this series 
of propositions resorts to the terminology of Lurianic Kabbalah.126 One 
might therefore suggest that the philosophical-theological tendency of 
Luzzatto’s kabbalistic thought allowed him to move seamlessly between 
different disciplinary languages. Indeed, one might even ask whether the 
philosophical-theological character of Luzzatto’s thought in fact shaped 
his understanding of kabbalistic categories from the outset, rather than in-
tervening a posteriori in the form of explanation or comment. In other 
words, did the categories of rational theology frame his conceptual grasp 
of the Lurianic Kabbalah?
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In Da‘ath tevunoth, Luzzatto understands the originally kabbalistic notion 
of tiqqun (repair) in terms of the traditional category of redemption, which 
is absolutely central to his thought. Indeed, one might equate tiqqun with the 
geulah (redemption) of which the prophets and the Talmudic masters speak: 
it is the progressive and inevitable revelation of the unity of God, which 
will dispel ideas of merit or guilt and therefore free will. It corresponds to 
a time when there will no longer be space for guilt, and good will replace 
evil. In this definitive phase of tiqqun the divine light (hearath panym) will 
reveal his concealed face (hester panym), leading to perfection. The absence 
of unity, the alternation of good and evil, and the material shadow prevail 
during the phases that come before this culmination. 
Luzzatto’s kabbalistic influences are most evident in his account of these 
phases. The divine decision to make visible the various forces presiding over 
the operation of the world is a case in point. As the attributes (middoth)—anal-
ogous to the sefyroth, which are significantly not mentioned—of Judgment 
and Kindness take turns directing the world, they produce light and darkness 
in varying proportions, more or less disclosing and concealing the divinity. 
This is illustrated and made visible in man through the soul and the body: 
whereas the soul is the image (tziyur) of the law, or the direction (hanhagah) 
of disclosure, the body represents concealment. In other words, the soul is 
one, like the unified perfection that will manifest itself through the total dis-
closure of divine unity, but the body is constituted of various parts, because 
it represents the world in the intermediate stage of reward and punishment, 
when God is concealed, not wanting to make manifest his perfection. In this 
phase, just as his ways of directing are multiple, so too he has wanted the cre-
ated body to have many parts and various members, in order that it may truly 
correspond (maqbylym) to the laws that govern the world.This, according to 
Luzzatto, is the true sense of the verse, “Let us make Man in Our image after 
Our likeness.”127 Similarly, the individual parts of the human body correspond 
to different aspects of divine direction: thus, the right and left sides of the 
body are, respectively, images of severe and benevolent governance.
Luzzatto’s approach to the same questions is radically different in his 
treatise Kelalym rishonym. Written after Da‘ath tevunoth, this brief text en-
gages with the same topics—creation, the existence of evil, the overcoming 
of evil—but in kabbalistic terms. In keeping with the program he set him-
self at the beginning of his dialogue Ḥoqer w-mequbbal (Philosopher and 
Kabbalist), the Paduan kabbalist strove to elucidate the notions of Kabbalah, 
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in particular Lurianic Kabbalah.128 Nevertheless, he cannot entirely help re-
sorting to technical jargon, which only readers at least partly familiar with 
the doctrine can understand. For example, Luzzatto compares the mixture 
of good and evil typical of the phase that comes before tiqqun—or redemp-
tion—to the relationship of the reshymu (the remainder of the divine light 
in the world) and the qaw (the ray of divine light that crosses the created 
worlds). Whereas the former is synonymous with exteriority (ḥitzoniyuth), 
the latter evokes interiority (penimiyuth): in other words, the two together 
conjure the concealment and disclosure of the divine face. These ideas pre-
suppose the fundamental notion of shevyrath ha-kelym (rupture of the re-
ceptacles or instruments), which caused the divine light formerly contained 
within the receptacles to instead coalesce with those receptacles. Together 
these two dimensions—good and evil, spirituality and materiality—consti-
tute the hanhagah: that is, the law regulating the combination and succession 
of good and evil as the worlds operate. The image of the hanhagah in its 
fullness is primordial man (adam qadmon), and the individual events taking 
place in the various worlds are the branches (‘anafym) of this primordial 
man. At the end of the process of repair and redemption, illumination will 
overwhelm the shadow of matter, disseminating knowledge throughout the 
community of Israel, the ray (qaw) will reabsorb the remainder of the light 
(reshymu), and the operation of the world will be characterized by unity.129
This brief treatise becomes yet more complicated when Luzzatto turns to 
more specific notions, in particular the different parts of primordial man, the 
roots and the individualization—i.e. the coming into existence—of events in 
the various worlds, and the split between inferior and superior sefyroth in the 
four worlds of the divinity. His treatment of these notions makes it clear that 
Kelalym rishonym was intended for a very different audience than Da‘ath 
tevunoth. 
Kelalym rishonym also offers some interesting new insights into another 
question, already evoked in Da‘ath tevunoth: how the human image makes 
the operation of the worlds visible. Instead of merely presenting that idea, 
Luzzatto now contextualizes it within the dynamics of the sefyroth. In other 
words, he now explains where—and to a certain extent how—the visualiza-
tion of the divine laws governing all the worlds and their concrete application 
in history (hanhagah) is possible. At the same time, he deploys kabbalistic 
notions in order to clarify the possibility of prophecy. According to Luzzatto, 
this is all thanks to the last sefyrah, the malkhuth (kingship) of the last divine 
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world, the world of action (‘asiyah). This sefyrah is the door, or passage, 
leading from the world of divine action to the world of human visualization:
Malkhuth is called “the image of God,” because it is the root of the im-
ages of all created beings, which are the branches of the superior attrib-
utes. The Lord, blessed be He, wanted to reproduce (leha‘atiq) the mode 
of operation of His attributes, including all the details connected with 
them, according to the images of the created beings. The root of these 
images, according to the law of such a reproduction, is the malkhuth. 
Prophets perceive the upper lights according to their reproduction in 
images. Therefore, they perceive only the malkhuth, thanks to what the 
upper lights understand and conceive. This is explained several times in 
the Zohar and the Tiqqunym, through the esoteric meaning of the verses: 
“But let him that glorieth glory in this” (Jeremiah 9:23), and “This is the 
gate of the Lord” (Psalms 118:20).130
The rational reduction of Kabbalah by two nearly contemporary authors, 
Ergas and Luzzatto, is no coincidence. It clearly constitutes their response to 
what they perceived to be an intellectual necessity at a time when philosoph-
ical-scientific rationalism was spreading through Europe. 
However, the two authors probably had different intellectual frames of ref-
erence. Unlike his Livornese counterpart, the Paduan kabbalist does not appeal 
to medieval, Aristotelian, or Platonic categories of thought. Luzzatto cannot 
do without the kabbalistic notion of hashpa‘ah (emanation), which defines 
both the relation between the worlds created by the divine will—in a descend-
ing order of spirituality—and the divine will’s constant direction (hanhagah) 
of the worlds. In order to clarify the concept of hashpa‘ah, he turns to “the 
great teacher,” Maimonides, in a rare textual reference:131 “All that is produced 
and exists among beings is produced or exists insofar as it is emanated from 
Him, blessed be He.”132 Yet, the reader quickly realizes that Luzzatto does not 
explain what he means by “emanation.” He only speaks generically of “that 
which originates from the Creator and is destined to his creatures,” which is 
not otherwise definable because humans cannot know how God really oper-
ates, and are limited to ascertaining the effects of his actions. In other words, 
this category is left open, and represents nothing more than a simple name.
Luzzatto also deploys another notion which seems to pertain to an 
Aristotelian worldview: finalism. His conception of redemption is marked by 
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a strong and basically optimistic finalism: good will ultimately triumph. The 
final causes of Aristotelian physics are not in play here, however. Instead, what 
we find is a philosophy of history which seems fairly consistent with the op-
timistic conceptions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe (includ-
ing the Jewish haskalah). Spinoza’s radical critique notwithstanding, finalism 
would still find fertile ground in European thought for many years to come.
Whatever their formal similarities, Ergas and Luzzato’s intellectual ref-
erence points differ significantly. Luzzatto departs in three important ways 
from Ergas, who thinks according to the medieval categories of metaphys-
ics, physics, and cosmology (the four elements of the sub-lunar sphere, the 
celestial spheres).133 First, Luzzatto’s thought is more dynamic, centering as 
it does on a philosophy of history that leads to the total and definitive rev-
elation of divine Unity. Second, it is more systematic, as it emphasizes the 
importance of conceptual coherence and distinguishing between concepts. 
Third, it is less openly neo-Platonic: instead, it was inspired by a scientific, 
post-Cartesian model, as we will try to show.134
Between 1736 and 1743, when Luzzatto lived in Amsterdam and was nei-
ther writing nor teaching on kabbalistic matters, he devoted himself to writ-
ing brief but edifying treatises on logic and religious works intended for a 
larger public than the works of his Italian period. They included a treatise on 
ethics, Mesyllath yesharym (The Path of the Just, published in Amsterdam in 
1740), which remains his best-known work to this day, and Derekh ha-Shem 
(The Way of the Lord, published in Amsterdam in 1896), which synthesized 
the principles of Jewish faith and practice. Luzzatto composed these works 
in order that the reader might “gather from them an intellectually correct and 
sufficient representation, free from inaccuracies and confusion.”135
Derekh ha-Shem is a small manual intended for good believers and ob-
servers. It is meant as a starting point for religious study and consists of 
four sections on the following topics: 1) the existence of God and the cre-
ated worlds; 2) providence; 3) prophecy; and 4) worship. Even then, the 
Kabbalah implicitly makes its presence felt right from the first section, where 
the author establishes that
one of the great principles that we possess is that to each body of the infe-
rior world there corresponds separate forces on high, from which inferior 
beings and that which happens to them [literally: their accidents, miqrey-
hem] emerge, according to a concatenation willed by divine Wisdom. 
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The superior forces are the roots, the inferior beings are the branches 
and the derivatives; and they are linked one to another, like the rings of 
a chain.136 
The sefyroth, which Luzzatto explains with the philosophical term mid-
doth (attributes) in Da‘ath tevunoth, simply becomes koḥoth (forces) in 
Derekh ha-Shem. As for providence, it is now called by its traditional name, 
hashgaḥah, instead of hanhagah, the typical term of his earlier works. After 
reading Kabbalah through the lens of rational theology, Luzzatto makes it the 
subject of a popular catechism in Derekh ha-Shem, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the devotion of the faithful and of terrestrial and celestial rewards. 
Furthermore, a range of topics which he hardly, if at all, touched upon in 
prior works make their appearances in this book, in particular the influence 
of the stars,137 the effects of the evocation of the divine names and of magi-
cal acts (kyshuf),138 and the presence of impure forces during the nighttime 
hours.139 The daily prayers are explained according to the kabbalistic kaw-
wanah, but in a language comprehensible to people not familiar with the 
esoteric doctrine. A work of divulgation, Derekh ha-Shem nevertheless also 
seeks to “translate” Kabbalah, although at a different level than the works of 
Luzzatto’s Italian period.
Even at this popular level, Luzzatto insists on the need for precision. 
In his presentation of the Derekh ha-Shem, he asks the reader to give each 
term due consideration, without forgoing exactitude, so as not to miss any 
necessary argument, because his exposition follows principles of order and 
progression. 
Luzzatto’s reaffirmation of the centrality of intellectual knowledge ech-
oes Maimonides’ aforementioned treatment of providence, which is one of 
the most controversial points of the Andalusian philosopher’s intellectual-
ism. Maimonides asserts in The Guide of the Perplexed that divine provi-
dence follows the divine emanation (shefa‘) of intelligence. In other words, 
for Maimonides “providence depends on intelligence,” and the most intel-
ligent people (the prophets, in particular) enjoy special celestial attention.140 
Picking up on this notion, Luzzatto applies it to the kabbalistic notion of 
human action, suggesting that it attracts the emanation (hashpa‘ah): the more 
elevated the action, the higher the level of emanation, or influence. Studying 
the Torah according to the right criteria (higayon) thus not only means reach-
ing the highest level of comprehension (haskalah), but also enjoying the 
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most elevated influence (which can be parallel to Maimonidean providence), 
since the two are linked. Luzzatto’s position on providence confirms his in-
tellectualist orientation, even though he sets it out in the context of practical 
Kabbalah, where knowledge is seen as a religious action corresponding to a 
reaction in the divine world.141 
The proximity between the intellectualism of the medieval philoso-
phers and that of the eighteenth-century kabbalist is further demonstrated 
by Luzzatto’s assertion that there are two paths to the fundamental truths 
(such as the unity of God): the prophetic path and the rational path. Claiming 
that he does not wish to linger on rational demonstrations, Luzzatto pre-
fers to focus on prophetic notions—that is to say, kabbalistic notions, even 
though he doesn’t make it explicit in this context—which demand rigorous 
exposition:
[God’s perfection, revealed at Sinai and transmitted by tradition] can also 
be confirmed by rational study and theoretical demonstrations, when nec-
essary, according to physics, geometry, astronomy, and other sciences, 
from which one can draw true premises that clarify these true notions. But 
we shall not dwell on this approach here; instead, we will formulate true 
premises, putting things in their proper order, according to the tradition 
that is ours and to ideas that are well-known throughout our Nation.142 
Kabbalah as System: A Jewish “Neo-Scholasticism”?
Luzzatto’s approach in one of his most ambitious texts, Qelaḥ pithḥey 
ḥokhmah (One Hundred Thirty-Eight Doors to Wisdom) may surprise one 
who thinks of the rhetoric of the kabbalists a century before. In this work, 
the author states a principle (a “door”) and proceeds to explain it in detail 
by subdividing it into two parts. This constitutes the apex of systematic for-
malism in kabbalistic exposition and departs markedly from the assertive 
rhetoric and narrative-exegetical form that Kabbalah assumes in the works 
of important seventeenth-century authors such as Mosheh Zacuto. In some 
ways, the expository style of Qelaḥ pithḥey ḥokhmah echoes contemporary 
manuals of Catholic scholastic theology based on Aquinas’ Summa theolog-
ica.143 Indeed, one might even speak of neo-scholasticism in relation to this 
text, as with those of contemporary Catholic authors. The uniqueness of this 
Jewish form of “neo-scholasticism” lies in the fact that its content derives 
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from Lurianic Kabbalah rather than from Jewish medieval philosophers, to 
continue our parallel with Catholic thought. 
The attempts of eighteenth-century authors, and Luzzatto in particular, 
at systematizing Kabbalah and couching it in rational terms took place at a 
time when philosophical production had stalled, according to historians of 
Jewish thought. Traditionally, Jewish philosophical thought is said to have 
gone through a period of stasis between the end of Jewish Aristotelianism—
between the late fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries (especially after Eliyah 
Del Medigo’s Beḥynath ha-dath, and Ovadiyah Sforno’s Or ‘ammym)—and 
the “rebirth” of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the authors of 
the Haskalah.144 It is in this “void” that Kabbalah developed, until it assumed 
the formal character of a theology toward the end of this period in Italy.
Spelling out the name of God in an acrostic as it lays out its first princi-
ple, the beginning of Qelaḥ pithḥey ḥokhmah is explicitly inspired by Sefer 
ha-mada‘, Maimonides’ philosophical introduction to Mishneh Torah. As in 
Maimonides’ text, Luzzatto highlights the unity of God only to set out the 
object of Kabbalah directly afterwards, the object being to develop knowl-
edge of the creation and the functioning of all beings on the basis of the 
direction (hanhagah) of the divine will. 
The principle of faith and the foundation of knowledge is the unity of the 
Highest, blessed be He; and it is therefore this that must be explained at 
the beginning, because all the knowledge of the truth is nothing other than 
a knowledge that demonstrates the truth of faith; so that one understands 
how everything that is created or that happens in the world comes from 
the will of the Highest, and how everything is directed in the world as 
suits the one God, blessed be He, and how everything develops in order 
to reach perfection in the end.145 
The unitary direction of all wordly things is the fundamental principle of this 
treatise, and Luzzatto repeates it many times. All created beings and events 
are linked to one another by a unitary intention—expressing a unitary will—
and Kabbalah is the revealed doctrine allowing us to know this, down to the 
smallest detail.146 Reiterated several times in other works as well, Luzzatto’s 
definition exhibits the totalizing ambition of the doctrine which grants us 
knowledge of all of the worlds. This ambition finds an echo in science, al-
though its field of application is rather different. We will see further along 
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that analogies may be drawn between science and Luzzatto’s understanding 
of Kabbalah. 
As the object of this study is to explicate the formal aspects of Luzzatto’s 
work, we shall refrain from giving a detailed account of the Paduan kabba-
list’s systematic treatment of the 138 principles of Lurianic Kabbalah, which 
he enumerates, explains, and fits into a general conceptual framework. This 
framework is essentially optimistic in nature: all the negative aspects of crea-
tion and history are seen as necessary steps toward the final revelation of 
divine unity. Evil exists for the benefit of good.147 Nevertheless, this rich 
exposition addresses two complex questions which deserve to be examined, 
both for their “philosophical” content and for Luzzatto’s attempt to engage 
with them at a conceptual level. These are 1) the relationship between the 
sefyroth and the eyn sof; and 2) the relationship between infinity and finitude, 
God and creation.
1) The sefyroth: these emanations from God (hem mah she-ha-elohuth 
mithpashet) are not created, since they are divine. It is their revelation that 
is created. As for the eyn sof, it calls for the principles of negative theology, 
because there is no word that can speak of him, nor any thought that can con-
ceive of him. Yet, knowledge of the sefyroth is possible. They are qualities 
or aspects (middoth) of the eyn sof, forces (koḥoth) which are not separate 
from him, knowable manifestations of his will; they are the ways in which 
the divine will directs the world. The sefyroth and worldly beings have dif-
ferent origins: whereas the creation of the sefyroth is nothing other than their 
manifestation, since they are divine, and therefore eternal, the very existence 
of wordly beings is created. The fact that the aspects of the eyn sof have been 
made manifest and can subsequently be known implies a limitation, because 
the divine in itself is not knowable: this justifies their name, sefyroth, from 
the verb safar (to count, or to measure). Their created limitation allows them 
to be known. 
All of God’s aspects are originally infinite in themselves, and so too is 
their number. However, although God’s aspects are infinite in number, only 
those through which the world was created and is directed have been made 
manifest. The manifestation/limitation of the sefyroth corresponds to a di-
vine providential design within which humankind plays a decisive role.148
At first glance, these notions recall Spinoza’s conception of the attributes 
of substance as defined in his Ethics. Luzzatto’s myddoth echo Spinoza’s 
definition of “attribute”: “what the intellect perceives of substance, as 
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constituting its essence,” and which is infinite in itself and in number.149 
Similarly, Luzzatto’s account of the kabbalistic partzufym (faces) as “the 
particularization of the modes of acting of each of these forces,”150 recalls 
Spinoza’s definition of “mode”: “the affections of a substance, or that which 
is in another through which it is also conceived.”151 In spite of such affinities, 
there are many fundamental differences between the concepts Spinoza and 
Luzzatto deploy. In particular, they refer to very different systems. As the 
kabbalist’s account of creation and the divine direction of the world suggests, 
his conceptual universe is religious. The philosopher, on the other hand, 
deploys non-religious Cartesian concepts, such as thought and extension: 
“Thought” and “extension” are two of “God’s infinite attributes.”152 
2) The relationship between infinity and finitude: this is extremely diffi-
cult to conceive, let alone describe. In order to account for the passage from 
infinite divinity to finite materiality, Luzzatto turns to the Lurianic concept of 
tzimtzum. Although the eyn sof possesses an infinite number of aspects—or 
forces—according to him, the human intellect can only conceive of those 
that played a role in the origin of the world and in directing it. As the force 
which produces the world undergoes a reduction, or contraction (tzimtzum), 
it renounces its infinity. This benefits humankind, because it allows humans 
to play a role in perfecting (tiqqun) the world and returning it to perfection. 
How was the move from infinity to finitude possible? Luzzatto asserts that 
infinity already contains finitude—limits are already present within limit-
lessness—and the divine will decided to make these limits manifest. It is 
through the passage into existence of limits that the unknowable divine will 
becomes knowable, or—in kabbalist parlance—visible. The limitation of the 
divine force leading to the material world is therefore not a non-being in the 
neo-Platonic sense, but rather a being (qiyum we-lo he‘der) that is already 
present within the infinite. Although there is no space within the infinite, this 
reduction allows the creation of a space (ḥalal) in which the root of justice 
(dyn) is manifested, altering the initial perfection. Infinite light made visible 
thanks to the reduction of divine force is called reshymu: that is, the impres-
sion (roshem) of infinite light.153 As limits are uncovered, the worlds gradu-
ally begin to come into being according to a hierarchy defined by their levels 
of spirituality, and imperfection starts to manifest itself.
Beyond its attempt to conceptualize the Lurianic doctrine, Luzzatto’s text 
describes the transition from infinity to finitude in terms of a very optimistic 
philosophy of history. The divine will sets the whole process into motion in 
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order to allow humankind to recognize that even evil is the work of the will 
of God, who will eventually eliminate it. On the other hand, Man is respon-
sible for the final revelation of divine unity, since he can contribute to the 
perfection of the world, at least at its lower levels.154 However, the divine will 
complete the process by imposing perfection onto the world even if human-
kind fails to contribute adequately to this apotheosis. 
Although Qelaḥ pitḥey ḥokhmah gives a detailed account of the relative 
roles that human and divine action will play in the advent of the future world, 
this question becomes problematic in Da‘ath tevunoth. Indeed, there seems 
to be an unresolved contradiction in Luzzatto’s thought: if redemption is cer-
tain, what is the point of human activity? If the divine will is going to mani-
fest itself “in any case,”155 why try to draw the divine closer by keeping the 
mitzwoth? The “Soul” is fully conscious of these problems in this dialogue: 
bewildered by the possible consequences of determinism, which could both 
make human efforts futile and doom to irrelevance the notion that imperfec-
tion allows Man greater merit as he strives to achieve perfection, the “Soul” 
asks the “intellect” to clarify. His interlocutor’s response is simply to quote 
biblical verses demonstrating beyond any shadow of a doubt that divine re-
demption is independent of human behavior—a rather disappointing answer 
in light of the exacting arguments presented in the dialogue.156 
The Scientific Method:  
The Importance of Making Distinctions
Like any rigorous scholarly text, Kabbalah must be set out according to 
precise criteria in order to be understood clearly. The “modern” kabbalists 
never tired of repeating this. Luzzatto’s kabbalistic works all introduce meth-
odological criteria designed to foster a formal association between esoteric 
knowledge and science.157 
The first of these criteria is a solid foundation: as the rationalist in 
Luzzatto’s dialogue explains to the kabbalist, the doctrine must be built on 
an unquestionable assertion: 
Had I found at least one stable principle on which to build all these no-
tions, perhaps their details would also have become comprehensible. But 
without this principle it is useless to strain over the details, seeing as the 
whole is problematic.158
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Supplying his interlocutor with this stable principle, the kabbalist simultane-
ously defines the object of Kabbalah. As he explains that the unity of God is 
this principle (yesod), and that the object (‘iniyan) of the doctrine is to ex-
plain how God directs the world,159 Kabbalah ceases to be a disordered mass 
of complex, obscure, and unnecessary notions. 
This principle supplied, the next criterion is to establish distinctions 
(havḥanah) between terms: definitions must be very precise because “com-
prehension depends on distinction.”160 It is important to start by naming con-
cepts161 before one can proceed in an orderly and progressive fashion. The 
rationalist interlocutor is adamant that disorderly progress leaves the intel-
lect dissatisfied, bewildered, and confused (navokh w-mevulbal). One must 
therefore proceed step by step, examining the various parts of the construc-
tion one by one.162 Incremental progression is key to knowledge: it is neces-
sary to start from general premises before one can move toward a satisfying 
global vision.163
Whereas disorderly progress fosters doubt by jumping from one topic 
to the next, an orderly disquisition will allow for a correct understanding of 
Kabbalah. Proceeding in an orderly fashion will grant rational coherence to 
Kabbalah, will explain the doctrine, and will make it perfectly acceptable 
to the intellect, which accepts the idea of God but is not satisfied by ob-
scure formulas that do not belong to a rigorous system. Without elucidating 
the meaning of each concept and the connections between them, one cannot 
pretend to know Kabbalah. To omit this step is to confine oneself to stating 
abstruse terms which mean nothing in and of themselves, such as “faces” 
(partzufym), “situations” (matzavym), and “ascents and descents” (aliyoth 
we-yeridoth). These examples taken from Lurianic Kabbalah were the most 
embarassing to a rational mind,164 and it was no coincidence that Luzzatto 
invoked them.
In case of doubt, the criterion of order would help to justify one conclu-
sion relative to another, because notions are validated by their logical con-
nections. Whereas logical relationships generate knowledge, their absence 
produces confusion (mevokhah).165 In other words, form can sometimes be a 
criterion for evaluating content. 
Proceeding logically also has pragmatic consequences, because a cor-
rectly and rigorously ordered argument makes it possible to concentrate on 
general principles, instead of lingering on details,166 while also sparing the 
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intellect useless effort.167 Less is often more: economy is one of the guiding 
principles of argumentation.168
Luzzatto’s tendency towards conceptual rigor goes beyond his kabbalistic 
works. Written and published in Amsterdam in 1742—i.e., at a time when 
he was not officially working on Kabbalah—Luzzatto’s study of Talmud, 
Derekh tevunoth (The Way of Understanding)169 is essentially a treatise on 
logic. According to him, the principles governing Talmudic discussions cor-
respond to innate intellectual notions, which the Talmud simply elucidates:
If one investigates correctly, one will find that all the questions (qushi-
yoth) and answers (terutzym), like every part of Talmudic reasoning 
(pilpul), lean on principles and notions that are innate to intellectual com-
prehension, imposing themselves spontaneously and necessarily on the 
human intellect without having to be learned.170 
It is the scholar’s task to order these principles correctly in order to make 
them operational. Studying complex arguments is made easier by reducing 
them to a few brief, simple rules.171 
The rules Luzzatto sets out for the study of Talmud are not based on tra-
ditional rules of Talmudic hermeneutics, such as the thirteen rules of Rabbi 
Ishma‘el. Instead, they are grounded in the principles of formal logic, which 
draw on and develop Aristotelian logic. Thus, Luzzatto devotes a chapter 
of Derekh tevunoth to the different types of argument, distinguising be-
tween sensitive, conventional,172 and logical demonstrations.173 Whereas the 
havḥanoth discriminate between terms and content in kabbalistic texts, in 
Derekh tevunoth they become criteria of definition analogous in function to 
Aristotelian categories, only more numerous (twenty-four instead of ten). 
In that same year—1742—Luzzatto wrote the Sefer ha-higayon (“Treatise 
on Logic”),174 which was mostly inspired by non-Jewish works.175 In this 
brief text, he confirms that the correct use of the intellect depends on rigor-
ous classification. He ends his first chapter by stating that “distinction is 
the necessary foundation of intellectual operations in the quest for knowl-
edge,”176 and declares that Jewish readers would find a treatise on logic use-
ful. For Luzzatto, disseminating such a work amounts to a religious task: 
just as farming perfects nature by increasing its beauty and usefulness,177 so 
too does logic allow each person to achieve a correct knowledge, free from 
confusion; both complete the work of God.178
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This short work stands out not for its originality but for its translation of 
the traditional terms of logic into Hebrew. Even then, this “Hebraization” 
of logic was redundant because Italian Jews likely to be interested in this 
material could easily access it in Italian and Latin texts. The significance 
of this attempt is essentially historical: it demonstrates that efforts to as-
similate external cultural products into Jewish cultural coordinates were still 
being made in the first decades of the eighteenth century. Although there 
were many such endeavors in the history of Jewish culture, this was one of 
the last in the history of Italian Jews, who were to confront non-Jewish works 
directly in the coming decades, no longer needing to “Hebraize” them. 
Luzzatto’s apologia of order and distinctions reached its apex in the intro-
duction to his religious manual, Derekh ha-Shem, where he deployed the ne-
oclassical metaphor of the Italian garden to describe how intelligent human 
action imposed order on nature:
The advantage of having knowledge of things according to their subdivi-
sions and the order of their relationships, as opposed to knowledge with-
out distinctions, corresponds to the vision of a garden with well main-
tained hedges, and adorned with narrow paths and lines of trees, com-
pared with a bush of reeds or a wood that grows in a disordered manner. 
For the intellect that desires to know, the representation of multiple parts 
which ignores their relationships and proper position in the construction 
of the whole is a tiresome and pleasureless operation.179 
Kabbalah: A Science of the Knowable
For Luzzatto, however, the parallels between Kabbalah and science are 
not merely methodological. Just as physical science—and the sciences con-
nected to it—establishes the laws governing natural events, the object of 
Kabbalah is to know the causes of these events, which constitute the divine 
direction (hanhagah) when united with the totality of physical and human 
events. While physics attempts to describe the laws governing events that are 
merely effects, Kabbalah states the laws presiding over physical and human 
causal events. Yet, even though the origins of physics are human and those 
of Kabbalah divine, both disciplines nevertheless seek to give an ordered, 
precise, and exhaustive account of their object. Luzzatto’s descriptions of the 
divine worlds sometimes appear to borrow from the terminology of physics: 
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it is not a coincidence that he refers to the sefyroth as “forces” (koḥoth). 
Indeed, the kabbalistic term ḥokhmah may be understood as meaning “sci-
ence”: it is the supreme science, a meta-science (or “metaphysics”) which 
goes beyond what other human sciences can do by establishing the connec-
tions between the superior and the inferior worlds. Yet this ḥokhmah shares 
the demonstrative rigor of the human sciences as well as their mechanistic 
outlook and ambition to achieve total knowledge of their object. 
Kabbalah touches on the “roots” of beings and the rules governing them. 
On the one hand, it seeks to know the primary source of all beings, but on 
the other it ignores the natural laws inscribed in the sefyroth, which are the 
concern of human science.180 
Luzzatto writes in a post-Cartesian context, at a time when mechanics are 
the model for all the sciences and when all that is really left of the categories 
of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics are terms largely stripped of their 
meaning. The world of the sefyroth is a very ordered world, which Luzzatto 
describes with the metaphor of a clock: it is built like a mechanism and its 
elements are connected to each other and the inferior world like a series of 
gears. Luzzatto is so bent on a mechanical model that he sees Man and the 
material world as proto-robots covered with skin, or a material membrane 
reverberating up to the divinity through their motions before returning down 
to humankind.181 Human acts are at the origin of the motion of the totality 
and depend on the soul, which is located in the body. 
The following account may be read as a religious transposition of 
Cartesian dualism, with the soul taking the place of Cartesian thought, and 
the global mechanism put at the service of God and the final proclamation 
of his unity. The various worlds are regulated by precise laws of operation 
(ḥuqqym) and a system governing the interaction (‘arakhym) of different 
forces182 in a dynamic combination responding to a unitary principle:
The totality is a fabric of many forces coming from different orders, each 
of which acts solely in its designated time and manner. This is called “the 
diffusion of the forces” (hithpashtuth ha-koḥoth), that is, the diffusion of 
the forces in different ways and according to different well-defined and 
established rules. […] This order is not dispersed and divided into parts 
that do not report to a single principle; rather, there is one general order 
governing the expansion of every force in the ways which pertain to it. 
Everything is calibrated with an eye to a final direction.183
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If the object of Kabbalah is to explain how this dynamic works both at 
the time of creation (at the origin) and over the course of time (in history) 
according to a unitary principle,184 then the kabbalist should give a de-
tailed account of the existence and present and future behavior of all be-
ings. In other words, although Kabbalah is a science of divine origin, its 
object is the functioning of the worlds (hanhagah), which Man can—and 
should—understand. 
Creation has come about by divine design: in his extraction of limits—
and renunciation of his infinity—God wanted to perform an act of mercy. 
The final tiqqun, the moment of redemption when his unity will definitively 
manifest itself, will come after a lengthy period when good and evil will be 
intermixed beyond the grasp of human knowledge. Tiqqun demands human 
intervention in a world that Man is able to know despite his limits. Thus 
God operates not according to his capacities, but according to Man’s: God 
wants Man to understand his ways, however limited that knowledge will 
be. Humans live in a comprehensible world because God wishes it to be so, 
subordinating his infinite action to the laws of causality and temporality.185
Human understanding cannot conceive of God’s essence, since, as 
Maimonides stated, the only thing we can affirm is the necessary existence of 
God. His actions, too, are thus only partly conceivable. Since everything—
good and evil, imperfection and perfection—is created by God, humans do 
not know what anything means for the divine will, i.e., in itself. Instead, what 
we know and understand corresponds to our way of knowing: 
That which is inside Him is unreachable for any intelligence; we can un-
derstand only that which is within us creatures.”186 
In other words, humans cannot know God’s works per se, only their effects.187 
Strictly speaking, central notions such as emanation (shefa‘), potential, or ac-
tion lie beyond our grasp: we cannot understand them from the agent’s point 
of view, only from our perspective as recipients.188 
Luzzatto’s gnoseology is a theory of the limits of knowledge (rather like 
the philosophy of Kant), which nevertheless is optimistic about the possibil-
ity of achieving knowledge within those limits. God wants us to achieve 
knowledge according to our capabilities. The content of this knowledge 
constitutes the object of the science of Kabbalah, and lies within the grasp 
of Man despite its divine origins. In the age of redemption, things will not 
226
Chapter 9
change fundamentally: our understanding of the divine remaining within the 
limits of our abilities, we will grasp “a drop compared to the ocean.”189
The entire science of truth consists of this: distinguishing between the 
forces God used to create the world, their intensity, their measure, and the 
relationships between forces and created beings. In effect, we are capable 
of knowing these forces only after they have been limited, and chosen be-
tween all the others. God created the world according to a single intention 
(kawwanah), and this intention implied limiting and ordering the forces 
that He wanted to introduce, and establishing their order and relationsh-
isps. Man can understand this, if this knowledge is given to him, because 
it is not unlimited and does not lie beyond the abilities of the human 
intellect. The totality of this order constitutes this science. And therefore 
we assess the measure of those forces according to a hierarchy; we un-
derstand how things exist in a reciprocal relationship, and how created 
beings are connected together. It is essential to understand that everything 
pertaining to created beings has its root in these forces, that everything 
happens according to a hierarchy and an order, that all these beings are 
connected one to another and oriented toward a single aim (kawwanah).190
It is the scientific character of Kabbalah that Luzzatto posits in these lines, 
by linking it formally to physics on several levels. He fosters a mechanistic 
vision by evoking “forces,” speaks of the human capacity to know this total-
ity, and founds the successful operations of this knowledge on a methodo-
logy based on order and distinctions.
Venerated to this day in Orthodox Jewish circles and rediscovered by 
a generation in search of a new spirituality, the young Paduan mystic who 
never wrote a word in any language other than Hebrew straddled two worlds: 
the old and ever-enduring world of kabbalistic thought and devotion and the 
eighteenth-century world of rationalism, marked by the scientific method 
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Ḥay ha-‘Olamin (L’immortale) pt. I: Rhetoric (Florence: Olschki, 1995) with 
a translation, accurate commentary, and comprehensive bibliography, followed 
by “L’educazione ebraica nella seconda metà del ‘400. Poetica e scienza naturali 
nel Ḥay ha-‘Olamim di Yoḥanan Alemanno,” Rinascimento 36 (1996): 75-136. 
In “Il ritorno agli antichi nella cultura ebraica tra Quattro e Cinquecento,” Storia 
d’Italia, ed. C. Vivanti (Turin: Einaudi, 1996), pt. 1 (Annali, 11), 387-409, Arthur 
Lesley contextualizes Alemanno’s work within the period’s rhetoric and educa-
tion. See his “‘The Song of Solomon’s Ascents’ by Yohanan Alemanno: Love 
and Human Perfection according to a Jewish Colleague of Giovanni Pico della 
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 25 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 24; Yeḥiyel, The Righteous Man, 470.
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 27 Nadav, A Letter, 456; Greenup, A Kabbalistic, 370.
 28 Yeḥiyel, Discourse on Eternal Life, 12-16.
 29 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, Introduction, IX.
 30 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 33, 72.
 31 R. Bonfil, Rabbis, 286. See also Kaufmann, in Revue des études Juives 26 (1893): 
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deux grands courants de la pensée juive,” La storia della filosofia ebraica, ed. 
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 34 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 21, 23.
 35 Yeḥiyel, The Righteous Man, 641; Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed I:58 and 
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1167). Cf. Judah Moscato, Sermons, vol. 1, ed. Gianfranco Miletto and Giuseppe 
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 37 Yeḥiyel, The Righteous Man, 465. See also Yeḥiyel, The Righteous Man, 469-470.
 38 See Idel, “Magical,” 211, 237, and M. Shulvass, The Jews in the World of the 
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magic and of the existence of demons, which he takes from the Torah and from 
experience. See Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 48 and following.
 39 Heptaplus, V exposition, ch. 7, ed. Garin (Florence: Vallecchi, 1942), 304; see 
E. Garin, La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano (Florence: Sansoni, 
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 40 Yeḥiyel, The Righteous Man, 464. See Zohar III: 244b-245a; Yehudah ha-Levy, 
Kuzary III: 26.
 41 Idel, Magical, 198.
 42 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 108.
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Guide of the Perplexed III:13, and it proves how strong Maimonides’ prestige 
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Shiltey ha-Gibborym (The Shields of the Braves) (Mantua, 1612), Introduction 
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(The Religion Exam), ed. J. J. Ross (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1984), 
99-100.
 45 Yeḥiyel, The Righteous Man, 460-469.
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the intellectual aspect is much more pronounced than in the ideas of the rabbi 
from Pisa. For Moscato, humanity is a microcosm, capable above all of universal 
understanding; the history of humanity is the history of a fall from the state of 
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up to the point of final redemption, which will lead to eternal intellectual pleni-
tude. Similarly (sermon 10/363, p. 125, Hebrew section), Moscato accepts the 
idea that an extraordinary man may be superior to the angels, but this superior-
ity—which only Moses possessed—is of an intellectual nature. Moreover, it is 
no coincidence that Moscato often cited the biblical commentaries of Ovadiyah 
Sforno, who has a decidedly rationalist attitude.
 47 Bonfil, Rabbis, 290-291. To understand this issue in the Italian rabbinical con-
text, see Bonfil, “Expressions of the Uniqueness of the Jewish People in Italy 
during the Renaissance” (Hebrew), Sinai 86 (1975): 34-46.
 48 Yeḥiyel, The Righteous Man, 471. Yeḥiyel picks up on Yehudah ha-Levy’s fa-
mous analogy in the Kuzary (II:36: “Israel is among the nations as the heart 
among the members of the body: it is the part most sensitive to sickness, as well 
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themselves at the moment of the writing of this text in 1559: the Talmud had just 
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III:221b.
 49 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 38; see Yehudah ha-Levi, Kuzary V:20, fourth premise.
 50 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath , 47.
 51 Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed III:7, 18.
 52 See Bonfil, “Expressions of the Uniqueness,” 36-46.
 53 Yeḥiyel, The Righteous Man, 471-472. Yeḥiyel modifies and explains in philo-
sophic fashion the interpretation of the Song of Songs, II:2 “Like a rose among 
thorns” given by Wa-yiqra Rabba 23:3. At issue is how to save the orchard in-
vaded by brambles to rescue to the one perfumed rose therein. That rose is the 
Torah.
 54 Quoted in C. B. Schmitt, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469-1533) and 
His Critique of Aristotle (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), 48.
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phy, see R. Bonfil, “The Doctrine of the Soul and of Sanctity in the Thought of 
‘Ovadiah Sforno” (Hebrew), Eshel Beer Sheva‘ 1 (1976): 200-257.
 56 O. Sforno, Or ‘ammym, new ed. in Ketavym (Jerusalem, 1985), 495.
 57 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 11.
 58 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath , 45-6. Yeḥiyel does not present in this case the usual review 
of philosophical opinions, but he refers to Ḥasdai Crescas, Or Adonai (The Light 
of God), pt. II rule 5. Yeḥiyel naturally does not follow Crescas in his semi-de-
terministic conclusions. On this subject see the Talmudic source, Talmud Bavly, 
Nidda 16b: “Everything is in the hands of God, except for the fear of God.”
 59 See L. Cristiani, “L’Eglise à l’époque du Concile de Trente,” L’Histoire de 
l’Eglise 17 (1948): 233; Enciclopedia Cattolica (Vatican City: Enciclopedia 
Cattolica, 1951), sub voce “Giustificazione.”
 60 For the consideration of Maimonides in Jewish Italy in this period, see M. 
Schulvass, “The Italian Jewish Study of the Torah during the Renaissance” 
(Hebrew) Ḥorev 10 (1948): 105-128, and Bonfil, Rabbis, 251-272.
 61 See, for example, Yehudah ha-Levy, Kuzary V:14.
 62 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 117-118; see also pp. 9 and 82 there and Yeḥiyel, The Righteous 
Man, 460.
 63 Augustini Niphi Suessani Philosophi in Aristotelis Libros Posteriorum 
Analyticorum Subtilissima Commentaria (Venice, 1558), 43.1 and 61.4. F. Cf. 
Aristotle, Physics 184 A 16.
 64 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 88. In this context, the contrast between the Torah and phi-
losophy is forcefully expressed: “To compare the two forms of knowledge means 
subverting true judgment, because their relationship is that of reciprocal aversion 
[ki hem tzaroth zo le-zo].”
 65 See P. Pomponazzi, De fato 709, quoted in Garin, Storia della filosofia italiana 
(Turin: Einaudi 1966), 509: “Ita sunt quae me insomnem et insanum reddunt, ut 
vera sit interpretatio fabulae Promethei (...) Prometheus vero est Philosophus 
qui dum vult scire Dei arcana, perpetuis curis et cogitationibus roditur.” See 
also T. Gregory, in Grande Antologia Filosofica VI (Milan: Marzorati, 1964), 
625.
 66 See E. Garin, Storia della Filosofia Italiana, 536, regarding Nifo’s early adhe-
sion to the transmigration theory.
 67 “Whoever wants to persevere in it [philosophy] shall always move in uncertainty 
and vagueness [...]. Those who proceed along the way of faith remain strong and 
sure”: “De immortalitate animae,” Grande Antologia Filosofica, 717. But also 
“Oportet in Philosophia haereticum esse qui veritatem invenire cupit” (in Garin, 
Storia della filosofia italiana, 511).
 68 Sforno, Or ‘ammym, 418.
 69 Ibid., 414-415.
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 70 See R. Bonfil, “The Commentary of Mosheh Provenzalo on the Twenty-five 
Axioms of Maimonides” (Hebrew), Qiryat Sefer 50 (1974-1975): 157-176.
 71 See E. Garin, La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano (Florence: Sansoni, 
1979), 118.
 72 Examen veritatis doctrinae gentium et veritatis disciplinae Christianae V, 2. 
Quoted in Garin, Storia della Filosofia Italiana, 593.
 73 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 48-50. In “Talmudists, Philosophers, Kabbalists: The Quest 
for Spirituality in the Sixteenth Century,” in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth 
Century, 446, Isadore Twersky highlights Yeḥiyel’s aspiration to completion, or 
spiritual perfection, which manifests itself in an exaltation of religious practice 
over pure intellectual activity. Indeed, the allusions to corporeality in his writings 
are not few: in Minḥath, p. 78, he speaks of the corporeal remains in the soul after 
death. The service of God is described in the Discourse on the Righteous Man 
and the Purpose of the World as an activity “of feelings and of all the members of 
the body” (and in Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 88: “the soul’s perfection is in its union with 
the body”). Moreover, a certain importance is granted to the sense of touch, in 
contrast to Aristotle’s and Maimonides’ devaluation of said sense (Maimonides, 
Guide of the Perplexed II:36; Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 81). This change in sensibility 
also merits further study.
 74 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 36. Moscato mentions the idea of the superiority of the Torah to 
the secular sciences: mathematics, which deals only with abstract concepts; phys-
ics, whose object is unstable; and metaphysics, the result of simple hypotheses, 
changeable according to differing opinions, are comparable to “slags of silver 
covering objects of clay.” (Compare this with the image invoked by Maimonides, 
in the introduction to Guide of the Perplexed, of the Torah as a golden apple cov-
ered with a net of silver.) Cf. Y. Moscato, Sermons, vol. 2, sermon 13/7-9, 19-20.
 75 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 22.
 76 See J. Gutmann, Philosophies of Judaism (Philadelphia: Holt, Rinehart And 
Winston 1964), 232. Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed I:51-54; Crescas, 
Or Adonai 1, III, 3.
 77 Yeḥiel, Minḥath, 43; Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed II:36. For the anal-
ogous theory of Avicenna, see S. M. Afnan, Avicenna, His Life and Works 
(London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1958). Eliyah Genazzano elaborated the same 
kind of critique of this idea, referring, however, not to Maimonides, but to Yosef 
Albo’s Book of Principles. See Genazzano, Iggereth Ḥamudoth, 11.
 78 Yitzḥaq Abravanel, in his commentary on this passage of Maimonides, highlights 
the role of the intellect as well. The philosopher and political man of Spanish 
origin had been in close contact with Yeḥiyel of Pisa, grandfather of our Yeḥiyel 
Nissim. See the quoted articles by Kaufmann and Cassuto mentioned above.
 79 The references to this distinction are in the Talmud Bavly, Yevamot 49b sub fine, 
and Zohar I:170.
 80 Yeḥiyel, Minḥath, 44.
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2: Can Fundamentalism be Modern? 
The Case of Avraham Portaleone, the Repentant Scientist 
Pages 30-61
 1 Critical references are Robert Bonfil, “Preaching as Mediation between Elite 
and Popular Cultures: The Case of Judah Del Bene,” in Preachers of the Italian 
Ghetto, ed. David B. Ruderman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) 
and David B. Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early 
Modern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
 2 Cf. Marco Mortara, “Un important document dans la famille des Portaleone,” in 
Revue des études juives 12 (1886): 113-116; D. Kaufmann, Testament of Abraham 
Sommo Portaleone’, JQR 4 (1892): 333; Shlomo Simonsohn, The History of the 
Jews in the Duchy of Mantua (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Kiryath Sepher, 1977), 294, 
312, and 387 note 83.
 3 Shiltey ha-Gibborym (Mantua, 1612), folio 185b, column 1.
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self a physician, in 1607: Abrahamo Portaleone, responsorum et consultationum 
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Latin 13004. See Andrew Berns, “Abraham Portaleone and Alessandro Magno: 
Jewish and Christian Correspondents on a Monstrous Birth,” European Journal 
of Jewish Studies 5, no. 1 (2011): 53-66. Cf. Simonsohn, The History of the 
Jews, 295. 
 5 According to the Shiltey ha-Gibborym, folio 185b, column 2, Guillaume was 
the third Duke of Mantua. In the De Auro, he simply mentions a “Vir prestan-
tissimus,” a “very famous figure.” The only existing mention of the “Dialogues 
on gold” in scholarly literature, to my knowledge, is in L. Thorndike, A History 
of Magic and Experimental Science (New York: History of Science Society 
Publications, 1941), 645-647. 
 6 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, ibid. Portaleone mentions here that he wrote the dialogues 
De auro “‘al regel eḥad” (sic), “on only one leg”; in a rush, that is. The en-
tire title is De Auro dialogi tres. In quibus non solum de Auri in re Medica 
facultate, verum etiam de specifica eius, & ceterarum rerum forma, ac duplici 
potestate, qua mixtis in omnibus illa operatur, copiose disputatur. Abrahamo 
e Porta Leonis Mantuano Medico Hebræo Auctor. The book is is possibly a 
comprehensive survey of Portaleone’s scientific and medical opinions. This is 
how we interpret the quick exchange between Achryvasmus and Dynachrisus 
on p. 20: “A.: A few days ago, a person told me your opinion, but in synthesis. 
But why did you not bring up so many things worth (in my opinion) knowing 
in your writings? D.: The little time available and the difficulty of the subject 
mutilated their writing. But I gave the opportunity to many scientists and erudite 
persons to attain the core of the thing in greater depth, with art and elegance.” 
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The expressions “the little time available and the difficulty of the subject,” and 
“the core of the thing” are irresistibly reminiscent of the lexicon of Maimonides 
in his Guide of the Perplexed (I:34 and introduction respectively). This is prob-
ably a rare instance of importation of expressions from Jewish literature into 
scientific literature.
 7 Marie-Thérèse Jones-Davies, ed., Gold in the Time of Renaissance (Paris: 
Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Institut de recherches sur les civilisations 
de l’Occident moderne, 1978); Allen G. Debus, The Chemical Philosophy: 
Paracelsian Science and Medicine in the Sixteen and Seventeenth Centuries 
(New York: Science History Publications, 1977); J.C. Margolin and S. Matton, 
eds., Alchimie et philosophie à la Renaissance (Paris: Vrin, 1993). On the issue of 
drinkable gold at a former time, see Chiara Crisciani, “Oro potabile fra alchimia 
e medicina: due testi in tempo di peste,” volume 115 of Memorie di Scienze 
Fisiche e Naturali. Rendiconti della Academia Nazionale delle Scienze detta dei 
XL, 5th series, vol. XXI/2, t. II (1997): 83-93.
 8 This notion of quintessence was probably inspired by Paracelsus, who in De 
Auro dialogi tres, p. 5, is referred to as “Paracelsus aureolus” (“the golden 
Paracelsus”). Cf. Walter Pagel, Paracelsus: An Introduction to Philosophical 
Medicine in the Era of the Renaissance (Basel: S. Karger, 1958), 99–100, who 
cites Paracelsus, De vita longa, chapter 1. Cf. on this subject L. Thorndike’s 
negative view of De Auro in A History of Magic and Experimental Science. 
 9 As an example, Gabriel de Castaigne published a small book in Paris in 1611 
entitled L’or potable qui guarit de tous maux (Drinking Gold to Heal All Ills), 
which largely consists of a list of attestations by patients healed by drinking gold 
produced by the author.
 10 On the literary form of medical writings in that period, and especially in 
Portaleone’s writings, see A. Berns, “Abraham Portaleone and Alessandro 
Magno,” 58: “Humanist trends that emerged in Italian culture in the Renaissance 
influenced the medical profession as well and elevated the importance of, and 
social value placed on, good writing, especially in Latin.” 
 11 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, f. 2v.
 12 On Shiltey ha-Gibborym see Abraham ben David Portaleone, Die Heldenschilde, 
German translation and commentary by Gianfranco Miletto (Frankfurt am 
Main: Lang, 2001); Gianfranco Miletto, Glauben und Wissen im Zeitalter der 
Reformation. Der salomonische Tempel bei Abraham ben David Portaleone 
(1542-1612) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004). See also Samuel S. Kottek, “Jews be-
tween Profane and Sacred Science in Renaissance Italy: the Case of Abraham 
Portaleone,” in Religious Confessions and the Sciences in the Sixteenth Century, 
ed. J Helm and A. Winkelmann (Leiden: 2001), 108-18. A recent contribution is 
the article by Andrew Berns, “Judah Moscato, Abraham Portaleone, and Biblical 
Incense in Late Renaissance Mantua,” in Rabbi Judah Moscato and the Jewish 
Intellectual World of Mantua in the 16th-17th Centuries, ed. Giuseppe Veltri 
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and Gianfranco Miletto (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 105-119. Berns deals with the 
connection made by many scientists in late-sixteenth-century Italy (including 
Portaleone) between natural philosophy and the Bible.
 13 The expression is from the De auro, 20.
 14 De auro, 63.
 15 In lieu of “barking” by the alchemists, cries of joy and encouragement performed 
by the necromancer, cf. Leonardo da Vinci, Scritti letterari, ed. A. Marimoni 
(Milano, 1974), 163. 
 16 This position is directly reminiscent of Francis Bacon’s statement in The 
Advancement of Learning, published in 1605: “The search and endeavors to 
make gold have brought many useful inventions and instructive experiments to 
light” (I quote the New York edition: Colonial Press, 1900, 19).
 17 De auro, 18-19.
 18 Cf. Nancy Siraisi, Avicenna in Renaissance Italy (Princeton, NJ: 1989), esp. 
68-70. Cf. also the text written by doctor Leonardo Fioravanti, Dello specchio 
di Scientia Universale (Venice: 1564), 96a, on alchemy, with an opinion simi-
lar to Dynachrysus/Portaleone’s; 281b on overestimating the medical theory in 
relation to practice; and 276a, against the blind worship of the authorities of 
the past.
 19 De auro, 74. See also ibid., 76: “Is your love for Pliny making you blind?” 
Niccolò Leoniceno, Professor of Medicine at Ferrara University, debuted in 
1492 the critical series on Natural History by Pliny the Elder: Nicolai Leoniceni 
de Plinii et aliorum in medicina erroribus, Ferrara, Laurentius de Valentia et 
Andreas de Castronovo, 1492. See, for example, page 5 (pages are not num-
bered): “I am inclined to believe that numerous things [Pliny] wrote about in his 
natural history books were not fully verified and explored.”
 20 De auro, 36-37.
 21 Ibid., 20: Achryvasmus: “Experientia quidem, rerum omnium naturalium mag-
istra celebratur, quod si denegaris, non repræhensione tantum, sed pœna etiam 
dignus esse videaris.” The Frenchman Alexandre de la Tourrete’s propos are very 
close to Portaleone’s. Cf. his Bref discours des admirables vertus de l’or potable. 
Avec une apologie de la tresutile (sic) science d’alchimie (Short Discourse on 
the Admirable Virtues of Drinking Gold. With an Apology for the Very Useful 
Science of Alchemy) (Lyon, 1575), 36 recto: “Their ignorance [that of the Greek 
and Arab medical authorities] on the one hand, with their incredulity on the other, 
are the cause, if they know nothing of the said illnesses or of the medicines 
necessary to heal them, in which the uncertainty of their science is manifestly 
revealed, since it is founded simply on dead words not on the light of nature, 
which has its physical reasons and ocular demonstrations for true and certain 
experiences.”
 22 Shiltey ha-Gibborym.
 23 Ibid., f. 37b, col. 2.
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 24 Ibid., f. 39b. Portaleone’s “technological” texts must be read in the background 
of the situation of Mantua in those years. A Jewish contemporary of Portaleone, 
Abraham Colorni (born ca. 1530) was an engineer, a polymath, an inventor of 
military technology, and the author of a book on cryptography, Scotographia 
o Vere (sic) Scienza di Scrivere Oscuro Facilissima et Securissima per Qualsi 
Voglia Lingua (Prague: 1593).
 25 On this figure see Deuteronomy 20:1-9; Mishnah Sota 8:1; Maimonides, Mishneh 
Torah, Hilkhoth Melakhym, 7.
 26 Ibid., “Iggereth” or introductory “Epistle.” 
 27 Ibid., f. 101 b. col. 2.
 28 Ibid., “Iggereth,” cit., f. 2b, col. 2.
 29 For the origin of the comparison, cf. Plato, Phaedo, 85 d-e.
 30 De auro, 37-39.
 31 Cf. also ibid., 48.
 32 Ibid., 15.
 33 Abraham Melamed, Wisdom’s Little Sister (Hebrew), unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Tel Aviv, 1976.
 34 Cf. for instance the similar position of Azariyah de’ Rossi, The Light of the Eyes, 
trans. Joanna Weinberg (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 699-709, 
and of Portaleone’s contemporary, the well-known Samuel Archivolti, in his lin-
guistic treatise ‘Arugath ha-bosem (Venice, 1603), 92a. Also to be considered, 
of course, is the critical attitude of Eliyahu Levita, in Massoreth ha-masssoreth 
(Basel, 1538).
 35 For a historical survey of the punctuation in that period, cf. Nina Catach, 
La Ponctuation (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), 28.
 36 Cf. on this topic, Jacques Poirier, L’âge d’or, Dijon, 1996. For an analysis of 
the visual treatment of the subject, see Élinor Myara Kelif, “De l’Eden païen au 
paradis terrestre: l’allégorie et le mythe des Âges de l’humanité,” in Le noyau 
de l’écorce. Les arts de l’allégorie XVe-XVIIe siècle, ed. Colette Nativel et al. 
(Rome: SOMOGY, 2009), 165-187.
 37 De auro, 83-84.
 38 Ibid., 90.
 39 Cited in D. Aricò, “Les ‘Yeux d’Argos’ et les ‘Étoiles d’Astrée’ pour mesurer 
l’univers. Les Jésuites italiens et la science nouvelle,” Revue de Synthèse 120 
(1999): 297.
 40 Cf. Andrea Battistini, Galileo e i Gesuiti. Miti letterari e retorica della scienza 
(Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2000).
 41 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, f. 58b.
 42 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, f. 97a, col. 1. He uses the same explanation (a flaw in the 
transmission of the text) to account for the mistake in the Talmud in the passage 
describing the oil fabrication for the anointment of the priests. Portaleone uses 
here the same argument as Pliny’s supporters used against Leoniceno’s attacks. 
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Cf. N. Siraisi, Avicenna in Renaissance Italy, 68. Nathan ben Yeḥiyel (twelfth 
century), the author of the ‘Arukh, one of the authorities whose work was consid-
ered inadequate by Portaleone, is justified by the fact that the medical literature 
of his time was generally inadequate and would simply iterate words that did not 
have any connection with reality. The same critical posture can be seen in the 
De auro.
 43 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, f. 92b, col. 2.
 44 Ibid. f. 100b, col. 1.
 45 Ibid., f. 96a, col. 1.
 46 Ibid., f. 96b, col. 1. Cf. also f. 95b, col. 1, the “fixative” or pre-Linnean classifica-
tion of species in nature, considering them as determined at creation, without any 
possibility of variation.
 47 For Portaleone’s messianic attitude, see the chapter “The Myth of Politics.”
 48 Portaleone refers to the previous description of the rites in the Jerusalem Temple 
made by the prestigious kabbalist Menaḥem ‘Azariyah Fano, Seder ‘avoda li-
temydin w-le-musafyn (Venice: 1583).
 49 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, f. 49a: “My opinion is somewhat different from theirs [i.e. 
from the philosophical and scientific authorities], since I have my own ideas on 
the truths of [natural] philosophy. I spoke about them at length in my Latin book 
printed in Venice on the subject of mineral gold [Hebrew: maḥtzavy, which cor-
responds to the “common gold” in De Auro] and its supposed medical properties, 
written at the behest of His Excellence Lord Guglielmo, Duke of Mantua and 
Monferrato.” One notes the great prudence of tone vis-à-vis De Auro with regard 
to the scientific authorities, even if they are non-Jewish authorities. 
 50 De auro, 20-21. To be compared with the position of Leonardo da Vinci, who 
defined himself as “a man lacking literary knowledge, but who was schooled by 
experience,” Scritti letterari, 148-149. 
 51 Even the phrase, “I left ... the opportunity” seem to be inspired by a text of rab-
binical literature, especially Talmud Bavly, Hullin 7a.
 52 This is a reference to Juvenal, Satire VI, v. 165: Rara avis nigroque simillima 
cycno (‘a rare bird, similar to a black swan’).
 53 Portaleone owned the Decameron, see G. Miletto, La Biblioteca di Avraham ben 
David Portaleone secondo l’inventario della sua eredità, p. 78, in the edition 
expurgated by Luigi Groto. Surprisingly, this edition presents the whole novel 
(pp. 471-473) in spite of its erotic content.
 54 The Guide of the Perplexed II:36.
 55 The Shiltey ha-Gibborym can be read as a fulfillment of David Provenzali of 
Mantua’s pedagogical agenda. Provenzali suggested the creation of a type of 
Jewish High School, in which sacred and profane study would be mixed. 
Provenzali’s Hebrew text is in S. Assaf, Meqoroth le-toledoth ha-ḥinnukh be-Yis-
rael, 4 vol. (Tel Aviv: 1926-47), t. II, pp. 115-120. For an analysis of the agenda, 
see A.M. Lesley, “Il richiamo agli ‘antichi’ nella cultura ebraica fra Quattro e 
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Cinquecento,” in Storia d’Italia. Gli Ebrei in Italia, 2 vol., ed. C. Vivanti (Turin: 
Cristina Galasso, 1996), t. I, pp. 385-409, especially pages 394-400. See also 
G. Miletto, “The Teaching Program of David ben Avraham and His Son Abraham 
Provenzali in its Historical-Cultural Context,” in Cultural Intermediaries, ed. 
David Ruderman and Giuseppe Veltri (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004), 127-148. 
 56 Cf. Isaac Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo (Yashar of Candia) (Leiden, 
1974), 93.
 57 Cf. Judah Messer Leon, The Book of Honeycomb’s Flow: Nopheth Suphim, ed. 
and trans. Isaac Rabinowitz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), espe-
cially pp. 142-143.
 58 See Miletto, Glauben und Wissen, 108-175.
 59 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, f. 4a. More recent readers of Portaleone have not failed to 
criticize this position, even using irony to do so. If Portaleone’s Latin translator, 
Ugolini, wrote that the Jewish author, dealing with military subjects, was fast 
asleep (see chapter “The Myth of Politics”), and the important Hebraist Giovanni 
Bernardo De Rossi spoke of him as follows in his Ditionario storico degli autori 
ebrei e delle loro opere (Parma, 1802): “This work [Shiltey ha-Gibborym] con-
tains much curious and rare information, which deserves to be read, and which 
one will search in vain to find elsewhere, [as it has] been drawn and gathered 
together from an infinity of ancient sources and books, introduced in the table 
of contents, and accompanied by the luminaries of learned men of other nations, 
and their exotic languages, which he speaks of at length in the introduction. But 
in the midst of so many beautiful things, his opinion sometimes seems new and 
bizarre, for instance when he writes that [...] the antiquity of the printing press 
dates back to the first centuries of the world and was known since the time of Job, 
an assumption for which he presents some texts, interpreted in his own way, as 
proof, condemning the error of all the learned men of his own time who, he says, 
sold it as a new invention created not more than a hundred years before.”
 60 Ibid. See also f. 42b. Azariyah de’ Rossi uses the same word, tzedeq, with ref-
erence to the contribution of Jewish and non-Jewish sages to knowledge. See 
Azariyah de’ Rossi, The Light of the Eyes: “It would be our duty to investigate 
and search out a solution, applying correct methods and not useless tools [i.e. use 
all valid sources irrespective of their origin] in order to ensure that faithfulness 
[tzedeq] and truth [emeth] are met.”
 61 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, f. 31b.
 62 The complete absence of reference to Meor ‘einayim in Shiltey ha-Gibborym, 
given that both authors were from the same town and shared the same culture, 
should be attributed to the misgivings that certain rabbis had expressed concern-
ing the contents of the former work. The Portaleone of the second half of his 
life probably did not want to be seen to be close to a controversial figure. See 
Azariyah de’ Rossi, Selected Chapters from “Sefer Meor Einayim” and “Matzref 
241
Notes to pages 30-61
la-Kessef,” ed. Reuven Bonfil (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1991), with a bibliog-
raphy on pp. 131–133. 
 63 De Auro, 54.
 64 Francesco Roheo, or François de la Rue (Lille, 1520-1585), the author of De gem-
mis aliquot iis presertim, quarum divus Ioannes in sua Apocalypsi meminit, de 
aliis quoque, quarum usus hoc aevi apud omnes percrebuit, Libri duo (Paris: 
1547; Zürich: 1565). The full information is in Abraham ben David Portaleone, 
Die Heldenschilde, 67, and Miletto., Glauben und Wissen, 288. See also Samuel 
S. Kottek, “Jews between Profane and Sacred Science in Renaissance Italy: the 
Case of Abraham Portaleone.”
 65 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, ff. 46a–b.
 66 The sapphire is like the heavens without stars, the ruby like the sphere of the stars, 
the diamond like the sun; the amethyst and the emerald like the spheres of some 
stars and the moon. Achryvasmus reacts admiringly to these parallels drawn by 
Dynachrisus: “Oh, human intellect, how penetrating you are!” Portaleone reuses 
exactly the same comparison in Shiltey ha-Gibborym, f. 80a, with biblical verses 
to support it. 
 67 Ibid., 43b.
 68 Miletto, Die Heldenschielde, 427, note 466, discovered that the source of this 
comparison is the Jesuit Francisco Ribera, Francisci Riberae Villacastinensis, 
presbyteri Societas Iesu, Doctorisque Theologi, De Templo, et de iis quae ad 
templum pertinent, libri quinque (Antwerp, 1602), 241. It is interesting to remark 
that, in order to satisfy the rabbis, the very orthodox Portaleone drew from a 
Christian source.
 69 Ibid., f. 49a
 70 Ibid., p. 51b. This affirmation is reminiscent of the exaltation of experience in 
De Auro, xx: “Without experience, there would be no real difference between 
man and the most intelligent animals.”
 71 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, f. 49b.
 72 Blasio Ugolini, Thesaurus antiquitatum sacrarum […] opuscula in quibus 
veterum Hebraeorum mores, leges, instituta, rituus sacri et civiles illustrantur 
(Venice: 1744-1769).
 73 For other quotations and commentaries of the book, cf. Eliacin Carmoly, 
Histoires des médecins juifs anciens et modernes (Bruxelles, 1844), 167; Julius 
Fürst, Bibliotheca Judaica (Leipzig: 1863), vol. 3, 114. Another interesting 
judgement is in Auguste-Arthur Beugnot, Les Juifs d’Occident, ou Recherches 
sur l’état civil, le commerce et la littérature des Juifs, en France, en Espagne et 
en Italie, pendant la durée du Moyen âge (Paris: 1824), 265-6. For a complete 
review of the early modern and modern readers of Portaleone, see Gianfranco 
Miletto, “La rappresentazione dello Stato ideale negli Shilte ha-gibborim 
di Avraham ben David da Portaleone,” in Annali di Storia dell’esegesi 18/2 
(2001): 447-463. 
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3: Allegorical Space and Geometrical Space:  
Representations of the Temple of Jerusalem  
in the Works of Italian Jewish Authors 
Pages 62-77
 1 On the notion of “image” in the Jewish tradition, see J. Gutmann, ed., No Graven 
Images: Studies in Art and the Hebrew Bible (New York: Ktav, 1971); R. Prigent, 
Le judaïsme et l’image (Tübingen: Mohr, 1990); K. P. Bland, The Artless Jew: 
Medieval and Modern Affirmations and Denials of the Visual (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000); V. B. Mann, Jewish Texts on the Visual Arts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
 2 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, Introduction.
 3 The Guide of the Perplexed III:51, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1974), vol. II, 618-619. 
 4 Rieti is a city northwest of Rome. On Mosheh of Rieti, see A. Guetta “Mosheh 
da Rieti (XIVe—XVe s.), philosophe, scientifique et poète,” Revue des Etudes 
Juives 158, nos. 3-4 (July-December 1999): 577-586; A. Guetta, “Renaissance et 
culture juive: le cas de Moshe ben Yitzhaq de Rieti” Tzafon 48 (2004-2005): 43-
57; D. Bregman, The Golden Way: The Hebrew Sonnet during the Renaissance 
and the Baroque (Tempe, AZ: ACMRS, 2006).
 5 This poem was published in J. Goldenthal, Il Dante Ebreo ossia il Picciol 
Sanctuario (Hebrew with an introduction in Italian) (Vienna, 1865). For a pres-
entation of the poem, with an English translation and an annotated version of 
the first two chapters, see D. Bergman, A. Guetta, and R. P. Scheindlin, eds., 
Prooftexts 23, no. 1 (2003), special issue of Medieval Jewish Literature.
 6 This chapter was remarkably popular with Italian Jews, among whom it enjoyed 
a longer-lasting success than the poem as a whole; it was extracted from its con-
text and translated into Italian verse (transcribed into Hebrew or Latin charac-
ters) by four different writers between the end of the sixteenth and the beginning 
of the seventeenth centuries. Various Jewish Italian scholars, including Azariyah 
de’ Rossi, also transcribed the original Hebrew version, evidently considering it 
to exemplify the Italian school of Hebrew poetry. See chapter 6, “The Italian and 
Latin Works of Lazzaro da Viterbo....”
 7 Goldenthal, second part, chap. 3, pp. 51a-52b.
 8 Ibid., chap. 4, p. 53b.
 9 A. Guetta, “Ya‘ ar ha-Levanon ou la quête de la connaissance perdue. Un texte 
en prose rimée de Moshe de Rieti,” Revue des études juives 164 (2005): 67-129 
(critical edition of an unpublished text with an introduction, French translation 
and notes).
 10 Moshe da Rieti, Filosofia naturale e fatti de Dio, ed. Irene Hijmans-Tromp 
(Leiden: Brill, 1989).
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 11 The original text can be found in ibid., 409-415. For a more extensive French 
translation, see A. Guetta, “Renaissance et culture juive.” 
 12 On this subject, see L. Bolzoni and P. Corsi, eds., La cultura della memoria 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992); L. Bolzoni, La chambre de la mémoire: modèles 
littéraires et iconographiques à l’âge de l`imprimerie (Genève: Droz, 2005).
 13 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, introduction.
 14 Philippe d’Aquin, Discours des sacrifices de la loy mosaique (Paris: Jean 
Laguehay, 1623), Part I: “Explications literales, allégoriques et moralles du 
Tabernacle, que Dieu commanda à Moyse de faire.”
 15 Hieronymi Pradi et Ioannis Baptistae Villalpandi e Societate Iesu, In Ezechielem 
explanationes et apparatus Urbis, ac temple Hyerosolymitani commentariis et 
imaginibus illustrates opus tribus tomis distinctum (Rome, 1596-1605).
 16 The work of the French Hebraist François Vatable (died 1542), who taught at 
the Collège de France, constitutes a noteworthy exception: Vatable illustrated 
the Bible that Robert Estienne published in 1538-40 with images of the Temple 
drawn from Jewish sources which neither allegorized nor symbolized it. On the 
predominantly Christian seventeenth-century representations of the Temple, see 
Helen Rosenau, Vision of the Temple: The Image of the Temple of Jerusalem in 
Judaism and Christianity (Londres: Oresko, 1979); Hendrik Bude and Andreas 
Nachama, eds., Die Reise nach Jerusalem (Berlin: Argon, 1996), particularly the 
chapter entitled “Der wiedererstandene Tempel: Architektonische Visionen.” 
 17 The expression is inspired by the book of G. Camillo, L`idea del theatro (1550, 
new edition Palermo: Sellerio, 1991).
 18 B. Ugolini, Thesaurus antiquitatum vol. 9, col. CCI-CCII, CCIX-CCXX, 
CCLIII-CCLIX, CCICVII-CCXCVIII, CCCXI-CCCXII.
 19 On this author, see H. Rosenau, “Jacob Judah Leon Templo’s Contribution to 
Architectural Imagery,” Journal of Jewish Studies 23, no. 1 (1972): 72-81; 
A. L. Shane, “Rabbi Jacob Judah Leon (Templo) of Amsterdam (1603-1675) and 
his Connections with England,” Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of 
England 25 (1977): 120-136; A. K. Offenberg, “Jacob Jehuda Leon (1602-1675) 
and his Model of the Temple,” in Jewish-Christian Relations in the Seventeenth 
Century, ed. J. Van Den Berg and E. Van Der Wall (Dordrecht: Springer, 1988): 
95-115.
 20 R. H. Popkin, “Christian Jews and Jewish Christians in the 17th Century,” in 
Jewish Christians and Christian Jews: From Renaissance to the Enlightenment, 
ed. R. H. Popkin and G. M. Weiner (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994), 57-72.
 21 Cf. D. B. Ruderman, Kabbalah, Magic and Science: The Cultural Universe of a 
Sixteenth-Century Jewish Physician (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1988). Leone Sommo, who composed several Italian plays as well as a treatise of 
dramatic theory written in Italian, was also the author of what is considered to be 
the first dramatic work written in Hebrew, Tzaḥuth bediḥuta de-kiddushin (The 
Comedy of Marriage). On this author, see R. Bonfil, “Lo spazio culturale degli 
244
Notes to pages 78-91
ebrei d`Italia fra Rinascimento ed Età barocca,” in, Storia d’Italia. Annali 11. 
Gli ebrei in Italia, vol. 1, pp. 413-473, ed. C. Vivanti (Turin: Einaudi, 1996), par-
ticularly pp. 457-472. A later Mantuan author of a book with a description of the 
Temple was the seventeenth-century scholar Malkyiel Ashkenazy. The book was 
published by Avraham Sofer, as Beur ‘al masekheth middoth le-ha-gaon Mosheh 
Caze. We-nilweh elayw sefer hanukath ha-bayit ‘al tzurath beyt ha-miqdash le-
he-hakham rabby Malkyiel Ashkenazy mi-Mantovah, in Jerusalem in 1963.
 22 There is one exception (f. 14v): a quotation from a “contemporary scholar,” 
whose name is not revealed, which endorses his position.
 23 F. 17a. See Talmud Bavly Sanhedrin 51b.
 24 Azariyah de’ Rossi, Meor ‘eynayim, section Imrey bynah, chapter 29. English 
translation by Joanna Weinberg, The Light of the Eyes, 406.
 25 Mishkeney ‘elyon was published for the first time by H. Friedlander in Ginzey 
Ramḥal (Bnei-Braq: 1984), 149-205. On M. H. Luzzatto, see in particular 
S. Ginzburg, The Life and Works of Moses Hayyim Luzzatto (Philadelphia: 
Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning, 1931); J. Hansel, Moïse 
Hayyim Luzzatto (1707-1746). Kabbale et philosophie (Paris: Editions du 
Cerf, 2004); N. Danieli, L’epistolario di Moshe Hayyim Luzzatto (Florence: 
Giuntina, 2006).
 26 Y. ben Abraham Gikatilla, Sha‘arey Orah (“Gates of Light”), ed. Y. ben Shelomo 
(Second edition, Jerusalem: 1989), vol. 1, p. 49. On Kabbalah and representa-
tion, see G. Busi, Qabbalah visiva (Turin: Einaudi, 2005). 
 27 Friedlander, 157.
4: The Myth of Politics in the Jewish Communities  
of the Italian City-States 
Pages 78-91
 1 Luzzatto, Simone, Discorso circa il stato de gl’hebrei (Venice, 1638) (reprinted 
in facsimile, Bologna: Arnaldo Forni, 1976), 37b. Now in Simone Luzzatto, 
Scritti politici e filosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento, ed. 
Giuseppe Veltri, Milano, Bompiani, 2013.
 2 For a select bibliography on Alemanno, see chapter 1.
 3 On Alemanno’s political thought see Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, “Some Observations 
on Yohanan Alemanno’s Political Ideas,” in Studies in Jewish Religious and 
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 4 Ḥesheq Shelomo, quoted in Joseph Perles, “Les savants juifs à Florence à 
l’époque de Laurent de Médicis,” in Revue des études Juives 13 (1886): 253.
 5 Ibid., 253-255.
 6 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, 34a. For an analysis of this section of Portaleone’s work 
and its relationship to the political thought of the Counter-Reformation, see 
Gianfranco Miletto, “La rappresentazione dello Stato ideale negli Shilte ha-gib-
borim di Avraham ben David da Portaleone.”
 7 Piero Camporesi, Le belle contrade. Nascita del paesaggio italiano (Milano: 
Garzanti, 1992).
 8 Shiltey ha-Gibborym, 34a.
 9 See supra, chapter 2.
 10 Ibid., 42b.
 11 On the historical consciousness of the Jews of this period, see Abraham Melamed, 
“The Perception of Jewish History in Italian Jewish thought of the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries: A re-examination,” Italia Judaica 2 (1986): 139-170.
 12 Ibid., 36b.
 13 On the juridical status of Mantuan Jews in Portaleone’s time, see Shlomo 
Simonsohn, History of the Jews in the Duchy of Mantua (Hebrew), vol. I, 78-86.
 14 In his Latin translation of excerpts from Shiltey ha-Gibborym, Blasio Ugolini 
appends a remark to this passage on artillery: “It is astonishing how, when speak-
ing on military matters, a man as intelligent and learned as our Abraham would 
not only fall asleep, but snore.” Thesaurus Antiquitatum Sacrarum, vol 9, col. 
CCCLXXV.
 15 Compare, for example, the illustration which represents a soldier armed with 
a musket in the work of the Dutch engraver Gheyn in Maniement d’armes 
d’arquebuses, mousquetz, et piques. En conformité de l’ordre de Mgr le Prince 
Maurice, Prince d’Orange,... Représenté par figures, par Jaques de Gheyn 
(By order of Sir Prince Maurice, Prince of Orange […] depicted with figures 
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 16 In the Varsaw 1862 edition of the Perush ‘al ha-Torah, pages 34v-37r.
 17 Ibid., 31v. This last comment was written in a period later than the previous. 
See Benzion Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel: Statesman and Philosopher 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1953, Hebrew trans. Jerusalem, 
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2005), 186-192. For a global analysis of Abravanel and his thought, see Roland 
Goetschel, Isaac Abravanel: Conseiller des princes et philosophe (1437-1508) 
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1996).
 18 Cf. Abraham Melamed, “The Myth of Venice in Italian Renaissance Jewish 
Thought,” in Italia Judaica. Atti del I Convegno internazionale, Bari, 18-22 May 
1981 (Rome: P.U.G. di Roma, 1983), 401-413.
 19 This author will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.
 20 Cf. Guido Bartolucci, “Venezia nel pensiero politico rinascimentale: un testo 
ritrovato di David de Pomis,” in Rinascimento, seconda serie, vol. XLIV (2004): 
225-247.
 21 Bartolucci notes this difference in his article, and justly cites the entry melekh 
(king) in the important Tzemaḥ David. Dittionario ebraico/italiano/latino by De 
Pomi (Venice, 1587).
 22 Bartolucci, “Venezia nel pensiero politico rinascimentale,” 244.
 23 Tzemaḥ David. Dittionario, 126 v.
 24 On S. Luzzatto, see Benjamin Ravid, Economics and Toleration in Seventeenth-
Century Venice: The Background and Context of the Discorso of Simone Luzzatto 
(New York: H. Kraus, 1978) Abraham Melamed, “Simone Luzzatto on Tacitus: 
Apologetica and Ragione di Stato,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and 
Literature, vol. 2, ed. Isidore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1984), 143-170; Giuseppe Veltri, “The City and the Ghetto: Simone 
Luzzatto and the Development of Jewish Political Thought,” in his Renaissance 
Philosophy in Jewish Garb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve 
of Modernity (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 195-225; and Giuseppe Veltri, “Dannare 
l’universale per il particolare? Colpa individuale e pena collettiva nel pensiero di 
Rabbi Simone Luzzatto,” Rassegna Mensile di Israele 77, n. 1-2 (2011): 65-81. 
 25 Socrate overo dell’humano sapere (Venice, 1651).
 26 Cf., for example, Luzzatto’s introduction to Yosef Shelomo Delmedigo’s Sefer 
Elym (Amsterdam, 1629), an important book on philosophy, geometry, and as-
tronomy, which rather stood out in the Hebrew canon: “My heart rejoices and my 
mind gloats over that wonderful knowledge; the mouths of those who look down 
upon us—saying that we lack science and wit—shall be sealed. Today, Greek and 
Roman scholars shall say: ‘So they have the same minds as us, and have shown 
their true worth.’ This text ought to be translated because it would bring us pres-
tige. I pray to God in His dwelling-place that the author may be acknowledged 
and praised and that the knowledge of God spreads over the earth!”
 27 Avraham Melamed, “Simone Luzzatto on Tacitus: Apologetica and Ragione di 
Stato,” 143-170. This argument had already been developed by Riccardo Bachi; 
cf. ibid., 156.
 28 Ibid. Luzzatto’s defense against the accusations of superstition directed at the 
Jews takes on an extra dimension when one considers that this was the central 
charge leveled at the Jews by his contemporary, the Venetian Samuel Nahmias 
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alias Giulio Morosini, a Jew who converted to Catholicism and was the author of 
Derekh Emunah. Via della fede mostrata a’gli ebrei (Roma, 1683). Cf. Discorso 
circa il stato de gl’hebrei, 66, and Derekh Emunah, 108 and passim.
 29 Ibid., 155.
 30 Discorso, 66a: “In much the same way, craftsmen work on leather, scouring it 
this way and that (“con il casuale stropiciamento”), stretching it, and softening it 
until it is ready to be handled and shaped.”
 31 Ibid.
 32 Here, he quotes Curtius Rufus’ Historiae Alexandri Magni: “Nulla res multi-
tudinem efficacius regit, quam superstitio.” Ibid., 67b.
 33 Ibid.
 34 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter 18. The Prince, according to 
Machiavelli, must be capable of acting “like both the fox and the lion.” 
 35 On this question, see also Melamed, op. cit., 168.
 36 Discorso, 73a. Cf. Melamed, 169-170.
 37 Discorso, 72b. Cf. Melamed, 167.
 38 Cf. for example, Abravanel’s comment on Deuteronomy XVII, 14-20. See 
also Yosef Kaplan, “Political Concepts in the World of the Portuguese Jews of 
Amsterdam During the Seventeenth Century: The Problem of Exclusion and the 
Boundaries of Self-Identity,” in Menasseh ben Israel and His World, ed. Yosef 
Kaplan, Henry Méchoulan, and Richard H. Popkin (Leiden: Brill, 1989); and 
Isaac Cardoso, Las excelencias y calunias de los Hebreos (Amsterdam, 1679); 
on the latter, see Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, From Spanish Court to Italian 
Ghetto: Isaac Cardoso: A Study in Seventeenth-Century Marranism and Jewish 
Apologetics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981).
 39 René Girard, Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde (Paris: Grasset, 
1978), 35. Quoted by Kaplan, 53. (Translated into English by Jean-Michel 
Oughourlian and Guy Lefort: Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World 
[New York: Athlone, 1987], 95). 
 40 See also chapter three: “De hebraeorum vocatione.”
5: A Link to Humanity: 
Judaism as Nation and Universal Religion 
Pages 92-104
 1 Hebraic Political Studies 1, no. 1 (2005): 24-56. This journal is entirely dedi-
cated to Jewish political thought. See also Abraham Melamed, Wisdom’s 
Little Sister: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought 
(Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2011); and Abraham Melamed, “Medieval 
and Renaissance Jewish Political Philosophy,” in History of Jewish Philosophy, 
ed. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge, 1997), vol. I, 
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pp. 415-449. For a key work in this field see Michael Walzer, Menachem 
Lorberbaum, Noam J. Zohar, and Yair Lorberbaum, eds., The Jewish Political 
Tradition, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000-2003). Confirming 
interest in the subject, the American journal Association of Jewish Studies also 
dedicated its Fall 2006 issue to “Jewish Political Studies.”
 2 On this issue, see Lea Campos Boralevi, “Mitzvoth beneh Noah: il diritto noaico 
nel dibattito seicentesco sulla tolleranza,” in La formazione storica della alterità. 
Studi di storia della tolleranza nell’età moderna offerti a Antonio Rotondo, ed. 
H. Méchoulan, E.H. Popkin, G. Ricuperati, and L. Simonutti (Olschki, Florence: 
Leo S. Olschki, 2001), 473-494, and Lea Campos Boralevi, “La Respublica he-
braeorum nella tradizione olandese,” in Politeia biblica 35, no. 3 (2003): 431-
463 (in an issue entirely devoted to “Political Thought”).
 3 See Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “A National Colonial Theology: Religion, 
Orientalism and the Construction of the Secular in Zionist Discourse,” in 
Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte 30 (2002): 312-326.
 4 Simone Luzzatto, Discorso circa il stato de gl’Hebrei, et in particolar dimoranti 
nell’inclita città di Venetia.
 5 But see the differing opinion in Giuseppe Veltri, “Ceremonial Law: History of 
a Philosophical-Political Concept,” in Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb, 
169-194.
 6 On Luzzatto’s Socrate see Giuseppe Veltri, “Principles of Jewish Skeptical 
Thought: The Case of Judah Moscato and Simone Luzzatto,” in Rabbi Judah 
Moscato and the Jewish Intellectual World of Mantua in the 16th-17th Centuries, 
ed. Giuseppe Veltri and Gianfranco Miletto (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 15-36.
 7 See Roberto Bonfil, “Changing Mentalities of Italian Jews Between the Periods 
of the Renaissance and the Baroque,” in Italia XI (1994): 61-79. Significantly, 
there was a movement at the time advocating the translation of the Bible, as 
well as philosophical and literary works, from Hebrew into Italian—as op-
posed to Judeo-Italian. On this subject, see Alessandro Guetta, “La traduzione 
italiana cinquecentesca del Moreh nevukhim di Maimonide,” in Percorsi di sto-
ria ebraica, ed. P. C. Ioly Zorattini (Udine, 2005), 281-303, and Alessandro 
Guetta, “Italian Translation of Hebrew Literature and Jewish Philosophy in 
the Renaissance” in Tov Elem: Memory, Community and Gender in Medieval 
and Early Modern Jewish Societies: Essays in Honor of Robert Bonfil, ed. 
E. Baumgarten, A. Raz Krakotzkin, and R. Weinstein (Jerusalem: Bialik 
Institute, 2011), 153-177.
 8 The poet and philosopher Mosheh of Rieti (1388-ca. 1465) used the same meta-
phor two centuries earlier, though to much more dramatic effect, in a text also 
written in Italian—or rather Umbrian: “Vidi un tempeštoso e terribil fjume, largo 
e profondo molto. Nascea appede de una città deserta. Lo cammino suo era long-
hissimo, e pjù perché rotava per salvatichi pagesi e girava nelle pjù štreme parti 
del mundo. Me parea quasi tornasse propio in quello lo’, o vero poco da longa. 
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Una nave, carica de donne e mammoli e pochi omini grandi, chi nudi e chi poco 
meno che nudi, se movea da la città deserta, tirava via verso el fine del fjume, ben 
che fosse lontano.
“… Nave nulla altra non se scontrao mai, ma per terra de là e de qua trova-
vano štranie genti che poco li antendeano; cercavano nogiarli, o tirarli a terra, 
o farli affocare.” (“I saw a stormy, terrible river, very wide and deep. It sprung 
at the foot of a desert city, and its course was very long, winding through wild 
countryside in the most remote parts of the world. A ship loaded with women 
and children, and a few adult men, all more or less naked, jouneyed from the 
desert city to the distant end of the river.… They never encountered other ships, 
but on either side of the river, there were strange people who barely understood 
them, and attempted either to drag them ashore or drown them.”) (Mosè da Rieti, 
Filosofia naturale e fatti de Dio. Testo inedito del secolo XV, ed. Irene Hijmans-
Tromp (Leiden: Brill, 1989) 416-417. After this excerpt, the text takes a mes-
sianic turn: a youth that has become a wise man takes the wheel of the ship and 
firmly leads it to its destination, which was also its starting point. There, the 
people that had watched the ship wander unite for battle but they all get killed, 
“and that magnificent city remained the queen of the world.” The city in question 
is Jerusalem, of course. 
 9 Cfr. B. Ravid, Economics and Toleration in Seventeenth Century Venice.
 10 As we have already seen (in the chapter on “The Myth of Politics”), in his introduc-
tion to Shelomo Yosef Delmedigo’s scientific text Sefer Elym (Amsterdam,1629), 
Luzzatto expounded on the scientific abilities of contemporary Jews, declaring 
them ahead of their Christian counterparts, and suggesting that Delmedigo’s 
book drew on a Latin tradition. The Venetian rabbi thus showed an implicit de-
sire for cultural collaboration between Jews and Christians.
 11 See Yosef H. Yerushalmi, “Clio and the Jews: Reflections on Jewish Histo-
rio graphy in the Sixteenth Century,” in Essential Papers on Jewish Culture in 
Renaissance and Baroque Italy, ed. David Ruderman (New York: New York 
University Press, 1992), 191-218; Robert Bonfil, “How Golden was the Age 
of the Renaissance in Jewish Historiography?,” History and Theory 27 (1988): 
78-102; and “Jewish Attitudes Toward History and Historical Writings in Pre-
Modern Times,” Jewish History 11, no. 1 (1997): 7-40.
 12 This term invites caution, as it also refers to the local community. Nevertheless, 
the unification of the Jews from all over the world, whatever their particular cus-
toms, was an important part of what Luzzatto meant by it. 
 13 A. Melamed, “ Simone Luzzatto on Tacitus: Apologetica and Ragione di Stato,” 
in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twerski, 2.
 14 In the introduction to Sefer Elym (see note 10 and chapter 4 note 18), Luzzatto 
bemoaned the loss of the Jewish sciences that the author of the book was restor-
ing. As well as rehearsing a notion of intellectual decadence that was a com-
monplace of Jewish literature, these words may be understood as denouncing 
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the popularization of Kabbalah in many social spheres. In his introduction to 
the same book, Leone Modena was more explicit than his Venetian colleague, 
arguing that the so-called “ascetic wise men of Israel” only denounced scientific 
books in order to conceal their own ignorance. 
 15 The word “modern” was in fact used by another proponent of this project: Leone 
Modena. See below, chapter 7.
 16 Baruch Spinoza, A Theological-Political Treatise, translated by R. H. M. Elwes 
(Rockville, MD: Arc Manor, 2008), 53. 
 17 Ibid., 60.
 18 See Gianfranco Miletto, “Die Bibel als Handbuch der Kriegskunst nach der 
Interpretation Portaleones,” in An der Schwelle zur Moderne. Juden in der 
Renaissance, ed. Giuseppe Veltri and Annette Winkelmann (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 
99-107.
 19 These three figures are linked, if not through personal acquaintance, at least 
through the references which were made to their respective works. Shiltey ha-
Gibborym (cf. Matzref la-Ḥokhmah, Odessa 1846, 16) was praised and com-
mended by Delmedigo, although he was one of the rare Jewish authors to ap-
prove of the book, probably because of its composite character. As we have al-
ready noted, Luzzatto believed that Delmedigo’s work was proof that the Jews 
were capable of science, and he wished to see it translated.
 20 De medico haebreo, 2.
 21 Ivi, 4.
 22 See Emilio Teza, “Delle operette minori di David De’ Pomi,” in Atti del R. Istituto 
di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Tomo VI, Serie VII (Venice, 1895), 965-984.
 23 Ivi, 14.
 24 Ivi, 40. 
 25 Ivi, 40 e 65-66.
 26 Ivi, 44, 66. 
 27 Ivi, 54.
 28 The work of the Venetian Sara Copio Sullam (1588?-1641) constitutes an inter-
esting evidence of universalistic religiosity without renouncing the Jewish par-
ticularity. In the following century, the poet Salomone Fiorentino (1743-1815) 
took up the same stance of fidelity to one’s original culture and spiritual adhesion 
to a non-confessional religiosity. See chapter “The Immortality of the Soul.”
 29 Ivi, 52.
 30 Published in Venice in 1572.
 31 L’Ecclesiaste di Salomone. Nuovamente dal testo hebreo tradotto e secondo il 
vero senso nel volgar idioma dichiarato (Venice, 1571).
 32 Leone Modena, Historia de’ riti ebraici (Paris, 1637).
 33 See chapter “Leone Modena’s Magen we-ḥerev as an Anti-Catholic Apologia”; 
Talya Fishman, “Changing Early Modern Jewish Discourse about Christianity: 
The Efforts of Rabbi Leon Modena,” in The Lion Shall Roar: Leon Modena 
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and His World (Italia, Conference Supplement Series, 1), ed. R. Bonfil and 
D. Malkiel (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2003), 159-194.
 34 Leone Modena, Py ha-Ariyeh (Venice, 1640) (Hebrew-Italian Biblical diction-
ary), introduction: “… The method of ancient interpretation in use among us is 
at present awkward and devoid of grace … and that is why I believe we need 
the light of a modern interpretation.” See Umberto Cassuto, “Saggi delle antiche 
traduzioni giudeo-italiane della Bibbia,” Annuario di studi ebraici 1 (1934): 
101-132.
 35 See Talya Fishman, Shaking the Pillars of Exile: “Voice of a Fool”: An Early 
Modern Jewish Critique of Rabbinic Culture (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997).
 36 There is an abundant bibliography on this question. See Roberto Bonfil, “Lo 
spazio culturale degli ebrei d’Italia fra Rinascimento ed Età barocca,” in Storia 
d’Italia. Annali 11: Gli ebrei in Italia, t. I: Dall’alto Medioevo all’età dei ghetti, 
ed. Corrado Vivanti (Turin: Einaudi, 1996), 433-441. On the relative “moder-
nity” of Kabbalah in Italy, see A. Guetta, “L’Italia e la ‘via ebraica alla moder-
nità’,” in David Bidussa (a cura di), Ebraismo, vol II by Giovanni Filoramo 
(a cura di), Le religioni e il mondo moderno (Turin: Einaudi, 2008), 5-24. 
 37 Cf.. Yeshayahu Tishby, “Ha-pulmus ‘al sefer ha-Zohar ba-meah ha-shesh-‘esreh 
be-Italiyah,” in Perakim: Yearbook of the Schocken Institute for Jewish Research 
of the Jewish Theological Seminary, 1967-68, pp. 131-192.
 38 Although Modena wrote an anti-kabbalistic work around 1640, it was only pub-
lished two centuries later, as Ary nohem (“A lion roaring”), in Leipzig in 1840. 
See Yaacob Dweck, The Scandal of Kabbalah: Leon Modena, Jewish Mysticism, 
Early Modern Venice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
 39 On this issue, see David Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in 
Early Modern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 213-228, in 
particular its chapter on “Kabbalah and Rationalism.”
6: The Italian and Latin Works of Lazzaro da Viterbo, 
Sixteenth-Century Jewish Humanist 
Pages 105-133
 1 David Kaufmann, “Lazarus de Viterbo’s Epistle to Cardinal Sirleto concerning 
the Integrity of the Text of the Hebrew Bible,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 7, 
no. 2 (1895): 278-296.
 2 François Secret, ed., “Le Tractatus de Anno Jubilaei de Lazaro de Viterbo, 
Grégoire XIII et la Kabbale chrétienne,” Rinascimento 17 (December 1966): 
305-333.
 3 Lazzaro’s teshuvah, written in 1578, figures in a responsa manuscript by Italian 
rabbis: see Mosè Giacomo Montefiore, “Un recueil de consultations rabbiniques 
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rédigé en Italie au XVIIe siècle,” in Revue des études juives 10 (1885): 185. Paul 
Rieger (Geschichte der Juden in Rom, zweiter Band 1420-1870 [Berlin: 1895], 
262-264) attributes another responsum to him, this one printed in Mashbyth 
milḥamoth (“He who makes the battles cease,” [Venice, 1606], ff. 91b-92a), 
which, however, is signed “Ḥamul Matzliaḥ Kohen son of Gaon, Rabbi Yitzḥaq 
Kohen da Viterbo.” This would indicate that the author is the nephew of Lazzaro 
(his brother’s son). Therefore, Rieger’s description of Lazzaro/Eli‘ezer as “a 
very important Roman Jewish jurist” (“Halachist”), erroneously based on this 
responsum, does not seem justified. According to Rieger, Lazzaro had been “fat-
tore,” or lay leader, of the Roman Jewish community as of 1570. The rabbinical 
title also derived from two legal documents published by Kenneth R. Stow in 
The Jews in Rome, vol. 2 (Boston: Brill, 1996), 562 and 570, in which “ha-aluf 
Rabbi Eli‘ezer Matzliaḥ ha-Kohen ben Avraham Kohen mi-Viterbo” is named 
as arbiter of a dispute been the Sicilian Scola and the Scola Nova of the Roman 
Jewish community. 
 4 On the medical title, see note 6. Lazzaro had previously lived, from 1549 to 1556, 
in Amelia, a town between Umbria and Lazio, where he was one of the owners 
of the local lending bank. See Michele Luzzati, Le Famiglie de Pomis da Spoleto 
e Cohen da Viterbo e l’emigrazione ebraica verso la Toscana meridionale nella 
seconda metà del Cinquecento, at http://www.consultacultura.org/santa_fiora/
storia/gli%20ebrei.htm. Lazzaro was probably the son-in-law of the famous 
doctor, exegete, and philosopher ‘Ovadiyah (Servadio) Sforno (1475-1550); see 
Michele Procaccia, “‘Non daberà’: gli ebrei di Roma nei primi cinquanta anni 
del ‘500 attraverso le fonti giudiziarie,” in Italia Judaica. Gli ebrei nello Stato 
pontificio fino al Ghetto (1555). Atti del VI Convegno internazionale, Tel Aviv, 
18-22 June 1995 (Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1998), 80-
93. On his kinship with David de Pomi, see note 6. For other information, see 
Jewish Encyclopedia, 1906, sub voce. However, the claim that Eli‘ezer/Lazzaro 
can be identified with Theodorus de Sacerdotibus, appointed personal physician 
to Pope Julius III in June of 1550 (cf. Simonsohn, The Apostolic See, VI, doc. 
2924), appears to be unfounded. The name Theodorus does not correspond to the 
Hebrew Eli’ezer (possibly to Nethanel), and Eli‘ezer ha-Kohen mi-Viterbo had 
a Latin/Italian name, Lazzaro/Lazarus. The Theodorus de Sacerdotibus who was 
the Pope’s doctor is probably the same doctor who was in Genoa and other places 
in the Republic of Genoa from 1538 to 1548; cf. Rossana Urbani and Guido 
Nathan Zazzu, The Jews in Genoa, vol. I (Leiden: Brill, 1999), doc. 258 et seq. 
The Jews were expelled from Genoa in April of 1550; Theodorus had to move to 
Rome and was immediately called into the service of the Pope. 
 5 Allatino, native of Spoleto, is the author of the Latin translation of the Hebrew 
version of Themistius’s paraphrases of Aristotle’s De caelo: Paraphrasis in li-
bros IV Aristotelis (Venice: Galignano, 1574); reprinted in Samuel Landauer, ed., 
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Themistii in libros Aristotelis De Caelo paraphrasis hebraice et latine (Berlin: 
Reimer, 1902). Another of his translations, the second part of Avicenna’s Canon, 
is lost. He lived in Ferrara. (For the last two points, see Tzemaḥ David, next 
note).
 6 De Pomi (born in 1525, also in Spoleto) wrote various essays in Latin and Italian, 
as well as a translation of Ecclesiastes that has survived and translations of other 
books of the Bible, which were never published and are now lost, and an impor-
tant Hebrew-Italian-Latin dictionary, Tzemaḥ David (1587). In the brief autobi-
ography in the Hebrew introduction to the Tzemaḥ David, reference is made to 
a kinship with Lazzaro, who is called ḥakham we-rofe muvhaq (wise and excel-
lent doctor), and to Lazzaro’s brother, Rabbi Yizḥaq da Viterbo “sublime sage 
(gaon) and great philosopher.” In the same introduction, De Pomi cites Mosè 
Allatino (“excellent philosopher and doctor”) as stepbrother of his teacher of 
logic, Yeḥyiel Reḥavia, in the city of Todi. 
 7 The Mantuan Sommo (1527-1592) was a prolific playwright and author of a trea-
tise in Italian on the art of theater. He also translated a part of the book of Psalms 
into Italian. He composed various poems in Hebrew and wrote the play Tzaḥuth 
bediḥuta de-Kiddushin.
 8 De’ Rossi (c. 1513-1578, born in Mantua and subsequently living in Ferrara) re-
ferred extensively to Latin sources for his magnum opus, Meor ‘eiynayim, which 
also includes a Hebrew translation of the Latin version of the Letter to Aristeas. 
He also wrote a brief treatise in Italian on the language of the Gospel, published 
in 2005 by Joanna Weinberg as Azariah de’ Rossi’s Observation on the Syriac 
New Testament: A Critique of the Vulgate by a Sixteenth-Century Jew (London: 
Warburg Institute, 2005).
 9 In 1584, Portaleone published De auro dialogi tres, which displays the knowl-
edge and attitude of a humanist scientist critical of the medieval tradition. In the 
Hebrew volume Shiltey ha-Gibborym, published in 1612, Portaleone uses a great 
many Greek and Latin sources and terms, which he often cites in the original 
language, but transliterated into Hebrew. He also edited the Consilia medica, 
a collection of scientific manuscripts in Italian and Latin. 
 10 Lazarus de Viterbo’s Epistle to Cardinal Sirleto, 278.
 11 For a general recognition, see Moses A. Shulvass, “The Knowledge of Antiquity 
among the Italian Jews of the Renaissance,” in the Proceedings of the American 
Association of Jewish Research 18 (1948-49): 291-299. See also Giuseppe Veltri, 
Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
 12 On the importance of Dante among Italian Jews see Asher Salah, “A Matter of 
Quotation: Dante and the Literary Identity of Jews in Italy,” The Italia Judaica 
Jubilee Conference, ed. Sh. Simonsohn, J. Shatzmiller (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 
167-197. 
 13 On Mosheh da Rieti, see previous chapters.
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 14 Two of these translations are in Hebrew characters: 
1) Shemuel da Castelnuovo, Me‘on ha-shoalym (Venice: Giovanni De Gara, 
1609). Shemuel had been one the leading rabbis in Rome starting in 1620. 
See Andrea Yaakov Lattes, Una società dentro le mura. La comunità ebraica 
di Roma nel Seicento, forthcoming, passim. 
2) Anonymous, manuscript preserved at the Bodleian Library at Oxford, MS 
Michael 11 ff. 13r-32r, Jerusalem Microfilm F 19150. This last translation 
(prior to 1554, the year it was submitted to censorship) appears in four other 
manuscripts, two in Hebrew characters and two in Italian characters, with 
some variants that likely attest to an evolution toward literary Italian: Rome, 
Biblioteca Casanatense 2728, ff. 35r-42v, Jerusalem Microfilm F25G; Milan, 
Biblioteca Ambrosiana X157 Sup, Jerusalem Microfilm F18669, ff. 56v-
77r; Cambridge, Trinity College ff.12-41, Jerusalem Microfilm F12226; and 
Florence, Medicea Laurenziana Plut. II. 29, Jerusalem Microfilm 17669, 
ff. 1r-6v (this last is a codex that contains the Hebrew text and the Italian 
translation of Keter malkhuth and the beginning of the Ke‘arath kesef; see 
note 16).
In Italian characters, and both printed, are: 
3) Eli‘ezer Matzliaḥ ben Avraham Kohen (Lazzaro da Viterbo), Me‘on ha-
Shoalym (Venice: Giovanni De Gara, c. 1585), date attributed by Steinschnei-
der in his Catalog of Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library of Oxford (Berlin 
1852-1860 col. 1987);
4) Debora Ascarelli, Me‘on ha-Shoalym (Venice: Daniel Zanetti, 1602). 
(A re-transcription in Hebrew characters was done by Yehuda Ḥayyim 
Carpi di Casale Monferrato, in the collection of Hebrew texts in the trans-
lation he did at Rivalta in 1612: manuscript preserved in Moscow at the 
Russian State Library, MS Guenzburg 669, Jerusalem Microfilm F47961, 
ff. 127r-141v). 
On these translations, see Moritz Steinschneider, “Die italienische Litteratur 
der Juden,” in Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 
2 (1898): 91-93.
 15 Of about fifty complete or partial manuscripts of Miqdash me‘at reviewed by 
the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts at the National Library of 
Jerusalem, about a dozen present only this chapter, copied from the early decades 
of the sixteenth century (a copy made by Azariyah de’ Rossi in 1531 is particu-
larly significant) until the seventeenth century (presumably in the early decades 
as well).
 16 In a manuscript preserved by the Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia of Budapest, 
MS Kaufmann A 428 (The Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts 
F 15810), the Me‘on ha-shoalym appears in the same codex with the Keter mal-
khuth of Shelomo Ibn Gabirol (Andalusia, eleventh century), the Ke‘arath kesef 
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of Yosef Ezobi (Provence, thirteenth century), and other penitential composi-
tions. Furthermore, Lazzaro da Viterbo, in his Hebrew dedication [see infra] 
identifies the text as a “powerful prayer [noraah], a psalm of thanksgiving, a 
confession for the terrible day [an allusion to Kippur] that purifies [ha-malbyn] 
the sins of Israel.”
 17 Lazzaro’s text presents none of the formal defects visible in other versions, 
which are, however, faithful and relatively fluent, especially when one considers 
the difficulty of translating such a long text in rhyme: 1) the hendecasyllable is 
always maintained; he does not do as other authors do (though rarely) by using 
verses of ten (Ascarelli: “S’altro onor dispregi esser beato”) or twelve sylla-
bles (Ascarelli: “Unite nei gradi lor alte, e supreme,” Castelnovo: “ché l’error 
mio nissun termine comparte”), or even thirteen (Ascarelli: “Perdona, perdona 
ohimé Signor clemente,” Castelnovo: “E scrivirò sul libro e sopre il cor che 
serra”); 2) The rhythmic accents always respect the semantics of the verse (while 
in Ascarelli we see: “Poi ch’il peccato non ׀ merta perdono”) or the tonic accent 
of the word (Ascarelli: “Porgemi, e fammi fe-׀-lice vedere”); 3) the anaphoras of 
the Hebrew text are partially maintained in the translation. 
 18 Tractatus, 309, Psalm 110: “Principium sapientiae est timor Domini.”
 19 Ibid., 318: “The Hebrew scholars say that in another time, there will be no food 
or drink, but the just will be seated with a crown on their heads, feeding on di-
vine beauty and making use of the wisdom of God,” reference to Talmud Bavly, 
Beraḥoth 17a, taken up by Maimonides in Commentary to the Mishnah, intro-
duction to the Sanhedrin treatise (Pereq ḥeleq) and Mishneh Torah, Hilkhoth 
Teshuva 8:2. The explicit reference to the Talmud, which was forbidden at that 
time, is interesting in itself.
 20 Ibid., “Pietas nihil aliud est quam Dei notio.”
 21 Tractatus, 316.
 22 Ibid.
 23 Ibid., 323. See also 328: “If by the grace of God the veil of the body will be lifted, 
and the light of knowledge will shine above us, we will make use of its wisdom, 
which is none other than the joining in pleasure, and remaining in it.”
 24 Ibid., 329.
 25 On 326, Lazzaro criticizes Aristotle, who “did not understand or did not want 
to understand” the meaning of certain statements of Parmenides and Melissus, 
which were in his opinion close to the rabbinical conception of God as begin-
ning, middle, and end of each thing.
 26 Direct or indirect citations by Maimonides are on 312 and 318. On 317, Lazzaro 
refers to biblical metaphors relating to God, taking them up again without citing 
the sources of the passages from the first part of the Guide.
 27 For the first, see 314 and 315 on the properties of the number seven; for the sec-
ond, see 313 on the meaning of the word yovel.
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 28 318.
 29 321.
 30 Another rabbinical interpretation on the piercing of the ears of slaves who reject 
freedom (Talmud Bavly Kiddushin 22b) is introduced by a statement of Plato 
based on the “authority of Homer.” See 324.
 31 Tractatus, 330.
 32 De doctrina christiana, De fide et symbolo, In expositione Psalmi 92, Epistolae, 
De gratia et libero arbitrio, Enchiridion.
 33 Tractatus, 330-331.
 34 For example, the importance of the number fifty in the Bible, 322; the identifica-
tion between the attribute of sefyrah Bynah (equivalent to Jubilee), and the “req-
uies aeterna” and “pietas absoluta,” 321 and 322; and the idea that the Hebrew 
letters are the “simulacrum sublimis sapientiae per quam creata sunt omnia,” 325. 
In this regard François Secret cites Johannes Reuchlin, Paulus Ricius, Egidio da 
Viterbo, and Francesco Zorzi, as well as Guillaume Postel. Lazzaro da Viterbo 
possessed a manuscript of ancient kabbalistic texts, now preserved at the Vatican 
Library (Hebrew 505).
 35 Manuscript from the Vatican Apostolic Library, Boncompagni, F, 32, folio 209 
V (thanks to Michela Torbidoni, who allowed me to obtain a reproduction of the 
manuscript). For the graphic transposition of psalm 67 (66 in the Catholic Bible), 
into the shape of the Menorah, common among all Jewish communities, associ-
ated in some cases with kabbalistic considerations, and going back to at least the 
fourteenth century, see Esther Juhasz, The Shiviti-Menorah: A Representation 
of the Sacred—Between Spirit and Matter, PhD thesis, Jewish University of 
Jerusalem, 2004, and Shubert Spero, “The Menorah Psalm,” in Jewish Bible 
Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2009): 11-17. For the same transposition of the Latin text of 
the psalm among Christian scholars of Judaism, see Anthony Grafton and Joanna 
Weinberg, I Have Always Loved The Holy Tongue: Isaac Casaubon, The Jews, 
and a Forgotten Chapter in Renaissance Scholarship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 84.
 36 314, on the divine attributes in 1 Chronicles 29 and in Revelation 7:12; 320 
on the remission of sins according to the Torah and the famous formula in 
Matthew (6:12) “Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debi-
toribus nostris”; 332 on the seven prayers of the Sunday oration inspired by 
Matthew.
 37 Tractatus 324.
 38 Kenneth R. Stow, The Jews in Rome, passim.
 39 Kenneth. R. Stow, “A Tale of Uncertainties: Converts in the Roman Ghetto,” 
in Shlomo Simonsohn Jubilee Volume, ed. D. Carpi et al (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv 
University Press, 1993), 257-281, reproduced in his Jewish Life in Early Modern 
Rome: Challenge, Conversion and Private Life (Hampshire: Ashgate, Variorum, 
2007). The reference to this episode is on p. 265. Caffiero 269 note 2. Medici 
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catalogo de’ neofiti, 53-59. On the conversion of Salomone Corcos and his 
son Lazzaro in 1572, see Paolo Sebastiano Medici, Catalogo de’ neofiti illustri 
(Florence, 1701), 53-57. Salomone and Lazzaro, who became respectively Ugo 
and Gregorio, attained high-level positions and honors, for themselves and their 
descendants. See also Marina Caffiero, Legami pericolosi: Ebrei e cristiani tra 
eresia, libri proibiti e stregoneria (Rome: Einaudi, 2012), passim.
 40 On Sirleto and the Jews, see Ch. Dejob, “Documents tirés des papiers du car-
dinal Sirleto,” Revue des etudes juives 9 (1884): 77-91; Kenneth R. Stow, “The 
Burning of the Talmud in 1553, in the Light of Sixteenth Century Catholic 
Attitudes towards the Talmud,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 34 
(1972): 435-459, reproduced with updates in Stow, Jewish Life. Sirleto’s name 
is also connected to an index of the most severely prohibited books issued by 
the Congregazione dell’Indice, of which he was President starting in 1571. See 
Gigliola Fragnito, La Bibbia al rogo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), 116-121.
 41 The other authors recalled were Pythagoras, Hermes Trismegistus, Homer, 
Hippocrates, Seneca, Justinian, Averroes, and Ficino.
 42 The author translates leshon ha-qodesh very precisely with “lingua sanctitatis” 
(Lazarus de Viterbo’s Epistle, 284). Lazzaro, like all Jewish and Christian writers 
of the time, considers Hebrew the language of creation, of consequence, one that 
has a “natural” and not conventional relationship with things.
 43 Ibid., 287: “An hoc sit verum nec ne, tanquam manifestissimum aliorum iudicio 
relinquo.”
 44 Ibid., “By their own fault they are oppressed everywhere.”
 45 Talmud Bavly Yoma 9b.
 46 294. I was unable to find this statement of Thomas Aquinas. The phrase was 
coined by Jerome, who refers to the apostle Paul as “vas electionis,” or “great 
expert on Law and Scripture” (Acts 9:15). See Jerome, Epistle 3:53.
 47 Christian commentators and translators read the Hebrew ka-ary (like a lion) as 
karu (they pierced [the hands and feet]).
 48 Jeremiah 23:6, on the name of the Messiah and on those who attribute this name 
to him.
 49 Elia Levita also uses the wording masera. See following notes.
 50 Lazarus de Viterbo’s Epistle, 289.
 51 Masoreth ha-masoreth (Venice: Bomberg, 1538). The position of Elia Levita on 
the dating of the vowel points and singing/chanting tones is enunciated in the 
first and the third introduction, on 5 and 20-30 respectively.
 52 “Divrey emeth nikkarym,” Masoreth ha-masoreth, 3.
 53 See A. de’ Rossi, Sefer meor ‘eynayim, English translation by Joanna Weinberg, 
The Light of the Eyes, 699-709.
 54 In 1620, Johannes Buxtorf published Tiberias, sive Commentarius Masoreticus, 
in which he criticized Levita’s conclusions. His son, Johannes Buxtorf II, con-
firmed his father’s thesis in an argument with Louis Cappel. On these discussions, 
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see Gérard F. Weil, Elie Lévita humaniste et massorète (1469-1549) (Leiden: 
Brill, 1963), 286-343, and Stephen G. Burnett, From Christian Hebraism to 
Jewish Studies: Johannes Buxtorf (1564-1629) and Hebrew Learning in the 
Seventeenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 203-239.
 55 On this subject, see A. Guetta, “The Crisis of Medieval Knowledge in the Work 
of the Fifteenth-Century Poet and Philosopher Moses da Rieti,” in Renewing 
the Past, Reconfiguring Jewish Culture: From al-Andalus to the Haskalah, ed. 
Ross Brann and Adam Sutcliffe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 59-68.
 56 This passage was certainly inspired by a religious poem (a “request,” baqqashah) 
by Sa‘adiyah Gaon (ninth to tenth centuries). See I. Davidson, S. Assaf, and 
B. I. Joel, eds., Siddur R. Saadja Gaon (Jerusalem: Mekize Nirdamim, 1941), 
64-81. 
 57 In the text: filla.
 58 In the text: Tarando.
 59 In the text: Del.
 60 In the text: darvi. 
 61 In the text: ci.
 62 Proposed addition in the text.
 63 In the text: i.
7: Leone Modena’s Magen we-ḥerev  
as an Anti-Catholic Apologia 
Pages 134-152
 1 See Daniel J. Lasker, Jewish Philosophical Polemics against Christianity in the 
Middle Ages (New York: Ktav, 1977); Idem, “Jewish Anti-Christian Polemics 
in the Early Modern Period: Change or Continuity?,” in Tradition, Heterodoxy 
and Religious Culture: Judaism and Christianity in the Early Modern Period, ed. 
Chanita Goodblatt  and Howard Kreisel (Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of 
the Negev, 2007), 469–88; David Berger, “On the Use of History in Medieval 
Jewish Polemic against Christianity: The Quest for the Historical Jesus,” in Jewish 
History and Jewish Memory: Essays in Honor of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, ed. 
Elisheva Carlebach et al. (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 1998), 25-39.
 2 Cf. note by Modena’s nephew Yitzḥaq min ha-Levyyim in the margin of his 
copy of Magen we-ḥerev (in Abraham Geiger, Leon da Modena Rabbiner zu 
Venedig [1571-1648] [Breslau: 1856], 11a): “He [Modena] had the idea of writ-
ing this book five years before his death. [ ... ] He took note of the opinions of all 
their most important scholars so as to answer them by striking them with their 
own sword, thus bringing true the verse (Psalms 37:15) ‘Their sword shall enter 
into their own heart.’”
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 3 On Magen ve-Ẓinnah see the French translation, with an excellent introduction 
by Jean-Pierre Osier, Le Bouclier et la Targe (Paris, 1980), republished in his 
D’Uriel da Costa à Spinoza (Paris, 1983). 
 4 Magen we-ḥerev: ḥibbur neged ha-Natzruth meeth Yehudah Ariyeh mi-Modena 
(Latin title, Clipeus et gladius. Leonis Mutinensis tractatus antichristianus) 
(Jerusalem, 1960). The words “Magen we-ḥerev” are a quotation from Psalms 
76:4 and 1 Chronicles 5:18. A doctoral thesis on the work is Lou Silberman, 
The Magen wa-ḥerev of R. Judah Aryeh of Modena, D. H. L. Thesis, Hebrew 
Union College, 1943. English translation: A Translation of the Magen We-Hereb 
by Leon Modena, translated by Allan Howard Podet (Lewiston-Queenston-
Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001).
 5 Magen, 42.
 6 Ibid., 44.
 7 Ibid., 46.
 8 Ibid., Introduction, p.3.
 9 The historical reconstitution of the life of Jesus aside, for which Modena recog-
nised (ibid. 43) he had “formulated an interpretative framework” (hotzety klal).
 10 De arcanis catholicae veritatis was first published by Soncino in Ortona in 1518. 
At least another six editions were catalogued between 1550 and 1672, published 
in Basel, Paris, and Frankfurt. On this subject, see Arduino Kleinhans, O.F.M., 
“De vita et operibus Petri Galatini, O.F.M., Scientiarum Biblicarum cultoris 
(c. 1460-1540)” Antonianum, Periodicum Philosophico-Theologicum, Annus I 
Tomus I (1926): 145-179 and 327-356. The reference to the editions is on 174. 
I have quoted the Basel edition of 1550.
 11 Howard Adelman, “Rabbi Leon Modena and the Christian Kabbalists”, in 
Renaissance Rereadings: Intertext and Context, ed. M. C. Horovitz, A. C. Cruz, 
and Wendy A. Furman (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271-286. 
 12 Magen, 51. See also ibid., 11. In fact Galatino had drawn freely on Raimondo 
Martini’s Pugio fidei, though Modena could not have been aware of it, since the 
work was published for the first time in 1651. Iohannes Benedictus Carpzovius, 
in his edition of Pugio fidei (Lipsie 1687), drew up an index of the passages 
Galatino had borrowed from Martini.
 13 De arcanis, caput VII.
 14 Ibid., Caput VI, p. 20.
 15 Ibid., Prefatio autoris.
 16 Ibid., 50 and 196.
 17 These manuscript texts were described by Kleinhans, 157-15 and 164, and ana-
lysed in Anna Morisi, “Galatino et la Kabbale chrétienne,” in Kabbalistes chré-
tiens. Cahiers de l’Hermétisme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), 213-231. See also 
Roberto Rusconi, Profezia e profeti alla fine del Medioevo (Rome: Viella, 1999) 
(especially pages 212-221 and 265-294, with bibliography) and Kenneth R. 
Stow, “The Burning of the Talmud in 1553,” in Essential Papers on Judaism and 
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Christianity in Conflict: From Late Antiquity to Reformation, ed. Jeremy Cohen 
(New York: New York University Press, 1991), 401-428.
 18 Cf. Morisi, 217 and 219.
 19 De arcanis, caput VI, p. 21.
 20 Cf., e. g., François Secret, Les Kabbalistes Chrétiens de la Renaissance, new 
ed., 1985, passim and esp. 102-106. Cf. also Encyclopaedia Judaica, sub voce 
Galatino, Pietro. On the importance of Kabbalah in the work of Galatino, see 
Rusconi, Profezia e profeti, 271-272. Galatino considered authentic Gale Rezayah 
and Iggereth ha-Sodoth, the two Kabbalist texts written by the Aragonese Paul de 
Heredia. Cf. A. Freimann, “Paulus de Heredia als Verfasser der Kabbalistischen 
Schriften Igeret ha-Sodot und Galie Raze,” in Festschrift Jakob Guttman 
(Leipzig, Fock, 1915), 206-209, and Gershom Scholem, “Zur Geschichte der 
Anfänge der christlichen Kabbala,” in Essays Presented to Leo Baeck (London: 
East and West Library, 1954), 158. Modena had already denied the authentic-
ity of these two texts, basing his opinion on textual and logical arguments. Cf. 
Magen we-ḥerev, 51. 
 21 Ibid., 9, where the opinion of the Talmudic scholars is mentioned after the ra-
tional proofs, on the subject of the repentance of Adam: “And I say that not to 
offer a proof against the Christians using the affirmations of our masters, but 
because the notion is correct from any point of view”; 65: “In this work my in-
tention is not to explain the verses used against us, with a few exceptions, nor a 
fortiori [to explain] the affirmations of our masters.”
 22 Ibid., 23. The affirmation is to be found in the chapter contesting the conceiv-
ability of the Trinity, defined by Modena as “fundamental” (‘iqaryth) because in 
it he states the criteria that, in his opinion, should decide the truth of religious 
dogma. On this idea see Yosef Albo, Sefer ha-‘iqqarym III, 25, 3 and Eliyah Del 
Medigo, Sefer Beḥynath ha-dath, ed. and trans. Jacob J. Ross, 77.
 23 This figure, naturally, is an exaggeration. It demonstrates, however, how an 
Italian Jew saw the world in the era of geographic discoveries.
 24 Ibid., 18.
 25 Ibid., 14.
 26 Modena’s terminology would appear to be not entirely religious. Sometimes he 
uses the term tziyyur to denote the imagination (p. 21, criticizing Christian “in-
ventions”) and sometimes to denote the concept (p. 22, defining the thinkable 
object).
 27 Ibid., 21-22.
 28 Ibid., 22. Modena’s text is a paraphrase which summarises the three relevant 
passages of Maimonides which referred to men who mechanically repeat be-
liefs with no adequate intellectual representation, whom he contrasts with the 
philosophers; his concern is thus with the dichotomy between philosophers and 
non-philosophers. Modena was closer to Albo in his religious polemical logic.
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 29 Ibid., 16-17.
 30 Ibid., 13.
 31 Ibid., 14.
 32 For an outstanding bibliography of the religious polemic of the Middle Ages, 
see Hanne Trautner-Kromann, Shield and Sword: Jewish Polemics against 
Christianity and the Christians in France and Spain from 1100-1500 (Tübingen: 
Mohr-Siebeck, 1993), 201-208.
 33 Cf. “The dispute between Nahmanides and Pablo Christiani (1263),” in Kitvey 
Ramban, vol. l, ed. David Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1963), 299-
320: “My soul is as alike to that of my first ancestor as to that of Pharaoh; and 
Pharaoh’s sins do not condemn my soul to hell. The punishment for the sin of 
the first man was corporal, for my body does come from my father and mother.” 
Modena was familiar with the text of this dispute; cf. Magen, 69; Ḥasdai Crescas, 
Maamar be-Vittul ‘Iqqarey Dath ha-Notzrym (A Treatise on Negation of the 
Foundations of the Christian Religion, trans. Yosef ben Shem Tov in 1451) in 
Judah David Eisenstein, ’Otzar Wiqquḥym (A Collection of Polemics and Dis-
putations) (New York, 1928), 298; Yitzḥak ben Avraham Troki, Sefer Ḥizzuq ha-
Emunah (ed. David Deutsch, Befestigung im Glauben) (Sohran-Breslau, 1873), 
88. On religious controversy after Modena, cf. Yair ben Shabbetay da Correggio, 
Ḥerev Pifiyoth (ed. Judah Rosenthal, A Two-Edged Sword) (Jerusalem: Mosad 
Harav Kook, 1958), 97. 
 34 On this question in rabbinical literature, see Israël Lévi, “Le péché originel 
dans les anciennes sources juives,” in École pratique des hautes etudes, Section 
sciences religieuses (Paris, 1907), 1-28; Ephraim E. Urbach, The Sages, Their 
Concepts and Beliefs (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), ch. XV.
 35 Y. Troki mentioned Ambrose (Ḥizzuq ha-Emunah, 91), but only to correct the 
Greek text of the Gospels.
 36 Magen, 10.
 37 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Primae secundae, quaestio LXXXI, artic-
ulus I., in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, vol. VI (Rome: 1891), 87-88: 
“Omnes homines qui nascuntur ex Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, in-
quantum in natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt.” Modena’s position can also 
be seen in the context of the debate on the transmission of the soul, and therefore 
of the original sin, by way of carnal generation. Luther and Calvin diverged on 
that issue; Calvin strongly opposed the notion.
 38 Magen, 11.
 39 De arcanis, caput V, 445 and following.
 40 Cf. Cecil Roth, “Leone da Modena and the Christian Hebraists of his age,” in 
his Studies in Books and Booklore (Fornborough: Gregg Publishing, 1972), 200. 
See also Modena’s own declaration in the same letter (ibid., 201): “1 corpi si 
hanno da lui [Adamo] con quelle maledittione e difficoltà al ben operare che per 
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il peccato furono causate nel suo, come corpi originati dal suo corpo, ma l’anima 
non mai sia stata dannata né impedita per il suo peccato essendo da Dio imme-
diatamente infusa nella creatione.” 
 41 Magen, 42.
 42 The book was first published in London in 1619, under the pseudonym of Pietro 
Soave Polano, and went through a number of editions. I cite the following edi-
tion: Paolo Sarpi, Istoria del concilio tridentino, ed. Corrado Vivanti (Turin: 
Einaudi, 1974). The discussion of original sin is on pages 292-307. 
 43 Istoria, 294. The formula approved by the Council was the following: “If a per-
son maintains that [...] only death and bodily suffering were communicated and 
passed on to all humankind by Adam and not the sin which is the death of the 
soul, that person shall be anathema [...].” In Carl Joseph Hefele, Histoire des 
Conciles, vol. X: A. Michel, Les décrets du Concile de Trente (Paris, 1938), 48.
 44 The idea that original sin was more an illness than a perversion had been formu-
lated by Ulrich Zwingli. Cf. U. Zwingli, De peccato originale, in Opera, eds. M. 
Schuller and L. Schultes (Zurich, 1822-1842), vol. III, p. 629.
 45 For the Jewish attitude to Protestantism, see Hayyim Ben-Sasson, “Ha-Yehudim 
mul ha-Reformatziyah” (The Reformation in Contemporary Jewish Eyes), 
Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 4, no. 5 (1970): 
62-116, and Roberto Bonfil, “Gli ebrei d’Italia e la riforma: una questione da 
riconsiderare,” Nouvelles de la Republique des lettres 2 (1996): 47-60, which 
corrects the theories of Ben-Sasson.
 46 On the beginnings of criticism of the Trinity in the modern period—in Spain in 
particular, namely Erasmianism and the works of Juan de Valdès and Miguel 
Servet—as well as its propinquity to the culture of the “new Christians,” see 
Richard H. Popkin, “Marranos, New Christians and the Beginnings of Modern 
Anti-Trinitarianism,” in Dor gerushey Sefarad, ed. Yom Tov Assis and Yosef 
Kaplan (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 1999), 143-160 of 
the English section.
 47 The Guide of the Perplexed I:6.
 48 Magen, 26. Modena draws other references in this vein (Hermes Trismegistus, 
Philo Judaeus) from Meor ‘eynayim (Enlightenment of the Eyes), published in 
1575 by Azariyah de’ Rossi, whom he called “One of our recent writers.”
 49 Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, pars prima, quaestio XXXII, art. I, in 
Opera omnia, vol. IV, p. 349) recognised the incapacity of natural reason to come 
to this understanding, for God is known through his creatures and—since the crea-
tive power is common to all three persons—we know only the unity of the divine 
essence. But, for Thomas, the idea of the Trinity did not run counter to reason.
 50 Magen, 31.
 51 Nicolai Parutae Viri Pientissimi, De Uno Vero Deo Iehova Fragmenta Quaedam 
Disputationum. The text was rediscovered by Massimo Firpo in a manuscript 
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which reproduced the text of the book, which had been published in 1575 and 
disappeared during the activities of the Inquisition. It is published in Massimo 
Firpo, Antitrinitari nell’Europa orientale del ‘500. Nuovi testi di Simon Budny, 
Niccolò Paruta e Iacopo Paleologo (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1977), 329-360. 
On Paruta, whose wandering fate was that of Italian “heretics” in his time, see the 
detailed presentation in ibid., 186-271.
 52 Ḥizzuq ha-Emunah, cil., p. 86. Troki also mentions the work of the Polish 
Anabaptist Martin Czechowitz (1532-1613). Judah Rosenthal studied the en-
counters between Christian sectaries and Jews in fifteenth-century Poland in his 
“Rabbi Ya‘aqov mi-Belzyce and his book of religious polemic” (in Hebrew), in 
Galed 1 (1973): 13-30, with a bibliography of previous articles on the subject by 
the author. It is interesting to note that the Catholics referred to these sectaries as 
“Judaisers.” 
 53 De Uno Vero Deo, 336. 
 54 Ibid., 353.
 55 Ibid., 360.
 56 Ibid., 354.
 57 On the description of the paths taken by other individual which have in com-
mon doubts on the divinity of Christ and a desire to become familiar with the 
Bible in the Hebrew original, see Aldo Stella, Anabattismo e antitrinitarismo in 
Italia nel XVI secolo (Padua: Liviana, 1969), and E. Pommier, “L’itinéraire reli-
gieux d’un moine vagabond italien au XVIe siècle,”, in Mélanges d’archéologie 
et d’histoire, École française de Rome, 66 (Paris, 1954) 293-322. According to 
Stella, the source of inspiration for this heresy on Venetian soil was rationalist-
Averroist thinking.
 58 See for example Magen, 42: “Nowhere in the Gospels is Jesus defined as being 
God, for—on the contrary—he called himself a man, and the humblest of them 
all.”
 59 Ibid., 11 and 15. See also 66-68. On Jewish authors’ portrayal of Jesus, see 
Avigdor Shinan’s anthology, Oto ha-Ish: Yehudym mesapperym ‘al Yeshu (Tel 
Aviv: Chemed Books, 1999).
 60 Magen, 20.
 61 Ibid.
 62 Ibid., 43. On the Toledoth Yeshu, see Jean-Pierre Osier, L’Evangile du Ghetto, ou 
comment les Juifs se racontaient Jésus (Paris: Editions Berg International, 1984), 
and Riccardo Di Segni, Il Vangelo del Ghetto (Milan: Newton Compton, 1985); 
Riccardo Di Segni, “La tradizione testuale delle Toledoth Jeshu: Manoscritti, 
edizioni a stampa, classificazione,” Rassegna Mensile di Israel L (January-April 
1984): 83-100; and “Due nuove fonti sulle Toledoth Jeshu,” Rassegna Mensile di 
Israel LV (1989): 127-132.
 63 Modena’s Jewish source was the Sefer Yosippon.
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 64 De Republica hebraeorum, 2. The historical context of Jesus is described on 
223-233. Sigonio’s sources are the Bellum Iudaicum and Antiquitates of Flavius 
Josephus, Philo Judaeus, the Shalsheleth ha-Qabbalah of Avraham Zakut, 
the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles, Pliny (Book V), Epiphanius, Tertullian 
(De prescritionibus), Jerome, Origen, Eusebius, and Isidore of Seville (Liber 
etymologiarum).
 65 Magen, 43.
 66 Mt 15: 1-9; Lc 11: 37-44. The historical reconstruction is on pages 43-46 of 
Magen we-ḥerev.
 67 Magen, 45.
 68 Cf. Tanḥuma, ed. Shlomo Buber (New York: H. Horowitz, 1946), vol. 1, p. 135.
 69 It is tempting to perceive the equivalence, suggested but not stated by Modena, 
between the terms “son of God” and “Messiah” attributed to the person of Jesus 
as an allusion for the reader. But an allusion to what? If Jesus considered himself 
to be the Messiah, he could have referred directly to the midrash, without relying 
on the new definition of “son of God.” Perhaps Modena thought that the midrash 
was posterior to Jesus? That would justify his argument’s use of other biblical 
verses to support his understanding of the “son of God” title. Some mystery 
nonetheless remains.
 70 Cf. Eisenstein, Otzar Wiqquḥym, 90. This midrash had been touched on before 
Modena, in the sixteenth century, by Yair Shabbetai da Correggio, in the apologia 
Ḥerev Pifiyoth (Double-Edged Sword), 51-52.
 71 Going back to the text of the midrash (Magen, 64), Modena held to the affirma-
tion that the Messiah would do more than the prophets and angels to facilitate 
universal recognition of God. 
 72 Cf. Bezalel Safran, “Leone da Modena’s Historical Thinking,” in Jewish 
Thought in the Seventeenth Century, ed. Isadore Twerski and Bernard Septimus 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Unviersity Press, 1987), 381-398. Safran (386) 
claims for Modena an “historical imagination actively reaching out to the past” 
despite the thin documentary evidence and also finds the same historical spirit in 
the Venetian rabbi’s responsa, Ziqnei Yehudah.
 73 Cf. Jean-Pierre Osier, Faust Socin ou le christianisme sans sacrifice (Paris: 
Le Cerf, 1996); Valerio Marchetti, I simulacri delle parole e il lavoro dell’eresia. 
Ricerca sulle origini del socinianesimo (Bologna: Cisec, 1999).
 74 Luigi Salvatorelli, Da Locke a Reitzenstein. L‘indagine storica delle origini cris-
tiane (Cosenza: L. Giordano, 1988). 
 75 Albert Schweitzer, Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, in his Gesammelte 
Werke, Munich s. d., vol. 3. Cf. esp. pp. 95 and 105. The authors in question are 
Karl Friedrich Behrdt (Briefe über die Bibel im Volkston [Halle, 1782]) and Karl 
Heinrich Venturini (Natürliche Geschichte des groβen Propheten von Nazaret 
[Copenhagen, 1800-1802]).
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 76 Magen, 63.
 77 Ibid., 64.
 78 Ibid.
 79 Composed in 1616-17 and first published in 1638 in Venice.
 80 Magen, 64. 
 81 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhoth melakhym, 11, 4.
 82 Modena showed himself to be disenchanted regarding the possibility of the Jews 
constituting themselves into a political subject. See David Malkiel, A Separate 
Republic: The Mechanics and Dynamics of Venetian Jewish Self-Government, 
1607-1624, supplement to Italia (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1991); in the same 
anthology, see Marina Cavarocchi Arbib’s article on the tragedy L’Ester.
 83 On the use of the term sevara to cast doubt on the logical grounds of Christian 
dogma, cf. Kuzary by Yehudah ha-Levy I:5, in Yehudah ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew 
translation. Gianfranco Miletto, La biblioteca di Avraham ben David Portaleone 
secondo l’inventario della sua eredità (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 2013).
 84 Nicolas Antoine, “Un pasteur protestant brulé à Genève en 1632 pour crime de 
Judaïsme,” Revue des Études Juives (1899): 36-37. Cf. also Elisabeth Labrousse, 
“Vie et mort de Nicolas Antoine,” Études théologiques et religieuses 52 (1977): 
421-433. I would like to thank Myriam Silvera for directing my attention to the 
latter article. 
 85 Ibid., 164.
 86 Leone Modena, Ziqney Yehudah, ed. Shlomo Simonsohn (Jerusalem: 1955-
1956), responsum 6. See also Israel Adler, La pratique musicale savante dans 
quelques communautés juives en Europe, aux XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: 
Mouton and Co., 1966), 254. A few lines earlier, Modena had drawn attention to 
the fact that disordered singing was a feature of Ashkenazic synagogues. 
 87 Giulio Morosini, Derekh Emunah. Via della fede mostrata a’gli ebrei 
(Rome,1683).
 88 Cf. for example ibid., 184, 566.
 89 Ibid., 108. ln a letter to the Catholic theologian Vincenzo Noghera, Modena ad-
mitted having written Historia de’ riti hebraici to reply to Johannes Buxtorf the 
Elder’s Synagoga Judaica (1st ed. 1603), emphasizing “the essential things, leav-
ing aside those which even our own (those endowed with ingegno [understand-
ing]) consider to be superstitions” (my italics). Cf. C. Roth, “Leone da Modena 
and the Christian Hebraists,” 196.
 90 Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences des arts et des métiers, vol. 
XV (Neufchastel: André le Breton, Michel-Antoine David, Laurent Durand, and 
Antoine-Claude Briasson, 1765), 669. Spinoza had already defined “supersti-
tion” as adoration of the scriptures rather than the Word of God. Cf. Tractatus 
theologicus philosophicus, Gebhardt Edition, transl. Samuel Shirlay (Leiden: 
Brill, 1989) 54.
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 91 If we accept the hypothesis put forward by a series of scholars, including most 
recently—and quite brilliantly—Talya Fishman (Shaking the Pillars of Exile 
[Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997]), according to which Qol sakhal 
(Voice of a Fool), a Jewish anti-rabbinical work, was written by Modena under 
an assumed name, then the image of the Venetian rabbi would be, finally, en-
riched in a consistent way. For where Magen we-ḥerev, with Christianity—an 
essentially dogmatic religion—as its polemical target, defines the outline of a 
religion that does not run counter to the laws of reason, Qol sakhal, which attacks 
Judaism—a religion based on the keeping of commandments—from the inside, 
sketches a religion pared down to the minimum and in strict conformity with the 
text of the Bible, putting it in a position to lay claim to being a universal religion. 
Cf. Shaking the Pillars of Exile, 35 and 64-65.
8: The Immortality of the Soul 
and Opening Up to the Christian World 
Pages 153-184
 1 One of the best surveys on this topic is still Giovanni Di Napoli, L’immortalità 
dell’anima nel Rinascimento (Turin: Societa Editrice Internationale, 1963).
 2 The champion of the Christian orthodox position was Thomas Aquinas, who de-
cided in favor of the permanence of the individual intellect after death in De uni-
tate intellectus contra Averroistas (written in 1270; On the Unity of Intellect 
against Averroists, trans. Beatrice H. Zedler [Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1968]). The polemics had little echo among the Jews, even if Maimonides 
seems to held an “averroistic” position, i.e. argued for the reality of an unique 
intellect; see Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope 
of Metaphysics,” in his Von der Mittelalterichen zur modernen Aufklärung 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1987), especially 87-90. A remarkable exception to this lack 
of interest in that issue is Tagmuley ha-nefesh by Hillel ben Shemuel of Verona 
(ca. 1220—ca. 1295), in which the first chapter of Thomas’ work is translated 
into Hebrew. See Yosef B. Sermoneta, ed., Sefer Tagmuley ha-nefesh (Jerusalem, 
1981), 100-145. The first part of the book deals with theoretical issues, the sec-
ond one with practical ones, such as the destiny of the soul according to its merits 
and faults.
 3 Paul Richard Blum, “The Immortality of the Soul,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 211-233.
 4 Guide I: 74, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 
220-221: “A modern philosopher maintains that the creation of the world in time 
is established by what the philosophers say regarding the permanent existence 
of the souls. He says: if the world is eternal, the number of men who died in the 
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limitless past is infinite. There would therefore be an infinite number of souls 
existing simultaneously. Now, this is a thing of which it has been indubitably 
demonstrated that it is false—I mean the simultaneous existence of an infinite 
number of numerable things. This is a wondrous matter, for it makes clear some-
thing hidden by something even more hidden.”
 5 Guide III:27.
 6 Ibid. III:51.
 7 Maimonides, commentary to the Mishnah, introduction to Sanhedrin X (Pereq 
ḥeleq) (Hebrew trans. by Yosef Qafiḥ in Mishnah ‘im perush Rabbenu Mosheh 
ben Maimon (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1968), 195-209; Mishneh Torah, 
Hilkhoth teshuvah, 8; Epistle on the Resurrection of the Dead, in Iggeroth 
Ha-Rambam, ed. Yitzḥaq Shelat (Jerusalem, 1995), 319-376. Cf. Herbert 
A. Davidson, Moses Maimonides: The Man and Hits Works (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 241-243; 377.
 8 Sha‘ar ha-gemul, in Kitvey ha-Ramban, ed. Ḥayyim Dov Shavel (Jerusalem, 
1964), 309. 
 9 Sha‘ar ha-gemul, 264-311.
 10 Seymour Feldman translated this section in English: cf. Gersonides, The Wars of 
the Lord, Part One: The Immortality of the Soul (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society, 1984).
 11 The Wars of the Lord, 213.
 12 Ḥasdai Crescas, Or Adonai, ed. Shlomo Fisher (Jerusalem: Sifre Ramot, 1990), 
Maamar 2, Kelal 6, pereq 1, p. 239.
 13 Ibid., Maamar 3, ḥelek 1, kelal 2, pereq 1, pp. 318-323.
 14 Ibid., Maamar 2, kelal 6, pereq 1, pp. 238-239.
 15 The so-called pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles (490-430c. B.C.) theorized 
that life and death are a result of the tension between Love and Hatred (Strife), 
which act on the four basic elements, binding and separating them. 
 16 Ibid., 244. Crescas is extremely reserved on the notion of the transmigration 
of the souls (gilgul; see infra), affirmed by tradition but not by religion. As for 
physical or spiritual nature, or both, in Gan ‘eden (Paradise) and in Gehynnom 
(Inferno), he evaluates all possibilities, on traditional and rational bases. 
 17 Sefer ha-‘Iqqarym (first edition Soncino, 1485); critical edition and English 
translation by Isaac Husik (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1946).
 18 On Albo, see Sina Rauschenbach, Josef Albo (um 1380-1444): jüdische 
Philosophie und christliche Kontroverstheologie in der frühen Neuzeit (Leiden: 
Brill, 2002). See a synthesis of the different positions on the subject in the in-
troduction of Mosè Maimonide, Immortalità e Resurrezione (Immortality and 
Resurrection), ed. Giuseppe Laras (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2006).
 19 To this “kabbalistic” period belongs Tofteh ‘arukh (The Prepared Inferno, 
Venice, 1743) of the important kabbalist Mosheh Zacuto (ca. 1610-1697) a long 
poem on the infernal sorrows that the sinner will suffer, based on midrashic 
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and kabbalistic sources. See the new edition edited by Dvora Bregman with an 
introduction in Deḥaq 2 (April 2010): 333-376. We will not deal here with this 
important text. Moreover, the important work of Aharon Bereḥiyah da Modena, 
Ma‘avar Yabboq (“The Passing of the River Yabboq,” Mantua, 1626), a col-
lection of rites and prayers for the sick and the dead, which synthesizes the 
Kabbalistic beliefs regarding the passing from life to death, must be noted. 
 20 Alessandro Guetta, “Ya‘ar ha-Levanon, ou la quête de la connaissance perdue. 
Un texte en prose rimée de Moshe de Rieti.”
 21 The sole printed edition is the one by Ya‘aqov Goldenthal, Il Dante ebreo, ossia 
Il Picciol Santuario (Vienna, 1851). A presentation of the poem and its meter, 
the Hebrew text, vocalized with an English translation and notes on the first two 
chapters can be found in Prooftexts 23, no. 1 (2003): 1-93.
 22 Il Dante ebreo, ff. 43a e 43b.
 23 F. 22b.
 24 A. Guetta, “Lev levavy ha-neehav: ha-qinah shel Mosheh-mi-Rieti ‘al petirath 
ishto” (Critical Edition and Notes of the Unedited Elegy of Mosheh da Rieti 
on the Death of his Wife, with an introduction of the author and his work), in 
Te‘udah 19, Studies in Hebrew Literature of the Middle Age and the Renaissance 
in Honor of Professor Yona David, ed. Tova Rosen and Avner Holzmann (2002): 
309-327.
 25 A similar relationship between a firm conviction in the immortality of the soul 
and, on the other hand, simple suppositions on the particulars of the afterlife, 
such as the possibility of encounter among the souls, can be found in the first and 
third dialogue of the Phaedo by Moses Mendelssohn, first and third dialogue. 
See Phaedon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele in drey Gesprachen, bey 
Friedrich Nicolai (Berlin-Stettin, 1767), republished in Gesammelte Schriften. 
Jubiläumausgabe III i (Stuttgart: Fromman-Holzboog, 1972), 5-9, 39-128. In 
his Phaedo, Plato had affirmed with certainty the immortality of the soul: as 
far as the specifics of its fate in the afterlife, he tells a “fable” (113-114c), and 
concludes with the following words: “I do not mean to affirm that the descrip-
tion which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true—a man 
of sense ought hardly to say that. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is 
shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, 
that something of the kind is true” (trans. B. Jovett, classics.mit.edu/Plato/
phaedo.html).
 26 Il Dante ebreo, f. 102v.
 27 A. Guetta, “The Crisis of Medieval Knowledge in the Work of the Fifteenth-
Century Poet and Philosopher Moses da Rieti,” in Renewing the Past, 
Reconfiguring Jewish Culture: From al-Andalus to the Haskalah, ed. Ross Brann 
and Adam Sutcliffe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 
59-68.
 28 Yoḥanan Alemanno, Sha‘ar ha-ḥesheq (Leghorn, 1790).
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 29 Giorgio Inglese, L’intelletto e l’amore. Studi sulla letteratura italiana del Due e 
Trecento (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 2000).
 30 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, one can witness a hesitant propin-
quity between Kabbalah and philosophy; this is not, however, an Aristotelian or 
Platonic philosophy but rather, a post-Cartesian rationalism. See chapter 9.
 31 Cf. Robert Bonfil, ed., Selected Chapters from Sefer Meor ‘Einayim (Jerusalem: 
Bialik Institute, 1991), 30 (Hebrew). 
 32 Cf. Dan Pagis, Change and Tradition in the Secular Poetry: Spain and Italy 
(Jerusalem: Keter, 1976), esp. 283-285; Michela Andreatta, Poesia religiosa 
ebraica di età barocca (Padova: Gordini, 2007).
 33 Cf. the classic work of Benzion Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel: Statesman 
and Philosopher (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1953).
 34 The idea of the transmigration of the soul is treated in his Commentary to 
Deuteronomy 25, 5-6, Jerusalem, 1999; the idea of the reincarnation at the be-
ginning of the cosmic cycles is in Mif‘aloth Elohim (The Deeds of God, Venice, 
1592). On Abravanel’s conception of the soul, compared with that of his contem-
porary Marsilio Ficino, see the ample analysis of Brian Ogren, “Circularity, The 
Soul-Vehicle and the Renaissance Rebirth of Reincarnation: Marsilio Ficino and 
the Possibility of Transmigration,” Accademia. Revue de la société Marsile Ficin 
VI (2004): 63-94. The author of the article dwells particularly on the relationship 
between philosophical and theological thought in Ficino and in Abravanel. While 
the first, in order to justify the Platonic and Neo-Platonic theory of transmigra-
tion from a Christian point of view, considers it a metaphor, the later accepts 
the kabbalistic teaching without problems, which he sees as origins of analo-
gous philosophical conceptions: Plato was a pupil of Jeremiah. The article has 
been expanded into the book Renaissance and Rebirth: Reincarnation in Early 
Modern Kabbalah (Leiden: Brill, 2009). In this book, B. Ogren points out that 
the Italian kabbalists Eliyah ben Ḥayyim da Genazzano and Yoḥanan Alemanno 
(fifteenth century) believed in metempsychosis.
 35 Ogren, “Circularity,” cit. 90.
 36 On the respective attitudes of the Italian and Spanish Jews in regards to the 
Kabbalah, see Moshe Idel, Particularism and Universalism in Kabbalah, in 
Essential Papers on Jewish Culture in Renaissance and Baroque Italy, ed. David 
B. Ruderman (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 324-344.
 37 Leone Modena composed a book in 1636 against the belief in gilgul¸ Sefer Ben 
David, still in manuscript. Talya Fishman (Shaking the Pillars of Exile [Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997], 204) assumes that the Venitian rabbi partici-
pated with this book to the controversy between Saul Levi Mortera and Isaac 
Aboab de Fonseca on the destiny of the soul. See below note 78.
 38 The judgment is commonly accepted among the historians of Jewish philoso-
phy. Among the most recent, see Mauro Zonta, La filosofia ebraica medievale. 
Storia e testi (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2002), 210. But see also ‘Ovadiyah Sforno’s 
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position in his Or ‘ammym (Light of Peoples, Bologna, 1537) and in Commentary 
to the Psalms (Venice, 1586). Both texts have been edited and published by Zeev 
Gottlieb: Kitvey Rabby ‘Ovadiyah Sforno (Jerusalem, 1987). The first book has 
a chapter on the immortality of the soul (in this case, a synonym for intellect), 
where the discussion is made on a dialetical, aristotelian basis, with a large num-
ber of quotations from Aristotle, Averroes, Plato, and Al-Ghazali. Besides some 
biblical quotations which show, according to Sforno, that the intellective soul 
is immortal, the emphasis on free will as “a gift of God” is remarkable. In the 
second book the exegesis of Psalm 1 is completely philosophical and focused on 
the immortality of the intellective soul. A thorough study on the work of this im-
portant Italian scholar is still a desideratum. On this topic see R. Bonfil, “Torath 
ha-nefesh we-ha-kedushah be-mishnath R. ‘Ovadiyah Sforno” (The Doctrine of 
the Soul and of the Sanctity in the Teaching of R. Ovadiyah Sforno), Eshel Beer 
Sheva‘ 1 (1976).
 39 The most recent synthesis of Del Medigo is by Seymour Feldman, in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, ed. Daniel H. Frank and 
Oliver Leaman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 416-420.
 40 Kalman P. Bland, “Elijah Del Medigo, Unicity of Intellect, and Immortality of 
Soul,” American Academy for Jewish Research LXI (1995): 1-22.
 41 Cf. Colette Sirat, La philosophie juive médiévale en Pays de Chrétienté (Paris: 
Presses du CNRS, 1988), 227.
 42 Jacob Joshua Ross, ed., Sefer Behinat hadat of Elijah Del-Medigo (Tel-Aviv: 
Chaim Rosenberg School of Jewish Studies, 1984), 78.
 43 Ibid., 84
 44 Ibid., 81
 45 Ibid.
 46 On Y. Moscato see Adam Shear, The Kuzari and the Shaping of Jewish Identity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 135-169; Judah Moscato, 
Sermons, edited by Gianfranco Miletto and Giuseppe Veltri, two volumes pub-
lished to date (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
 47 Nefutzoth Yehudah, f. 49v.
 48 Ibid., f. 52v.
 49 Ibid., f. 52r.
 50 F. 52v.
 51 F. 50v.
 52 F. 51v.
 53 A more “technical” and traditional discourse on the remuneration of the soul 
after death can be found in sermon 41, ff. 193r-195r.
 54 Besides the Italian translations of the chapter of Rieti’s Miqdash me‘at, an in-
teresting work is L’angelica tromba (Ferrara, 1589), by Yoḥanan Yehudah ben 
Shelomo Alatrini, which contains the Italian translation in terza rima (the meter 
of Dantes’s Divina Commedia) of the piyyut Barekhy nafshy by R. Baḥiyah 
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b. Joseph. See A. Guetta, “Le Traduzione liturgiche italiane cinque-seisentesthe 
come esempio di ‘poesia spirituale ebraica’,” in Archivio Italiano per la Storia 
della Pietà 25 (2012): 11-33.
 55 Discorso intorno a l’humana miseria, Introduction.
 56 “Si come interviene al rustico, che per non conoscere le delicattezze della città, 
non si vuol partir dalla libertà della villa, ancor che piena di fatica gli sia, cosi 
parimente occorrere allo stolto: il quale, per non comprendere le delicie del para-
diso, se dà agli piaceri terreni: onde poi gli ne succede un’eterno stento” (f. 37r).
 57 F. 12v.
 58 See chapter “A Link to Humanity.”
 59 The available bibliographic material on Sara Copio Sullam is by now quite rich. 
The most comprehensive contributions are Umberto Fortis, La “bella ebrea”. 
Sara Copio Sullam poetessa nel ghetto di Venezia del ‘600 (Turin: Umberto 
Fortis, 2003), with Sara’s sonnets and Don Harran, trans. and ed., Sarra Copia 
Sullam: Jewish Poet and Intellectual in Seventeenth-Century Venice (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009). The controversy between Bonifaccio and 
Copio Sullam is acutely analyzed in the context of the philosophy and theol-
ogy of the time by Giuseppe Veltri, in Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), 226-248.
 60 Manifesto di Sarra Copia Sulam Hebrea. Nel quale è da lei riprovata e detes-
tata l’opinione negante l’immortalità dell’anima, falsamente attribuitale dal Sig. 
Baldassare Bonifaccio (Venice, 1621).
 61 Ansaldo Cebà, Lettere di Ansaldo Cebà scritte a Copio e dedicate a Marc’Antonio 
Doria (Genoa, 1623).
 62 Cf. the translation of Qol sakhal (Voice of a Fool), possibly written by Leone 
Modena, and particularly the chapter on the immortality of the soul, in Talya 
Fishman, Shaking the Pillars of Exile, 90-92. For the Hebrew version, see Isacco 
Reggio, Examen Traditionis. Duo inedita et poene incognita Leonis Mutinensis 
Opuscula Complectens (Gorizia, 1852), 13-15. The author of Qol sakhal ar-
gued—probably quoting a passage from Gersonides’ The Wars of the Lord: 
Book One: The Immortality of the Soul (a translation can be found by Seymour 
Feldman [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1984], 120)—that there are 
no decisive demonstrations of the immortality of the soul, and even fewer scrip-
tural proofs. Nevertheless, “analysis greatly inclines—if it does not compel us—
to believe that the soul has existence after the death of the body” (Shaking the 
Pillars of Exile, 91). This analysis was grounded on the superiority of Man—as 
an intellectual being—over the animals. Were his intellect mortal, Man—who 
forecasts physical death—would be unhappier than animals, and therefore in-
ferior to them. In the same years and in the same city Paolo Sarpi, the official 
religious consultant of the Venetian Republic, denied the idea of human superior-
ity based on intellect, and maintained that the immortality of the soul was but a 
human projection. See Vittorio Frajese, “Maimonide, il desiderio di immortalità 
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e l’immagine de Dio. Problemi di interpretazione dell’insegnamento esoterico 
di Sarpi,” in Ripensando Paolo Sarpi (Venezia: Ateneo Veneto, 2006), 153-181. 
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9: Kabbalah and Rationalism In the Works of  
Mosheh Ḥayyim Luzzatto and some Kabbalists of his time 
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nist in the polemic against Neḥemiyah Hayyun, accused of professing Sabbatean 
and Christianizing doctrines—was the grandson of Mosheh Pinheiro, who was a 
faithful friend of Shabbetay Tzevy and student of the famous Sabbatean kabbalist 
Binyamin ha-Cohen of Reggio Emilia. Cf. Malakhy ha-Cohen’s introduction to 
the collection of “responsa” Divrey Yosef (Leghorn: 1742). As for Luzzatto, it is 
known that he wrote a work, Qinath ha-Shem tzevaoth (The Zeal of the Lord of 
Hosts), refuting Sabbatean ideas (v. Sh. Ginzburg, R.M.Ḥ.L. w-vney doro, 153-
156). However, Luzzatto’s insistence on certain ideas—that redemption would 
come when the negation of God’s unity would be more diffuse, and that good was 
recognized by evil—lent his thought an apocalyptic quality bordering on heresy. 
See, above all, Da‘ath tevunoth, 32-33.
 44 Emunath ḥakhamym, ff. 11r, 32r.
 45 S. D. Luzzatto (Lezioni di Teologia, 41) judged Basilea rather severely: “R. Aviad 
Basilea, of Mantua, published in 1740, in that city, his Emunath ḥakhamym, 
where, without philosophy and without criticism, he takes on the philosophers, 
as well as those in favor of criticizing the Sacred Writings and interpreting them 
literally. There, deploying the weapons of authority and disparagement, he de-
fends the infallibility of the Talmudists’ decisions and the divine origin of kab-
balistic doctrines.”




 50 29v and 48v.
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 54 Basilea seems not to have picked up on the criticisms which Pietro Galatino di-
rected at modern Jews in De arcanis catholicae veritatis (1518) for not following 
the doctrines of their Talmudic teachers. According to Galatino, this implied that 
the rabbis of the Talmud implicitly accepted the Christian message. 
 55 Yosef Ergas, Divrey Yosef (Leghorn, 1742), ff. 9r and 9v. Developing his legal 
argument, Ergas noted that Yitzḥaq Luria’s opinion was applicable because “he 
received inspiration from the holy spirit in his school.” This demonstrates the 
influence Kabbalah—and especially prophetic Kabbalah—had on juridical deci-
sions, even if in this case what was at stake was a secondary question, which 
essentially touched on a matter of principle.
 56 Cfr. Benayahu, Hadpasah, 107-108; the anonymous introduction to Yehudah 
Ariyeh (Leone) Modena, Ary nohem (Lipzig, 1840), xvii; and Giulio Bartolocci, 
Bibliotheca Rabbinica (Rome, 1675), part IV, p. 56. See also Moshe Carmilly-
Weinberger, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in Jewish History, 231 
(which lacks quotations from the source material). 
 57 In a letter to Luzzatto’s teacher, Yeshayahu Bassan, Yosef Ergas described his 
Shomer Emunym, which was still in manuscript form, as “a book small in volume, 
but great in quality”; see S. Ginzburg, R.M.Ḥ.L. w-vney doro, 102. The impor-
tance Luzzatto placed on the publication of his dialogue, Maamar ha-wiqquaḥ, 
is evidenced by his insistence on obtaining his master Bassan’s authorization; 
see note 18. Bassan saw his student’s text as an apologia for Kabbalah, answer-
ing skeptical works such as Yosef Delmedigos’ Matzref la-ḥokhmah and even 
Basilea’s Emunath ḥakhamym; see S. Ginzburg, R.M.Ḥ.L. w-vney doro, 246.
 58 Shomer emunym, Introduction, p. 4. All quotes are from the 1965 Jerusalem 
edition. On Ergas, see Beracha Sacq’s general presentation, “‘Yiun be-qab-
balato shel R. Yosef Ergas” (Examination of the Kabbalah of Yosef Ergas), in 
Yahaduth: sugiyoth, keta‘ym, panym, zehuyioth, Sefer Rivqah (“Judaism: Topics, 
Extracts, Aspects, Identities. The Book of Rebecca—In Honor of Rivka Schatz-
Uffenheimer”), ed. Chaviva Pedaya and Efraim Meir (Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion 
University, 2007), 393-407. For discussions of particular aspects of this work, see 
Roland Goetschel, “Kawwanah‘ et finalité de la prière dans le ‘Shomer Emûnîm’ 
de Joseph ben Emmanuel Ergaz (1685-1730),” Jewish Studies at the Turn of the 
Twentieth Century II (1999): 34-39; Roland Goetschel, “La notion de simsum 
dans le “Somer ’Emunim” de Joseph Ergaz,” in Hommage à Georges Vajda, 
ed. G. Nahon and Ch. Touati (Paris: Peters, 1980), 385-396; Roland Goetschel, 
“La justification de la cabbale dans le Shomer Emunim de Joseph Ergas (1685-
1730),” in Jewish Studies in a New Europe, ed. U. Haxen, H. Trautner-Kromann, 
and K.L. Goldschmidt-Salamon (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1994), 269-283; Joëlle 
Hansel, “La figure du ‘mashal’ dans l’herméneutique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle,” 
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in Revue des études juives 160, no. 1-2 (2001): 135-154; Joëlle Hansel, “La lettre 
ou l’allégorie: la controverse sur l’interprétation du ‘Simsum’ dans la cabbale 
italienne du XVIIIe siècle,” in La controverse religieuse et ses formes, ed. Alain 
Le Boulluec (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1995), 99-125. In addition to these theoretical 
sources, see a complete bibliography in A. Salah, La République des Lettres, 
227-230.
 59 For more on the superficial study of Kabbalah, see Ergas’ “responsum” in Divrey 
Yosef, ff. 45v-46r. 
 60 Ibid., 6.
 61 Shomer emunym, 46. The emphasis Ergas places on the continuity between the 
Talmud and Kabbalah evokes both Basilea and another important Livornese 
kabbalist who lived in the following century, Elia Benamozegh. For more on 
Benamozegh, see A. Guetta, Philosophy and Kabbalah: Elijah Benamozegh and 
the Reconciliation of Western Thought and Jewish Esotericism (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2009). 
 62 Shomer emunym, 45. It should be noted that these assertions appeared in the 
introduction to the second part of the dialogue, not in the dialogue itself.
 63 Luzzatto later made repeated use of this term in his own theoretical argumentation.
 64 Ibid., 13-14.
 65 Ibid., 34.
 66 This dialogue, probably written in 1734, was published posthumously on several 
occasions and under two different titles: Ḥoqer w-mequbbal and Maamar ha-
wikkuaḥ. For comprehensive bibliographies of Luzzatto’s writings, see A. Salah, 
La République, 382-389, and Natascia Danieli, L’epistolario di Moŝe Hayyim 
Luzzatto (Florence: Giuntina, 2007), 291-308. This dialogue was the Paduan 
kabbalist’s only work to receive a haskamah (authorization for publication) from 
his teacher, Yeshayahu Bassani.
 67 Luzzatto was committed to reawakening Israel from its slumber. A parallel could 
be drawn between his vision of Jewish cultural decadence and reawakening and 
the way in which, in the following century, the German maskylym conceived of 
their own work as the rebirth of Judaism after dark centuries of exile. Indeed, it 
is possible to argue that Luzzatto’s historical vision anticipated the maskylym 
even though its content was different. For the historical vision of the haskalah, 
see Shmuel Feiner, Haskalah and History: The Emergence of a Modern Jewish 
Historical Consciousness (Oxford: Littman Library, 2004), esp. 45-50.
 68 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Introduction: “In our days, severe vicissitudes pre-
vail, and all feel the pressure of hard times. The wisdom of our wise men has 
disappeared; the understanding of our prudent men is hidden. Hence, the com-
mentaries of the Geonim and their compilations of laws and responses, which 
they took care to make clear, have in our times become hard to understand so 
that only a few individuals properly comprehend them. […] The Talmud itself—
the Babylonian as well as the Palestinian—the Sifra, the Sifre, and the Tosefta 
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require, for their comprehension, a broad mind, a wise soul and considerable 
study.” Luzzatto probably saw himself as a new Maimonides, though he replaced 
Talmudic knowledge with Kabbalah. For more on the prophetic mission which 
Maimonides may have imagined to be his, see Israel Yuval, “Moshe redivivus: 
ha-Rambam ke-‘ozer la-melekh ha-mashiaḥ’” (Moses redivivus: Maimonides as 
an “Assistant to the King Messiah”), Zion 72, no. 2 (2007): 161-188.
 69 Mosheh Ḥayyim Luzzatto, Maamar ha-wikkuaḥ (B’nai Brak, 1989), 33.
 70 In a letter sent to the rabbi of Altona, Yeḥezkel Katzenellenbogen, in 1730, the 
rabbis of Padua clearly realized that Luzzatto’s intellectual contribution was “re-
establishing the knowledge of the subject matter of the holy Luria, insofar as 
these are obscure and hard to understand.” See S. Ginzburg, R. M.Ḥ.L. w-vney 
doro, 88.
 71 Ibid., 37.
 72 Ibid., 62.
 73 Emunath ḥakhamym, f. 11v.
 74 Ibid., f. 35v.
 75 F. 7v.
 76 Y. Alemanno, Hay ha-‘olamim, L’immortale, ed. Fabrizio Lelli (Florence, 1995); 
Moshe Idel, La Cabbalà in Italia (1280-1510) (Florence: Giuntina, 2007).
 77 E. Benamozegh, Teologia dogmatica e apologetica (Leghorn, 1877); A. Guetta, 
Philosophy and Kabbalah.
 78 Emunath ḥakhamym, f. 19r.
 79 Ibid., 19r, ff 8r and v.
 80 Ibid., f. 9r.
 81 Ibid., f. 43 v.
 82 Ibid., ff. 4r, 4v, 16v, 26r, 26v, 30v.
 83 Ibid., f. 7v.
 84 Shomer emunym, 26-27.
 85 Ibid., 31.
 86 Ibid., 42.
 87 Ibid., 13.
 88 Ibid., 35.
 89 Ibid., 83-84.
 90 Ibid., 28. 
 91 Ibid., 29.
 92 Ibid., 34.
 93 Ibid., 21.
 94 Ibid., 76. In other cases, Ergas provides a philosophical exegesis of entire pas-
sages of the Zohar, which he reproduces in Aramaic and translates into Hebrew: 
see p. 40, on the sefyrah keter, the absolute Unity, which corresponds to the 
philosophical categories of “knowledge,” “knowing,” and “known,” based on 
Maimonidean notions (Guide of the Perplexed I:68). 
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 95 Joëlle Hansel, “La lettre et l’allégorie.”
 96 It is significant that although Ergas seeks to give a rational account of the doctrine 
of Yitzḥaq Luria, the author to whom he refers most frequently in the Shomer 
emunym is Mosheh Cordovero, the most “philosophical” (or theological) of the 
sixteenth-century kabbalists.
 97 Cf. Roland Goetschel, “La notion de Simsum.”
 98 Yitzḥaq Abrabanel, Rosh amanah, ed. Menahem Kellner (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan 
University Press, 1992).
 99 See, especially, Menahem Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything? (London: 
Littman Library, 1999).
 100 Shomer emunym, 63.
 101 Ibid., 58-63. Benamozegh also composed a series of articles of faith, which he 
titled Il mio credo and defined as “philosophical-religious.” See E. Benamozegh, 
Teologia dogmatica e apologetica, Vol. 1: Dio (Leghorn, 1877); New edition 
Il mio Credo (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2002).
 102 Shomer emunym, 91-96.
 103 See the introduction by Yitzḥaq Stern to Shomer emunym. 
 104 The Guide of the Perplexed III:17.
 105 On Yosef Attias, see A. Salah, La République, 50-2; and Lucia Frattarelli Fischer, 
“Lo specchio di un intellettuale cosmopolita: La biblioteca di Giuseppe Attias,” 
forthcoming. 
 106 Meir Benayahu, Rabbi Ḥayyim Yosef David Azulay (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav 
Kook, 1959), 134-141. On the intellectual atmosphere in Tuscany during the 
first half of the eighteenth century, see Ulrich Wyrwa, “‘Perché i moderni rab-
bini pretendono di dare ad intendere una favola chimerica…’ L’illuminismo tos-
cano e gli ebrei,” Quaderni storici 103, XXXV.1 (2000): 139-161. This article 
divides the eighteenth century into two periods. Whereas Jewish and Christian 
intellectuals were still at odds in the first half of the eighteenth century, this hos-
tility died out in the second half, particularly during the 1770s, when German 
and French ideas on religious tolerance reached that area. On Livorno see 
A. Guetta, “Livorno, un centro di qabbalah?,” in Livorno 1606-1806. Luogo 
d’incontro tra popoli e culture, ed. Adriano Prosperi (Turin: Allemandi, 2010), 
375-381.
 107 David Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery.
 108 Emunath ḥakhamym, 22r and v. It may be that this “great philosopher” was none 
other than Simḥah, or Simone Luzzatto, a rational mind par excellence and a 
famous scientist. 
 109 Maamar ha-wikkuaḥ, 60.
 110 Ibid., 45. Beyond the reference to spectacles, Luzzatto’s position may be consid-
ered “modern” insofar as it integrated the hermeneutic conception of the author’s 
intention, which the works of Protestant thinkers were developing during that 
period. See Jakob Rambach, Institutiones hermeneuticae sacrae, 1723.
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 111 Maamar ha-wikkuaḥ, 49.
 112 Ibid., 74-5.
 113 Ibid., 55.
 114 Ibid., 40.
 115 Sa‘adiyah ben Yosef Al-Fayyumi, known as Sa‘adiyah Gaon, Ha-nivḥar ba-emu-
nath we-ha-de‘oth (Selection of beliefs and opinions), trans. Y. Qafih (Jerusalem, 
1993), 28. 
 116 Maamar ha-wikkuaḥ, 70; Qelaḥ pithḥey ḥokhmah, 44: “We are forbidden to 
know the reason for the existence [of the sefyroth] […] but we have to study and 
know their precise and wisely executed operation (hanhagah).” 
 117 Da‘ath tevunoth, 64.
 118 The Guide of the Perplexed I:64.
 119 Da‘ath tevunoth, 65.
 120 There are a few instances in Luzzatto’s thought where the relationship between 
human and divine action seems unresolved: in these instances it is not clear 
whether the human act of comprehension is the cause or consequence of the 
influx of divine light.
 121 Da‘ath tevunoth, 64.
 122 Ibid., 103.
 123 Written in 1734, it remained in manuscript form until Shemuel Luria’s edition 
(Warsaw, 1889). All quotations refer to Hayyim Friedlander’s edition (Bnei 
Brak, 1998).
 124 Shemuel David Luzzatto wrote (in his Lezioni di Teologia, 42) that he “set out 
his system with great clarity in various works, principally in one entitled One 
Hundred Thirty-Eight Doors to Wisdom (Qelaḥ pithḥey ḥokhmah). Without using 
kabbalistic terms, he laid it out in a dialogue between the intellect and the soul 
(Wikkuaḥ beyn ha-sekhel we-ha-neshamah), which only exists in manuscript 
form, in the possession of the afore-praised, most excellent Rabbi Ghirondi.”
 125 Da‘ath tevunoth, 57, 59 (Midrash ha-ne‘elam), and 71 (Ra‘iya meheymna, called 
“the midrash of Shim‘on bar Yoḥay”). On page 63, Luzzato attributes a quotation 
from the Zohar 3,113 to Ḥazal, i.e. to the Talmudic masters. 
 126 Da‘ath tevunoth, introduction by Friedlander, 11 n12.
 127 Ibid., 68.
 128 According to Luzzatto, the advantage of the Lurianic doctrine over Cordovero’s 
is that while Cordovero limits himself to general statements about the ten se-
fyroth and what they produce, Luria defines this process in detail. Cf. Maamar 
ha-wikkuaḥ, p. 66.
 129 Kelalym rishonym, p. 172 in the same volume that contains the Da‘ath tevunoth.
 130 Ibid., 287.
 131 Essentially a theoretician, Luzzatto seldom made references to other works.
 132 Da‘ath tevunoth, 91. 
 133 See notes 84 and 85.
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 134 On the diffusion of Cartesianism in Italy, see Vincenzo Ferrone, Scienza natura 
religione. Mondo newtoniano e cultura italiana nel primo Settecento, Naples, 
1982; and in particular 151: “The reference […] to Descartes meant clear and 
distinct ideas, methodical doubt, and an exultant and convincing vision of sci-
ence at odds with Aristotelianism, for entire generations of intellectuals (from 
Valletta to Muratori).” See also 465, on the Discours de la méthode and the 
greater impact it had than the Principia philosophicae.
 135 This quotation is taken from Y. Spiner’s edition, with critical notes by M. Chriqui 
(Jerusalem, 2007).
 136 Derekh ha-Shem, 1, 5, 2, 48. On this image in kabbalistic literature see Moshe 
Idel, Enchanted Chains: Techniques and Rituals in Jewish Mysticism (Los 
Angeles, CA, 2004).
 137 Ibid., 2, 7, 1, 114-6.
 138 Ibid., 3, 2, 1-9, .137-50. Luzzatto briefly alluded to the power of invoking God’s 
names in Qelaḥ pitḥḥey ḥokhmah. He made this remark in the context of an 
analysis of the correspondence between the letters of the tetragrammaton and 
sefyroth (see 55-57).
 139 Ibid., 2, 8, 1-2, 117-21.
 140 The Guide of the Perplexed III:17 and 18.
 141 For a comprehensive account of Luzzato’s perspective on Maimonides, and in 
particular on the distinction between the essence and existence of God, see Joëlle 
Hansel, Moïse Hayyim Luzzatto (1707-1746), 205-210. Hansel’s book consti-
tutes the most exhaustive study of the relationship between logic and Kabbalah 
in Luzzatto’s thought. Among her many important insights is the suggestion that 
internal kabbalistic sources—in particular Hayyim Vital’s Etz Hayyim—may 
have inspired the logical orientation of the Paduan author. 
 142 Derekh ha-Shem, 1, 1, 2, 9-10. One may also find a certain similarity between 
Luzzatto and Gersonides. The Provençal philosopher and scientist believed the 
Agent Intellect possessed “the Law of the existing things here (i.e. in this sub-
lunar world), their right plan, and their order”(Sefer Milḥamoth Ha-Shem (Rive 
del Garda, 1560), f. 7v. My translation differs slightly from Seymour Feldman’s 
in Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 
1984), 146.
 143 See Ghislain Lafont, Histoire théologique de l’Église catholique. Intinéraires et 
formes de la théologie (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1994), 252-275: Le temps des 
ruptures (1563-1774); Battista Modin, Storia della teologia, vol. 3 (Epoca mod-
erna) (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano,1996), 259; José Luis Illanes and 
Josep Ignasi Saranyana, Historia de la teologia (Madrid: Biblioteca de autores 
cristianos, 1996), 237.
 144 For an attempt to alter this traditional perspective, see Hava Tirosh-Rothschild, 
“Jewish Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity,” in History of Jewish Philosophy, 
ed. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge, 2003), 499-573.
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 145 Qelaḥ pitḥey ḥokhmah (Bnei Brak, 1992), 1.
 146 Ibid., 38, 53.
 147 Ibid., 76, 89.
 148 Ibid., 19.
 149 Benedict Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Stuart Hampshire. (London: Penguin Classics, 
1996), Part I, def. IV, p. 1.
 150 Qelaḥ pithḥey ḥokhmah, 49. 
 151 Benedict Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, def. V, p. 1.
 152 Ibid., Part II, prop. I and II, pp. 32-33. For a comparison between kabbalistic 
theology and Spinoza’s system, see the astute observations of the philosopher-
kabbalist Elia Benamozegh in his Spinoza et la cabbale, published in various 
numbers of the Univers Israélite in 1864 before being republished separately in 
Padua in 1962 and then Jerusalem in 1988. 
 153 Qelaḥ pitḥey ḥokhmah, 58-70.
 154 Ibid., 176-177.
 155 Da‘ath tevunoth, 25.
 156 Ibid., 32-33.
 157 This was almost obviously in reference to Descartes’ clear and distinctive knowl-
edge. The French philosopher was well known in Italy by this time, including by 
Jewish scholars. As already noted, in his Emunath ḥakhamym, Basilea described 
Descartes as the author whose physics had supplanted Aristotle, exposing the 
vanity of the scientific pretension to definitive truth. 
 158 Maamar ha-wikkuaḥ, 43.
 159 Ibid., 44, 56. Qelaḥ pitḥey ḥokhmah, 89. On the importance of the idea of God’s 
unity, see Da‘ath tevunoth, 10.
 160 Da‘ath tevunoth, 21.
 161 Maamar ha-wikkuaḥ, 48.
 162 Ibid., 62, 76.
 163 Da‘ath tevunoth, 9.
 164 Maamar ha-wikkuaḥ, 68.
 165 Qelaḥ pitḥey ḥokhmah, 124.
 166 Ibid., 168.
 167 Da‘ath tevunoth, 74.
 168 Maamar ha-wikkuaḥ, 65.
 169 The lexical and semantic echoes between Derekh tevunoth and Da‘ath tevunoth 
(a theological treatise grounded in Kabbalah) are significant.
 170 Derekh tevunoth (Amsterdam, 1742), f. 3r.
 171 Ibid., author’s introduction (no pages numbers).
 172 There were two types of conventional demonstrations: those that were common 
to everyone (e.g., “modesty is praiseworthy”) and those that were the reserve of 
Israel (e.g., “the oral and written Torah is true”).
 173 Ibid., ff 17v-19r.
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 174 First edition published in Warsaw in 1897. The quotations are from the Jerusalem 
edition, published in 1993.
 175 Mostly Petrus Ramus, according to C. H. Manekin. See above, note 15.
 176 Sefer ha-higayon, 3. 
 177 It is worth pointing out that both this aesthetic criterion (which is surprising in a 
Jewish text) and the pragmatic criterion of utility are attributable to a “modern” 
sensibility. 
 178 Sefer ha-higayon, 1-2. The rhetorical treatise Luzzatto composed at the age of 
19, Leshon limmudym (“A Cultured Language,” published in Mantua in 1727), 
also proceeded rigorously: praising distinctions from its opening pages, it began 
with general definitions (geder) and gradually progressed to particulars. 
 179 Derekh ha-Shem, 3.
 180 Da‘ath tevunoth, 262-263.
 181 Ibid., 102. “The supreme will wanted man to have power over numerous [su-
perior] beings, which all move according to his acts and movements. This great 
contrivance is like a clock, the gears of which meet each other in such a way that 
a small gear puts many other larger gears in motion. Thus did the blessed Lord 
connect all of His creatures with many points of contact, and He connected all 
to man, who acts, thus putting the totality in motion with all His acts. He also 
covered everything with a membrane of skin and a layer of flesh, so that only 
the bodily surface is seen. But all this has a meaning: the great device created by 
God in His world operates according to man’s acts and worship, elevating him 
and sanctifying him, or diminishing him—may this not happen!— thus produc-
ing manifold situations. And all this depends on the soul, its parts and the roots 
that He put in the human body.” The same image of the clock gears is taken up in 
Kelalym rishonym, chapter 12, p. 256. Ergas deploys the more traditional meta-
phor of a chain hanging between the worlds; see Shomer emunym, 88.
 182 Maamar ha-wikkuaḥ, 53. Cf. Qelaḥ pitḥey ḥokhmah, 202, on the precise rela-
tionships that unite the sefyroth. As well as having an adverse impact on the 
exposition of a system, disorder may affect its operation. This occured after the 
shevyrath ha-kelym, before the action of the sefyroth was coordinated and unified 
by the sefyrah malkhuth. Cf. Qelaḥ pitḥey ḥokhmah, ibid.
 183 Qelaḥ pitḥey ḥokhmah, 25. In Da‘ath tevunoth, 98, Luzzatto insists that measure 
(middah, shi‘ur) and hierarchy or gradation (hadragah) are divine creations and 
that every being occupies a precise position (ish ‘al meqomo). 
 184 Ibid., 1.
 185 Da‘ath tevunoth, 22.
 186 Ibid., 36. 
 187 Ibid.
 188 Ibid., 87, 92.
 189 Ibid., 46.
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